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Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel Management Program

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(name redacted)
National Defense Fellow
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act of 1986: Proposals for Reforming the Joint Officer Personnel Management Program

Summary

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986, commonly called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is considered landmark legislation as it reorganized the Department of Defense (DoD) to a more unified military structure. Joint personnel officer management (organizing, directing, educating and evaluating military members of two or more military departments to accomplish an assigned mission) was established as a major aspect of GNA's design to improve war-fighting capabilities. The objective was to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint organizations, increase educational and experience levels of these officers, and expand the interaction among the military services' officers corps by addressing inter-service issues.

While many experts believe the GNA has been a success, the passage of time, the constraining provisions of the law, and some implementation issues have led some to believe the GNA joint officer personnel management program could benefit from reexamination and possible revision. Indeed, the original framers of the GNA predicted that change would be necessary as the DoD evolved into a more joint-oriented military force. Reinforcing this view, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated a need for joint officer personnel management change.

A major problem is that the current provisions of the law for joint officer personnel management are so specific that the DoD predicts it can not continue to meet the requirements. This is in part because the DoD has drawn down its military personnel strength by nearly 40% while operational requirements have increased. Further, the law does not allow all officers to be credited with all their joint experience. And, technological advances in distributive and distance learning can not be utilized to fulfill joint education requirements for the officers assigned to these positions.

This report covers the background and intent of the GNA, as well as the present joint officer personnel management program. The DoD has proposed options for its revision, to Congress; they include replacing the joint specialty officer designation with a special duty identifier, decoupling promotion comparisons, and employing distributive and distance learning for joint professional military education. The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549, introduced language concerning joint officer personnel management which is consistent with the DoD proposal, with two exceptions. The first difference is noted in the area of promotion comparisons and the second is in Joint Professional Military Education. Other potential options include forming a commission or special committee, conducting hearings, or mandating a study to further assess the program. Changes to joint officer personnel management would require legislative changes to the GNA.

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Introduction and Background

Introduction

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA),¹ also called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, changed the Department of Defense (DoD) joint officer personnel management, setting in law a course for more interaction among the U.S. military services. Prior to the enactment of the law, each service existed independently of, and in relative isolation to, the other services; they were not “joint”² oriented. Training, missions, equipment, etc., tended to be “service-specific”, thereby limiting service interoperability and joint operations. The GNA brought the services closer and most experts believe that this has resulted in more coordinated military operations, and increased the war fighting capabilities of the DoD.³ However, over time a number of factors, such as changes in the strategic environment, the implementation of the specific provisions of the law, and the nearly 40% downsizing of military personnel strength, have changed, and, in the view of many experts, may have made revisiting the GNA necessary. One aspect of the GNA which some, including General Hugh Shelton, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, have singled out specifically is joint officer personnel management. Any changes would be subject to congressional oversight.

Due to the complexity of joint officer personnel management, this report is divided into eight primary sections: (1) the background section provides a description

¹ Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986; 100 Stat. 992, et. seq.

² The law, PL 99-433, section 668, does not define “joint”. However, it defines “joint matters” as matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command. The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms defines joint as activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate. (for additional DoD joint definitions see the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, [<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/>]). Throughout this report “joint duty, jointness, joint assignments” and like references apply to officers who are assigned or who have previously been assigned to a joint duty assignment in the Joint Staff, joint agencies or other joint activities. See Appendix B for abbreviations/acronyms; Appendix C for definitions.

³ *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*. Edited by Dennis J. Quinn. Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1999.

of the situations that preceded the GNA and the provisions of the law, (2) the “joint officer personnel management under the GNA” section examines officer personnel management provisions and administrative changes of the law, (3) this section, understanding joint officer personnel management in relation to the GNA, describes specific terms and concepts of joint officer personnel management in relation to the law, (4) the DoD compliance reports to Congress section examines the current compliance by the DoD and a shortfall in reporting requirements, (5) unintended developments of the GNA are reviewed, (6) this section outlines the DoD proposal, which was submitted in the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omnibus in early 2000, to address perceived problems with the GNA, (7) the section on Legislation in the 106th Congress, 2nd Session, examines the differences in the DoD proposal and the proposed legislation, and (8) finally, some congressional options are addressed in the last section.

This report does not provide a general discussion of overall officer personnel management issues outside the boundaries of the GNA, particularly those governed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).⁴ Broader aspects of DOPMA, which established the basic parameters of overall officer personnel management for the U.S. armed forces and not joint management, are briefly analyzed at the end of this report to clarify some specific joint officer personnel management points.

Background on the GNA

An Act to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

- Opening Statement, Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

Congressional authority over the organization of the military establishment, with regard to the rules and regulations of the land and naval forces, is found in the Constitution of the United States (art 1, sec 8). After World War II, the Cabinet-level Departments of War and Navy, and a newly independent Department of the Air Force, were brought under considerable central control of a new Department of Defense, via the National Security Act of 1947, and the 1949 Amendments to the 1947 Act. Congressional intent was to provide three separate, fairly autonomous, military departments, independently administered, yet unified in effort and subject to a more centralized supervision under the Secretary of Defense. However, the Act allowed the services to maintain their respective identities and missions. Indeed, some

⁴ Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980; 94 Stat 2835, et. seq.

have noted that this structure encouraged the services to compete for limited resources. In some cases, such competition encouraged independence and self-sufficiency, and in others discouraged interoperability or mutual support.

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 increased the subordination of the military departments to the central authority of the Secretary of Defense. The 1958 Act also clarified that the military departments were to be separately organized versus separately administered, continuing a trend of steadily reducing the independence of the military departments. This amendment also established the chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified/specified commands which controlled the operational forces of the DoD around the world.

From 1958 until the early 1980s, there was little relevant congressional action concerning the organization of the DoD. Then, as a result of interoperability problems and shortcomings during significant military operations – the 1980 Iran hostage rescue attempt, the 1982 destruction of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut, and the 1983 invasion of Grenada – the need for defense reorganization became apparent. Experts highlighted the lack of cross-service communications, interoperability and imbalances in service/joint, centralization/decentralization, functional/geographic, and specialist/generalist tensions as inherent shortcomings of the pre-GNA structure.

The services had evolved with their own unique identities, missions, languages/jargons, personnel systems, etc. There were real concerns and some evidence that senior military leaders lacked an understanding and appreciation of joint operations as well as the other services' capabilities. The services did not value joint operations or staffs – they had no desire to “waste” their most talented officers in a joint assignment. Officers were rewarded and promoted for working within their respective services. Assignments outside the service, while necessary, were often shunned and viewed as “career ending” tours. To some extent, specific service practices seemed almost foreign to members of the other services.

The senior uniformed leadership of the services was virtually unanimous in opposing the GNA and arguing that the then - current joint operational architecture needed major fixing. One conspicuous dissenter from this mind-set, however, was General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who appeared before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) on February 3, 1982 and testified that, “It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapon systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning and the full war-fighting capability....We do not have an adequate organizational structure today.”⁵ His call for defense reform set into motion four years and 241 days of discussions and debates resulting in the passage of the GNA.⁶ The effect was to move away from the service chiefs responding first and foremost to service-specific parochial interests and to move toward a more centralized

⁵ *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective.* p. 13.

⁶ See Appendix A for a Historical Timeline detailing defense reorganization.

decision-making structure involving greater mutual support and interoperability among the services.

The GNA passed by Congress in 1986 contained the following objectives:

- Enhance civilian authority within DoD by increasing the Secretary's authority and control over program planning and contingency planning.
- Improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense by vesting the duties and staff resources of the entire body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the CJCS, and creating a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) to assist the newly empowered CJCS with his duties.
- Ensure the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified commanders-in-chief (CINCs) is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of assigned missions, by giving them command authority along with the right to convene courts martial.
- Provide more efficient use of defense resources by requiring the CJCS to solicit budgetary requirements from the CINCs, to evaluate the requirements and to establish prioritization of the requirements. The VCJCS was given the lead of oversight – chairing the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).⁷ Furthermore, the CJCS was charged with establishing a uniform system for evaluating the readiness of each CINC to meet mission requirements.
- Improve joint officer management policies. The GNA specifically addresses the policies, procedures and practices for the management of active duty officers in relation to joint duty. (This report deals in depth with this area.)

The main objective of the GNA was to enhance jointness⁸ without damaging the positive aspects of the services' identities. The idea was to pull the best service aspects into integrated operations both "in the field" and at the headquarters level. Joint officer personnel management was a significant aspect utilized to facilitate the

⁷ Formed in 1984, renamed the JROC in 1986, it is comprised of the Services' Vice Chiefs of Staff and operates as a clearinghouse of information for independent service weapons. The JROC accounts for the CINC's warfighting needs and seeks to accommodate the CINC's requirements and the services' financial constraints to attain the best balance for DoD. In addition, they review future weapons systems in relation to joint warfighting potentials. (For additional information, see CRS Report 97-346F, *Defense Budget: Role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, March 12, 1997)

⁸ Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and policies for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of defense resources.

integration and to add support for the general effort to ensure a higher level of joint interaction.

Joint Officer Personnel Management Under the GNA

Joint officer personnel management was designed to improve the quality of officers assigned to joint positions, to increase both educational and experience levels of the assigned officers, and to expand jointness of officers via increased exposure to joint matters. The GNA established the joint specialty officer (JSO)⁹ and the critical occupational specialty (COS),¹⁰ defined the specific educational and experience requirements for an officer to be designated as a JSO, requested a career path¹¹ for such an officer, and set promotion objectives for officers assigned to joint duty. The GNA contained specific requirements to ensure the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty was equivalent to the quality of the officers assigned to the specific service headquarters. The GNA also set specifically defined joint duty tour lengths and established a minimum requirement of one joint duty assignment (JDA) for all officers promoted to general officer/Navy flag officer (GO/FO).

Specific GNA Joint Officer Personnel Management Directives

The joint officer personnel management directives of the GNA are listed below:¹²

- Establish a joint specialty occupational category (designation) for the management of officers specifically trained in and oriented toward joint matters. This applies to field grade officers – pay grades 0-4, 0-5, 0-6 or rank of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel/Navy lieutenant commander, commander and captain. The GNA also sets some joint duty requirements for promotion to brigadier general/Navy rear admiral (lower half).

⁹ Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - an officer who is specifically trained in and oriented toward joint matters; eligibility includes completion of Joint Professional Military Education, and completion of a full Joint Duty Assignment, in order. There are four basic methods for the services to produce JSOs/JSO-nominees: (a) The officer attends JPME, serves a joint tour as a JSO-nominee, and is eventually designated a JSO. The majority of officers adhere to this method. (b) A critical occupational specialty (COS) (see note 7) officer can serve a joint tour and then complete joint professional military education (JPME). (c) A COS officer can serve a joint tour, additional tours, and then complete JPME (SecDef waiver required for JSO status). (d) An officer can complete two joint tours without attending JPME (SecDef waiver required for JSO status).

¹⁰ Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - a joint military occupational specialty officer from among the combat arms of the military departments; specialties engaged in the operational art to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.

¹¹ Members of the active duty armed services are eligible for retirement following the completion of 20 years of honorable service.

¹² Public Law 99-443, Sec 401.

- JSOs will be selected by the Secretary of Defense from nominations submitted by the secretaries of the military departments.
- An officer cannot be selected as a JSO until a defined program of joint professional military education (JPME) and a full joint tour are completed (exception: can be a JSO after two full JDAs without JPME).
- Requires that at least 50% of JDAs be filled by officers nominated for or selected as JSOs.
- Directed the Secretary of Defense to designate a set number of joint military positions as critical joint duty assignments which must always be filled by JSOs.
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to establish career guidelines for JSOs.
- Prescribes specific tour lengths required for consideration of a full joint tour of duty.
- Precludes the inclusion of joint training assignments and assignments within a specific military department to be included as a JDA.
- Establishes promotion board processes:
 - Requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the secretaries of the military departments guidelines to ensure appropriate consideration is given to joint duty performance by all promotion boards.
 - Directs the CJCS to review all promotion board reports before they are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
 - Authorizes the secretaries of the military departments to return the promotion board report to the board/convene a special promotion board if it is determined that board did not act in accordance with the Secretary of Defense guidance concerning joint duty performance.
 - Directs the Secretary of Defense to act on any unresolved disagreements concerning promotions between the secretaries of the military departments and the CJCS.
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the quality of the officers assigned to joint duty are such that specific promotion rates are comparable to like service promotion rates.

- Requires that an officer cannot be promoted to GO/FO unless the officer has served in a JDA.
- Requires that all officers promoted to GO/FO rank must attend a specific GO/FO joint educational course known as CAPSTONE.¹³
- Requires the CJCS to evaluate the joint duty performance of all officers recommended for the GO/FO grades of O-9 and O-10 (lieutenant general/Navy vice admiral and general/Navy admiral).
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to advise the president of the specific joint qualifications required of officers to serve in the grades of O-9 and O-10.

In early 1987, the DoD suggested some modification of the GNA joint officer personnel management based upon complications with implementing the directives. As a result, in the fiscal year (FY) 1988 and FY1989 National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress altered the law to allow waivers in education and experience requirements, to give authority to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for designating joint specialists, and to allow cumulative credit toward joint tour length requirements. In addition, although not suggested by the DoD, Congress made changes to restricting career specialties which could be designated COS.

In 1993, recognizing the changing environment of employing troops, Congress made another change to allow joint duty credit for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.¹⁴ With the assignment of JPME graduates, a minimum of at least 50% mandated to joint duty, Congress also afforded the military services the opportunity to assign JPME graduates to joint positions in either their primary or secondary assignment.¹⁵

¹³ The CAPSTONE course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies, informal discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of making attendees more effective in planning and employing joint and combined operations. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied nation issues. Created in 1982, as a voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in 1986 the GNA mandated that all newly selected GO/FOs attend. [<http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/capstone>]

¹⁴ Kathleen van Trees Medlock, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership" (Public Law 100-180, section 1301), unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, 1993, p. 67.

¹⁵ Public Law 103-357, sections 932-933.

Understanding Joint Officer Personnel Management in Relation to the GNA

Although very detailed and sometimes very tedious, it is essential to examine the intended goals and the specific aspects of joint officer personnel management in order to understand possible future change. The specific aspects to be examined include the establishment of the JDAL, JSO, and COS, and the restrictions set forth for assignments, joint tour lengths, promotions and JPME. Joint waivers and reserve component officer personnel management in relation to the Act are also covered.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL), Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) and Critical Occupational Specialty (COS)

The GNA created a number of new provisions with regard to personnel management. Specifically, these include JDAL, JSO and COS. In addition, specific requirements were created with regard to these. However, for a number of reasons explained later, the services have sometimes fallen short of meeting all the requirements established under the GNA.

The following describes JDAL, JSO and COS. These are described in terms of how they were designed under the GNA. In addition, the manner in which they have evolved is considered.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL). Under the GNA, the Secretary of Defense is required to establish a JDAL. The JDAL is a listing of military positions involving joint duty that satisfies the requirements of the GNA. This list includes military positions in multi-service/multi-national commands or activities involved with the integrated employment or support of the land, sea and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Designated military positions are those which include involvement in matters related to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, strategic and contingency planning, and command/control of combat operations.¹⁶ Not all military positions in a multi-service environment are designated as JDA and included in the JDAL. In addition, this list explicitly details the requirements of each position. For example, the JDAL contains the rank and primary specialty of the officer to serve in a particular position. Although a position may be “filled” by an officer who has been designated to carry out the particular duties of the position, the officer may not be of the required rank. Thus, the position is occupied, but the specific requirements of the designation is not viewed as being in compliance with the GNA. Initially in 1987, the Secretary of Defense designated 8,000+ JDA positions for inclusion in the JDAL. Of the 8,000+ JDAs, GNA mandated that 1,000 of them would further be designated as COS positions. Today the JDAL consists of 9,100+ joint positions and 850+ of those are designated as COS military positions.¹⁷ Table 1 details the positions of the JDAL by service and assignment.

¹⁶ 10 United States Code, Chapter 38, sec 668 (a)(1-3).

¹⁷ Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing, 7 January 2000.

Table 1. Joint Duty Position Distribution by Service
(as of Sep 30, 99)

	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Joint Staff (JCS)	278	280	67	228	853
Other Joint Duty	2,900	3,153	488	1,768	8,309
Total Joint Duty	3,178	3,433	555	1,996	9,162
% of Total Joint	34.7%	37.5%	6.1%	21.8%	100%
% of Total Officers <small>(note)</small>	29.8%	36.8%	9.0%	24.3%	100%

Note: total commissioned officers: 0-3 through 0-10 minus professional categories

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). By law, the DoD was mandated to create the occupational category JSO. As noted in the introduction and background section, in order to be designated a JSO, an officer is required to have JPME (such as satisfactory completion of the National War College), to be in a qualifying joint duty assignment (such as antiterrorism action officer on the Joint Staff) which is included in the JDAL, and to be nominated by the secretary of the service and so designated by the Secretary of Defense. Merely being assigned in a joint arena or attending a joint war college is insufficient to receive designation as a JSO.

The services have utilized two methods to produce JSOs. The first method was employed from 1987 to 1989. During this period, the established requirements of the law were so new that it was reasonable to acknowledge that few military officers could satisfy the criteria. Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the requirements of the law, Congress provided the DoD with the authority to designate individuals as JSOs via "transition boards." Individuals so designed by these transitional boards were not subject to all the educational and assignment requisites of the law. In other words, this original period provided DoD with the flexibility to "jump start" the personnel requirements in order to have a sufficient number of officers designated as JSOs. As a result of this designation method, by FY1990, more than 12,000+ officers were designated as JSOs.

In 1990, the GNA had been in place for a sufficient period for officers to have had the opportunity to meet the established criteria of the JPME, JDA and Secretary of Defense designation. Therefore, in FY1990, the GNA required that all the requirements of the law to be designated a JSO be met. Currently there are about 6,000 JSOs.

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). Within the JSO designations, the law created the COS. COS officers are those JSOs who are trained and educated primarily in joint operational war skills. Table 1 lists these war skills by service. In creating COSs, Title IV of the GNA gives some special considerations to this group

of officers who were identified as having a need to concentrate on developing, maintaining and then passing on to other officers very specific war-fighting skills. It was noted that excessive time away from the operational military position/specialty would result in quick deterioration of the skills; thus, this category of officers has less stringent timing requirements for JPME and usually serves shorter tour lengths. Currently there are 850+ COS positions, with a fill rate of 81%, designated within the JDAL.

Table 2. Critical Occupational Specialties

USA	USAF	USMC	USN
Infantry	Pilot	Infantry	Surface
Armor	Navigator	Tanks/AAV**	Submarine
Artillery	Command/Control Operations	Artillery	Aviation
Air Defense Artillery	Space/Missile Operations	Air Control/Air Support	SEALS***
Aviation		Anti-Air Warfare	Special Operations
Special Operations		Aviation	
Combat Engineers		Engineers	

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000." [http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

** AAV - amphibious assault vehicles (personnel carriers)

*** SEALS - sea, air and land special warfare teams (counterinsurgency force for offensive operations)

Currently there is no definitive analytical study which specifically notes the optimum number of JSOs/COSs, either for the current force or on a per capita basis which would hold no matter the size of the force.¹⁸ Two views as to why there has been no determination of the optimum number: (1) some consider the optimum JSO and COS numbers to be a moot point since the law sets the numbers and others have

¹⁸ In 1996, RAND released a study which analyzed supportability of assignments and careers, promotion objectives and JPME allocations; and in a second 1996 study RAND released algorithm results for ranking joint military positions to determine a potential JDAL size. But, neither study addressed the optimum number of JSOs for the current force or for a per capita basis. [Margaret C. Harrell, John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg, *How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments*. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996. John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Jennifer Kawata, Margaret C. Harrell, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg. *Who Is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List*. RAND: Mr-574, 1996.]

difficulty embracing a study of the optimum number since the determination might not result in a change to the numbers designated in the law; (2) still others have found this determination to be in the “too hard to do” category since the ever-changing missions of the services and world strategic situations should drive the JDAL numbers – defining the optimum number today would likely be obsolete tomorrow.

Despite the goals in establishing the JDAL as well as the JSO and COS, various forces have modified how they were originally implemented and/or how they have since evolved. Beginning first with the JDAL, it is interesting to note that since the end of the Gulf War, the size of the military has decreased by nearly 40%. In other words, the DoD now has just over one-third fewer military personnel in uniform. However, the list of positions on the JDAL has not been reduced to reflect this decrease.

There is continually a lag between what is reflected in the JDAL and the actual joint requirements. Based upon the joint activities being dynamic organizations – changing organizational structures, areas of responsibility and mission priorities are a constant – requirements change. Therefore, ever-changing future needs of the joint community may well be different from what is produced by the JSO program or is reflected in the JDAL. It takes the services a minimum of four years to produce the inventory to meet the requirements. The actual length of time required to reflect joint mission changes in the JDAL, coupled with the time the services require to produce/train/educate the officers of specific specialties necessary for joint duty, falls short of real-time mission changes. The time lag between mission changes appearing in the JDAL and the reality of joint mission requirements is primarily an administratively driven lag. And, this lag is even more evident in critical military positions.

Turning next to the management of JSOs, following the end of the “transition board” and the beginning of the stricter adherence to the GNA requirements in FY1990, the number of officers designated as JSOs has decreased. This decrease occurred for various reasons. First, as noted above, the number of officers has decreased as a result of the number of JSO-designated officers who left the service following the Gulf War. Second, the more rigid adherence to the requirements has meant that fewer officers qualify as JSOs.

The original concept of the law was to produce a JSO who would follow a joint-dominated career path, but JSO careers have not evolved in this manner. The CINCs and joint agencies (Defense Intelligence Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Defense Logistics Agency, etc.) continually express a need for officers with a high degree of expertise in their designated career specialties for their respective services. Officers with this current service expertise, rotating in and out of the joint arena, have become the nucleus of the joint environment, rather than a JSO for whom joint duty assignments are more common than assignments in their service. Apparently the CINCs and directors of joint agencies believe that previous joint experience can be of value, but it does not outweigh the CINCs’/joint activities’ perceived need for officers current in the most recent development in their specialty and service doctrine. Likewise, the continual cross flow of officers with both joint and service expertise is perceived as valuable to the services by creating linkage between the operational world and the joint environment. As it has evolved, it would

appear that the original concept of a joint-dominated career path JSO does not meet the needs of either the joint arena or the services.

As a result of the above issues, the JSO population has fallen from 12,000+ officers in 1990 to approximately 6,000 today. By FY2005, it is anticipated that this number will fall below 4,000. This shrinking JSO population will eventually lead the DoD to report non-compliance with the GNA.¹⁹ The DoD will be forced to not fill military positions of the JDAL and report non-compliance in maintaining the end-strength of the JDAL. Or conversely, the DoD could maintain the end strength of the JDAL with personnel who do not meet the promotion criteria of the Act, thus reporting non-compliance with promotion expectations.

Assignments and Joint Tour Lengths

Specific assignments and tour lengths were established to provide stability within the joint community and to ensure officers obtained a credible level of joint experience. The GNA requires that of all military positions in the JDAL, at least 50% must be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected as a JSO. All COS positions must be filled by designated JSOs. All JSOs and at least 50% plus one officer, of all officers attending a JPME school, must be assigned to joint duty within the first or second assignment following JPME.

The law sets minimum tour lengths for joint military positions at 36 months for field grade officers and 24 months for general/flag officers. The law does allow for a restricted number of waivers of these time minimums in relation to all joint military positions. Joint policy further states that the tour length shall not exceed 48 months without Secretary of Defense approval.

The law specifies that to become a GO/FO, one must have served in a joint duty assignment in the grades of 04-06. A specific JPME course, CAPSTONE, is also required for all newly selected general officers/flag officers.

Promotions

The GNA contains numerous requirements and restrictions concerning the promotion of officers in relation to joint duty so as to ensure that the JSOs and Joint Staff officers being assigned to the joint arena were equal in quality to, and were promoted at least at the same rates as, the officers being assigned to service-specific headquarters staffs. They thus mandated that specific promotion statistics be maintained for officers assigned to joint positions above the grade of captain/Navy lieutenant.²⁰

¹⁹ The DoD utilizes the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) to track JSOs/JSO-nominees with joint experience in compliance with the GNA. The JDAMIS tracking number assigned to each eligible officer is independent of the service position number to which the individual is assigned and these differing numbers can contribute to administrative tracking burdens of the GNA.

²⁰ The multiple comparisons require a very detailed understanding of promotion data and require a substantial amount of time to assess. In a 1996 RAND study (Margaret C. Harrell,

The promotion statistics by which joint officers are measured against depends upon the type of joint position or organization to which an officer is assigned and whether an officer has received the JSO designation. Three categories were established within the law: Joint Staff, JSO and other joint. The Joint Staff category is for current and previously assigned officers who serve with the Joint Staff. The JSO category is for officers who have been designated as a JSO by the Secretary of Defense. Officers can be counted in both of these two latter categories. The other joint category is for all others, not counted as Joint Staff or JSO, who are currently or who were previously assigned to a joint military position listed in the JDAL. Officers coded Joint Staff or JSO are not included in the other joint category. Promotion rates for officers of the Joint Staff and JSO categories are compared to promotion rates of officers of the service-specific headquarters staffs; promotion rates for officers in the other joint category are compared to the promotion rates for the service-specific averages. The promotion rates for each category are compared for every field grade promotion board. These assessments are further calculated for officers competing for promotion in-the-promotion zone (IPZ), above-the-promotion zone (APZ), and below-the-promotion zone (BPZ).²¹ Within each assessment, the promotion rates are also compared for officers currently serving joint and for those having served joint previously in their first post joint promotion cycle. In total, there are 40+ promotion categories tracked: five grades, three promotion zones, three joint categories and two assignment categories.

The intent of monitoring promotions within GNA was to first increase and then to maintain quality of officers placed in joint assignments. The “serving in” and “have served in” comparison standards were designed to raise the quality of officers assigned within the joint arena, and to ensure those serving in the joint arena were not discriminated in the service-specific arena for having served joint. The GNA provides that the quality of officers serving in the joint environment will be competitive/comparable to the officers serving in service-specific headquarters staffs. The intent was not, however, for joint officers to be promoted at an increased rate or before any other officer who was better qualified for promotion.

John F. Schank, Harry Thie, Clifford Graf, Paul Steinberg, *How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments*. RAND: MR-593-JS, 1996.), “How Many Can Be Joint?”, the authors noted that the promotion comparisons are complicated and oblique, and do not necessarily reflect or measure the actual objectives established by Goldwater-Nichols. Many find that the utility of these comparisons has been lost in the tracking efforts.

²¹ CRS Report 96-824. (name redacted), *Defense Officer Personnel Management: The ‘Up-or-Out’ System*. October 11, 1996. “Officers being considered for promotion to pay grades 0-3 to 0-8 are promoted on a ‘best qualified’ basis. The ‘best qualified’ method of promotion generally requires that those officers judged best qualified for promotion against a specified maximum number of officers that can be promoted be selected for promotion...eligibility for consideration for promotion is not rigidly tied to a particular cohort or cohort-related group of officers. Officers can be promoted ‘above the zone’ (i.e., after having been previously considered, along with their regular cohort, for promotion, and failing of selection). ‘A small number of promotions also go to officers who have demonstrated outstanding potential and are selected before the majority of their cohort.’ These are known as ‘below-the-zone’ promotions.” (Most pertinent statutes are in chapter 36, title 10, 10 USC 611, et. seq.)

Many analysts and personnel involved in the tracking and reporting of the multiple comparisons believe that the process has become bureaucratic and burdensome, and offers minimum value. In addition, many assert that the tracking process has become an inhibitor to assigning the right person to a specific, defined requirement due to the overarching requirement to meet promotion standards. The mandated promotion targets have become the priority. The result of the long-term, higher standards for JSOs has been a relatively small pool of highly qualified/promotable personnel which does not allow for matching the best qualified officer to the joint requirement. The small pool appears to be counter to the original intent of GNA to expand the population to ensure all joint qualified officers were identified for/available to meet joint requirements.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

Joint education has its origins in the GNA and the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education of 1989 (known as the Skelton Panel for its chairman, Representative Ike Skelton).²² It was intended that a joint perspective be ensured by immersion of officers into a multi-service environment of academics, sports and living accommodations in which the student body and faculty are proportionally representative of all military departments. Becoming a joint team player, communicating with members of other services, and understanding the services' capabilities and limitations for mission accomplishment are goals of the JPME programs.

GNA authorized statutory Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements for officers to be designated as JSOs. As noted earlier, to be designated a JSO, an officer must have completed an "appropriate program at a joint professional military education school" (10USC 663). This can be accomplished in two ways. First, an officer can graduate from the National War College (NWC) or the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University in Washington, DC (these are the only two joint senior service schools - "war colleges" - with an academic year-long curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel/Navy commander or colonel/Navy captain; NWC and ICAF produce about 300 graduates a year). Second, an officer can also fulfill the JSO JPME requirement by graduating from (1) either a service-specific senior service school ("war college" with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel or colonel/Navy commander or captain) or intermediate service school ("staff college" with an academic-year curriculum for officers in the grades of major/Navy lieutenant commander) by residence, seminar or correspondence programs, and (2) by graduating from the 12-week course of the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia - another joint school.

The second method, referenced above, is the primary tool for most officers to obtain JSO status. The educational focus is upon the joint operational art of war, although the largest number of graduates fill strategic level JDAs within the Joint Staff or on CINC headquarter staffs. The annual graduates number around 900. In

²² Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress of the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Congress, first Session, April 21, 1989.

addition, each course must contain a balanced student body from the three service departments.

An issue arises in relation to the timing of the AFSC courses. Given that the course dates and reassignment timings do not necessarily align, most students report to the JDA and then return on temporary duty (TDY) to AFSC for the required course. For example, the AFSC course begins the first duty Monday in March and the assigned officer had a reporting date of 10 January to the CINC's staff in the Hawaii Pacific Command. The officer reports to the new assignment in Hawaii by 10 January and works for about 40 days prior to being sent back to Virginia for 12 weeks to complete the AFSC course. During the time at the course, the officer's duties in Hawaii either go undone or must be completed by other officers who have their own duties. In addition, the military must pay for the officer's return travel expenses and pay per diem, living expenses, for the duration of the course. While this officer is in Virginia, the family has possibly been left to settle the household and themselves into a completely new environment. The impact of the TDY and return JPME completion results in the temporary assignment/loss of primary duty performance of an equivalent of 210 officers per year.²³

With the limited seating currently offered in JPME, a substantial number of military members serving in JDAs are never formally educated in joint matters. The total JPME production today is around 1200 graduates annually. With a JDAL of 9400 based upon a 36-month average tour length. It is not feasible for the DoD to produce enough JSOs under the current laws to fulfill requirements. To further compound the issue, many joint positions are currently filled or augmented by reserve component officers;²⁴ yet, today's JPME virtually never reaches these officers.²⁵

Given scheduling, career requirements, manpower needs and availability, as well as operational contingencies (some being emergency deployments which can not be anticipated), it is very difficult to produce sufficient numbers of qualified JSOs under the current legislative requirements of the GNA. JPME is one limiting factor, based upon seat availability, for the services in producing JSOs. Couple the JPME requirements with those of the assignment process, and it becomes clear that the DoD can not succeed under the current provisions.

²³ Colonel Frank H. Ayers, Jr., "JPME 2010," JCS/J-7 Briefing, February 4, 2000.

²⁴ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), RSC: DD-RA(M) 1147/1148, FY1998. "The Ready Reserve (reserve components) is comprised of military members of the Reserve and National Guard, organized in units or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency."

²⁵ The provisions of the GNA are not specifically applied to the reserve components (see Reserve Officer Personnel Management section below). With the active duty services actively seeking JPME assignments for their eligible officers and with the GNA currently not applying to reservists, seats are virtually non-existent their attendance.

Joint Waivers

Virtually every aspect of the GNA joint officer personnel management can be waived for some reason, at some level. During the early years following enactment of the law, the services commonly utilized every available waiver. Under the oversight of Congress and within the spirit of the law, the services have steadily declined the utilization of, but by no means eliminated, joint waivers as joint officer personnel management has evolved. Utilization of waivers varies by service, but the bottom line is that there are multiple ways, consistent with the law, to bypass the requirements. For example, it is not uncommon for a 36-month joint tour length requirement to be waived to 24 months, and full credit for the tour rendered in order for an officer to move to a needed command position. From grade designation to JPME to mandatory JSO-designees in COS military positions, waivers can be and are granted. Although permissible, these waivers are a reflection of requirements in the law and implementation of personnel management issues which arguably do not support sound joint officer personnel management.

Reserve Officer Personnel Management

The provisions of the GNA are not specifically extended to the reserve components. Nevertheless, the reserve components are mandated to apply the GNA active duty joint officer personnel management parameters to the "extent possible". Currently, these are not applied and the reserve components lack procedures to identify/track positions which provide reserve officers with the knowledge and experience that come from working with other services and from joint operations.

Given the demands of today's environment, coupled with the military drawdown, the reserve components are included in most every mission – from disaster relief within the continental United States to ongoing operations in Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. Effective utilization of the Total Force, the active and reserve components combined, is viewed as critical to continued success in joint operations.

Realizing the importance of the reserve components and the importance of capturing reserve component joint utilization, a working group, co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, and the Assistant Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, Reserve Matters, has been established to determine the application of joint officer personnel management for the reserve components. The charter of the working group includes: (1) defining reserve component positions which yield joint experience using the broadest possible definition of joint; (2) establishing DoD policy to provide guidance to the services concerning joint officer personnel management for reserve components; (3) assisting the services in creating processes to track reserve components' members joint experiences; (4) advising reserve component leaders on implementing career tracks for the best and brightest officers to gain joint experience; and (5) encouraging joint duty as a career enhancer for reserve component members. The working group is targeting the June 2000 reserve component senior leadership conference to present their findings.

DoD Compliance Reports to Congress

The Secretary of Defense is required to report to Congress each year the services' compliance with the personnel requirements of the GNA. The report contains limited narrative and detailed data charts which supposedly denotes the DoD's progress in compliance or non-compliance with the directives of the GNA. However, in reality, the report provides detailed data which presents a snap shot in time, and many of the required charts do not demonstrate any specific compliance. In addition, the report does not cover trend analysis or year-to-year comparisons which would further demonstrate progression or non-compliance.

For example, in the latest report, DoD covers compliance utilizing FY1999, and provides a summary of JSOs as specifically required in the GNA:

Table 3. Summary of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO)

	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Designated as JSOs	362	223	70	203	858
Designated as JSO Nominees	714	814	173	574	2,275
JSO Nominees Designated Under COS Provisions	368	365	101	316	1,150

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000." [http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

The DoD reported that 858 officers had been designated as JSOs, that 2,275 officers had been designated as JSO nominees and that 1,150 JSO nominees were designated under COS provisions. In addition, the total numbers are reported by service. As noted earlier, there has never been an optimum JSO number determination. However, this summary does not demonstrate any specific level of compliance, it merely provides factual data (a more complete view of the FY1999 compliance charts of the annual report can be found in Appendix D).

Although DoD has made progress with compliance in accordance with the GNA, the annual report does not always reflect the magnitude of progress or document long-term areas of concern. For example, the report (Appendix D, Table 12) shows that the Navy did not meet the 0-6 promotion objective in the "other joint" category in FY1999. But, the Joint Staff office, which tracks compliance, has found that the Navy consistently fails, from year to year, to meet the 0-6 promotion objectives in the "other joint" category. Thus, a requirement for a multi-year, long-term trend analysis, versus one-year information, could provide a better understanding of DoD compliance with the GNA.

Unintended Developments of the GNA for Joint Officer Personnel Management

There are several joint officer personnel management unintended developments since GNA's enactment, which have developed over time. The first development is that the JSOs did not necessarily evolve as envisioned by the original framers and COS has become a misnomer. In addition, the time demands upon an officer has made, not only joint officer personnel management, but all personnel management, a difficult and precise balancing act to ensure an officer can meet all requirements. The second development concerns the application of the promotion standards. When applied they allow for some of the best officers to avoid joint duty until they are selected for promotion to brigadier general/Navy rear admiral lower half. The third development, compliance reporting, has led to the promotion criteria, rather than sound personnel management, being a primary factor in joint duty. And, very few officers serve a second tour in the joint arena. These unintended and unforeseen developments indicate why the DoD predicts significant non-compliance in the near future and why the DoD has made proposals which follow this section.

Joint Specialty Officers


The JSO career path, as discussed earlier, did not necessarily evolve as envisioned. The very nature of the skills and expertise which contribute to the joint culture is possibly a two-edged sword in the management of personnel and in an individual's career goals. In addition to joint duty outside the specific career specialty, the officer must maintain specialty expertise in his/her primary specialization area (i.e., pilot, submariner, infantryman). Officers need service expertise to be promoted, and serving in joint duty assignments competes with time available in an average career to acquire service expertise. It is precisely this expertise which is most value-added in the joint arena. Thus, there can be a negative effect upon the officer's career progress, as well as negative effects for utilization within the service and within the joint arena.

Career Management. It was never intended in the original concept of the JSO, that placing an officer in a joint tour for a specified time would create difficulties in career management. In the course of a twenty-year career, an exceptional officer often spends one year in primary specialty training followed by three years of primary specialty duty, two years in-residence professional military education, two to four years in command and three years on a headquarters staff. This allows for seven years of a typical career to be devoted to advanced specialty training, JPME, joint duty and pursuit of higher education.²⁶ Kathleen van Trees Medlock, a noted student of military personnel management, studied a typical Army officer and found that from

²⁶ An advanced specialty course is designed to provide advanced education in the specific corps specialty such as aircraft investigation qualification or senior security police management. The command course offers specific training in issues necessary for commanding units, i.e., legal, environmental, public affairs. PME provides individual military members with the skills, knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make sound decisions in progressively more demanding positions within the national security environment; it focuses on service-specific, joint and leadership issues.

the time of eligibility to begin the JSO process, a typical Army officer has twelve years to become a JSO and prepare for competition for promotion to Brigadier General. During those twelve years the officer must complete assignments in command, service headquarters staffs, and two service school rotations as well as devoting three to four years to JSO qualifications.²⁷ Given this timing, currently only 29% of officers designated as JSOs return to joint duty once; less than 10% return to joint duty twice.²⁸ Align these numbers with the end of the Cold War, current OPTEMPO/deployments and downsizing of the military forces, and a typical career officer must have extraordinarily precise personnel management to succeed within the current system – anything which “derails” this progression will throw a career off track. Plus, it is even more difficult to work joint assignments into the careers of officers who are promoted below-the-zone.

Figure 1. Typical Officer Career Path



As the services express concern over assigning officers to complete JPME and serve in joint military positions in order to be designated as a JSO, they are implicitly relating that it is extremely difficult to fit both the joint experiences and the service experiences, which they consider equally important, into a typical career path.

Another unintended JSO consequence is related to the initial implementation of the GNA which allowed for the transitional JSO. The transitional method afforded an oversized pool of JSOs from which to draw the expertise needed to meet joint

²⁷ Kathleen van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership”, unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, 1993, p. 67.

²⁸ Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing, 7 January 2000.

requirements. As noted, the transitional JSO pool, which is 46% of JSOs today, is rapidly shrinking as this group of officers reaches retirement eligibility, and as it is nearly impossible for the services to replenish the pool with “by-law” JSOs. The transitional losses, coupled with the “by-law” losses, are two times the production rate for JSOs. The pool of eligible JSOs has been on the decline since the high of 12,000+ in 1990 and is projected to be below 4,000 by 2005.²⁹ The ever-shrinking pool is making it more and more difficult to fill all military positions.

Also unforeseen when enacted, but noted by many, is the concern that the services are – have to be, by law – meeting the JSO requirements and expectations of the law at the expense of sound joint officer personnel management. For example, officers with good records and the potential for promotion to make the grade of colonel/Navy captain often meet the requirements and are designated as JSOs without regard for the specialty being required within the JDAL. Likewise, an officer with high potential for promotion, who has completed PME in residence, who has held a command and served in a JDA, is likely to be designated a JSO regardless of the existence of requirements for the officer’s specialty/grade on the JDAL or promotion potential for GO/FO. Also, the assignment of an officer graduating from the National Defense University (NDU) is often more influenced by the statutory requirement to place at least 50% plus one member of each NDU graduating class into an approved JDA than it is driven by where the individual officer can best be utilized. This desire to comply with law has developed a gap between the JDAL requirements and the JSO inventory. In other words, the internal composition of the skills/specialties of the JSOs are not necessarily the composition required to fill the JDAL. The fact that only 29% of officers having been designated as JSOs ever serve in a JDA following JSO designation highlights this consequence.

Promotions

As with the case of JSOs, when the promotability standards are applied, unintended developments appear. Some of the best qualified officers in specific specialties never serve in joint assignments while other quality officers are denied the opportunity to serve joint. Compliance with the promotion standards affect today’s joint officer personnel management.

With the services seeking to promote officers who have the highest potential for command, leadership and continued promotion, it is not difficult for the best officers to bypass joint. The law as written, and the current promotion system, allows the services to “groom/grow” officers without joint experience until they reach the grade of brigadier general /Navy rear admiral lower half. This pool of officers is usually the very best of the best.

In addition, promotion standards by design also exclude some excellent officers from serving in joint positions due to their lack of promotability to colonel/Navy captain. For example, an officer’s career which has centered around a specific area of expertise, such as Russia, may not possess the qualities sought for promotion to 0-

²⁹ Major Marilyn Howe, “The Future of Joint Officer Management,” JCS/J-1 Briefing, January 7, 2000.

6; considered an expert, this officer might be the perfect 0-5 to serve as a desk officer in the Joint Staff. Paradoxically though, the demand to reserve JDA positions for promotable officers could preclude service in the joint arena. Promotion standards were envisioned as ensuring improved the quality of officers assigned within the joint arena; however, it also eliminates some of the most experienced, best qualified officers from utilization in the joint arena.

As with JSO assignments, to ensure compliance with the law, promotability potential has become a top priority when nominating/designating officers as JSOs. The requirement for a sufficiently large pool of JSOs to meet requirements is often countered by the promotability issues. The end result is a relatively small, carefully selected, highly qualified/promotable JSO pool which will not meet JDAL requirements in the near future. Although not counter productive to efforts to maintain a highly promotable pool of JSOs, it currently contributes to the gap between the number of JSOs and the specialty requirements mentioned earlier.

To measure the quality of joint personnel on a narrow continuum of a single promotion board, for a specific grade and category, does not present the whole picture of the officer, of the officer's career or of the officer's future potential or utilization. Since officers are promoted based upon their immediate future potential, a single board only measures performance at the time of eligibility. In essence, the current promotion comparisons/narrow views do not allow for the distribution of quality over time to be measured. Thus, it is a misleading measure of long-term quality. For example, the services could be meeting quality targets over time if an aggregate were measured, and yet not be meeting every specific board target.

Critical Occupational Specialty

"Critical position" has become a misnomer; within today's JDAL it is often the least critical positions which carry the COS designation. When the joint officer personnel management program cannot deliver the intended COS officer, the CINCs/joint activities: (1) accept officers who meet the legal requirements, but not necessarily the mission needs; (2) live with a vacancy because a COS officer to fill the critical military position is not available; (3) process a waiver for a non-JSO to be assigned to the critical military position; or (4) move the critical military position designation to another military position so they can acquire an officer to meet the mission needs. In all cases, but especially in the case of moving the critical military position designation, the original intent of the law is manipulated to meet mission needs. The end result is that the least critical of the military positions, the ones which can be left vacant or can be filled by a non-JSO, are the ones designated as the critical military positions. This evolution has developed a system in which it is impracticable to determine the future COS needs of the joint world and to properly plan/prepare in advance for the future needs. The process does not allow for keeping pace with real-world, real-time needs.

Careerism

Another significant consequence is the shift from a service to joint orientation, and in some cases preference. At the time of GNA enactment, the services were

experiencing some “careerism”³⁰ within the officer corps. The services have never promoted careerism, nor do their core values allow for careerism. At the time of the GNA, the services were gaining momentum in cataloging careerism as opprobrium. But today, following the requirements of GNA and the services’ embracement of joint duty, “joint careerism,” (i.e., jockeying for a Joint Staff or Unified Command position) is surfacing within the officer corps.³¹ “Today, personnel from all the services seek joint assignments, which has become a prerequisite for promotion to general or flag officer”³² This has the potential to serve as a “positive” consequence when viewed from the perspective of having the best and brightest officers serve in joint positions. Or, on the other hand, it can be a “negative” consequence if it grows to counter one of the armed forces’ strong core values – service before self.

The Current DoD View

In 1996, ten years after the GNA was enacted, one of the initial framers of the legislation, former Senate staffer James R. Locher noted, “Congress had hoped that the department, after several years of implementing title IV, would conceptualize a better approach to joint officer management. That has not occurred. The Goldwater-Nichols objective of improving joint officer management has been achieved, but DoD still lacks a vision of its needs for joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”³³ Three years later, Secretary Cohen shared the current DoD view in his January 2000 Report to the President, “...the Department and the Joint Staff are currently completing an extensive review of both the law and policy governing joint officer management. The recommendations from this review promise to uphold the fundamental tenets of Goldwater-Nichols while streamlining the processes that will allow the Department to continue to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”³⁴ The DoD believes it has evolved to the point that “joint” is normal, although it has not evolved to the exact letter of the law.

The DoD has studied and designed a proposal concerning several aspects of the law governing joint officer personnel management. Their proposal includes replacing the JSO with a special duty identifier, deleting the COS, separating promotion comparisons and JSO designations, redesigning promotion comparisons, realigning joint tour lengths with standard service tours lengths, redesigning and expanding JPME, and redefining the annual report to Congress. The proposal has been

³⁰ Careerism - positioning to enhance individual prospects for promotion, key assignment selections, etc. for the betterment of the one without regard for the betterment of the service

³¹ Colonel Mackubin T. Owens, Jr., USMCR (Ret), “Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1998: 48-53.

³² John M. Shalikashvili, “A Word from the Chairman,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn 1996: 4-7.

³³ James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996: 10-14.

³⁴ William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to the President and the Congress,” February 2000: E-1.

approved by the CJCS and presented to some key congressional members and staffers.

The first and overarching aspect of the proposal is to **replace the JSO designation with a special duty identifier**. The GNA focused on a specialist career track for the JSO which has not evolved within the services, and the DoD proposes replacing the JSO with a JSO “special duty identifier”. The DoD sees this change as a means of placing emphasis on building a larger pool of officers with joint expertise and education. The JSO duty identifier would allow for the automatic granting of JSO status to every officer who completes the required joint education and joint duty assignment (there would be no required order of education/assignment as currently exists in the law). The JSO designation board which selects JSO nominees based upon meeting criteria and promotion potential would no longer be necessary. This new designation process would allow for “ever-current” identification of all joint qualified personnel, thus allowing immediate identification of eligible officers required to meet ever-changing, immediate joint requirements. The intent is to expand the JSO pool to include all qualified officers and to provide a greater variety of grades and specialties. Having the right officer who meets the requirements is the highest priority of the joint environment, and the expansion of identifying all joint trained/qualified officers meets this key need.

With the JSO special duty identifier being utilized, the **COS would be deleted**. The CINC/joint agency, owners of the joint military positions, would establish all requirements through the officer requisition process currently utilized by the services and there would be no requirement for the COS. The DoD proposal to delete the COS would, supposedly, offer the joint activities the flexibility to determine requirements and to requisition qualified officers to meet them. With the deletion of the COS, and the associated restrictions for filling COS military positions, the ability to quickly locate officers with the desired expertise to fill time-/mission-critical requirements would, according to the DoD, be enhanced. The DoD envisions the multiple JDAL fill-rate tracking requirements ceasing as all joint military positions would be created equal.

The proposal also includes **decoupling promotion comparisons from JSO designation**. This delinking will allow identification of all officers who are joint qualified versus identifying only those select officers who would enhance the statistics by meeting promotion standards. Although delinked, promotion standards would continue as a quality indicator for officers assigned to joint military positions.

To ensure the quality of officers assigned to JDAs, **promotion comparisons would be redesigned**. The DoD proposal is designed to continue a comparison, but would delete much of the administrative criteria currently required. It proposes to compare those currently assigned in the joint staff to those currently serving in the service headquarters staffs and compare those assigned in the joint agencies to the service average. The proposal would delete the requirements for comparing those who have previously served joint and JSO-designees specifically. The DoD believes its proposal would continue to measure the quality of the officers without allowing the reporting requirements to become more important than matching the correct person to the requirement. Thus, an officer’s special background/expertise would be

the driving factor in assignments. The DoD proposal would continue with the current service quality screening process before an officer could be assigned to a JDA.

The DoD believes that **joint tour lengths should be aligned with standard service tour lengths**.³⁵ The current provisions for tour lengths, with its many exceptions and waivers, can be confusing, and the tracking process requires extensive oversight. The DoD proposal is designed to advance the intent of the GNA concerning joint tour stability, yet provide a more simplified process. This proposal would grant the Secretary of Defense additional authority in determining full joint credit for a tour of duty and would allow the Secretary of Defense more discretion in deeming which assignments/situations grant valuable joint experience.

A joint tour of 36 months, like the majority of standard tour lengths, would remain the standard for most joint duty. However, for example, a joint tour in Korea would be aligned to the current assignment standard for a short tour – 12 to 18 months. These short tour locations sustain high OPTEMPO, and the joint experience in this type arena is commensurate to that of officers serving longer tours in less strained environments. In addition, serving in a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters³⁶ is considered valuable joint duty. The proposal would allow for full joint credit to officers who amass 365 days in JTF Headquarters when deployed via 90-day+ rotations. The current cumulative credit authorization enacted in 1996 for credit after 36 months would be deleted. The proposed credit for short tours in remote areas and for JTF service would recognize valuable joint experience which otherwise goes unnoticed and uncredited to the individual officer today.

The DoD proposal would support the original legislation which recognizes there are legitimate reasons for curtailment of a 36-month tour. And, it would retain 24 months as the minimum service for joint tour credit in most cases. In addition, the proposal establishes a provision for the owning joint activity to agree to the early release of an officer; if the owning activity does not agree, the officer will not be moved prior to completion of the joint tour. The proposal deletes the use of cumulative credit for partial tours as known today – officers either complete the joint tour to receive full credit or leave early and receive no credit (an automatic incentive to enhance stability in tour lengths). If an officer is moved from one joint position to

³⁵ Every authorized military position has an assigned tour length. A most common length/standard length for a tour is 36 months. However, for military positions authorized within very intense/demanding areas of operations, tour lengths vary from 12 months to 24 months. A 12 month tour is commonly referred to as a short tour. There are no short tour authorizations within the continental United States. For example, an assignment in Korea, specifically in close proximity to the North and South border, would be classified as a short tour. The area of operation experiences an intense OPTEMPO in a significantly dangerous area thus affording the uniformed member experience above/beyond that of a uniformed member performing similar duties in a headquarters/within the United States.

³⁶ A Joint Task Force is a temporary operation which is created to handle a specific mission for which there are no permanent military positions authorized and for which there is no intent to authorize permanent military positions. Although the duty is joint and hosts considerable joint experience of value to CINCs, joint credit is seldom authorized due to the lack of permanent military positions.

another joint position, joint credit between consecutive joint duty would be recognized. The tour length proposal is drastically simplified as compared to today's requirements. The firm tour length standards, to be rigorously implemented, meet the requirements of the joint arena and mirror the way the forces operate today.

The DoD believes that the career focus should be a broad joint education and recommends **expanding the capabilities of joint education**, as well as opening joint education to a much greater number of officers. However, to accommodate this expansion, **education must first be delinked from assignments**, thus allowing for the expansion of education and allowing the education to reach a significantly higher number of officers.

The DoD proposal focuses upon "one stop", strategic-level JPME which will delete the TDY and return issues, expand JPME to a much larger Total Force audience, at a reasonable price, as it deepens and broadens the JPME content. The proposal includes an elective course design at the current senior service schools, distributed JPME via joint seminar formats, distance JPME to the individual officer on-line, and allows for AFSC to be expanded into a joint operations school.

Extending an AFSC exported curriculum (and faculty if requested) as an elective course at the current senior service schools would meet the joint requirements and eliminate an extensive number of TDY and return losses as noted earlier. This would allow joint education within a currently established school (AFSC in-residence outreach). The expected audience would be approximately 650 officers per year.

The second aspect of distributed JPME would consist of an AFSC exported curriculum into the joint arena. The program would be taught in seminar format (one session per week for six months) at the CINC headquarters. This proposal would also delete TDY and return losses, as well as delivering JPME to officers who currently have no opportunity for JPME. In addition to the basic curriculum from AFSC, CINC-specific concerns, issues and topics could be incorporated into the program. It is estimated that this proposal could reach an additional 600 officers who currently receive no education in joint matters.

The third aspect employs distance learning by exporting the AFSC curriculum directly to individual officers on their home/office personal computers. This is envisioned to be a six month course, using off the shelf technology and "virtual" seminars. This aspect would greatly expand JPME to the Total Force by providing "anywhere/anytime" JPME capability. The annual audience could reach 2,500 officers who currently receive no JPME.

In addition to reaching an expanded officer pool at the strategic JPME level, it is proposed that the **expansion of the current AFSC** to a 10-month, 100 student joint operational school. This residence program would qualify as intermediate service school and fulfill the requirement of JPME. AFSC would also establish a two-month summer course which would cover the requirements which are currently in place as AFSC. This program would reach approximately 100 students annually and 300 students during the summer program.

The DoD proposal would increase the number of officers currently educated in joint matters annually from 1,200 to approximately 4,350 without significantly increasing JPME expenses above current spending levels. The DoD proposes expanding the intent of the GNA by educating additional students for a one-time investment in advanced distributed learning. The design would allow for all officers destined for joint duty the opportunity to receive joint education commensurate with rank and responsibilities. In addition, the DoD sees this proposal as recasting JPME as an educational component of a continuum of lifelong joint learning.

The entire DoD proposal of the GNA maintains the standards for the Secretary of Defense to monitor the state of joint officer personnel management and **redefines the measurements** which would continue to be reported to Congress in the annual defense reports. To satisfy the concerns of those who might interpret the DoD proposal as cutting away too many of the aspects which have enhanced “jointness”, the DoD would report: (1) JSO special duty identified officers by grade/service/specialty; (2) analysis of how well the service secretaries are assigning personnel to joint positions; (3) number of “good of the service” waivers for GO/FO selected; (4) percent of officers departing from joint duty before earning full joint tour credit; (5) percent of NDU class seats filled, by course; (6) listing of JTF headquarters currently approved for joint duty credit; (7) promotion comparisons; and (8) significant information as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Although extensive in nature, the DoD believes the proposed reporting will convey the continued progress of “jointness” without allowing the reporting constraints to adversely affect personnel utilization/joint officer personnel management.

In sum, the proposal maintains a JDAL of assignments in which officers gain significant experience in joint matters. But, in doing so, it would delete many of the current waiver options. Critical military positions would be deleted, the JSO pool would be greatly expanded and there would be no quota for at least 50% of JDAL military positions to be manned by JSO nominees. Promotion comparisons would be for officers currently serving joint. General officers/flag officers would continue to require joint duty prior to promotion to O-7 and completion of CAPSTONE. The sequence rules for JPME prior to JDA would not be required and JPME would be redesigned to afford a greater number of officers, including Guardsmen and Reservists, the opportunity to complete joint education. Assignment requirements of 50% plus one would be dropped for NDU graduates. And, the annual report to Congress would be updated to ensure reported information focused on meeting the joint arena requirements by reporting what matters to Congress in their oversight role.

With the intent of staying within the GNA provisions of the law, the proposed changes are suggested to offer more flexibility in joint officer personnel management and to afford a greater chance of getting the correct officers with the appropriate skills/education matched to real-world requirements – the proposal synchronizes the joint management process with the services’ personnel management processes.

In his most recent posture statement,³⁷ General Shelton, CJCS, assured Congress he is not seeking to weaken jointness, but to improve it, “to champion it”. Just as is supported by “Joint Vision 2020”,³⁸ he is seeking the flexibility in personnel management to fulfill the strategic concept of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence and strategic agility. The DoD’s goal is to transform joint personnel management, balanced with the performance of missions in a dynamic environment, to maximize JSO production, as early as possible in a career, for better personnel utilization.

The new DoD proposal is not without controversy. Some find the proposal to be too far-reaching in lifting the GNA joint officer personnel management constraints and reporting aspects of the Act. Concerns of this nature focus on the fact that the proposal gives additional authority to the Secretary of Defense and JCS which could fall short of the original intent of the GNA. Given the DoD’s reluctance to seek jointness at the time of its enactment, some hold a distrustful view of the DoD’s ability to self-manage joint officer personnel. Still others have expressed disappointment in the DoD view; they have described it as making administrative and mechanical change to ease the burden of reporting and have found that the proposal lacks innovation and major redesign for the future of joint officer personnel management. The proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will streamline the process, while maintaining the original intent of the GNA, and will allow for sound joint officer personnel management.

Legislation in the 106th Congress, Second Session

The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, S. 2549 (Subtitle B, Joint Officer Management, Sec. 521-528), provides the following language concerning joint officer personnel management:³⁹

The committee recommends a series of provisions that would streamline the designation and management of joint speciality officers. The recommended provisions would simplify the requirements to be designated as a joint speciality officer, would require that Joint Professional Military Training be conducted in residence, would establish the promotion objectives for joint speciality officers as a group to be equal to or greater than the rate of officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category serving on the headquarters staff of that armed force, would establish the minimum tour length to qualify for joint tour, and would modify the required contents of the annual report to comply with the simplified management requirements.⁴⁰

³⁷ “CJCS 2000 Posture Statement to Congress,” Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2000: 24. [<http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00.html>]

³⁸ United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000. [<http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020>]

³⁹ 106th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Rept. 106-292, May 12, 2000.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 298. As used speciality refers to specialty and Joint Professional Military Training refers to Joint Professional Military Education.

This legislative language from S.2549 is consistent with the DoD proposal with two major exceptions. First, section 522 of the bill would alter promotion comparisons to compare all officers serving in and having previously served in a joint duty assignment, to officers of the same armed force, in the same grade and competitive category who are serving on the headquarters staff of that armed force; whereas the DoD proposal, would discontinue the comparison of officers having previously served. In addition, the DoD proposal called for comparing Joint Staff assigned officers to headquarters staffs and all other officers in joint duty assignments outside the Joint Staff to the service average. As a result, the Senate language would increase non-compliance reporting, because it raises the promotion criteria standards above what is currently expected. If the Army and Air Force placed every promotion allocation toward joint officer (none toward the Service), most likely they could not meet the criteria set by the Senate language. The second major exception is that there were no significant changes to Joint Professional Military Education in the legislative language. Specifically, there was no change to allow the utilization of current technology, specifically distributive or distance learning, for accomplishing joint education.

Options for Congress

Framers of the GNA wrote of a need for congressional oversight and congressional fine-tuning of the law to ensure the continual progression set in motion by the original legislation. As already mentioned, the DoD has made a proposal to make changes in the joint personnel officer management program. In early February 2000, General Shelton, CJCS, submitted these suggested program changes in the GNA to Congress in the posture statement to the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services. This and other congressional options are presented below.

Options for Congressional Action

Continue the Status Quo. There are those who believe DoD did not originally embrace “jointness” and that more effort should be made to make it work on its own terms before altering it. If this option is elected, the DoD believes a dilemma is quickly approaching under the rules of the current law. The DoD will have the option to produce additional JSOs to meet requirements, but doing so will draw the DoD into a situation where the promotion targets are not met. Or, the DoD could maintain the current promotion standards and fail to fill the requisite number of JDAL military positions, thus creating an impact on joint operations which has yet to be defined. Either DoD choice would lead to reporting non-compliance to Congress. In addition, maintaining the status quo will not allow the DoD the utilization of current technological advances to expand JPME within the current active force and to introduce JPME to the reserve components.

Adjust the GNA. Congress could accept the pledge of the DoD to progress with the original intent of the GNA and allow flexibility concerning how to best proceed. Proponents of the DoD proposal believe it will allow the DoD to grow and groom the required airmen/soldiers/sailors/Marines with an appropriate joint view to

meet the ever-expanding, future needs of both joint operations and the military departments.

Congress could modify the GNA by accepting only select aspects of the proposal:

- Establishment of JSO duty identifiers to expand the JSO population
- Deletion of critical positions
- Decoupling of promotion comparisons from JSO designations
- Redesigned promotion comparisons
- Adjusted tour lengths
- Delinking of JPME and the assignment process
- Redesigned JPME

Or, Congress could modify the DoD proposal by adding additional aspects:

- Solicit CINC-specific and service-specific Chiefs of Personnel opinions of and suggestions concerning the overall DoD proposal (DoD did solicit in 1997 prior to proposal formulation of their current proposal)
- Offer joint credit to all officers regardless of grade when serving joint; offer joint credit to all O-3s when serving joint⁴¹
- Require complete review/deletion of duplication of effort within the offices of the Secretary of Defense and JCS concerning joint officer personnel management
- Require a complete DoD business plan defining the future joint officer – exactly how many/what specialty are required prior to proceeding with any proposal – and, requiring a recruitment business plan to meet requirements

⁴¹ With consideration to allowing joint credit for additional grades, a couple of significant points surface: a) joint agencies and CINC staffs would be allowed greater personnel management flexibility based upon the number of O-3s assigned (the joint Staff and OSD would experience little impact based upon the small number of O-3 assignees); b) expanding the eligibility criteria to include O-3s would expand the JSO pool, increasing the number of GO/FO eligible officers, and would offer relief for the 50% assignment rules; and c) expanding the eligibility could also negatively affect the promotion targets based upon the difficulty to predict O-3 promotion potential at such a young career point and it could increase the assignment gap between serving joint and GO/FO promotion.

Furthermore, Congress could adjust the GNA as presented in the Senate committee's report (S.Rept. 106-292). Congress might accept the language in S. 2549 and doing so will enhance some aspects of joint officer personnel management, such as allowing joint duty identifiers to track all joint experience. But, the language concerning promotion criteria will intensify the non-compliance reporting predicted by the DoD, and it will not allow for the expansion of joint education by utilizing available technologies.

Pursue Other Options: Commission, Hearing, Special Committee, Study.

Congress could elect to establish a commission, hold hearings, appoint a special committee or mandate a study to further investigate the DoD's proposal. Such action would allow Congress to seek opinions from academics, senior current/retired military, and other experts before determining a course of action. Choosing the correct mix of persons to participate in a commission, hearing, special committees, or study is important because of the intricacies of the GNA.

The GNA in Relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act

Although the focus of this report is joint officer personnel management in relation to the GNA, Congress may also want to consider military personnel management in relation to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).⁴² As the GNA focused on the DoD organization and manning for joint operations, DOPMA created uniform laws for the military services with the intent to allow for the recruitment and retention of an appropriate number of quality officers, and to afford all officers consistent career opportunities. DOPMA addresses grade tables, authority to manage the officer force, field-grade allocations, promotion procedures/opportunities/timelines, provisions for career expectations/appointment of regular officers, competitive categories, and tenure issues. A change in the DOPMA could have residual effects on joint officer personnel management, but it probably would not change the challenges presented in this report.

Some believe that an extension of the retirement eligibility of 20 years could resolve the joint officer personnel management issues. They profess that extending the years required in a career would allow for additional time for the fulfillment of joint requirements. Although adding man-years by any means, whether it be via extending career lengths or expanding authorized end-strengths, could have a positive effect – decrease OPTEMPO, increase quality of life, etc. – it would not address the joint officer personnel challenges faced today, such as bureaucratic complexity, the prospect on non-compliance reporting, and other issues discussed above. In addition, many believe that the negative effects – if not grandfathered, a view of a broken promise or decreased retention, etc. – could far outweigh any net gain. To increase effectiveness and efficiency of joint officer personnel management, change must be addressed within the governing laws of the GNA.

⁴² Public Law 96-513, December 12, 1980. At the time of its enactment, DOPMA was the first comprehensive change in officer personnel management laws since 1947.

Appendix A: Historical Timeline

July 1947	National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253
August 1949	Amended National Security Act of 1949, Public Law 216
May 1954	Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA), PL 83-349
August 1958	Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Public Law 85-599
January 1968	North Korea seizes <i>USS Pueblo</i> , U.S. Navy intelligence ship, in Sea of Japan
March 1973	End of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam via Peace Accord
May 1975	Khmer Rouge seize <i>Mayaguez</i> , U.S. freighter, off coast of Cambodia; Marines attempt crew rescue
April 1980	Unsuccessful attempt to rescue U.S. embassy employees taken hostage in Tehran
November 1980	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), PL 96-513
January 1982	General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticizes the JCS structure and speaks out for reorganization
Spring 1982	House Armed Services Committee, Investigations Subcommittee, began five months of “JCS reform” hearings
August 1982	House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the Investigations Subcommittee. Senate Armed Services Committee elects not to entertain the House bill which disappears at the end of the session
June 1983	Chairman, Armed Services Committee, Senator John Tower (R-Tex), begins a series of hearings on defense management, not limited to but including JCS reform

August 1983	Again the House passes the JCS reform bill introduced by the Investigations Subcommittee, chaired by Bill Nichols (D-AL) and again the Senate Armed Services Committee elects not to consider the bill
Fall 1983	Senator John Tower appoints staffer James Locher to conduct a reorganization study
October 1983	Terrorist bombing of Marines barracks in Beirut Invasion of Grenada, Operation Urgent Fury
Summer 1984	In an effort to engage Senate consideration of the House JCS reform efforts, Representative Nichols introduces legislation which resulted in a multi-listing of questions forwarded to Department of Defense by the Senate Armed Services Committee
January 1985	Following the retirement of Senator John Tower, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz) becomes Chairman, Armed Services Committee and encourages James Locher to complete the reorganization study charged in mid-1984
March 1985	The Department of Defense, led by Secretary Casper Weinberger, responds to the Senate Armed Service Committee inquiries; DoD opposes reorganization
May 1985	Senate calls for the establishment of the Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Management
July 1985	The President creates a Presidential Commission on Defense Management chaired by David Packard (Packard Commission, <i>A Quest for Excellence</i>)
October 1985	Staffer James Locher reorganization staff study to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, S. Prt. 99-86, <i>Defense Organization: The Need for Change</i> , is published; the study calls for significant reform With strong involvement by Congressman Les Aspin (D-Wis), a bill was introduced and passed in the House in late 1985
November - December 1985	The Senate Armed Services Committee hosts extensive JCS reform hearings
December 1985 - January 1986	The Senate Armed Services Committee staff draft their version of JCS reform bill

February 1986	The interim Packard Commission report is released; it supports the reform arguments heard in the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings
March 1986	Following extensive debate and more than 85 amendments, the Senate Armed Services Committee approves the JCS reform bill on March 6, The Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 The House Armed Services Committee embarks on a series of hearings concerning the general issue of Defense Management
April 1986	President Reagan directs the Department of Defense to implement virtually all the recommendations from the interim Packard Commission report
April - May 1986	The William Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, calling for more extensive reform than the Senate bill, is passed from the House Armed Services Committee in late June
May 1986	The Senate unanimously approves the Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
July 1986	Final version of the Packard Commission report, <i>A Quest for Excellence</i> , is published
August - September 1986	The House-Senate Conference confers on the William Nichols/Barry Goldwater Department of Defense Reorganization Acts of 1986
October 1986	Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
December 1989	Operation Just Cause, invasion of Panama
August 1990	Operation Desert Shield, Kuwait
January 1991	Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait
December 1992	Operation Restore Hope, Somalia
September 1994	Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti
December 1995	NATO-led multinational force, Bosnia-Herzegovina
March 1999	Operation Allied Forces, Kosova

Appendix B:

Abbreviation/Acronyms

APZ: Above the Promotion (Primary) Zone
BPZ: Below the Promotion (Primary) Zone
CINC: Commander-in-Chief/Commander-in-Charge
CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CNO: Chief of Naval Operations
COS: Critical Occupational Specialty
CSA: Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force
DA: Department of the Army
DoD: Department of Defense
DoDD: Department of Defense Directives
FITREP: Fitness Report
FO: Flag Officer
FY: Fiscal year
GAO: Government Accounting Office
GO: General Officer
GNA: Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986
HASC: House Armed Services Committee
ICAF: Industrial College of the Armed Forces
IPZ: In the Promotion (Primary) Zone
ISS: Intermediate Service School
JDA: Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL: Joint Duty Assignment Listing
JPME: Joint Professional Military Education
JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JSO: Joint Specialty Officer
JCS: Joint Chief of Staffs
NDU: National Defense University
NWC: National War College
OPTEMPO: Operating Tempo
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
PERSTEMPO: Personnel Tempo
PME: Professional Military Education
POC: Point of Contact
PL: Public Law
SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee
SecDef: Secretary of Defense
SSS: Senior Service School
USA: United States Army
USAF: United States Air Force
USD: Under Secretary of Defense
USMC: United States Marine Corps
USN: United States Navy
VCJCS: Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix C: Definitions

CAPSTONE - A course is a six-week course consisting of seminars, case studies, informal discussions, and visits to key U.S. military commands, with the objective of making attendees more effective in planning and employing joint and combined operations. The curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoperability and key allied nation issues. Created in 1982, as a voluntary participation course for GO/FOs, in 1986 the GNA mandated that all newly selected GO/FOs attend.

Combatant Commander - A commander-in-chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.

Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) - A military occupational specialty selected from among the combat arms of the Military Departments. Military specialties are those engaged in the operational art to attain strategic goals in a theatre of conflict through the design, organization, and conduct campaigns and major operations.

Critical Joint Duty Assignment, Military Position - A joint duty assignment position for which, considering the duties and responsibilities of the position, it is highly important that the assigned officer be particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. Critical military positions are selected by heads of joint organizations, approved by the Secretary of Defense and documented in the Joint Duty Assignment List.

Cross-Department Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which an officer serves full-time duties with another Military Department or with the armed forces of a foreign nation.

Dual Hat Joint Duty Assignment - An assignment in which the officer has responsibilities to both a parent Service and to a joint activity.

Field Grade - An officer serving in the grade of 0-4 (Major or Lieutenant Commander) through 0-6 (Colonel or Navy Captain)

Joint - Activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate.

Joint Doctrine - Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is promulgated by the CJCS in coordination with the CINCs, services and joint staff.

Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) - An assignment to a designated position in a multi-service, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three military departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning,

contingency planning and command and control of combat operations under a unified or specified command.

Joint Duty Assignment Listing (JDAL)- A consolidated listing of all field grade positions designated as joint duty assignments as approved by the Secretary of Defense and maintained by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Force - A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments, operating under a single joint force commander.

Joint Force Commander - A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force.

Joint Matters - The law, PL 99-33, section 668, defines “joint matters” as matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to (1) national military strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency planning; and, (3) command and control of combat operations under unified command.

Joint Operations - a general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves do not create joint forces.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) - Resident professional military education programs of the National Defense University and other programs as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The National War College, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Armed Forces Staff College are designated as institutions of JPME.

Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) - An officer on the active duty list who is particularly trained in and oriented toward joint matters. In order to be eligible to become a JSO, an officer must complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and then complete a full Joint Duty Assignment (JDA).

Joint Specialty officer Nominee - An officer who has completed a program of joint professional military education or an officer who has a critical occupational specialty tour. In either instance, the officer has been designated as a joint specialty officer nominee by the concerned military service.

Joint Staff - The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinate functional component which includes members from two or more of the military departments. Included in this definition is the staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Joint Task Force (JTF) - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (A temporary operation which is created to

handle a specific mission for which there are no permanent military positions authorized and for which there is no intent to authorize permanent military positions)

Joint Vision 2010 - A publication originally released by General John M. Shalikashvili (USA Retired), Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, which provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the armed forces for a challenging and uncertain future.

Joint Vision 2020 - An updated version of *JV 2010* released by General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in June 2000, which extends the original concepts of *JV 2010* out to the year 2020 and continues to focus of a fully joint force which will be dominant across a full spectrum of military operations.

Jointness - a unified direction of the armed forces governed by joint doctrine and policies for the employment of multi-service military forces and the efficient use of defense resources

Personnel - Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission.

Professional Military Education - Provides individual military members with the skills, knowledge, understanding, appreciation which enables them to make sound decision in progressively more demanding positions within the national security environment.

*NOTE - unless stated other wise, these definitions refer to words and/or phrases as defined by the DoD. [[Http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/)]

Appendix D: DoD Compliance with the GNA

The DoD compliance with the GNA depicted in the following tables, is based upon FY1999 data extracted from the SecDef's annual report to the President and Congress:

Table 4. Summary of Critical Positions

	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Critical Positions	347	319	56	155	877
Vacant Critical Positions	52	78	11	26	167
% Critical Positions Filled	86%	78%	80%	83%	81%
Critical Positions filled by JSOs	204	187	10	68	469
Critical Positions filled by non-JSOs	39	54	35	61	241

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

DoD reported that there were 877 COS positions with 81% of these positions filled. Various reasons exist as to why the critical positions are filled by officers who are not JSOs: (1) the positions could have been filled by a non-JSO before it was designated on the JDAL; (2) the positions are being converted from critical to non-critical, or being deleted; or, (3) a JSO was not available and, the best qualified officers assigned to these positions were not JSOs. Mission changes drive redesignations of critical positions and can affect the percentage of fill.

Table 5. Average Length of Tour of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments
(In months)

General/Flag Officers	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Joint Staff (JCS)	24.0	24.5	24.5	22.0	23.8
Other Joint	25.3	27.9	25.3	31.8	27.3
Joint Total <small>(note 1)</small>	25.0	27.3	24.8	29.3	26.5
Field Grade Officers	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Joint Staff (JCS)	35.7	34.8	41.5	36.0	35.7
Other Joint	37.6	38.3	38.3	38.8	38.1
Joint Total <small>(note 2)</small>	37.5	37.9	38.5	38.5	37.9

Note 1: GNA requires a tour length of 24 months

Note 2: GNA requires a tour length of 36 months

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

Tour lengths, as reported in Table 5, are not tracked by JSO, JSO nominee and non-JSO categories, but rather, at the request of Congress, the reporting is by the assignment categories of Joint Staff, other joint and total. In 1999, only the compliance within the joint staff fell short of the designated 24 months for GO/FO and 36 months for field grade officers. Navy tour lengths are the primary reason that the GO/FO statistics fell short, and both the Army and the Air Force tour lengths are highlighted as the reason the field grade officers, joint staff, did not meet the requirements. In addition, there are numerous reasons for tour length exclusion: retirement; separation; suspension from duty; compassionate/medical reassignment; assignment to other joint duty following promotion; reorganization; joint overseas short tours; second tours; joint accumulation; and, reassignment to another critical specialty officer military position.

Table 6. GO/FO Joint Equivalency Waivers

	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Officers Selected for 0-7	40	40	15	35	130
Officers Joint Qualified	32	34	15	24	105
Percent Joint Qualified	80%	85%	100%	69%	81%
Joint Equivalency Waivers Used	0	0	0	0	0

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

In early year assessments of GO/FO compliance, it was fairly routine for the DoD to fall short of expectations. The DoD cites a significant reduction in the number of joint duty, “good of the service”,⁴³ waivers over any previous year for officers attaining GO/FO rank as a positive indicator of their commitment to the GNA (see Table 6). The narrative of the SecDef Annual report states that there were a total of 102 GO/FO waivers granted in FY1999.

Table 7. Summary of COS Officers

	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Completed JPME	1,539	2,074	525	1,452	5,590
Designated as JSO	977	1,168	398	888	3,431
JSO-nominees	2,227	2,951	573	2,332	8,083
JSO-nominees without JPME	1,627	1,988	422	1,764	5,801
JSO-nominees serving in JDA	1,075	1,245	244	1,017	3,581
JSO-nominees completed JDA currently attending JPME	6	11	0	11	28

* “Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000.”
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

Congress requires reports related specifically to COS officers as shown above in Table 7. A positive highlight, but not visible in the above chart, is the increase in JPME completion by COS officers. In addition, the narrative of the SecDef report notes that the number of officers who have completed Phase I JPME by correspondence or seminar is increasing.

⁴³ “Good of the Service” waivers allow SecDef to waive the requirement for joint duty prior to promotion to O-7. The number of waivers is unlimited and the language in the law does not require the service to give defined/logical reason as to why the officer did not serve a joint tour.

Table 8. JSO with COS Who Are Serving in Second Joint Assignment

Field Grade	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Have Served	255(94)	282(112)	30(15)	88(41)	655(262)
Are Serving	123(54)	153(62)	19(5)	68(21)	363(142)
GO/FO	USA	USAF	USMC	USN	Total
Have Served	14(6)	37(10)	11(7)	13(6)	75(29)
Are Serving	17(7)	29(13)	3(3)	3(1)	52(24)

NOTE: Number in parenthesis indicates number of second joint assignments which were to a critical joint military position

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

The DoD continues to see an increase in number of COS officers filling JDA assignments twice. Many proponents of GNA note this increase as another positive step in the evolution of the Act.

The narrative of the SecDef report reveals that a total of 284 field grade waivers: 18 JSO sequence, 32 JSO two-tour, 5 JDA assignment and 229 JDA tour length waivers were utilized in FY1999.

The following charts provide promotion comparisons of joint officers in relation to service officers. These comparisons were intended to offer a view of the quality of the officers assigned to joint positions.

Table 9. Army Promotion Comparisons

Grade	Category	Are Serving In			Have Served In			Total in Zone		
		In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	Con	Sel	%
0-8	Joint Staff	100	N/A	N/A	80	N/A	N/A	8	7	88
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23	10	44
	Service HQ	67	N/A	N/A	60	N/A	N/A	11	7	64
	Other Joint	80	N/A	N/A	40	N/A	N/A	15	8	53
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	62	32	52
0-7	Joint Staff	9	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	86	4	5
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	730	13	2
	Service HQ	5	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	194	7	4
	Other Joint	5	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	272	13	5

	Board Ave	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1725	40	2
0-6	Joint Staff	63	0	8	74	5	0	45	31	69
	JSO	38	0	4	65	4	0	125	74	60
	Service HQ	37	2	2	58	3	0	184	96	52
	Other Joint	56	0	4	19	1	3	246	91	37
	Board Avg	42	2	3	42	2	3	806	341	42
0-5	Joint Staff	92	22	0	N/A	0	N/A	12	11	92
	JSO	100	0	0	86	0	N/A	7	6	86
	Service HQ	72	5	0	84	13	0	114	88	77
	Other Joint	81	6	5	52	2	7	317	233	74
	Board Avg	69	4	3	69	4	3	1386	954	69
0-4	Joint Staff	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	78	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	9	7	76
	Other Joint	75	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	5	3	60
	Board Avg	78	4	19	78	4	19	1732	1353	78

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

Table 10. Air Force Promotion Comparisons

Grade	Category	Are Serving In			Have Served In			Total in Zone		
		In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	Con	Sel	%
0-8	Joint Staff	33	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	9	1	11
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	61	19	31
	Service HQ	29	N/A	N/A	13	N/A	N/A	21	5	24
	Other Joint	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	5	0	0
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	93	28	30
0-7	Joint Staff	10	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	51	3	6
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	565	26	5
	Service HQ	7	N/A	N/A	2	N/A	N/A	144	8	6
	Other Joint	1	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	229	4	2

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	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1615	40	3
0-6	Joint Staff	86	12	25	55	4	0	47	34	72
	JSO	61	0	5	57	2	0	125	71	57
	Service HQ	53	2	6	61	6	0	150	89	59
	Other Joint	47	2	4	34	2	17	204	84	41
	Board Avg	41	2	1	41	2	1	798	330	41
0-5	Joint Staff	95	5	0	N/A	0	0	19	18	95
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	80	9	9	81	9	0	183	147	80
	Other Joint	71	4	6	59	2	4	386	262	68
	Board Avg	65	4	3	65	4	3	1817	1179	65
0-4	Joint Staff	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	96	N/A	100	100	N/A	N/A	31	30	97
	Other Joint	86	N/A	100	80	N/A	0	27	23	85
	Board Avg	86	N/A	13	86	N/A	13	1953	1689	87

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec>]

Table 11. Marine Corps Promotion Comparisons

Grade	Category	Are Serving In			Have Served In			Total in Zone		
		In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	Con	Sel	%
0-8	Joint Staff	0	N/A	N/A	50	N/A	N/A	3	1	33
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17	9	53
	Service HQ	22	N/A	N/A	100	N/A	N/A	12	5	42
	Other Joint	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	22	10	46
0-7	Joint Staff	13	N/A	N/A	11	N/A	N/A	35	4	11
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	200	9	5
	Service HQ	4	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	67	2	3
	Other Joint	6	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	76	3	4
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	490	15	3
0-6	Joint Staff	53	0	0	100	0	N/A	18	11	61
	JSO	40	0	0	50	0	0	31	13	42
	Service HQ	25	0	0	50	0	0	38	15	40
	Other Joint	55	0	0	21	0	0	41	19	46
	Board Avg	44	0	0	44	0	0.01	207	92	44
0-5	Joint Staff	57	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	8	4	50
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	77	0	0	73	0	0.04	95	71	75
	Other Joint	81	0	7	78	0	0	78	63	81
	Board Avg	68	0	5	68	0	0.05	563	381	68
0-4	Joint Staff	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	91	0	50	0	0	N/A	12	10	83
	Other Joint	100	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4	4	100
	Board Avg	84	0	12	84	0	0.12	788	658	84

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

Table 12. Navy Promotion Comparisons

Grade	Category	Are Serving In			Have Served In			Total in Zone		
		In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	In Zone %	Below Zone %	Above Zone %	Con	Sel	%
0-8	Joint Staff	0	N/A	N/A	50	N/A	N/A	16	7	44
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	22	7	32
	Service HQ	22	N/A	N/A	67	N/A	N/A	18	8	44
	Other Joint	40	N/A	N/A	50	N/A	N/A	14	7	50
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	46	22	48
0-7	Joint Staff	22	N/A	N/A	6	N/A	N/A	110	10	9
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	411	11	3
	Service HQ	7	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	260	12	5
	Other Joint	3	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	247	7	3
	Board Avg	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1249	35	3
0-6	Joint Staff	93	0	50	73	0	0	48	38	79
	JSO	25	0	0	69	0	13	110	67	61
	Service HQ	56	3	14	64	1	11	115	61	53
	Other Joint	38	0	4	41	1	0	166	70	42
	Board Avg	47	1	11	47	1	11	792	375	47
0-5	Joint Staff	88	8	0	67	0	0	11	9	82
	JSO	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	89	0	8	76	1	0	72	58	81
	Other Joint	71	3	9	76	14	0	164	120	73
	Board Avg	65	1	6	65	1	6	1164	759	65
0-4	Joint Staff	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	JSO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0
	Service HQ	60	0	33	100	0	0	16	12	75
	Other Joint	69	0	0	91	0	0	42	31	74
	Board Avg	69	14	19	69	14	19	1706	1178	69

NOTE: Con = considered; Sel = selected

* "Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2000."
[http://www.dtic.mil/execsec]

As detailed earlier and as can be noted in Tables 9-12, promotion comparisons are complex.

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