Order Code IB92011
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
Updated June 13, 2000
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Human Spaceflight
Space Science and Applications
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Commercial Space Programs
Military Space Programs
Interagency Coordination
International Cooperation and Competition
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
Space Program Issues
NASA’s Current Challenges
Military Space in the Post-Cold War Era
Space Launch Vehicles: 1998-1999 Failures and Developing New Systems
Environment
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
Ballistic Missile Proliferation
International Relationships
LEGISLATION

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U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
SUMMARY
The 106th Congress is addressing a broad
FY2001 request.
range of civilian, military, and commercial
space issues.
Civilian and military satellites provide
data useful for environmental objectives.
The National Aeronautics and Space
NASA’s Earth Observing System has been
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
controversial for several years because of its
visible space activities. NASA’s International
cost and other issues. A probe proposed by
Space Station (ISS) program is the most
Vice President Gore called Triana to transmit
controversial because it is over budget, behind
images of the Earth to the Internet is the
schedule, and relies on Russia for some
current focus of controversy, however.
hardware and services. Nevertheless, it has
Proponents insist that it will provide important
survived 21 termination attempts in NASA
scientific data. Critics argue that it was not
funding bills since 1991. Other NASA issues
subjected to proper peer review.
are whether NASA is adequately managing its
flight programs, ensuring the safe operation of
The appropriate role of the government in
the space shuttle, developing new launch
facilitating commercial space businesses is an
vehicles, and facilitating space commercializa-
ongoing debate. For many years, the focus has
tion. Concerns about NASA’s budget have
been on commercial space launch services, but
been somewhat ameliorated in the FY2001
remote sensing satellites also pose complex
budget request. NASA received $13.6 billion
questions.
for FY2000. The request for FY2001 is $14
billion, and is projected to rise to $15.6 billion
Space launch vehicles are similar to
by FY2005.
ballistic missiles and concerns exist about the
potential transfer of certain space technologies
The Department of Defense (DOD) has a
to countries intending to build missiles as well.
less visible but equally substantial space pro-
U.S. linkage between space cooperation and
gram. Tracking the DOD space budget is
adherence to the Missile Technology Control
extremely difficult since space is not identified
Regime was a significant factor in reaching
as a separate line item in the budget. DOD
agreement on cooperative and commercial
sometimes releases only partial information
space activities with Russia, and creates a
(omitting funding for classified programs) or
complex relationship with China.
will suddenly release without explanation new
figures for prior years that are quite different
International cooperation and competi-
from what was previously reported. However,
tion in space are being affected by the world
in July 1999, OMB reported that DOD’s total
economic situation and the post-Cold War
space budget was $12.359 billion for FY1998
political climate. President Clinton’s decision
and $13.207 billion for FY1999. For FY2000,
to merge NASA’s space station program with
$13.026 billion was requested; final appropria-
Russia’s is symbolic of the dramatic changes,
tions figures are not yet available. Nor is the
and the risks.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 12, the House Appropriations Committee reported the FY2001 VA-HUD-IA
appropriations bill (H.R. 4635, H. Rept. 106-674), which includes NASA. The committee cut
NASA’s FY2001 request of $14 billion by $322 million. That would give the agency $113
million more than in FY2000. It also directed NASA to terminate all joint aeronautics and
space related research programs with the Air Force.
The House passed the FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations bill (H.R.
4576, H. Rept. 106-644) on June 7; the Senate has begun debate on its version (S. 2593, S.
Rept. 106-298). The House passed the FY2001 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 4205) on May
18; the Senate has begun debate on its version (S. 2549, S. Rept. 106-292). Among space-
related issues, the Senate authorization and appropriation bills add funding for the space-
based laser (SBL) program and Army space control technologies, and the Senate
authorization bill adds funding for the Kinetic Energy antisatellite (KEAsat) program. The
House authorization bill funds the requested levels for those programs (zero in the case of
KEAsat). The House appropriations bill reduces funding for the SBL program and funds
space control and KEAsat at the requested levels. The House passed the FY2001
intelligence authorization bill (H.R. 4392) on May 23. The Senate Intelligence Committee
reported its version of the bill (S. 2507, S. Rept. 106-279) on May 4. The House and Senate
Intelligence Committees expressed concern about inadequate funding for utilizing data
produced by intelligence satellites, especially under the Future Imagery Architecture soon
to be implemented.
(See also: CRS Issue Brief IB93017, Space Stations; CRS Report RL30493, NASA’s
FY2001 Budget Request ...; CRS Report RS20252, NASA’s Triana Spacecraft; and CRS
Issue Brief IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles...)
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568, the “NASA Act”), symbolized the
entrance of the United States into the space age. The Soviet Union had successfully orbited
the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957, lending the U.S. space program a
new urgency. The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1 (developed and launched by the Army), was
orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures of the Naval Research Laboratory’s
Vanguard rocket. President Eisenhower’s desire to separate military and civilian space
activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the civilian NASA on October 1, 1958,
with the Department of Defense (DOD) retaining control over military space programs.
Human Spaceflight. The Soviets achieved another space “first” on April 12, 1961,
when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth. The United States responded by
launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5 (though he made only a suborbital flight; the
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first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in February 1962). Following Shepard’s
flight, President Kennedy announced that the United States intended to put a man on the
Moon within a decade, a goal accomplished on July 20, 1969 when Neil Armstrong and Buzz
Aldrin walked on the Moon (a total of six 2-man crews walked on the Moon through 1972).
Apollo was followed by the Skylab space station (to which 3 crews were sent in 1973-1974)
and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in which a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with 3 astronauts
and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft with 2 cosmonauts docked for 2 days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s space shuttle program to develop a reusable
spacecraft for taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit. The first shuttle flight occurred in
1981 and the system was declared operational in 1982. The Challenger tragedy in January
1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months, but all the missions since the shuttle
returned to flight in 1988 have been successful. NASA remains concerned about shuttle
safety, however, and in the FY2001 budget request is asking for funds to hire more people
at the NASA centers that work on the shuttle program (see CRS Issue Brief 93062).
In 1984, President Reagan directed NASA to build a permanently occupied space station
“within a decade.” In 1988, Europe, Canada and Japan agreed to be partners with the United
States in building the space station. Redesigned and rescheduled repeatedly, President
Clinton called for yet another redesign in 1993 and later that year merged NASA’s space
station program with Russia’s. That program, the International Space Station (ISS), is the
one currently being built. The first two segments of ISS were launched at the end of 1998
and docked together by a space shuttle crew. ISS now awaits the launch of the third
segment, Russia’s Zvezda Service Module. That schedule is uncertain because of funding
difficulties in Russia, the delay in U.S. shuttle launches, and software problems. Questions
about Russia’s financial ability to fulfill its obligations to the ISS program and substantial cost
overruns on NASA’s part of the program make ISS an issue of continuing controversy.
Twenty-one attempts since 1991 to terminate the program in NASA funding bills and three
attempts in broader legislation have failed (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).
Space Science and Applications. NASA has launched many spacecraft for space
science and applications. Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts,
and have visited all the planets in the solar system except Pluto. Many space science
spacecraft are now in development or operating. As discussed further under the section on
“Current NASA Issues” below, in 1999, NASA lost two Mars missions, one of which
involved three separate spacecraft, so a total of four spacecraft were lost. First was the Mars
Climate Orbiter (MCO) that failed in September 1999 because NASA used metric units while
its contractor, Lockheed Martin, used English units for calculating and sending navigation
commands to MCO. Consequently, the probe was off course as it attempted to go into Mars’
orbit. MCO carried replacement instruments to compensate for another failed NASA probe,
Mars Observer, with which NASA had lost contact just before it reached Mars in 1993.
MCO’s sister spacecraft, Mars Polar Lander (MPL), and two “Deep Space 2" probes carried
with it were lost in December 1999. An investigation team could not determine for certain
what caused the failures, but believes that MPL was lost due to a software design problem.
MCO and MPL were carried as a single line item in the NASA budget with a total cost of
$328.5 million. MCO and MPL were part of NASA’s Mars Surveyor program in which two
spacecraft were to be sent to Mars every 26 months (when Earth and Mars are aligned
properly). They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to scientific
spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information, but take
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longer and cost more to build. The last two of that type are Galileo, which arrived at Jupiter
in 1995 and continues to return data, and Cassini, now enroute to Saturn. The FBC approach
is now being scrutinized, however, and NASA is restructuring its Mars exploration program.
Earth-orbiting observatories have studied the universe since the 1960s, creating new
fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths (such as x-rays
and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. In the 1980s, NASA embarked
upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Three have been launched: Hubble Space Telescope, launched April 1990 (for the
visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, launched April 1991, deorbited
June 2000; and Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July 1999. The fourth, Space Infrared
Telescope Facility (SIRTF), was reduced in size because of budgetary issues, but NASA still
calls it a “great observatory.” SIRTF is scheduled for launch in 2001.
The 1960s witnessed the development of communications and meteorological satellites
by NASA, and in the 1970s, land and ocean remote sensing satellites. NASA’s role in this
aspect of space utilization, called space applications, traditionally is for R&D, not operations,
however. Once the technology is proven, operational responsibility is transferred to other
government agencies or the private sector. NASA continues to perform research in many of
these areas, and the Landsat land remote sensing program was returned to NASA after a
decade of trying to privatize it. NASA’s major environmental satellite research program today
is the Earth Observing System, a series of satellites to be launched over 15-20 years to
provide data to help understand global climate change (see Environment). Controversy also
has erupted over another Earth science program, Triana (see Environment).
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Beginning in the 1960s, other agencies became involved in space. At that time,
operation of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. The Landsat land
remote sensing satellite system was transferred to NOAA in 1979. (Later, NOAA oversaw
private sector operation of the system, but in 1992, Congress moved the program back into
the government; see below). The Department of Commerce also is involved in space issues
due to its role in trade policy and export of items on the Commerce Control List, and has an
Office of Space Commercialization mandated to facilitate commercial space businesses. In
1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was given responsibility for facilitating and
regulating commercial launch services companies. This function is performed through the
Federal Aviation Administration. DOT and DOD co-chair a group that oversees use of
DOD’s Global Positioning System of navigation satellites. DOT represents civilian users and
has programs to augment the system’s utility to the civilian community. Other government
agencies involved in space include the Department of Energy, which historically has
developed nuclear power sources for satellites; the Departments of Agriculture and Interior
(particularly the U.S. Geological Survey) that use satellite data for crop forecasting and map
making, for example; and the Department of State, which develops international space policy
and determines whether to grant export licenses for items on the Munitions List (including
some types of spacecraft and launch vehicles). The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and other White
House offices also are involved. President Clinton released a comprehensive space policy on
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September 19, 1996, covering all government space activities including those in support of
commercial objectives.
Commercial Space Programs
Civilian communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to commercialize
other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success. Congress has passed several
laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch services for putting satellites into orbit
(the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988 Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments, the 1990 Launch Services Purchase Act, and the 1998 Commercial Space
Act). The development of a U.S. commercial launch services industry has been largely
successful. DOD and NASA continue to play a strong role in developing new launch
vehicles, though private companies also are developing their own. The most controversial
issues are the relative roles of the government versus the private sector in developing new
systems, ensuring that U.S. companies can compete with foreign launch services companies,
and trade and missile proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for
launch. These issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites by
privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365). Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
uses. After a tumultuous 8 years that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress
repealed that Act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-555), bringing Landsat back under government sponsorship. The Act also promoted
development of new systems by the private sector. Coupled with a 1994 Clinton
Administration policy, these actions led several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build
remote sensing satellites and offer imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must
obtain an operating license from NOAA for such systems. (The first successful launch of a
commercial imaging satellite, Space Imaging’s Ikonos 2, was achieved in September 1999).
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses continues
to complicate this commercial space effort, however. Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, some of the private sector systems under development can produce
imagery with 1 meter resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size).
NASA’s Landsat 7 offers 15 meter resolution. France, Russia, and India offer commercial
satellite imagery with 10-meter, 2-meter, and 6-meter resolution respectively. Tensions
between the government and the private sector in implementing the 1994 Clinton policy to
ensure that national security is not harmed by commercial imagery sales prompted an
interagency review. One major issue is when the government can exercise “shutter control,”
forcing companies to discontinue obtaining or distributing imagery of certain parts of the
world in times of crisis. Shutter control is part of the 1994 policy, but the companies want
greater guidance on when it could be exercised. Another issue is the government’s role in
controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which countries may invest in the U.S.-owned
systems. U.S. companies want time limits on how long the government can take to decide
whether particular sales or investments will be permitted so they can make wise business
decisions. Under the 1992 Landsat Act, the Commerce Department has 120 days to accept
or reject license applications. However, Clinton Administration policy requires that it consult
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with other agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense. There are no time limits
for those departments.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel. On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (one of the U.S. systems, built by Orbital Sciences Corporation and
subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be made available to
Saudi Arabia, which is providing partial financing for the system and would be the location
of a ground station. Eyeglass officials subsequently agreed not to take images of Israel, but
the issue of access to high quality data is still controversial. The FY1997 DOD authorization
bill (P.L. 104-201) included language prohibiting the collection and release, or U.S.
government declassification, of satellite imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more
detailed or precise than what is available from commercial sources.
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military, since
the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes. The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have strongly encouraged the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) to purchase commercial imagery to augment classified imagery. NIMA has
announced several contracts with commercial imagery providers.
Other potential commercial space activities are microgravity materials processing
(making products such as purer pharmaceuticals by utilizing the microgravity conditions in
space), space tourism, and space facilities such as Spacehab’s modules that fly inside the
space shuttle’s cargo bay for scientific experiments or carrying cargo.
Representative Rohrabacher is a strong proponent of the potential of space as a
commercial venue and introduced legislation (H.R. 3898) on March 9, 2000, that would
exempt products manufactured in space or services provided in or from space from certain
federal taxes. The exemption would not apply to services provided by telecommunications
or weather or other earth observation satellites, or services for transporting property to or
from space. The exemption would begin to be phased out in 2026.
Military Space Programs
The creation of NASA was a deliberate step by President Eisenhower to separate
military and civilian space activities. Among other things, he wanted to stress that the United
States was interested in the peaceful uses of space, but recognized that space had military
applications as well. The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military
space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). The Air Force is DOD’s
executive agent for most space programs. The intelligence community (coordinated by the
Director of Central Intelligence) makes significant use of space-based intelligence collection
capabilities, and participates in managing satellite reconnaissance programs through the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency within DOD. NRO builds and operates
intelligence collection satellites, and collects and processes the resulting data. The data are
provided to users such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA). How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work
together effectively on space matters has been an issue for several years. The FY2000 DOD
authorization act (P.L. 106-65) establishes a Commission to Assess U.S. National Security
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Space Management and Organization to report within six months of its first meeting
(expected in June 2000). The panel’s membership was announced in May 2000; it will be
chaired by former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. One issue it will address is whether a Space
Force should be created separate from the other military services. Also, the FY2000
intelligence authorization act (P.L.106-120) establishes a National Commission on the Review
of the National Reconnaissance Office to report in one year.
DOD and the intelligence community rely increasingly on satellites for reconnaissance,
surveillance, early warning, weather forecasts, navigation, and communications. During the
Persian Gulf War, space-based sensors furnished commanders and staff at all levels with
detailed information, often in near real-time, and satellites were crucial for communications
between the National Command Authority in the United States and Central Command in the
Persian Gulf, and within Central Command. GPS navigation satellites helped U.S. and allied
land, sea, and air forces pinpoint their own locations as well as enemy targets. Support from
space displayed great improvement over what was available during the last major conflict,
Vietnam. Hence, the Persian Gulf War is dubbed by some the first “space war.”
The separation between military and civilian space programs remains, but the functions
performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided. Both sectors
use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance satellites, which
may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have similar technology.
The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military, civilian, or commercial
satellite. DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice verse.
DOD develops space launch vehicles, too. The Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles
were all initially developed by DOD, while NASA developed Scout and Saturn (both no
longer produced), and the space shuttle. All except the shuttle are “expendable launch
vehicles” (ELVs) that can only be used once (the shuttle is reusable). An August 1994 White
House policy gave DOD responsibility for maintaining and upgrading the ELV fleet (through
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program), while NASA maintains the shuttle and
develops new reusable technology (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062).
After the Cold War ended, DOD and congressional interest in space weapons, both those
to attack other satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons) and weapons based in space to
attack ballistic missiles, declined initially, but since the 104th Congress, funding has been
added for these projects (see below). Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been
controversial since President Reagan’s 1983 announcement that he would initiate a Strategic
Defense Initiative to study the viability of building a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
to protect the United States and its allies. In May 1993, DOD changed the name of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO)reflecting decreased emphasis on “national missile defense” (NMD) to defend against
a Soviet attack and increased interest in “theater missile defense” (TMD) for regional
conflicts. In recent years, however, a renewed commitment to NMD has been made (see CRS
Issue Brief IB10034). Whether BMD weapons ultimately are based in space or on the ground,
a BMD system undoubtedly would require satellites for early warning, communications, and
other traditional support functions served by spacecraft.
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Interagency Coordination
Several different mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space
policy. Dissatisfied with the Reagan Administration’s approach of using a Senior Interagency
Group (SIG/Space) under the National Security Council, in the FY1989 NASA authorization
act (P.L. 100-685) Congress re-created the National Space Council. The original council,
which included aeronautics, was created in the 1958 Space Act but was abolished by
President Nixon in 1973. The FY1989 law required the council to be chaired by the Vice
President, but did not stipulate what agencies were members. President Clinton decided to
merge the Space Council functions into a National Science and Technology Council,
administered through the Office of Science and Technology Policy. It oversees civil and
commercial space policy; military space activities are overseen by the National Security
Council. The Space Council still exists in law, but it is not staffed or funded.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites. By this criterion, seven countries (Russia, the United
States, China, Japan, India, Israel, and Ukraine) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are
members. These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation in space, as well as competition. The 14 members of ESA are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. (North Korea claims to have
successfully launched a satellite in August 1998. The United States concluded it was a failed
satellite launch attempt. Others think it was a ballistic missile test.)
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA will conduct international space activities,
and most NASA space programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan have participated in many
cooperative space programs with NASA. Most of these countries also compete with U.S.
companies in space activities. As noted earlier, one area of current concern is competition
in launch services for placing satellites into orbit. Other competitors include France, Russia,
and India in remote sensing, Europe in communications satellite technology, and Europe and
Japan in microgravity materials processing research.
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention. A joint commission on economic and technological cooperation,
headed by Vice President Gore and the Russian prime minister, was created in 1993 and
meets semi-annually. Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense. The prestige competition may finally have ebbed,
and the reduction in military tensions has muted concerns about military satellites. Thus, the
main area of competition in the future may be on the economic front.
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NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of U.S. government space funding goes to NASA and DOD. The
accompanying table shows NASA and DOD space funding, but must be used cautiously.
Tracking the DOD space budget is difficult since space is not specifically identified as a line
item in the DOD budget. OMB and GAO provided CRS with DOD space funding figures
through FY1995 including funding for both unclassified and classified DOD space programs.
However, in 1996, the
Director of Central
NASA/DOD Space Funding
Intelligence decided for
In Billions of Unadjusted Dollars
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the NRO funding figure
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space spending were not
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available for more than a
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year. In the summer of
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1997, the Administration
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finally released a number
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for the total DOD
59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03
'
FY1996 space budget,
NASA
)DOD
$11.5 billion, but at the
Does not include Transition Quarter. See text for other notes.
same time revised
numbers downward for
FY1992-1995 without explanation. This table shows the data as provided in the FY1997
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President (published in 1998), with additional data from
OMB for DOD’s budget for FY1998, FY1999, and the FY2000 request. Final figures for
FY2000 are not yet available, nor is the FY2001 request. NASA received $13.6 billion for
FY2000; its FY2001 request is $14 billion. NASA’s out-year projections as shown in the
chart are from the FY2001 budget request. All NASA figures include aeronautics funding,
approximately $1-1.3 billion a year in recent years.
Space Program Issues
NASA’s Current Challenges
NASA has faced many challenges in recent years. During the early 1990s, high profile
problems (a 5-month delay in shuttle launches because of hydrogen leaks, the Hubble Space
Telescope originally not performing as planned, and the loss of the Mars Observer spacecraft)
created a perception that the agency was not managing programs adequately. During the
mid-1990s, NASA repaired its image, and even though in 1999 NASA began encountering
problems similar to those in the early 1990s, as well as delays in the space station program
and significant problems with developing new launch vehicles, it has escaped the intense
unfavorable media scrutiny of earlier years although Congress has focused on some of the
problems. In particular, the loss of the two Mars missions discussed earlier have been
sparked congressional interested, as well as internal NASA studies.
The 1999 Mars failures have raised concerns in general about NASA’s “faster, better,
cheaper” (FBC) approach to building spacecraft. Three reports requested by NASA were
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released in March 2000 that looked at the Mars failures and/or at the FBC paradigm in
general. Colloquially they are called the Stephenson Report, the Spear Report, and the Young
Report and are available at [http://www.nasa.gov/newsinfo/publicreports.html]. A fourth
report was prepared by the National Research Council at the request of Congress prior to the
Mars failures. NRC issue a prepublication version of the report on March 14 (Assessment of
Mission Size Trade-Offs for Earth and Space Science Missions). The Stephenson report is
the final report of a team headed by Arthur Stephenson, director of NASA’s Marshall
Spaceflight Center, that investigated the first Mars failure (Mars Climate Orbiter). An initial
Stephenson report had focused on technical issues, while the final report, released March 13,
focused on project management. It found flaws in the implementation of FBC and
recommended a modification to the FBC concept, termed “Mission Success First,” to ensure
proper processes are in place to ensure that missions succeed. The same day, NASA
released a report that had been requested by NASA Administrator Goldin assessing FBC in
general. It was prepared by Tony Spear who had worked on the successful Mars Pathfinder
program that landed a small rover on Mars in 1997. The Spear report identified
improvements needed to implement FBC missions successfully. A week later, the team
organized to investigate the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 failures and recommend
potential changes to NASA’s Mars exploration program released its 3-volume report that
looked not only at the Mars failures, but at three other projects that were conducted under
the FBC rubric and were successful. This team was headed by Tom Young, a retired
Lockheed Martin official (Lockheed Martin built both Mars Climate Orbiter and Mars Polar
Lander).The Young Report noted that in the missions that failed, there was a lack of training,
inexperienced project managers, understaffing, inadequate testing, and poor communications
between NASA and its contractors, including the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) that
executes NASA’s planetary exploration program. JPL is a Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC) operated by the California Institute of Technology. The
Young Report also cited lack of sufficient funding as a contributing factor to the spacecraft
losses, concluding that the project was underfunded by 30%. The Spear and Young reports
noted the lack of a precise definition of what FBC means, with different individuals holding
sharply differing viewpoints. None of the NASA reports recommended abandoning FBC.
Instead they all made recommendations on improving its implementation. Similarly, the NRC
report concluded that the FBC philosophy is sound but inherently creates additional risk. It
concluded that not all scientific missions can be accomplished under tight budget and size
constraints, and a range of small, medium, and large spacecraft are needed. NRC
recommended that”desired scientific outcomes” be the driver for determining mission size.
The Senate Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
held a hearing on March 22, 2000 on management problems at NASA where these and other
issues were discussed. Allegations in the media that NASA test results were altered in the
Mars Polar Lander program contributing to the probe’s failure prompted the chairmen and
ranking Democratic Senators on the full committee and subcommittee to request detailed
documents from NASA. The House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and
Aeronautics held a hearing on the Young Report April 12.
Military Space Issues
Congress has been quite supportive of DOD space programs in recent years. The DOD
space budget is difficult to track, as noted already, but the major DOD space programs have
been supported. Among them is a new early warning satellite system, the Space Based
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Infrared System (SBIRS). Existing satellites in the Defense Support Program (DSP) series
are primarily designed to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) rather than
shorter-range missiles, such as the Scud used by Iraq. After two failed attempts to initiate
new early warning satellite programs, SBIRS was proposed and approved in the FY1996
DOD budget. It comprises satellites in both high orbits (“SBIRS-High”) and low orbits
(“SBIRS-Low”), unlike DSP which only uses the “high” orbit. Congress added money to
accelerate the development of SBIRS in FY1996, FY1997, and FY1999.
Following a review that addressed technical, cost, and schedule issues in the program,
however, DOD restructured both SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low in the FY2000 request. The
first launch of SBIRS-High was delayed from 2002 to 2004 and the first launch of SBIRS-
Low from 2004 to 2006. Two demonstration projects for SBIRS-Low were canceled. The
FY2000 request was $328.6 million for SBIRS-High and $229 million for SBIRS-Low. The
House Intelligence Committee, and House and Senate Armed Services Committees all
expressed concerns in their reports on intelligence and DOD funding bills about how the
program was being managed. For SBIRS-Low, conferees on the DOD authorization bill
designated the primary purpose of the program as ballistic missile defense and made other
program management changes, including consolidating SBIRS-Low funding. The FY2000
DOD appropriations act also consolidated the SBIRS-Low funding, and for SBIRS-High,
added $92 million to the $328.7 million requested but placed constraints on obligating more
than $100 million. For FY2001, DOD is requesting $569 million for SBIRS-High and $241
million for SBIRS-Low. The House and Senate FY2001 DOD authorization bills (H.R.
4205/S. 2549), and the House and Senate DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 4576/S. 2593)
approve the requested funding levels. In April 2000, DOD agreed that management of
SBIRS-Low should return to BMDO and the Senate-reported version of the FY2001 DOD
authorization bill shifts the funding to BMDO.
As noted earlier, since 1995 Congress has shown renewed interest in space-based
weapons to destroy enemy missiles as part of a National Missile Defense (NMD), as well as
in weapons to attack satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, systems). In addition to funding
ground-based NMD programs, Congress added $50 million in FY1996, $70 million in
FY1997, $98 million in FY1998, and $74 million in FY1999 for space based laser (SBL)
research and development in the DOD appropriations bills. The FY1999 DOD authorization
conference report directed DOD to release promptly a request for proposals (RFP) for a
space based laser readiness demonstrator (SBL-RD). However, the Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board concluded that technology is not sufficiently advanced to proceed with the
SBL-RD, now renamed the Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX). The Air Force has
restructured the program so that instead of choosing a single contractor, a Boeing-Lockheed
Martin-TRW team will jointly develop the IFX, after which a spacecraft contractor will be
competitively selected. For FY2000, Congress added $10 million to the Air Force’s $63.8
million request for SBL and approved the $75 million requested for defense-wide RDT&E
for a total of $148.8 million. For FY2001, DOD is requesting $63 million for the Air Force
program and $75 million for defense-wide RDT&E. In the FY2001 DOD authorization bills
(H.R. 4205/S. 2549), the Senate Armed Services Committee added $30 million to the Air
Force level while the House approved the requested amounts. In the FY2001 DOD
appropriations bills (H.R. 4576/S. 2593), the House reduced the Air Force program by $28
million and the defense-wide RDT&E program by $16.6 million; the Senate Appropriations
Committee added $10 million to the Air Force program
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As for ASAT development, the Clinton Administration terminated a program to develop
a ground-based kinetic-energy ASAT (“KEAsat”) interceptor in 1993, permitting only
technology studies. Congress revived the program in FY1996, however, adding $30 million
that year, $50 million in FY1997, and $37.5 million in FY1998. President Clinton line-item
vetoed the $37.5 million on the basis that DOD has other ASAT options and did not need the
KEAsat program. After the Supreme Court rejected the line-item veto that money was
restored to DOD, and the conference report on the FY1999 DOD authorization bill (H.R.
3616, H.Rept. 105-736) directed DOD to obligate the funds promptly. However, Congress
apparently was persuaded that there are other methods for achieving the objective of space
control, and stated that DOD could use some of that money for other space control
technologies and added $15 million for space control technologies for FY1999. For FY2000,
the Administration requested no funding for KEAsat, and $9.8 million for Air Force space
control technologies. Congress added $7.5 million was added for KEAsat to the defense-
wide RDT&E budget, and $3 million for Air Force space control technology in the FY2000
DOD appropriations act. Senator Smith reportedly has requested a GAO report on the status
of the KEAsat program because of concern that the Army is planning to restructure it without
congressional permission. DOD requested no funding for KEAsat and $9.7 million for Air
Force space control R&D. In the FY2001 DOD authorization bills (H.R. 4205/S. 2549), the
Senate Armed Services Committee added $20 million for the KEAsat program and $5 million
for other Army space control technology development while the House approved the DOD
requested levels. The House and the Senate Appropriations Committees did not add funding
for this program (H.R. 4576/S. 2593).
Among the alternatives to the KEAsat is a ground-based laser called MIRACL (Mid-
Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser) in New Mexico. A long-standing congressional
restriction in DOD authorization bills prohibiting the use of MIRACL against targets in space
expired in FY1996. On October 2, 1997, DOD Secretary William Cohen approved a test use
of MIRACL against an Air Force satellite (MSTI-3). The test was conducted on October 17.
DOD insists it was a defensive test designed to assess the satellite’s vulnerability to laser
attack. Others view it as a test of an offensive antisatellite capability.
Another controversial aspect of military space activities involves the NRO. Revelations
beginning in September 1995 about poor financial management practices resulting in NRO
accumulating almost $4 billion in unspent funds raised questions about how the agency is
managed and led to a review by a panel chaired by retired Admiral David Jeremiah. The
report, released in April 1997, made 47 recommendations, some of which were adopted while
others were referred for further study. In its report on the FY1999 intelligence authorization
bill (H.Rept. 105-508), the House Intelligence Committee expressed dissatisfaction with how
NRO responded to its concerns about cost control and noted that NRO programs are taking
an increasing percentage of the national foreign intelligence programs budget. NRO’s budget
is classified, but is thought to be on the order of $6 billion a year. Recognizing that future
budgets could be constrained, NRO adopted the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) plan that
calls for developing more smaller, less expensive intelligence collection satellites and using
commercial imagery to augment that provided by NRO’s classified systems (discussed
earlier). As noted above, the FY2000 intelligence authorization act (P.L. 106-120)
establishes a National Commission on the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office to
report by November 2000 on the roles and missions and other aspects of the NRO “to assure
continuing success in satellite reconnaissance in the new millennium.” The House and Senate
Intelligence Committees’ reports on the FY2001 intelligence authorization bill (H.R. 4392/S.
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2507) express concern that insufficient funds will be available to NIMA for processing the
data acquired by the FIA into usable products through NIMA’s “tasking, processing,
exploitation, and dissemination” (TPED) activities. The House report further states that
technical problems with some of the satellite intelligence systems may mean schedule delays
and cost increases, and lack of priority on developing cutting-edge technologies “ensures that
the core mission of space intelligence—to collect secrets—will continue to languish and
become increasingly limited” (page 9).
Space Launch Vehicles: 1998-1999 Failures and Developing New Systems
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062. Briefly, a 1994 Clinton Administration policy directive gives NASA primary
responsibility for maintaining the space shuttle and developing new reusable launch vehicles
(RLVs), while DOD is responsible for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). Private sector
companies also are developing new launch vehicles on their own or in partnership with the
government. U.S. government satellites must be launched on U.S. launch vehicles unless the
President grants a waiver. Government and commercial customers in the United States and
commercial customers abroad purchase launch services from U.S. launch service companies.
New launch vehicles are in development both by the government and the private sector.
NASA and Lockheed Martin are jointly developing technologies for a large
“single-stage-to-orbit” RLV in a 3-year technology development program called X-33.
Technical challenges have delayed the initiation of test flights from March 1999 to perhaps
2001. Consequently, NASA has delayed from 2000 to 2005 a decision on whether to invest
in more upgrades to space shuttle to keep it operating for many more years, or to anticipate
that the private sector will develop a new “2nd generation RLV” to replace it and be used for
both government and commercial missions. In its FY2001 budget request, NASA completely
restructured its space launch program, initiating a two pronged “space launch initiative.” It
involves assisting the private sector in developing new launch vehicles by risk reduction
efforts such as providing NASA funding for technology demonstrations, for example, while
also performing “safety and supportability” upgrades to the shuttle. The total cost for the 2nd
generation RLV activity and shuttle upgrades is $6.4 billion for FY2001-2005. The House
Appropriations Committee zeroed the FY2001 request of $290 million for the2nd generation
RLV in its report the FY2001 VA-HUD appropriations bill (H.R. 4635, H.Rept. 106-674)
on June 7. It approved the request for shuttle upgrades.
DOD is pursuing the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade
U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs by at least 25%. Although DOD
originally planned to choose one EELV design, it later decided to fund development of two
based on changing market forecasts in the late 1990s showing increased demand for launch
vehicle services. Lockheed Martin and Boeing were selected to build the two EELVs (Atlas
5 and Delta 4, respectively). They and DOD are sharing the development costs. A downturn
in the market forecast has caused DOD to reassess its EELV procurement strategy, however.
Several private companies also are developing their own launch vehicles (see CRS
Report 98-658). Senator Breaux has introduced S. 469 to provide loan guarantees to
companies attempting to develop low cost space transportation systems.
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Environment
Satellites are used to study the Earth’s atmosphere and surface and provide information
relative to the study of global change, such as that expected from NASA’s Earth Observing
System (EOS) program within the Office of Earth Science. Strong interest developed over
ensuring that data not only from civilian satellites, but from military satellites are used to the
maximum extent possible in solving environmental issues. After years of discussion, President
Clinton signed an executive order on February 24, 1995, which, for the first time, allowed
public release of historical spy satellite imagery (taken between 1960 and 1972). Data from
other previously classified satellite programs subsequently have been declassified.
EOS, once part of a program called Mission to Planet Earth (MTPE), has been
controversial since its beginning (see CRS Report 97-601 SPR). Designed to gather a
15-year set of data on the Earth’s environment, NASA’s original plan was criticized by
several advisory groups as too risky. Congress found the cost estimate prohibitive and told
NASA to expect less funding through the year 2000 ($8 billion rather than $17 billion).
Subsequent program restructurings reduced the expected cost through the year 2000 to $6.8
billion. In June 1995, GAO stated that total program costs through the end of the program
in 2022 is $33 billion. In September 1995, a National Research Council report concluded that
MTPE had been restructured enough and the spacecraft launches should not be delayed, while
agreeing that more work is needed on the associated data system (EOSDIS). Problems with
EOSDIS delayed the launch of the first satellite in the Earth Observing System (EOS) series,
Terra. It was finally launched in December 1999.
Another program, Triana, is a new focus of controversy (see CRS Report RS20252).
Proposed by Vice President Gore in 1998, the probe would be located at a point between the
Earth and Sun and continuously transmit images of the Earth that could be viewed on the
Internet. Critics claim that the project is politically motivated and was not subject to scientific
peer review. Supporters counter that peer review was conducted on the project after it was
proposed by the Vice President and it now will carry additional instruments that will provide
useful scientific data. The additional instruments increased the cost of the mission from $50
million (including launch costs) to $75 million (not including launch costs). The House-
passed version of the FY2000-2002 NASA authorization bill (H.R. 1654) would terminate
Triana; the Senate-passed version does not. The FY2000 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act
(P.L. 106-74) suspended work on the program until the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
evaluates its scientific goals. The NAS report was released on March 8, 2000 and was
generally positive about the scientific goals.
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
Commercial space launch issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062. Briefly, the
role of the government in encouraging the growth of commercial space businesses either by
direct or indirect subsidies, or policies that help stave off foreign competitors, continues to
be debated. Some argue that the government provides indirect subsidies to launch services
companies by allowing them to use government launch sites at nominal costs and providing
a guaranteed market for a certain number of launches. Others insist that the U.S. government
is doing no more than foreign governments.
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The competitors to U.S. companies today are Europe, China, Russia, Ukraine, India, and
Japan. Most of the satellites that require launches are built in the United States or contain
U.S. components, meaning export licenses are required to ship them to the launch site. Thus,
the United States has substantial leverage over the success of these competitors in offering
launch services. Bilateral agreements have been signed with China, Russia, and Ukraine
setting forth the conditions under which they offer launch services, both the number of
launches and the price they can charge compared to Western prices (a table comparing these
agreements appears in CRS Issue Brief IB93062). China’s violations of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (see next section) have long created a vacillating relationship
where U.S. sanctions are imposed, lifted, and imposed again, and consequently export licenses
are granted, suspended, or reinstated based on the political situation. Recent concerns that
China has acquired militarily useful technical knowledge by launching U.S.-built satellites has
resulted in new U.S. laws and regulations to ensure such technology or information is not
transferred to China or other countries (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062 and CRS Report
RL30231).
The 1996 Clinton space policy calls for a transition from “negotiated trade” in
commercial space launch services to “free and open interaction of market economies” once
the existing commercial launch services agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and China expire.
President Clinton terminated the agreement with Ukraine in June 2000 in recognition of
Ukraine’s commitment to international nonproliferation norms.
As discussed above, another commercial space issue concerns the sale of remote sensing
data with very good resolution. At issue is how to allow U.S. companies to compete in this
market without sacrificing national security interests.
Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Space launch vehicles are close cousins of ballistic missiles, raising concerns about
ensuring that certain space technologies are not exported to countries intending to build
missiles. A May 1992 agreement between the Russian company Glavkosmos and the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO) to sell Russian rocket engines and technology to ISRO
prompted the imposition by the United States of 2-year sanctions against Glavkosmos and
ISRO because the State Department asserted the sale violated the MTCR. To reach
agreement on commercial space launch services and other space cooperation with the United
States, in 1993 Russia agreed to terminate portions of the contract with India regarding the
transfer of technology and know-how (the United States does not object to sale of the engines
per se). The United States agreed to increase space cooperation with Russia, including
merging the American and Russian space station programs (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017)
and paying Russia $400 million, the same amount of money Russia said it would lose by
restructuring the contract with India. Questions have arisen, however, as to whether Russia
is abiding by the MTCR. The U.S. government has imposed sanctions against 10 Russian
entities suspected of providing assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and
the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) prohibits, for example, the transfer of NASA
money to Russia for the space station program unless the President certifies that Russian
companies working on the program have not proliferated to Iran.
Also, export of space products has been used as leverage to get countries to accept U.S.
proliferation policies generally. For example, President Bush announced in June 1991 that
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no U.S.-built satellites would be exported to China for launch until China’s policies regarding
missile proliferation changed. China agreed to abide by the MTCR and the sanctions were
lifted. The Clinton Administration charged China with violating the MTCR in August 1993
and imposed sanctions, which were lifted after China again pledged to abide by the MTCR.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation, as exemplified by the merger of the American and Russian
space station programs. Since Europe, Canada, and Japan already had agreed to work with
the United States, by the year 2004 a multi-national space station should be in orbit.
Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed political circumstances, but also of
constrained budgets throughout the world. All the major space-faring countries are
questioning how much they should invest in space. The same budget constraints may
preclude the initiation of new programs if a critical mass of funding is not available.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1654 (Rohrabacher)
FY2000-2002 NASA Authorization Act. H.R. 1654 reported from Committee on
Science May 18 (H.Rept. 106-145); passed House May 19, passed Senate November 5. S.
342 reported from Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation June 16
(S.Rept. 106-77). House and Senate conferees have been named.
H.R. 3898 (Rohrabacher)
Zero Gravity, Zero Tax Act. Introduced March 9, 2000; referred to Committee on Way
and Means.
H.R. 4205 (Spence )/S. 2549 (Warner)
FY2001 DOD authorization bill. H.R. 4205 reported from House Armed Services
Committee May 12 (H. Rept. 106-616); passed House May 18. S. 2549 (replacing S. 2481)
reported from Senate Armed Services Committee May 12 (S. Rept. 106-292).
H.R. 4392 (Goss)/S. 2507 (Shelby)
FY2001 intelligence authorization. H.R. 4392 reported from House Intelligence
Committee May 16 (H. Rept. 106-620); passed House May 23. S. 2507 reported from
Senate Intelligence Committee May 4 (S. Rept. 106-279).
H.R. 4576 (Lewis)/ S. 2593 (Stevens)
FY2001 DOD appropriations bill. Reported from House Appropriations Committee
June 1 (H. Rept. 106-644); passed House June 7. Reported from Senate Appropriations
Committee May 18 (S. Rept. 106-298).
H.R. 4635 (Walsh)
FY2001 VA-HUD-IA appropriations, including NASA. Reported from House
Appropriations Committee June 12 (H. Rept. 106-674).
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