Order Code IB88090
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Energy Policy
Updated May 24, 2000
Mark Holt and Zachary Davis
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
Nuclear Power Research and Development
Light Water Reactors
Standard Design Certification
First-of-a-kind Engineering
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Domestic Reactor Safety
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
Regulation
Decommissioning and Life Extension
Nuclear Waste Management
Interim Storage Legislation
Low-level Waste Facilities
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Environmental Problems at Nuclear Weapons Facilities
Uranium Enrichment
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
LEGISLATION


IB88090
05-24-00
Nuclear Energy Policy
SUMMARY
Nuclear energy policy issues facing Con-
Whether progress on nuclear waste
gress include questions about radioactive
disposal and other congressional action will
waste management, research and development
revive the U.S. nuclear power industry’s
priorities, power plant safety and regulation,
growth will depend on economic consider-
nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear weap-
ations. Natural gas- and coal-fired power-
ons facilities cleanup, and technology for
plants currently are favored over nuclear
producing nuclear fuel.
reactors for new generating capacity. Howev-
er, the nuclear industry believes that simpler,
Federal funding for nuclear energy re-
safer versions of today’s commercial reactors
search and development has been substantially
could eventually be built in the United States.
reduced by the Clinton Administration, which
places a higher priority on energy efficiency
Concern about the spread, or prolifera-
and alternative energy technologies. However,
tion, of nuclear weapons throughout the world
the FY2001 budget request by the Department
has risen sharply since longtime rivals India
of Energy (DOE) seeks $35 million for the
and Pakistan conducted competing nuclear
Administration’s Nuclear Energy Research
weapons tests in May 1998. The heightened
Initiative, which focuses on advanced nuclear
tensions in Southeast Asia have focused atten-
technology research.
tion on the effectiveness of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Potential
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has
nuclear weapons development by North Korea
been one of the most controversial aspects of
and Iran have also recently raised considerable
nuclear power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
U.S. concern.
of 1982 (P.L. 97-425), as amended in 1987,
requires DOE to begin detailed physical
Cleaning up severe environmental prob-
characterization of Yucca Mountain in Nevada
lems at U.S. nuclear weapons production
as a permanent underground repository for
facilities, owned by DOE, is expected to cost
high-level waste.
about $150 billion over the next several de-
cades. After sharp growth in the early 1990s,
Legislation was introduced in the 106th
DOE environmental cleanup funding under the
Congress (H.R. 45, S. 608) to establish an
Clinton Administration has been nearly flat.
interim storage facility for nuclear waste at
DOE is requesting about $6.3 billion for the
Yucca Mountain. But the Clinton Administra-
program in FY2001, including $515 million for
tion opposes temporary storage at the site. In
“privatized” waste treatment projects.
response, the Senate approved an alternative
measure February 10, 2000, to authorize DOE
The enrichment of natural uranium to
to store waste at Yucca Mountain only after
make nuclear fuel, formerly a government
receiving a construction permit for a perma-
activity, now is carried out by the newly pri-
nent repository (S. 1287). The House passed
vatized U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
the bill without amendment March 22, 2000,
USEC was privatized in a $1.9 billion initial
sending it to the President, who vetoed it April
public stock offering that was completed July
25, 2000. A Senate effort to override the veto
28, 1998.
fell short on May 2, 2000, by a vote of 64-35.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

IB88090
05-24-00
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Senate voted May 2 not to override President Clinton’s veto of a bill that would
advance the schedule for receiving nuclear waste at a planned permanent repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (S. 1287). The 64-35 vote was three votes short of the two-thirds
of the Senate needed for a veto override. The legislation would authorize the Department
of Energy (DOE) to begin storing waste at the site as early as 2007, if the repository
received a construction permit from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would be barred from issuing final environmental
standards for the repository until June 1, 2001. In vetoing the bill April 25, the President
contended that it would hinder EPA’s rulemaking authority and reduce public confidence
in the repository program. The 35 senators voting against the override included Senator
Lott, who switched his vote so that he could enter a motion to reconsider, keeping the door
open for another override attempt before the 106th Congress adjourns.

Most Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear-related programs would receive increased
funding under the Clinton Administration’s budget request that was submitted to Congress
February 7. Nuclear energy programs would rise about 7%, to $306.1 million, and DOE’s
civilian nuclear waste disposal program would receive a 26% boost, to $437.5 million.
Funding for environmental restoration and waste management would total $6.3 billion, an
increase of $440 million; most of the increase is for “privatized” waste treatment projects,
such as a high-level waste vitrification plant at Hanford, Washington.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
The U.S. nuclear power industry, while currently generating about 20% of the nation’s
electricity, faces an uncertain future. No nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978 and
more than 100 reactors have been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. No units are
currently under active construction; the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar 1 reactor,
ordered in 1970 and licensed to operate in 1996, was the last U.S. nuclear unit to be
completed. The nuclear power industry’s troubles include a slowdown in the rate of growth
of electricity demand, high nuclear power plant construction costs, relatively low costs for
competing fuels, public concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory
compliance costs.
High construction costs are perhaps the most serious obstacle to nuclear power
expansion. Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s have ranged from
$2-$6 billion, averaging about $3,000 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 1995
dollars). The nuclear industry predicts that new plant designs could be built for about half
that amount, but their total generating costs would still exceed currently projected costs for
new coal- and gas-fired plants.
Of more immediate concern to the nuclear power industry is the outlook for existing
nuclear reactors in a deregulated electricity market. Electric utility restructuring, which is
CRS-1

IB88090
05-24-00
currently underway in several states, could increase the competition faced by existing nuclear
plants. High operating costs and the need for costly improvements and equipment
replacements have resulted during the past decade in the permanent shutdown of 11 U.S.
commercial reactors before completion of their 40-year licensed operating periods.
Nevertheless, all is not bleak for the U.S. nuclear power industry, which currently
comprises 103 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states (NRC data on each site, by state,
is available at [http://www.nrc.gov./AEOD/pib/pib.html]). Electricity production from U.S.
nuclear power plants is greater than that from oil, natural gas, and hydropower, and behind
only coal, which accounts for 55% of U.S. electricity generation. Nuclear plants generate
more than half the electricity in six states.
Average operating costs of U.S. nuclear plants dropped substantially during the 1990s,
and costly downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed commercial reactors generated
electricity at a record-high average of nearly 85% of their total capacity in 1999, according
to industry statistics. The Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant received the first 20-year license
extension from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 2000, and several more
extensions are pending. Industry consolidation could also help existing nuclear power plants,
as larger nuclear operators purchase plants from utilities that run only one or two reactors.
Several such sales have been announced, including the planned sale of two New York Power
Authority reactors to Entergy Nuclear for the record price of $967 million. The planned
merger of two of the nation’s largest nuclear utilities, PECO Energy and Unicom, announced
September 23, 1999, would consolidate the operation of 14 reactors under a single corporate
entity.
Global warming that may be caused by fossil fuels — the “greenhouse effect” — is cited
by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of reactors.
But the large obstacles noted above must still be overcome before electric utilities will risk
ordering new nuclear units. Reactor manufacturers are working on designs for safer, less
expensive nuclear plants, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved new
regulations intended to speed up the nuclear licensing process, consistent with the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). Even so, the Energy Information Administration
forecasts that no new U.S. reactors will become operational before 2010, at the earliest.
Nuclear Power Research and Development
For the Clinton Administration, “nuclear power is not high priority,” according to a
FY1995 DOE budget summary, but “the option should be kept open.” That ambivalence is
reflected in DOE’s nuclear R&D budget under the Clinton Administration, which has
proposed to continue research on existing commercial nuclear plants while terminating
development of advanced reactors.
Termination of DOE research on advanced reactors began in FY1995, when Congress
accepted the Administration’s plan to halt development of the advanced liquid metal reactor
(ALMR), also called the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR). For FY1996, Congress agreed to
terminate research on the gas turbine modular helium reactor (GT-MHR), although $5 million
was provided in FY1999 for a joint U.S.-Russian program to develop the GT-MHR for
destruction of surplus weapons plutonium. Congress and the Administration continued
CRS-2

IB88090
05-24-00
funding for improved versions of today’s light water reactors (LWRs) through FY1997. But
the Administration’s FY1998 request declared the program completed and provided only $5.5
million in termination costs for advanced LWR development.
The Clinton Administration’s FY2001 budget request includes $40 million for two new
LWR programs in DOE, which started in FY1999 and FY2000. The “nuclear energy plant
optimization” (NEPO) program, for which $5 million is requested, is intended to improve the
economic competitiveness of existing nuclear power plants. The “nuclear energy research
initiative” (NERI), to be funded at $35 million, is designed to support innovative nuclear
energy research projects. Congress provided $22 million for NERI and $5 million for NEPO
for FY2000.
DOE justifies its efforts to encourage the continued operation of commercial U.S.
nuclear plants as an important element in meeting national goals for reducing carbon dioxide
emissions. Because nuclear plants directly emit no carbon dioxide, the continued operation
of existing U.S. reactors avoids more than 620 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each
year, according to the FY2000 DOE budget justification. Opponents have criticized the
nuclear energy research proposals as providing wasteful subsidies to a failing industry.
Shutting down the ALMR program and its associated research facilities, particularly the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) in Idaho, is expected to take several years. Some
ALMR facilities are being used for electrometallurgical treatment of EBR-II fuel, for which
$45 million was appropriated in FY1999. Opponents of the program have expressed concern
that such activities could help keep the ALMR/IFR program alive and have called for
Congress to halt further funding. Supporters contend that the technology could convert
unstable fuel elements into safer forms for storage and disposal. According to DOE’s FY2001
budget justification, a National Research Council report to be completed in early 2000 will
help determine whether the electrometallurgical process should be used for full-scale
treatment of spent fuel at the Idaho site.
Light Water Reactors
Funding for a program to develop improved versions of today’s commercial LWRs
ended in FY1997. The effort resulted in NRC certification of advanced light water reactor
(ALWR) designs that are intended to be simpler, safer, and less expensive to build and
operate than existing plants. Opponents called such funding an unjustified subsidy to the
nuclear industry, which they contend will be uncompetitive with future electricity generation
alternatives. The DOE effort comprised two major elements:
Standard Design Certification. DOE helped major U.S. nuclear reactor manufacturers
obtain NRC standard design certification for advanced LWR power plants. Once a standard
design is certified by NRC, a utility can order the design for the next 15 years with a minimum
of further NRC design review. Two designs, from General Electric (GE) and Asea Brown
Boveri/ Combustion Engineering (ABB/CE), received NRC standard design certification
December 6, 1996; final rules to implement the certifications were issued May 21, 1997, for
the GE design and May 21, 1997, for the ABB/CE reactor. A more advanced design, by
Westinghouse, received NRC approval for standard design certification December 15, 1999.
CRS-3

IB88090
05-24-00
First-of-a-kind Engineering. First-of-a-kind engineering (FOAKE) for advanced LWR
power plants is the design stage in which most of the engineering and construction details are
completed — details not needed for NRC-certified standard designs. Such additional detail
is considered necessary to develop the cost estimates that utilities would require before
ordering one of the new nuclear plants, even if it already had NRC certification. The cost of
the FOAKE program was shared by DOE, electric utilities, and reactor manufacturers. The
FY1997 nuclear energy funding was “the final Federal contribution to the light water reactor
program,” according to the conference report on that year’s Energy and Water Development
Appropriations bill (H.Rept. 104-782).
Although the Energy Information Administration does not expect advanced nuclear
reactors to be built in the United States within the next decade, overseas sales remain a
possibility, particularly in Asia. For example, two reactors using GE’s recently certified
advanced design have already been completed in Japan, and another two-unit plant has been
ordered by Taiwan. Implementation of a U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement in March
1998 allows U.S. reactor sales to China for the first time.
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Controversy over safety has dogged nuclear power throughout its development,
particularly following the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the April 1986
Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. In the United States, safety-related
shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation
and maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In addition,
mishaps have occurred in which key safety systems have been disabled. NRC’s oversight of
the nuclear industry is an ongoing issue; nuclear utilities often complain that they are subject
to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics charge that NRC frequently
relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or costly to the industry.
Domestic Reactor Safety. In terms of public health consequences, the safety record
of the U.S. nuclear power industry in comparison with other major commercial energy
technologies has been excellent. In more than 2,250 reactor-years of operation in the United
States, the only incident at a commercial power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries
to the public has been the Three Mile Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core
melted. Public exposure to radioactive materials released during that accident is expected to
cause fewer than five deaths (and perhaps none) from cancer over the following 30 years. An
independent study released in September 1990 found no “convincing evidence” that the TMI
accident had affected cancer rates in the area around the plant. However, a study released
in February 1997 concluded that much higher levels of radiation may have been released
during the TMI accident than previously believed.
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal
operation are not generally believed to pose significant hazards. Documented public exposure
to radioactivity from nuclear power plant waste has also been minimal, although the potential
long-term hazard of waste disposal remains controversial. There is substantial scientific
CRS-4

IB88090
05-24-00
uncertainty about the level of risk posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many
carcinogens and other hazardous substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at
relatively high exposure levels. In the case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level
exposure has been extrapolated mostly from health effects documented among persons
exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing.
The consensus among most safety experts is that a severe nuclear power plant accident
in the United States is likely to occur less frequently than once every 10,000 reactor-years of
operation. These experts believe that most severe accidents would have small public health
impacts, and that accidents causing as many as 100 deaths would be much rarer than once
every 10,000 reactor-years. On the other hand, some experts challenge the complex
calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending that accidents with
serious public health consequences may be more frequent.
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc. The Chernobyl accident was by far the
worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred anywhere in the world. At least 31
persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other injuries, and between 5,000 and
45,000 fatal cancers may result over the next 40 years from radiation released during the
accident. Those cancers would represent an increase in the cancer rate of about half a percent
among the 75 million people in the western part of the former Soviet Union and a smaller
increase in non-Soviet Europe, with a higher increase possible in the contaminated region
around the plant.
The 10-year anniversary of the Chernobyl accident prompted renewed interest in the
disaster’s long-term consequences. According to a November 1995 report by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the primary observable
health consequence of the accident has been a dramatic increase in childhood thyroid cancer.
About 1,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer have been reported in certain regions
surrounding the destroyed reactor — a rate that is as much as a hundred times the pre-
accident level, according to OECD. The death rate for accident cleanup workers has also
risen measurably, the organization reported. Other recent studies have found increased genetic
mutations among children born in contaminated regions.
Environmental contamination from the accident was widespread. The OECD report
estimated that about 50,000 square miles of land in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia were
substantially contaminated with radioactive cesium. Significant levels of radioactive strontium,
plutonium, and other isotopes were also deposited. Although radiation levels have declined
during the past decade, land-use restrictions in the most contaminated areas may remain
indefinitely, according to OECD.
World concern in recent years has focused on the safety of 14 other Chernobyl-type
reactors (called RBMKs) that are still operating in the former Soviet Union, including one
reactor at the Chernobyl site (a second operating reactor at the site was shut down November
30, 1996). Despite safety improvements made after the Chernobyl disaster, the RBMKs
remain inherently unstable and dangerous, according to many Western experts. Also still
operating in the former Soviet bloc are 10 early-model Soviet light water reactors (LWRs),
which are similar to most Western reactors but suffer from major safety deficiencies, such as
the lack of Western-style emergency cooling systems. More than two dozen newer Soviet-
CRS-5

IB88090
05-24-00
designed LWRs that are currently operating are substantially safer than the earlier models but
still do not meet all Western standards.
Immediate shutdown of the Soviet-designed reactors appears impractical because of the
ex-Soviet bloc’s critical need for electricity. Western help has been proposed for developing
replacement power sources, allowing shutdown of the riskiest nuclear units, as well as funding
for short- and long-term safety improvements. Russian leaders have estimated that total costs
of the effort could range as high as $40 billion.
The United States is providing direct assistance for upgrading the safety of Soviet-
designed reactors, a program being coordinated by DOE, NRC, the Agency for International
Development (AID), and the Department of State. DOE was appropriated $45 million in
FY1997 for improving the operation and physical condition of Soviet-designed nuclear power
plants. The program was appropriated $35 million in FY1999, and Congress provided $15
million for FY2000.
The General Accounting Office estimates that $1.93 billion has been provided through
November 1999 by the United States and other industrialized nations to improve the safety
of Soviet-designed reactors. Of that amount, $753 was contributed by the European Union,
$532 by the United States, $43 million by the International Atomic Energy Agency (which
receives much of its funding from the United States), and the remainder from 14 other
countries.
Regulation
For many years a top priority of the nuclear industry was to modify the process for
licensing new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power
plant, according to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and
designs were less subject to mid-construction safety-related changes ordered by NRC. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C.
2011-2282) had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit
to build a plant, and then, after construction was finished, an operating permit to run it. Each
stage of the licensing process involved complicated proceedings. Environmental impact
statements also are required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act (P.L. 102-
486) provides a clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses, allowing completed plants
to operate without delay if construction criteria are met. NRC would hold preoperational
hearings on the adequacy of plant construction only in specified circumstances.
A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in
issuing and enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have
regularly complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety
regulations have burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs.
Moreover, the nuclear industry is concerned about the size of NRC’s own budget, because
the agency is required to cover most of its costs through annual fees imposed on commercial
reactors. But many environmentalists, nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with
CRS-6

IB88090
05-24-00
being too close to the nuclear industry, a situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight
of nuclear power plants and routine exemptions from safety requirements.
That controversy was illustrated by a March 4, 1996, Time magazine cover article about
regulatory violations at the three-reactor Millstone nuclear plant in Connecticut. The article
described the efforts of two Millstone engineers to stop the routine placement of greater
amounts of hot nuclear fuel in the plant’s storage pools than the pools were qualified to hold.
NRC had been aware of the problem, but the article focused national attention on the
situation and prompted closer NRC scrutiny of the Millstone plant and its own procedures.
Because of the storage pool situation and numerous other problems, all three Millstone
reactors were shut down and not allowed to restart until NRC was satisfied with the plant’s
safety compliance. The newest Millstone unit was restarted in June 1998 after being out of
service more than 2 years, and the oldest of the three units is being permanently closed. The
remaining unit restarted in 1999.
In a speech on April 9, 1996, NRC Chairman Shirley Ann Jackson said that the Millstone
problems “can and should be considered a wake-up call to both the regulated industry and the
NRC.” However, she contended that overall safety of commercial nuclear power plants had
steadily improved during the past decade, with the number of automatic reactor shutdowns
and safety system actuations dropping dramatically.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear utilities, which are
required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also
monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear
power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the
performance of reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety
violations, NRC often dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites. NRC Chairman
Jackson testified September 5, 1996, to the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House
Commerce Committee that each nuclear power plant has averaged about 10 safety violations
per year since 1989.
In a May 1997 report on nuclear reactor regulation (RCED 97-145), the General
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded, “While we are not making judgments on the safety of
plants, the many safety problems identified in some plants raises questions about whether
NRC’s regulatory program is working as it should.” The report also found, “For some plants,
NRC has not taken aggressive enforcement action to force the licensees to fix their long-
standing safety problems on a timely basis. As a result, the plants’ conditions have worsened,
making safety margins smaller.”
However, the opposite trend was identified by the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees in considering NRC’s FY1999 budget request. The Senate Committee report
on the FY1999 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill strongly criticized NRC
for allegedly failing to streamline its regulatory system in line with improvements in nuclear
industry safety. The Committee contended, among other problems, that NRC’s regional
offices were inconsistent with one another, that NRC was inappropriately interfering with
nuclear plant management, and that numerous NRC review processes were outdated and
unnecessary. The House panel directed NRC to “reduce its workforce, reduce the regulatory
burdens on licensees, and streamline its adjudicatory process.”
CRS-7

IB88090
05-24-00
In response, NRC has begun reorganizing and overhauling many of its procedures. The
Commission is moving toward “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety enforcement is
guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC began
implementing a new reactor oversight system April 2, 2000, that relies on a series of
performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.
The House and Senate Appropriations committees expressed general satisfaction with the
NRC response to last year’s criticism, and Congress approved nearly the full NRC FY2000
funding request, except for a $1 million cut for the NRC Inspector General.
Decommissioning and Life Extension
When nuclear power plants end their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to special trust funds to ensure that money is available to remove all radioactive
material from reactors after they are closed. Because no full-sized U.S. commercial reactor
has yet been completely decommissioned, which can take several decades, the cost of the
process can only be estimated. Decommissioning cost estimates cited by a 1996 DOE report,
for one full-sized commercial reactor, ranged from about $150 million to $600 million in 1995
dollars. Disposal of low-level waste is expected to account for much of those costs.
For planning purposes, it is generally assumed that U.S. commercial reactors could be
decommissioned at the end of their 40-year operating licenses, although several plants have
been retired before their licenses expired and others could seek license renewals to operate
longer. NRC rules that took effect June 13, 1992, allow plants to apply for a 20-year license
extension, for a total operating life of 60 years. On March 23, 2000, the Calvert Cliffs nuclear
plant in Maryland became the first U.S. plant to receive a license extension. Several other
license-extension applications are pending, and more are expected to be filed. Assuming a
40-year lifespan, without life extension, more than half of today’s 103 licensed reactors could
be decommissioned by the year 2016.
Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive
waste, which can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces
an annual average of about 20 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel and 50-200 cubic
meters of low-level radioactive waste.
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel
(paid for with a fee on nuclear power) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for commercial low-level waste. Spent fuel
and other highly radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository,
consisting of a vast network of chambers carved from rock that has remained geologically
undisturbed for hundreds of thousands of years.
DOE is studying Nevada’s Yucca Mountain as the site for such a geologic repository,
as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, P.L. 97-425) as amended.
DOE issued a “viability assessment” in December 1998 that found no insurmountable
CRS-8

IB88090
05-24-00
problems with the site, but a final recommendation on the site’s suitability is not expected
until 2001. DOE contends that it will need its full FY2001 budget request of $437.5 million
to keep the program on schedule.
As originally enacted, the 1982 nuclear waste law established procedures and timetables
for DOE to examine candidate sites for at least one deep repository for commercial spent fuel
(with the option of also taking government high-level waste), to begin operating by January
31, 1998. Nuclear utilities were required to sign a contract with DOE for disposal services.
The Nuclear Waste Fund, consisting of revenues from a fee on nuclear power, was created
to pay for the disposal program. However, DOE could not spend money from the fund
without annual congressional appropriations. The waste repository was required to meet
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards and be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).
Controversy over implementation of the waste law led to fundamental revisions included
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203). The revised waste law
singled out Yucca Mountain as the only candidate site for a permanent waste repository.
With no federal storage or disposal facility available by the nuclear waste law’s 1998
deadline, nuclear power plants must continue storing their waste at reactor sites much longer
than originally anticipated. Most are expected to build additional on-site storage facilities, a
move that has drawn strong state and local opposition in several recent cases. A federal
appeals court ruled July 23, 1996, that DOE was required to meet the 1998 deadline,
although the court did not specify a remedy for missing it. The same panel on November 14,
1997, refused to order DOE to begin taking waste from nuclear plant sites, but ruled that the
Department would be liable for damages under its contract with utilities. (For more
background, see CRS Report 96-212, Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporary Storage
Options
.)
Interim Storage Legislation
DOE’s current goal for opening the Yucca Mountain waste repository is 2010 — 12
years later than required by NWPA. The nuclear industry and state utility regulators are
urging Congress to authorize waste to be stored at an interim facility near Yucca Mountain
until the permanent repository is ready.
Legislation to establish a Yucca Mountain nuclear waste interim storage facility was
introduced in both Houses in the 106th Congress (H.R. 45, S. 608), but Administration veto
threats appear to have stalled the idea. In an effort to reach a compromise, an alternative bill
was developed in the Senate (S. 1287) that would allow waste to be shipped to Yucca
Mountain after NRC granted a repository construction permit – as early as 2007, under the
bill’s schedule. The Senate approved S. 1287 by a vote of 64-34 on February 10, 2000, and
the House passed the same bill without amendment March 22, 2000, by 253-167, sending it
to the President’s desk. In addition to authorizing expedited waste shipments, the bill would
bar EPA from issuing final environmental standards for the repository until June 1, 2001.
H.R. 45 was approved by the House Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy
and Power on April 14, 1999, by a vote of 25-0, with full Committee approval following on
April 21, 1999, by a 40-6 vote. The Committee-passed version would require an interim
CRS-9

IB88090
05-24-00
storage facility at Yucca Mountain to open by June 2003 and require work on a permanent
repository to move forward at the same time. To pay for both activities, the bill would
exempt the program’s spending from budget ceilings while maintaining utility fees at the
current level. Several key Commerce Committee leaders spoke out against the move to bring
S. 1287 to the House floor rather than H.R. 45.
The Clinton Administration opposes the siting of an interim storage facility at Yucca
Mountain before more technical study of the site’s suitability for a permanent repository can
be completed. Administration veto threats blocked the proposal in the 104th and 105th
Congresses. Before the Energy and Power Subcommittee markup of H.R. 45, Energy
Secretary Richardson reiterated the Administration’s opposition.
The Senate Energy Committee marked up S. 1287 on June 16, 1999, including
provisions that would have authorized DOE to take title to spent fuel at commercial reactor
sites and pay for storage costs, and eliminated EPA’s role in setting repository standards, in
addition to authorizing early waste shipments to the repository site (S. 1287, S. Rept. 106-
98). Environmental and anti-nuclear groups staunchly oppose any proposal that would hasten
waste shipments to Yucca Mountain, charging that the risks of transporting unprecedented
amounts of high-level radioactive waste across the country are unwarranted. Supporters of
the various nuclear waste bills contend that minimal transportation risks would be outweighed
by the margin of safety gained by removing spent fuel from multiple reactor sites. (For more
on the transportation issue, see CRS Report 97-403 ENR, Transportation of Spent Nuclear
Fuel
).
Supporters of S. 1287 made further changes on the Senate floor in an effort to win
enough votes to override a presidential veto. The EPA role in setting environmental
standards for the repository was restored, but the agency was barred from issuing final
standards until June 1, 2001, after a new Administration would be in place. The provision
allowing DOE to take title to nuclear waste at reactor sites was dropped, in response to
concerns that DOE might keep the waste at reactor sites indefinitely.
Despite the changes, President Clinton vetoed S. 1287 on April 25, 2000, contending
that it would interfere with EPA rulemaking and undermine public confidence in the
repository program. An effort in the Senate to override the veto fell short of the necessary
two-thirds majority, 64-35, on May 2, 2000. The 35 senators voting against the override
included Senator Lott, who switched his vote so that he could enter a motion to reconsider,
keeping the door open for another override attempt before the 106th Congress adjourns.
Low-level Waste Facilities
Disposal facilities for commercially generated low-level radioactive waste — from
nuclear power plants, hospitals, universities and industry — are a state responsibility. The
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-240) gave states and
regions until the beginning of 1993 to begin operating their own low-level waste disposal
facilities before potentially losing access to outside waste sites.
Only two commercial low-level sites, in South Carolina and Washington, are currently
operating. Certain types of low-activity waste are also accepted by a Utah disposal facility,
which has applied for a license to receive all three major classes of low-level waste. Access
CRS-10

IB88090
05-24-00
to the Washington site is allowed only to states in the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain
regions. A planned disposal facility at Ward Valley, California, for use by the Southwestern
disposal region received a state license in 1993, but the facility’s operation has been blocked
by the federal government’s refusal to transfer the federally owned site to the State of
California. California Governor Davis established an advisory panel in June 1999 to study
alternative waste management strategies.
Congress approved a disposal compact among Texas, Maine, and Vermont September
2, 1998 (P.L. 105-236), which allows waste from the three states to go to a site to be
developed in Texas and the exclusion of waste from other states. Controversy over the
measure had focused on a candidate disposal site chosen by Texas low-level waste authorities.
However, the proposed site, located in a predominantly Hispanic area, was rejected by the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission October 22 because of concerns about
potential earthquakes and socioeconomic effects. (For further details, see CRS Issue Brief
IB92059, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal.)
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Nuclear technology was first used to make nuclear weapons, initially by the United
States, and subsequently in Russia, England, France, and China. Peaceful nuclear energy
followed the development of nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests carried out by India and
Pakistan in May 1998, combined with proliferation problems in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and
Russia, intensified longstanding concerns about worldwide efforts to prevent the spread, or
proliferation, of nuclear weapons. Both the international nonproliferation regime and U.S.
policy are receiving attention from many directions.
The discovery following the Gulf War in 1991 that Iraq had been near success in
developing nuclear weapons led to efforts to strengthen inspection and enforcement of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is nearly universal, with 187 members.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a global safeguards system that
monitors nuclear technology and materials to deter and detect diversions from peaceful to
military uses. Detection by the IAEA of undeclared nuclear activities in North Korea — like
Iraq, a member of the NPT — triggered efforts to halt nuclear weapons development in that
nation as well.
The United States continues to be a leading proponent of the international non-
proliferation regime. It also has a system of export control and licensing laws covering
transfers of nuclear technology or materials. There are also laws requiring sanctions against
countries that obtain or test nuclear weapons, which were applied against India and Pakistan.
In addition to broad questions about the effectiveness of international nonproliferation
efforts, Congress is sometimes faced with the repercussions of nonproliferation policy in
specific instances, particularly with respect to sanctions and controls that do not solve
proliferation problems, but still have negative effects on bilateral relations and trade.
South Asia. The sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan included a prohibition on
export credits, including export credits for agricultural products. The 105th Congress passed
separate legislation exempting credits, guarantees, and financial assistance to support
CRS-11

IB88090
05-24-00
purchase of food or agricultural commodities from the mandated sanctions. In addition, the
Omnibus FY1999 Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) gave the President authority to waive
some sanctions for a year. President Clinton used the new authority by lifting some of the
sanctions on India and Pakistan November 6, 1998, to encourage the two countries to halt
further testing, establish effective export controls, and begin bilateral discussions on nuclear
weapons. There has since been little progress or restraint, despite further lifting of sanctions
and the President’s visit to India and Pakistan in March 2000. Restrictions on transfers of
nuclear technology, however, remain in place.
The Middle East. The ongoing confrontation between certain Arab Middle East
countries and Israel has long had a nuclear undercurrent. Israel has made no official
acknowledgment of a weapons program, but is widely considered to have developed nuclear
weapons. Israel's weapons program has led to calls in Arab states for development of an
"Islamic bomb." Iraq, before its defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, actively pursued nuclear
weapons development. Iran declares it has no nuclear weapons program, but the United
States claims that it does. The Clinton Administration has not succeeded in efforts to
dissuade Russia from selling nuclear reactors to Iran. It is feared that such assistance could
be a cover for weapons-related activities. (See Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle
East
, CRS Report RL30408.)
China. China has long been a nonproliferation concern. It was the major supplier to
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, and also supplied
technology to Iran and Algeria. However, China has gradually taken steps to join
international nonproliferation agreements, and the 105th Congress approved a U.S. agreement
for nuclear cooperation with China. However, the projected demand for U.S. nuclear
technology sales to China has not materialized.
North Korea. North Korea had an active nuclear weapons program in the early 1990's.
In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea to exchange its
existing nuclear reactors and reprocessing equipment for light water reactor technology that
is less suited to making bombs. The agreement has had a difficult history, with funding being
a continuing issue. A House amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for
FY2000 (H.R. 2606) put new conditions on aid to the Korea Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), which is building the nuclear power plant in North Korea. Conditions
include a new certification for U.S.-North Korean nuclear cooperation. The Clinton
Administration waived parts of the certification when it was submitted February 24, 2000.
(For more details see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program.)
Russia. Maintaining control over the storage and disposal of Russian nuclear materials
is also a nonproliferation issue. The Departments of Energy, Defense, and State are involved
in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program to improve the security of
Russian nuclear material, technology, and expertise. In February 1993 the United States
agreed to buy 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian
weapons to use in commercial nuclear power reactors. Implementation of the purchase by
the newly privatized U.S. Enrichment Corporation has faced numerous hurdles, however.
Disposal of plutonium from weapons is a more difficult problem; President Clinton and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a joint statement September 2, 1998, calling for the
elimination of 50 metric tons of weapons plutonium by each nation. The Department of
Energy plans to “burn” part of the excess plutonium as fuel in existing civilian power reactors,
CRS-12

IB88090
05-24-00
but the plan is expensive and controversial. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL30170, Nuclear Weapons: Disposal of Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.)
The Clinton Administration requested $973.6 million for its Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative (ETRI) for FY2001. Congress allocated $890 million for ETRI when it was first
introduced in FY2000, and both the House and Senate approved an additional $1 billion in
May 2000 in separate defense authorization bills for FY2001. The ETRI includes Defense
Department, State Department, and Energy Department programs to assist Russia and other
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) to secure nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, materials, and expertise. However, Congress also passed legislation that would cut
assistance to Russia if it continues to assist Iran to build nuclear plants and missiles. (For
more information on nonproliferation, see CRS Issue Brief IB98039, Nuclear
Nonproliferation Policy.
)
Environmental Problems at Nuclear Weapons Facilities
The aging U.S. nuclear weapons production complex, managed by the Department of
Energy, faces long-term problems with environmental contamination, radioactive waste
disposal, and other environmental risks. DOE’s Environmental Management Program, which
is responsible for cleaning up the nuclear weapons complex, has grown into DOE’s largest
activity since its formal establishment in 1989. For FY2000, DOE was appropriated $5.9
billion for the program, including nearly $200 million for the “privatization” of future cleanup
and waste management projects. DOE requested $6.3 billion for the program for FY2001,
including more than $500 million for privatized projects.
A DOE proposal for accelerating the cleanup program, issued in June 1998, estimated
that total costs could reach about $150 billion through 2070, with cleanup completed at 41
of 53 major sites by 2006. DOE managers contend that substantial long-term savings can be
gained by focusing on completing work at those sites, allowing the earliest possible
termination of infrastructure costs.
The bulk of the EM privatization funding was intended to go toward the Hanford Tank
Waste Remediation System, consisting of a “vitrification” plant that would turn liquid high-
level waste into radioactive glass for eventual disposal. However, high costs estimates
prompted DOE to decide in May 2000 to switch the project to traditional contracting
methods. Other major privatized projects include a project to treat “mixed” radioactive and
hazardous waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The EM privatization effort is intended to reduce costs by increasing competition for
cleanup work and shifting a portion of project risks from the federal government to
contractors. Profits to contractors would depend on their success in meeting project
schedules and holding down costs; potentially, profits could be substantially higher than under
traditional DOE contracting arrangements.
CRS-13

IB88090
05-24-00
Uranium Enrichment
Only 0.7% of the uranium found in nature is the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235).
The remaining 99.3% is U-238. Before uranium can be used in most nuclear reactors, the
amount of U-235 must be increased (enriched) to 3-5%. Uranium is enriched in the United
States for commercial reactors at plants originally built for the nuclear weapons program.
Until July 1, 1993, the enrichment program was run by DOE.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) established the U.S. Enrichment Corporation
(USEC), a wholly owned government corporation that took over operation of DOE’s
uranium enrichment facilities and enrichment marketing activities.
EPACT authorized the
sale of USEC to the private sector and required the corporation to prepare a privatization
plan by July 1, 1995. Legislation to facilitate USEC privatization was included in an omnibus
continuing appropriations bill for FY1996 signed by the President April 26, 1996 (P.L. 104-
134).
The USEC privatization was completed July 28, 1998, with an initial public offering of
stock that raised an estimated $1.9 billion for the federal government. Controversy over the
privatized corporation has focused on whether USEC will continue purchasing highly
enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons (under an agreement
negotiated in 1993), and future sales of USEC’s large inventories of natural uranium. Under
the HEU agreement, USEC receives enriched uranium from Russian nuclear weapons and,
in addition to its payment for the material, returns an equivalent amount of natural
(unenriched) uranium to Russia to sell on the world market.
One of assets transferred from DOE to USEC was the right to commercialize a new
enrichment technology called “atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS). As a
government corporation, USEC continued funding to develop the technology. After
privatization, however, the company’s board of directors decided on June 9, 1999, that
further investment in AVLIS was unlikely to pay off and canceled the program. Energy
Secretary Richardson, concerned about the abandonment of a technology for which DOE and
USEC had spent nearly $2 billion during the past 25 years, announced the same day that the
Clinton Administration would review the national security implications of the AVLIS
decision.
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear fission programs and
uranium activities, and for the NRC. The sources for the funding figures are Administration
budget requests and committee reports on the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Acts, which fund all nuclear programs. President Clinton’s funding request
for FY2001 was submitted to Congress February 7, 2000. FY2000 funding reflects a
rescission of 0.38% imposed on each federal agency’s discretionary funding after enactment
of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-60). Subsequently, a
by the FY2000 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3194). In allocating the rescission,
agencies may not reduce any program, project, or activity by more than 15%, and reductions
in defense-related accounts must be applied in equal proportion.
CRS-14

IB88090
05-24-00
Table 1. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001


Approp.
Approp.
Request
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Reactor Safety
210.6
210.7
217.2


Nuclear Materials Safety
51.9
53.3
57.4


Nuclear Waste Safety
58.4
52.4
57.8


Defense and International
4.0
4.7
4.8


Management and Support
149.1
143.8
144.7


Inspector General
4.8
5.0
6.2


TOTAL NRC BUDGET
468.8*
469.9*
488.1


AUTHORITY
* Entirely offset by fees on NRC licensees, plus payments from the Nuclear Waste Fund for
repository licensing. Subtotals in House and Senate bills not specified.
Table 2. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
Approp.
Approp. Request
Nuclear Energy (selected programs)
Termination Costs
84.5
91.4
92.2


Fast Flux Test Facility
30.0
78.8
74.0


Advanced Radioisotope
36.8
34.1
31.2


Power Systems
Program Direction
24.7
24.7
27.6


University Reactor Assistance
11.0
12.0
12.0


Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization
0
5.0
5.0


Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
18.5
22.4
35.0


Uranium Programs
50.8
41.9
53.4


Isotope Support
21.5
20.5
17.2


Accelerator Transmutation of Waste
0
9.0
0


International Nuclear Safety*
80.0
15.0
20.0


Total, Nuclear Energy
279.1
285.1
306.1


Nuclear Waste Activities
Environmental Management, Defense
4,322.4
4,465.5
4,551.5


Environmental Mgmt. Privatization
228.4
188.3
515.0


Env. Management, Non-Defense
405.4
307.2
286.0


Uranium Enrichment D&D Fund
220.2
249.2
303.0


Nuclear Waste Fund Activities**
353.5
347.2
437.5


* Funded under “Other Nuclear Security Activities.”
** Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power, plus appropriations for defense waste disposal.
FY2000 request excludes $39 million in previous appropriations for interim storage.
CRS-15

IB88090
05-24-00
LEGISLATION
H.R. 45 (Upton)/S. 608 (Murkowski)
Rewrites Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and mandates construction of an interim
storage site for spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. House bill introduced January
6, 1999; referred to Commerce Committee, with sequential referrals to the Committees on
Resources and Transportation and Infrastructure. Approved 25-0 by Energy and Power
Subcommittee on April 14, 1999. Senate bill introduced March 15, 1999; referred to
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
H.R. 2605 (Packard)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2000. Provides funding for
DOE nuclear-related programs. Approved by Senate Appropriations Committee May 27,
1999 (S. 1186, S.Rept. 106-58), and by the Senate June 16, 1999. House Appropriations
Committee reported July 23, 1999, and House approved July 27, 1999. Senate passed House
bill in lieu of S. 1186 on July 28, 1999. Conference report approved by House September 27,
1999, and by Senate September 28, 1999. Signed by President September 29, 1999 (P.L.
106-60).
H.R. 2531 (Barton)/S. 1627 (Inhofe)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Authorization for Fiscal Year 2000. Authorizes NRC
funding and extends authority for NRC to collect fees sufficient to offset 100% of agency
funding. House bill introduced July 15, 1999; referred to Committee on Commerce. Ordered
reported September 29, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-415). Senate measure introduced September 23;
referred to Committee on Environment and Public Works. Ordered reported September 29,
1999, with provisions to eliminate fees for NRC activities that do not directly benefit licensees
(S.Rept. 106-220).
S. 1287 (Murkowski)
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000. Authorizes DOE to receive spent fuel
at Yucca Mountain site after NRC issues a construction permit for a permanent repository.
Reported as an original bill by Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (S.Rept.
106-98) June 24, 1999. Approved by the Senate February 10, 2000, by vote of 64-34.
Approved by the House, 253-167, on March 22, 2000. Vetoed by the President April 25,
2000. Senate defeated veto override May 2, 2000, by vote of 64-35.
CRS-16