Order Code RL30138
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Social Security Reform:
Bills in the 106th Congress
Updated April 11, 2000
David Stuart Koitz
Specialist in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

ABSTRACT
The Social Security system is projected to have long-range funding problems. Although the
system’s income currently exceeds its expenditures, its trust funds are projected to be depleted
in 2037. Concern about the problem and a belief that the remedy lies partly in economic
growth that could be bolstered by changes to the system have led to introduction of a number
of bills incorporating varying degrees of reform. This report describes the funding problem
in some detail, summarizes many of the reform bills introduced in the 106th Congress, and
provides a list of other related CRS reports. It will be updated periodically to reflect new bills
and legislative activity.

---

Social Security Reform: Bills in the 106th Congress
Summary
The Social Security system is projected to have long-range funding problems.
Although its income currently exceeds its expenditures, the Social Security Board of
Trustees estimates that over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures would
exceed its income by 14% on average and by 2037 its trust funds would be depleted.
This adverse outlook is mirrored by public opinion polls where fewer than 50% of
respondents express confidence that Social Security can meet its future commitments.
Accompanying this skepticism is a growing perception that the system’s benefits will
not be as good a value in the future as they are today. These concerns and a belief
that the remedy lies partly in economic growth that could be bolstered by changes to
the system have led to a large number of reform plans. They range from restoring the
system’s long-range solvency with as few changes as possible to totally revamping it
toward private-sector pension models.
In his State of the Union address on January 27, 2000, the President called for
eliminating the federal debt held by the public and crediting the interest savings to the
Social Security trust funds. This is similar to measures he proposed last year. In his
State of the Union address last year, he outlined a “framework” for dealing with the
issues, one which the Administration projected would resolve two-thirds of the
system’s long-range funding problem. He proposed reserving 62% of the $4.9 trillion
overall projected federal budget surpluses of the next 15 years for Social Security —
some $2.8 trillion — that would be credited to the Social Security trust funds as a
general fund infusion. Part of the infusion would be used to buy stock. In June 1999,
he raised his 15-year surplus projection to $5.9 trillion and revised his Social Security
plan. It called for creating a budget “lock box” to protect the Social Security portion
of the budget surpluses, similar to approaches being considered by Congress, and
general fund infusions to the system equal to the estimated interest savings from using
the “lock box” surpluses to reduce the outstanding federal debt. The infusions were
to be invested in stocks until the stock portion of trust fund holdings reached 15%.
On October 26, 1999, he sent draft legislation to Congress reflecting yet another plan.
It resembled the June plan, but omitted the part calling for investments in stock. His
latest plan, however, renews the call for stock investments. Some 50% of the
“interest-derived”infusions to the trust funds would be invested in stocks until the
stock portion of their holdings reached 15%. In effect, this proposal is close to the
one he recommended in June 1999. It is projected to extend the life of the system
until 2054.
Congressional leaders also pledged to make Social Security reform a major
priority for the 106th Congress. In the first session, their efforts were directed at
setting aside the Social Security portion of the next 10 years’ federal budget surpluses
pending consideration of reform legislation, bolstered by separate “lock box”
measures to protect the set asides. These measures were still pending at the close of
the first session. In the current session, following a public statement by President
Clinton that he would support repeal of the Social Security earnings test, Congress
passed H.R. 5, a bill to allow recipients ages 65 to 69 to work without losing benefits,
effective in 2000. The President signed the measure into law on April 7, 2000, as P.L.
106-182.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Projected Financing Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Past Financing Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Emerging Calls for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The 1994/1996 Advisory Council on Social Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Reform Bills and Other Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Social Security Bills Introduced In 106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Social Security Bills In 106th Congress On Which Action Has Been Taken 18
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
List of Figures
Figure 1. Social Security Trust Fund Balances, 1983 and 2000 Projections . . . . 5
List of Tables
Table 1. Measures Enacted in 1977 and 1983 to Shore Up Financial Condition of
Social Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Major Assumptions Underlying Long-Range Social Security Projections
Made in 1983 and 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 3. Social Security’s Long-Range Financing Shortfall Addressed in 1977 and
1983 Compared to That Shown in 2000 Trustees’ Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 4. Social Security Bills in 106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

---

Social Security Reform:
Bills in the 106th Congress
Introduction
The Social Security system is projected to have long-range funding problems.
Although the system’s income currently exceeds its outgo, its board of trustees
projects that over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures will exceed its income

---

CRS-2
by 14% on average and by 2037 its trust funds will be depleted.1 This adverse
outlook is mirrored by opinion polls where fewer than 50% of respondents express
confidence that the system will pay them their promised benefits. Accompanying this
skepticism is a growing perception that Social Security will not be as good a value in
the future as it is today. Until recent years, a typical retiree could expect to receive
far more in benefits than he or she paid in Social Security taxes. However, because
Social Security tax rates have increased to cover the costs of a maturing system, it has
become increasingly apparent that the system will be less of a good deal for future
recipients.2 These concerns and a belief that the remedy lies partly in economic
growth that could be bolstered by Social Security reforms have led to a number of
major proposals, including ones to totally revamp the system toward private-sector
pension models.
Others suggest that the issues are not as serious as sometimes portrayed. They
point out that there is no imminent crisis, that the system is now running surpluses and
is projected to do so for two decades or more, that the public still likes the program,
and that there is considerable risk in some of the new reform ideas. They contend that
modest changes would resolve the long-range funding problem.
In his State of the Union address on January 19, 1999 and his FY2000 budget
request to Congress, the President proposed using $2.8 trillion of some $4.9 trillion
in projected federal budget surpluses over the next 15 years to shore up the Social
Security system — 21% of this infusion (or nearly $.6 trillion) would be invested in
the stock market, the rest would be invested in federal government securities. The
proposal was estimated to keep the system solvent until 2059. He further proposed
that recipients be allowed to work without losing benefits — through elimination of
the Social Security earnings test — and unspecified measures to reduce poverty
among elderly women. He also proposed that $.5 trillion of the budget surpluses be
used to create new Universal Savings Accounts (USAs) — 401(k)-like savings
accounts that individuals would own. These would be intended to supplement Social
Security benefits. He stated he would work with Congress to consider additional
measures to resolve the entire problem.
1 The Social Security Board of Trustees, comprised of three Cabinet Members, the
Commissioner of Social Security, and two members representing the public at large, annually
projects the long-range financial condition of the Social Security system. Traditionally, the
Board uses a valuation period extending 75 years into the future. Although the measure of
solvency was refined in 1991 to encompass shorter and more recent periods of valuation,
generally long-range solvency — or what is technically referred to as “close actuarial balance”
— is assumed to exist if the system’s average income over the 75-year period as a whole is
projected to be within 95% of its average costs.
2 To a large extent, the very favorable returns on taxes experienced by the first few decades
of Social Security recipients were artificial, stemming from policy decisions to pay relatively
large benefits early on while keeping tax rates low. As the system matured, with more people
becoming eligible with longer periods of paying taxes, and higher taxes becoming necessary
to cover the benefit costs of an expanding eligible population, the ratio of benefits-to-taxes
declined. The continued decline in the ratio of workers to retirees is projected to further erode
benefit-to-tax ratios for future recipients.

---

CRS-3
On June 28, 1999, he raised his 15-year surplus projection to $5.9 trillion and
revised his Social Security proposal. It called for creation of a budget “lock box” to
protect the Social Security portion of the projected budget surpluses, similar to
approaches being considered by Congress, and general fund infusions to the Social
Security trust funds of $543 billion in the FY2011-2014 period, followed by an
indefinite $189 billion per year infusion thereafter. These amounts were estimated to
equal the interest savings to the Treasury from using the “lock box” surpluses to
reduce outstanding publicly-held federal debt. The infusions were to be invested in
stocks until the stock portion of trust fund holdings reached 15%. The plan was
projected to keep the system solvent until 2053. On October 26, 1999, the President
sent draft legislation to Congress reflecting another plan. It resembled the June plan,
but omitted the part calling for investment of the new infusions in stock. It called,
instead, for crediting the trust funds with $735.2 billion in federal securities in the
FY2011-2015 period, followed by $215.5 billion per year through 2044. The plan
was projected to extend the life of the system until 2050. It also called for reserving
a of future budget surpluses for Medicare reform. The draft legislation was
introduced by Senators Moynihan (S. 1828) and Daschle (S. 1831) and
Representative Gephardt (H.R. 3165).
In his State of the Union address on January 27, 2000 and his FY2001 budget
request, the President renewed his call to protect the projected Social Security
surpluses, and again proposed that interest savings from eliminating publicly-held
federal debt be credited to the Social Security trust funds. Unlike his October 1999
proposal, this one calls for investment of part of these new infusions in stock. Some
50% of the infusions would be invested in stocks until the stock portion of the trust
funds’ holdings reached 15%. In effect, his latest plan is close to his June 1999 plan.
The new trust fund infusions would begin in FY2011. The Social Security
Administration’s actuaries estimate that they would range from $98.7 billion in
FY2011 to $204.9 billion in 2016 and thereafter (with all such infusions ending in
2050), and that plan would extend the life of the system until 2054.
Congressional leaders also have pledged to make Social Security reform a major
priority for the 106th Congress. Initial efforts have been directed toward setting aside
the portion of the next 10 years’ unified budget surpluses attributable to Social
Security pending consideration of reform legislation. This would be bolstered by
procedural measures designed to discourage tax cuts or spending increases that would
dip into the set aside — budget “lock box” measures. These procedural measures
were still pending at the close of the first session of the 106th Congress. Hearings also
have been held examining the President’s plans and other ideas that have been
suggested to reform the system.
In the current session, following a public statement by President Clinton early in
the year that he would support repeal of the Social Security earnings test, Congress
passed H.R. 5 (Representative Sam Johnson), a bill to allow recipients ages 65 to 69
to work without losing benefits effective in 2000. Under the old law, recipients ages
65 to 69 who earned more than $17,000 in 2000 would have lost one dollar in
benefits for each three dollars they earned above the limit; there was no loss of
benefits once a person reached age 70. Under the new law, recipients age 65 to 69
will receive full benefits beginning with the month they reach age 65, or beginning
with January 2000 if the reached age 65 before this year. The President signed the

---

CRS-4
measure into law on April 7, 2000, as P.L. 106-182. For further details, see CRS
Report 98-789.
This report summarizes the various reform bills and other legislation introduced
in the 106th Congress. For additional reading on the issues, see the Appendix to this
report. Many of the CRS products listed there and links to information from other
organizations can be accessed through an on-line Social Security “electronic briefing
book” located at the CRS website [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebssc1.html].
Background
Projected Financing Problem. Currently the Social Security system’s income
exceeds its outgo. However, the Social Security Board of Trustees projects that on
average over the next 75 years the system’s expenditures will exceed its income by
14%. The primary reason is demographic: an aging post-World War II “baby boom”
generation will begin retiring in less than 10 years and increasing life expectancy is
creating an older society. By 2025, the number of people 65 and older is projected
to rise by 75%. In contrast, the number of workers whose taxes will finance future
Social Security benefits is projected to grow by only 13%. As a result, the ratio of
workers to Social Security recipients is projected to fall from 3.4 to 1 today to 2.1 to
1 in 2035 and ultimately to 1.9 to 1 in 2075 (the end of trustees’ projection period).3
Social Security revenues are paid into the U.S. Treasury and invested in federal
securities recorded to the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust
funds maintained by the Treasury Department (OASDI being the formal title for
Social Security). Social Security benefits and administrative costs are paid out of the
Treasury and a corresponding amount of securities are written off the trust funds.
The tax surpluses the system is currently generating and the interest the
government “pays” to the trust funds on the securities they hold appear as growing
trust fund balances. On March 30, 2000, the trustees projected that the balances
would grow to a peak of $6 trillion in 2024. After 2024, the trust funds’ income
would be less than their outgo and the balances would fall. By 2037, the balances
would be totally depleted and the system would be technically insolvent.4
Although aggregate trust fund surpluses are projected through 2024, the point
at which Social Security taxes alone (ignoring interest credited to the funds) would
fall below the system’s outgo is 2015. Since interest “paid” to the trust funds is
simply an exchange of credits among governmental accounts, it does not represent a
source of receipts for the government. Only the portion of the trust funds’ income
represented by taxes provides receipts for the government. Hence, it is in 2015 that
surplus Social Security taxes would no longer be available to the government and
other resources of the government would be needed to help meet the costs of the
system. At that point, in the absence of surplus receipts from the rest of the
3 See the 2000 Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance Trust Funds, Intermediate projections.
4 The reader should recognize that at that point the system is projected to still be receiving
taxes sufficient to cover about 72% of its ongoing costs.

---

CRS-5
government’s operations, policymakers would have three basic choices: raise taxes,
cut spending, or borrow money from the public.5
Today, the cost of the system — estimated to be $410 billion in 2000 — is equal
to 10.34% of the total amount of national earnings subject to Social Security taxation
(referred to as taxable payroll). It is projected to rise slowly over the next decade,
reaching 11.55% of payroll by 2010. It would then begin a more precipitous rise to
16.24% in 2025 and 17.86% in 2035. This would be near the end of the baby
boomers’ retirement as those born in 1965 (the approximate end of the baby boom)
would be 70 years old in 2035. After that, the system’s cost would rise slowly to
19.53% of payroll in 2075. The system’s average cost over the entire 75-year period
would be 15.4% of payroll or 14% higher than its average income. However, the gap
between income and outgo would grow throughout the period and by 2075, income
would equal 13.34% of payroll, outgo would equal 19.53% of payroll, and the gap
would equal 6.18% of payroll. Simply put, by the end of the projection period, outgo
would exceed income by 46%.
Past Financing Problems. The current problem is not unprecedented. In 1983
and in legislation in 1977, Congress enacted a variety of measures to address financing
shortfalls similar to those now being forecast. Among them were benefit computation
changes, a gradual increase from 65 to 67 in Social Security’s “full” benefit age,
increases in payroll taxes, partial taxation of the Social Security benefits of higher-
income recipients, and extension of coverage to federal and nonprofit employees.
(See Table 1.) Since then, new long-term deficits have been forecast, resulting from
changes in actuarial methods and assumptions, as well as extensions of the 75-year
valuation period to later years (which added years of deficits at the back end of the
period, while subtracting recent years of surpluses). (See Figure 1 and Table 2.)
5 Since the trust funds would still be credited with interest for the securities they hold, from
an accounting standpoint their “total” income (tax receipts and interest combined) would
exceed their outgo and the use of general governmental resources during the 2015-2024 period
would be “making good” on part of the interest due to the funds. Even more general
governmental resources would be needed in 2025-2037 period as the balances of the trust
funds are drawn down.

---

CRS-6
Table 1. Measures Enacted in 1977 and 1983 to Shore Up Financial
Condition of Social Security System
Measures enacted in 1983
Percent of projected 75-year
funding gap closed by measure
Raise full benefit age from 65 to 67
34%
Subject up to ½ benefits to income taxes
29%
Cover federal & non-profit employees
18%
Move COLAs from July to January
14%
Other
5%
Funding gap remaining after changes
-0-
Measures enacted in 1977
Changes in benefit computation rules
58%
Increase in Social Security tax rates
15%
Increase in taxable earnings base
7%
Other
2%
Sub-total of changes
82%
Funding gap remaining after changes*
18%
* The 1977 amendments did not fully resolve the long-range financing problem projected at that time.
Figure 1. Social Security Trust Fund Balances, 1983 and
2000 Projections
Trust Fund Balance as % of Annual Outgo
600
1983 Projections
500
400
300
200
100
2000 Projections
0
1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2037 2045 2055

---

CRS-7
Table 2. Major Assumptions Underlying Long-Range Social Security
Projections Made in 1983 and 2000
Long-range assumptions
1983 projections
2000 projections
Annual increase in:
—wages in covered employment
5.5%
4.3%
—consumer price index
4.0%
3.3%
Unemployment rate
5.5%
5.5%
Annual interest rate
6.1%
6.3%
Fertility rate (births per woman)
2.0
1.95
Life expectancy in 2060 birth):
At birth (in years):
—women
84.4
84.1
—men
76.3
79.9
At age 65 (in years):
—women
23.6
22.0
—men
17.9
19.1
Annual net immigration
400,000
900,000
Source: 1983 and 2000 OASDI Trustees’ Report, Intermediate projections.
Expressed as a percent of taxable payroll, the currently projected financing
problem of 1.89% of payroll (averaged over the next 75 years) is slightly less than the
size as the problem that Congress tackled in 1983 and only about one-fourth the size
of the problem addressed in 1977 (see Table 3 on the next page). The more
important difference between the financing problems projected then and now is that
the problems in 1977 and 1983 were immediate. The imminent “insolvency” of the
trust funds gave political impetus to act on the issue. Today, there is no near-term
problem, only a long-term one. In one sense, it makes dealing with the problem
harder, because the length of time before the problem emerges gives people a basis
to doubt what the projections show (the argument being that long-term projections
will inevitably be wrong). On the other hand, the longer time frame until the problem
emerges allows for gradual changes to be made to solve it, in lieu of precipitous
benefit cuts or tax increases that might be required if insolvency were imminent.

---

CRS-8
Table 3. Social Security’s Long-Range Financing Shortfall Addressed
in 1977 and 1983 Compared to That Shown in 2000 Trustees’ Report
Year of
Income
Outgo
Deficit
Deficit as Percent
Projection
of Income
(75-year average in % of payroll)
1977
10.99
19.19
-8.20
75%
1983
12.29
14.38
-2.09
17%
2000
13.51
15.40
-1.89
14%
Source: 1977 and 2000 OASDI Trustees’ Report, Intermediate projections, and projections provided
to House Committee on Ways and Means and Senate Committee on Finance, February 1983.
Emerging Calls for Reform
As far back as 1990, Social Security trustees serving under Presidents Bush and
Clinton concluded that steps eventually would need to be taken to fix the system.
Impetus to move soon was triggered by the 1994/1995 Bipartisan Commission on
Entitlement and Tax Reform (better known as the Kerrey-Danforth Commission),
which, while failing to get agreement on a specific plan, did conclude that the earlier
action was taken the better. This perspective was echoed two years later by the 1994-
1996 Social Security Advisory Council, a legislatively-mandated panel convened to
study Social Security’s long-term problem. It too was unable to agree on a specific
plan, but its members also concluded that action needed to be taken soon. Since then,
numerous other private and governmental entities, including a new permanent Social
Security Advisory Board, the General Accounting Office, the National Association
of Manufacturers, the Committee on Economic Development, and the American
Academy of Actuaries have come forward urging Congress to take action. Moreover,
opinion polls suggest that the public generally sees the need and is in favor of reform
soon. However, while a consensus has emerged that action is necessary, there is a
wide range of opinion over what should be done.
The 1994/1996 Advisory Council on Social Security. Although the recent
Social Security Advisory Council could not agree on a single plan, its 1997 report
contained three possible alternatives to restore the system’s solvency.6 The first (the
“maintain benefits” plan) would have kept the system’s benefit structure essentially
in tact by addressing most of the long-range problem with revenue increases
(including an eventual rise in the payroll tax) and minor benefit cuts. To close the
remaining gap, its proponents suggested that Congress consider authorizing
investment of up to 40% of the Social Security trust funds in the stock market. The
second (the “individual account” plan) addressed the problem mostly with gradually
growing benefit reductions. It also would have required workers to make an extra
1.6% of pay contribution to new personal savings accounts. The third (the “personal
security account” plan) proposed a complete redesign of the system that would have
6 Report on the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security. Washington, GPO, 1997.

---

CRS-9
gradually replaced the current earnings-related retirement benefits with flat-rate
benefits based on length of service and personal savings accounts funded with a 5%
of pay contribution (carved out of the current payroll tax). It would have covered the
costs of transitioning to the new system with a 1.52% of pay increase in payroll taxes
and government borrowing.
While Congress did not act on any of the Advisory Council’s plans, the Council’s
report and varied plans have served to stimulate public debate. The conceptual
approaches they reflect can be found in the many reform bills introduced in the 105th
and 106th Congresses as well as in other proposals suggested by private panels and
experts.
Reform Bills and Other Proposals. This section briefly summarizes some of
the more fundamental reform bills introduced in recent Congresses and proposals
suggested by others. A more general list of Social Security-related bills introduced
in the 106th Congress is provided in the succeeding section.
During the 103rd Congress, bills were introduced proposing to raise the system’s
full benefit age to 70, modify cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), and make other
benefit reductions — H.R. 4275 (Pickle), H.R. 4372/H.R. 4373 (Penny), H.R. 5308
(Nick Smith). H.R. 4245 (Rostenkowski) of the 103rd Congress sought a mix of
benefit reductions and tax increases. In the 104th Congress, more far-reaching
proposals were introduced encompassing not only some of these changes, but also
seeking to privatize a portion of the program — S. 818 (Kerrey), S. 825 (Kerrey and
Simpson), and H.R. 3758 (Nick Smith). In the 105th Congress more than 30 reform
bills reflecting an even wider array of options were introduced.
The largest number of bills to change Social Security introduced thus far in the
106th Congress are measures to alter the program’s treatment in the federal budget —
more than 40 would do so either by changing how Social Security is viewed and
treated in the congressional budget-making process or through constitutional
amendments to balance the federal budget without counting Social Security. Included
among them is the FY2000 concurrent budget resolution, H.Con.Res. 68 (passed by
Congress in April 1999), and the now pending budget resolution for FY2001,
H.Con.Res. 290 and S.Con.Res. 101, setting aside the portion of projected budget
surpluses attributable to Social Security for the next 10 years pending action to reform
the system. Other so-called budget “lock box” measures include amendments to S.
557 (Thompson) pending in the Senate, which would set a statutory limit on publicly-
held debt that would decline annually by the amount of Social Security surpluses, and
H.R. 1259 (Herger), passed by the House on May 26, 1999, which would create
points of order against bills that would use the Social Security portion of budget
surpluses for spending increases or tax cuts. The Administration has come forward
with its ideas as well (See CRS Report RS20165 for further discussion of Social
Security “lock box”).
Also prominent are measures to allow aged recipients to earn more without
losing benefits. As previously mentioned, following the President’s statement that he
would sign a “clean” bill eliminating the earnings limit for recipients age 65 to 69,
both Houses of Congress passed H.R. 5 (Representative Sam Johnson) unanimously
with no other amendments or alterations of the program. The President signed the

---

CRS-10
bill into law as P.L. 106-182, on April 7, 2000. Under the new law, the earnings limit
for this age group was eliminated beginning in the year 2000.
Most of the fundamental reform bills introduced in the current Congress and
those aimed at addressing the system’s long-range financing problems would alter the
system with some combination of benefit restraints and income-producing measures.
Most would make some use of the nation’s financial markets, either by permitting the
creation of new personal savings accounts to supplement or take the place of future
Social Security benefits or by requiring or permitting the “collective” investment of
the Social Security trust funds in the markets. Some involving the creation of
personal accounts would phase-in rapidly, giving workers so-called recognition bonds
for their past Social Security taxes, while others call for a long transition.
H.R. 249 (Sanford) and H.R. 874 (Porter) of the 106th Congress would allow
workers to divert 8 and 10 percentage points, respectively, of the current Social
Security tax rate paid by employees and employers into new personal accounts.
Under H.R. 249, workers do so would receive Social Security benefits equivalent to
what they would have received had they turned age 62 and retired in the year 2000
and a minimum annual annuity from their new personal accounts (with any remaining
balance being available as a personal asset). For those who stay in the existing
system, the bill would gradually raise the full benefit age to 70, alter the basic benefit
formula to produce lower benefits (i.e., than current law), and reduce annual COLAs
and spousal benefits. It also extends Social Security coverage to newly hired state
and local government workers. Under H.R. 874, workers opting for the new system
would receive Social Security benefits (through recognition bonds) based on their
employment record before they joined and a minimum annuity from their new
personal accounts. For those remaining in the existing system, the bill would
gradually raise the full benefit age to 70 and alter the basic benefit formula to produce
lower benefits.
S. 1103 of the 106th Congress (Rod Grams) and H.R. 3683 (Sessions) of the
105th Congress would similarly allow workers to opt for a new system of personal
accounts. S. 1103, like H.R. 874, would allow workers to divert 10 percentage
points of the current tax rate into the new accounts. Workers age 30 and older would
receive recognition bonds for past Social Security taxes. Those choosing the new
system could opt back into the old one within 10 years upon repayment of the taxes
and any recognition bonds received. Under H.R. 3683, once a worker opted out, his
or her portion of the Social Security tax — 6.2% of pay — would be deposited into
a new personal account. Employers would continue to pay their share of the tax to
the existing system for 15 years, after which they would contribute to the worker’s
personal account. There would be a 90-day period of dual coverage, after which the
worker’s Social Security coverage would decline by 20% per year until all protections
were forfeited in the 5th year.
S. 21 (Moynihan/Kerrey) of the 106th Congress would put the current system on
a pay-as-you-go basis by immediately reducing the tax rate by one percentage point
each on workers and their employers, and then raising it later in tandem with the
system’s future cost. Workers would be given the option of using the tax cut to
create new personal accounts. If they did, their employers would have to match their
contributions. The bill also would reduce COLAs, increase and extend the taxation

---

CRS-11
of benefits to all recipients, repeal the currently scheduled increase in the full Social
Security benefit age while constraining the future growth in benefits to reflect
increasing life expectancy, lengthen the earnings “averaging period” for computing
benefits, eliminate the Social Security earnings test (allowing recipients age 62 and
older to receive benefits regardless of their earnings), raise the maximum amount of
earnings subject to taxation, extend Social Security coverage to all newly hired state
and local government workers, and create a new system of personal savings accounts
for children under the age of 6, referred to as kidsave accounts, funded with
contributions by the government.
Senator Phil Gramm has suggested a plan under which workers would be
allowed to divert three percentage points of their tax rate into new personal accounts
with the government guaranteeing a higher retirement income than would be payable
from Social Security alone. The guarantee would apply when a retiree’s Social
Security benefits plus an annuity from the new personal accounts are less than 120%
of current law Social Security benefits. An amount equal to an additional two percent
of workers’ pay also would be contributed to personal accounts by the Federal
government, and the annuities from these contributions would be used entirely to
offset the cost of a worker’s eventual Social Security benefits. Federal budget
surpluses, a partial drawdown of the Social Security trust funds, and higher corporate
tax receipts resulting from the potential economic stimulus created by the plan were
suggested as ways of covering transition costs. The Senator suggested that the plan
would resolve Social Security’s funding problems since the personal account annuities
would fully or partially offset Social Security benefits. The plan has not yet been
introduced in bill form.
Representative Kasich proposed a plan under which a new system of voluntary
personal accounts would be coupled with constraints on the growth of the benefit
formula such that benefits would rise only at the rate of inflation. Under current rules,
future retirees’ Social Security benefits are scheduled to rise at the rate of average
wages in the economy. Under the proposal, their benefits would rise at the rate of
inflation, which historically has risen at a slower pace than wages. This change alone
would be expected to bring the system into long-range balance. Under the new
personal accounts system, workers under age 55 in the year 2000 could make an
irrevocable choice to divert a portion of their Social Security taxes into the accounts,
and in return accept a partial reduction in their eventual Social Security benefits. The
amount of the diversion would vary with the level of a worker’s annual earnings; the
smaller the earnings, the larger the diversion rate (with a minimum of 1% of earnings
and a maximum approaching 3.5%). The proposal also calls for general fund
infusions to the Social Security trust funds to help cover transition costs. This plan
too has not yet been introduced in bill form.
H.R. 3206 (Nick Smith) of the 106th Congress would allow workers to put 2.5
percentage points of their Social Security taxes into new personal accounts for the
next 25 years, 2.75 percentage points from 2026 to 2038, and an amount thereafter
based on the yearly excess of aggregate Social Security revenue over expenditures.
At retirement, each participant’s Social Security benefits would be reduced by the
amount of a hypothetical annuity derived from their accounts. The bill would alter the
existing system by accelerating the scheduled increase in the full benefit age to 67 for
those born in 1949, thereafter increasing it by 1 month every 2 years, and make

---

CRS-12
changes to the basic benefit formula to produce lower initial benefits such that
ultimately there would be nearly a single-rate benefit formula. It also would raise
benefits for surviving spouses by 10% beginning in 2001, increase the “delayed
retirement credit” to 8% per year beginning in 2000 (instead of in 2008 as scheduled
under current law), extend Social Security coverage to newly hired state and local
government workers, eliminate the Social Security earnings test for recipients age 62
and older, and make general fund infusions to the trust funds equal to non-Social
Security budget surpluses for FY2001-FY2009 and for a portion of the costs of
Disability Insurance.
S. 588 (Bunning) of the 106th Congress would allow workers to initially divert
2.5% of their taxes into new accounts with the diversion amount rising to up to half
of their taxes over 20 years. Workers opting to do so would be required to take a
50% reduction in their eventual Social Security benefits. Retirees would be required
to draw down at least 75% of their personal account accumulations in the form of an
annuity or other monthly payment based on their life expectancy.
Patterned after recommendations made by the National Commission on
Retirement Policy, an independent panel comprised of Members of Congress, business
leaders, economists, and other experts in the pension field, S. 2313 (Gregg/Breaux)
and H.R. 4256/H.R. 4824 (Kolbe/Stenholm) of the 105th Congress would have
mandatorily diverted two percentage points of the workers’ tax rate into new
accounts (for those under age 55 upon enactment). They would have raised the
existing system’s income by extending Social Security coverage to newly hired state
and local government workers and crediting proceeds from the current income tax on
benefits that now go to the Medicare Hospital Insurance trust fund to the Social
Security trust funds. They would have reduced its outgo by raising the early and full
benefit ages gradually to 67 and 70, thereafter increasing them by 2 months every 3
years, altering the basic benefit formula to produce lower benefits, reducing the
dependent spouse’s benefit, lengthening the earnings averaging period for computing
benefits, and reducing Social Security COLAs. The bills also called for a new system
of minimum Social Security benefits, ending the Social Security earnings test for
recipients at or above the full benefit age, and creating new voluntary incentives for
personal savings.
Representatives Kolbe and Stenholm introduced a revised proposal in the 106th
Congress, H.R. 1793. While retaining many of the same provisions of H.R. 4256 and
H.R. 4824 (including the two percentage point tax mandatory “carve out” for new
personal accounts and a new but revised minimum benefit), the new bill does not
contain measures extending Social Security coverage to state and local government
workers and reducing the dependent spouse’s benefit. It also revises the provisions
of the previous bills affecting the early and full benefit age, such that after the full
benefit age rises to 67 in 2011, both it and the early benefit age would rise more
slowly than under the previous bills (i.e. by one month every two years). It adds two
new benefit formula constraints to the package: (1) limiting the future growth in
benefits to reflect increases in life expectancy (similar to approach taken in S.21) and
(2) constraining the growth of the middle and upper brackets of the formula (these
two constraints would be additive, not separate). It also revises voluntary savings
provisions in the previous bills by adding government matching contributions for low-
income workers. In addition, to assist with program financing, it calls for general

---

CRS-13
fund infusions to the Social Security trust funds rising from amounts equal to 0.4%
of pay in 2000 to 0.8% in 2060 and thereafter.
Senators Gregg and Breaux (along with 5 other co-sponsors) also introduced a
revised plan, S. 1383. It only raises the full benefit age to 67 (albeit somewhat faster
than current law and with greater reductions and increases for early and delayed
retirement) and does not increase the earliest eligibility age. In lieu of such changes
proposed in their previous bill, it contains a provision similar to that of S. 21,
constraining the growth of the system’s benefit formula to reflect increasing life
expectancy. It would retain a two percentage point mandatory tax “carve out” for
new personal accounts, however, in contrast to their previous bill, some or all of the
annuities from these accounts would cause a reduction in future Social Security
benefits. In addition, it would not create a new minimum benefit but instead revises
the basic benefit formula to tilt it more heavily toward low-wage workers. The new
package also calls for creation of “kidsave” accounts similar to those of S. 21 (with
half of the eventual “kidsave” annuities causing a reduction in Social Security
benefits), and it revises voluntary savings provisions in the previous bill by adding a
government contribution and matching rate for low-income workers. To assist with
program financing, it would raise the maximum amount of earnings subject to Social
Security taxation and authorize general fund infusions to the Social Security trust
funds rising from amounts equal to 0.6% of pay in 2000 to 1.2% in 2060 and
thereafter. As with H.R. 1793 (Kolbe/Stenholm), this new package excludes
provisions extending Social Security coverage to state and local government workers
and reducing the dependent spouse’s benefit.
H.R. 250 and H.R. 251 (Sanford) of the 106th Congress would mandatorily
divert one percentage point of the workers’ share of the tax rate on into new personal
accounts (for those under age 55 upon enactment) managed by the Treasury in the
same manner as the federal workers’ Thrift Savings Plan (with the same investment
options) or by banking institutions. Future Social Security benefits would be scaled
down to reflect the annuity value of the account accumulations. They also gradually
raise Social Security’s early and full retirement ages to 67 and 70, respectively, for
those born in 1967, thereafter increasing them by about 1 month every 2 years, and
reduce COLAs.
Economists Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick have suggested a personal
accounts system funded with federal budget surpluses allocated to workers at a rate
equal to 2% of their pay. Under their plan, withdrawals from the accounts would
cause a partial reduction in Social Security benefits; i.e., for every $1 withdrawn, $.75
in Social Security benefits should be forfeited. In this way, the build up of the
accounts would lead to an eventual reduction in the existing system’s cost while
enhancing future retirees’ income. They claim the proposal would make the existing
system solvent in the long run.
A related approach suggested by Representatives Archer and Shaw would
establish a personal accounts system (referred to as Social Security “guarantee
accounts”) funded with indefinite government contributions equal to 2% of pay. The
government would establish the accounts for all workers who pay Social Security
taxes. However, workers’ Social Security taxes would be unaffected, since the
funding of the accounts would be through refundable tax credits (the accounts would

---

CRS-14
be effectively funded with general revenues). The accounts would be managed by
selected investment companies with portfolios containing a 60/40% split of equities
and corporate bonds. Upon entitlement to Social Security, an amount equal to a “life
annuity” would be transferred monthly from each worker’s account to the Social
Security system, and the higher of current law Social Security benefits or the life
annuity would be paid to the recipient (in effect, the annuity payment would fund a
portion or all of the Social Security benefit depending on its size). The account
balances of deceased recipients would be used to finance Social Security benefits of
any eligible survivors or would otherwise revert to the Social Security trust funds.
The account balances of workers who die before entitlement with no eligible survivors
would become part of the worker’s estate. The proposal also would eliminate the
Social Security earnings test for recipients age 62 and older and liberalize Social
Security survivor benefits for two-earner couples (the Social Security benefits of the
surviving spouse would be equal to 2/3rds of the combined benefits they formerly
received as a couple). The plan has not yet been introduced in bill form.
Following the theme of the “maintain benefits” plan of 1994-1996 Social
Security Advisory Council, three other approaches would attempt to close the
system’s funding gap without altering Social Security benefits or creating new
personal accounts. Reflecting in part the original “framework” for reform proposed
by the President in January 1999, H.R. 1043 (Nadler) in the 106th Congress would
credit the trust funds with $2.8 trillion of the then projected $4.9 trillion in federal
budget surpluses over the next 15 years as a general fund “infusion,” using 40% of
such amounts to buy stocks (about $1.1 trillion worth). It also would raise the
maximum amount of earnings subject to Social Security taxation. H.R. 2039 (Stark)
would credit the Social Security trust funds with annual general fund infusions equal
to 2.07% of taxable payroll (about $75 billion per year in 1999 dollars), an amount
equivalent to the average long-range funding gap projected in the 1999 trustees’
report. S. 1376 (Hollings) calls for the creation of a new source of federal revenue
— a 5% value added tax — that would be used to retire the federal debt and help
shore up the Social Security trust funds.
Other more limited approaches embody the concept of expanding the investment
policies of the program; more specifically, by creating a board empowered to invest
Social Security funds in stocks as well as federal bonds. The idea is that a managed
fund that took advantage of investment yields from stocks would raise the income of
the trust funds. This is incorporated in both the President’s latest reform plan and
original January 1999 “framework” for reform, which as previously mentioned would
have credited the trust funds with general fund infusions, part of which was to be used
to buy stocks. It also is similar to approaches suggested in H.R. 633 and H.R. 990
(Bartlett), H.R. 871 (Markey), H.R. 1043 (Nadler), and H.R. 2717 (DeFazio) in the
106th Congress and H.R. 336 (Solomon) of the 105th Congress, and to proposals of
former Social Security commissioner, Robert Ball, and Brookings economists, Henry
Aaron and Robert Reischauer.
Not all proposals attempt to close the system’s funding gap. S. 263 (Roth) of
the 106th Congress and H.R. 3456 (Kasich) and S. 2369 (Roth) of the 105th Congress
would create personal savings accounts funded with federal budget surpluses that
would be considered supplements to Social Security. These proposals assume no
changes to the existing system. The expressed view is that the Social Security system

---

CRS-15
will have to be changed at some point, and the creation of these accounts could help
fill the gap in benefits caused by those eventual changes. A similar measure to create
universal savings accounts (USAs) using a portion of the budget surpluses is
incorporated in President’s 1999 reform framework. In a detailed plan announced on
April 14, 1999, he proposed a progressive system of automatic government
contributions, with a further progressive government match when a worker makes a
voluntary contribution (progressive in the sense that the lower a worker’s income, the
larger the automatic contribution and matching rate).
Also embedded in all of the President’s reform plans and, to a more limited
extent in H.R. 147 (Ralph Hall) and H.R. 160 (Royce) in the 106th Congress and H.R.
2191 (Neumann) in the 105th Congress, is a proposal to buy up federal securities in
the financial markets (i.e., outstanding publicly-held federal debt) and credit an
equivalent amount of federal securities to the Social Security trust funds. The various
bills introduced simply call for replacement of the trust funds’ non-marketable
securities with marketable federal ones. The President’s January 1999 plan called for
crediting $2.2 trillion of such to the trust funds over the next 15 years as a general
fund infusion. His revised June 1999 plan would have credited the trust funds only
with interest savings from buying up federal securities, first in the form of stocks, and
then in the form of federal securities (i.e., once the trust funds’ holdings in stocks
reached 15% of the total). In his October 1999 plan, all of the trust fund infusions
(again representing interest savings from retiring federal debt) would have been in the
form of federal securities. His latest plan, reflected in his FY2001 budget request,
resembles the June 1999 plan calling for 50% of the “interest-derived” infusions to be
invested in stock until the trust funds’ holdings in stocks reached 15% of the total.
Social Security Bills Introduced In 106th Congress
Table 4 beginning on the next page lists many of the bills introduced in the 106th
Congress affecting Social Security. It is a relatively comprehensive but not an all-
inclusive list. The bills shown are confined to those that would reform the system or
otherwise address its financing problems, change its budget status, or have notable
cost or revenue effects. They have been grouped into categories reflecting their
general nature.

---

CRS-16
Table 4. Social Security Bills in 106th Congress
General Nature of Bill
Attempts to restore
Creates new voluntary or
Creates personal accounts,
solvency of current system
mandatory system of
but does not alter current
personal accounts in place
system
of part of current system
H.R. 1
Hastert
H.R. 249
Sanford
S. 263
Roth
(reserved for
President’s
bill)
H.R. 249
Sanford
H.R. 250
Sanford
H.R. 250
Sanford
H.R. 251
Sanford
H.R. 251
Sanford
H.R. 874
Porter
H.R. 1043
Nadler
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 1897
Petri
H.R. 2039
Stark
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
H.R. 2717
DeFazio
S. 21
Moynihan
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
S. 588
Bunning
H.R. 3165
Gephardt
S. 1103
Grams
S. 21
Moynihan
S. 1383
Gregg
S. 588
Bunning
S. 1103
Grams
S. 1376
Hollings
S. 1383
Gregg
S. 1828
Moynihan
S. 1831
Daschle
Alters system’s investment
Alters Social Security’s
Alters Social Security’s
policies
budget treatment
disability provisions
(including “lock box” bills)
H.R. 147
Hall
H.R. 37
Livingston
H.R. 401
Mink
H.R. 160
Royce
H.R. 74
Bilbray
H.R. 545
N. Johnson
H.R. 219
Paul
H.R. 167
Klink
H.R. 631
N. Johnson
H.R. 633
Bartlett
H.R. 196
Minge
H.R. 1091
Hulshof
H.R. 871
Markey
H.R. 343
Andrews
H.R. 1107
Watkins
H.R. 990
Bartlett
H.R. 420
Nick Smith
H.R. 1180
Lazio
H.R. 1043
Nadler
H.R. 563
Adam Smith
H.R. 3280
Mink
H.R. 1268
Gary Miller
H.R. 656
Stearns
S. 86
Bunning
H.R. 2717
DeFazio
H.R. 685
Moore
S. 285
McCain
S. 633
Ashcroft
H.R. 853
Nussle
S. 331
Jeffords
H.R. 863
Herger

---

CRS-17
General Nature of Bill
Alters system’s investment
Alters Social Security’s
Alters Social Security’s
policies — cont’d:
budget treatment
disability provisions —
(including “lock box” bills)
cont’d:
— cont’d:
H.R. 1157
Herger
H.R. 1259
Herger
H.R. 1803
Kasich
H.R. 1927
Holt
H.R. 3012
Barton
H.R. 3165
Gephardt
H.R. 3175
Minge
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
H.R. 3695
Toomey
H.R. 3859
Herger
H.Res. 18
Pascell
H.Res. 98
Ryan
H.Res. 302
Herger
H.Res. 306
Herger
H.J.Res. 40
Traficant
H.J.Res. 53
Istook
S. 8
Daschle
S. 27
Feingold
S. 359
Grams
S. 502
Ashcroft
Amendments
Thompson
to S. 557
S. 588
Bunning
S. 605
Hollings
S. 862
Lautenberg
S. 1097
Enzi
S. 1168
McCain
S. 1693
Grams
S. 1768
Abraham
S. 1828
Moynihan
S. 1831
Daschle
S. 1889
Grams
S. 1962
Ashcroft
S. 2001
Grams

---

CRS-18
General Nature of Bill
Alters system’s investment
Alters Social Security’s
Alters Social Security’s
policies — cont’d:
budget treatment
disability provisions —
(including “lock box” bills)
cont’d:
— cont’d:
S. 2126
Grams
S. 2220
Allard
S.J.Res. 5
Gramm
S.J.Res. 13
Abraham
S.J.Res. 38
Voinovich
Liberalizes or eliminates
Repeals some or all of
Addresses Social Security
Social Security earnings or
taxation of Social Security
“notch” issueb
retirement testa
benefits
H.R. 5
S. Johnson
H.R. 48
Stump
H.R. 120
Emerson
H.R. 47
Stump
H.R. 107
Knollenberg
H.R. 122
Emerson
H.R. 107
Knollenberg
H.R. 291
Sweeney
H.R. 148
Hall
H.R. 288
Sweeney
H.R. 688
Salmon
H.R. 538
Clement
H.R. 519
Gilman
H.R. 761
Forbes
H.R. 568
Wexler
H.R. 1084
Dunn
H.R. 3437
Nadler
H.R. 1771
Emerson
H.R. 1793
Kolbe
H.R. 3438
Nadler
S. 390
Reid
H.R. 2020
N. Johnson
H.R. 3857
Franks, Bob
H.R. 2698
Dreier
S. 137
Kyl
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
S. 286
McCain
H.R. 3599
Nick Smith
S. 482
Abraham
S. 21
Moynihan
S. 488
Grams
S. 279
McCain
S. 2180
Abraham
S. 1160
Grassley
S. 2304
Shelby
S. 1168
McCain
S. 1383
Gregg
S. 1440
Gramm
S. 2074
Ashcroft
S. 2085
Lugar
S. 2086
Lugar
Liberalizes “windfall”
Liberalizes “government
Authorizes benefits for the
benefits provisionc
pension offset” provisiond
month of deathe
H.R. 742
Sandlin
H.R. 1217
Jefferson
H.R. 163
Holden
H.R. 860
Frank
H.R. 1590
Gejdenson
H.R. 287
Sweeney
S. 8
Daschle
H.R. 3890
Mink
S. 717
Mikulski
S. 786
Mikulski

---

CRS-19
General Nature of Bill
Provides an income tax
Expresses sense of Congress
Budget resolutions
deduction for payment of
about Social Security issue
Social Security taxes
H.R. 105
Knollenberg
H.R. 245
Sanford
H.Con.Res. 68
Kasich
H.R. 1458
Nethercutt
H.Res. 34
DeLauro
S.Con.Res. 20
Domenici
S. 807
Ashcroft
H.Res. 48
Ryan
S.Con.Res. 290
Kasich
H.Res. 93
Nadler
H.J.Res. 32
Ryan
H.Con.Res.
Mark Green
101
H.Con.Res.
Schaffer
155
Requires that Social
Revises Consumer Price
Alters Social Security taxes
Security benefits be made a
Index (CPI) for purpose of
for purposes other than to
“legally-enforceable
altering Social Security
restore solvency
guarantee”
COLAs
S. 1102
Grams
H.R. 2180
Weiner
H.R. 1099
Owens
S. 1247
Grams
H.R. 1316
Dreier
Mandates coverage of state
Expands eligibility for
and local government
lump sum death benefit
workers
H.R. 249
Sanford
H.R. 3281
Mink
H.R. 3206
Nick Smith
S. 21
Moynihan
Source: Derived from on-line Legislative Information System; incorporates bills introduced as of
March 30, 2000.
a. For discussion of issue, see CRS Report 98-789, Proposed Changes to the Social Security Earnings
Test.
b. For discussion of issue, see CRS Report 95-188, The Social Security Notch Issue.
c. For discussion of issue, see CRS Report RS20148, Social Security: The Government Pension
Offset.
d. For discussion of issue, see CRS Report 98-35, The Windfall Benefit Provision.
e. For discussion of issue, see CRS Report 93-792, Social Security benefits Are Not Paid For the
Month of Death.
Social Security Bills In 106th Congress On Which Action Has Been
Taken
H.J.Res. 32, (Ryan, et al.) — A joint resolution expressing the sense of the
Congress that the President and the Congress should join in undertaking the Social
Security Guarantee Initiative to strengthen and protect the retirement income security
of all Americans through the creation of a fair and modern Social Security Program
for the 21st century. Passed by House, March 2, 1999, by vote of 416-1.

---

CRS-20
H.Res. 306, (Herger) — A resolution expressing the desire of the House of
Representatives to not spend any of the budget surplus created by Social Security
receipts and to continue to retire the debt held by the public. Passed House 417-2,
September 28, 1999.
H.Con.Res. 68, (Kasich, et al.); S.Con.Res. 20, (Domenici, et al.) — A
concurrent resolution establishing the congressional budget for the United States
Government for FY2000 and setting forth appropriate budgetary levels for each of
FY2001 through 2009. Conference agreement on resolution (H.Con.Res. 68) passed
House 220-208, April 14, 1999; passed Senate 54 to 44, April 15, 1999. (In addition
to setting forth congressional budget totals setting aside Social Security surpluses,
includes provisions and sense of House and Senate statements pertaining to treatment
of Social Security surpluses in the federal budget and other aspects of the program).
S. 331, (Jeffords, et al.) — A bill to amend the Social Security Act to expand the
availability of health care coverage for working individuals with disabilities, to
establish a Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program in the Social Security
Administration to provide such individuals with meaningful opportunities to work and
for other purposes. Approved and ordered to be reported by Senate Finance
Committee on March 4, 1999; passed by Senate, June 16, 1999, by vote of 99-0.
Also see H.R. 1180 (Lazio, et al.) — similar legislation jointly referred to House
Ways and Means and Commerce Committees on March 18, 1999; approved and
reported from Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of Commerce
Committee on April 20, 1999; approved and ordered reported from Commerce
Committee on May 19, 1999. Passed by House, October 19, 1999 by vote of 412-9
(including additional provisions of H.R. 3070 (Hulshof, et al.), reported from
Committee on Ways and Means, October 18, 1999). Conference report passed by
House, November 18, 1999 by a vote of 418-2; passed by Senate, November 19,
1999 by vote of 95-1. Presented to President, December 6, 1999.
H.R. 1259, (Herger, et al.) — A bill to amend the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 to protect Social Security surpluses through strengthened budgetary
enforcement mechanisms. Passed by House, May 26, 1999, by vote of 416-12.
H.R. 5, (Sam Johnson, et.al.) – A bill to repeal the Social Security earning test
at ages 65-69, effective in 2000. Approved by Social Security Subcommittee of
House Ways and Means Committee, February 16, 2000. Approved by full
Committee, February 29, 2000. Passed House, March 1, 2000, by a vote of 422-0.
Passed Senate, March 22, 2000, by a vote of 100-0. Bill with Senate technical
amendment passed House, March 29, 2000, by a vote of 419-0. President Clinton
signed the bill into law as P.L. 106-182, April 7, 2000.

---

CRS-21
Appendix
CRS Issue Brief IB98048, Social Security Reform, by David Koitz
CRS Memorandum, President Clinton’s Social Security Reform Proposal, by David
Koitz. March 10, 1999.
CRS Report RS20165, The Social Security “Lock Box,” by David Koitz.
CRS Report RL30380, Social Security Reform: Assessing Changes to Future
Retirement Benefits, by David Koitz.
CRS Report 98-961, Social Security Reform: Projected Contributions and Benefits
Under Three Proposals (S. 1792 and S. 2313/H.R. 4256 in the 105th Congress,
and a Plan by Robert M. Ball), by Geoffrey Kollmann, David Koitz, and Dawn
Nuschler.
CRS Report 98-799, Social Security: The Protect Social Security Account, by
Geoffrey Kollmann and David Koitz.
CRS Report 98-750, Social Security Reform: Bills in the 105th Congress and Other
Proposals, by David Koitz, Geoffrey Kollmann and Dawn Nuschler.
CRS Report 98-422, Social Security and the Federal Budget: What Does Social
Security Being “Off Budget” Mean? by David Koitz.
CRS Report 98-195, Social Security Reform — How Much of a Role Could Private
Accounts Play? by David Koitz, updated by Dawn Nuschler.
CRS Report 97-990, Social Security in the United Kingdom: A Model for Reform?
by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 97-741, Social Security Financing Reform: Lessons From the 1983
Amendments, by David Koitz.
CRS Report 97-116, Social Security – Eliminating the Taxable Earnings Base, by
David Koitz.
CRS Report 97-81, Social Security: Recommendations of the 1994-1996 Advisory
Council on Social Security, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 97-77, The Long Range Social Security Projections, by David Koitz and
Gary Sidor.
CRS Report 96-504, Ideas for Privatizing Social Security, by David Koitz.
CRS Report 96-32, Social Security: Worldwide Trends, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 95-839, Social Security - the Chilean Example, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 95-543, The Financial Outlook for Social Security and Medicare, by
David Koitz and Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 95-1494, Social Security: The Relationship of Taxes and Benefits for
Past, Present, and Future Retirees, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 94-791, Means-Testing Social Security Benefits: An Issues Summary,
by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 94-622, Social Security: Raising the Retirement Age - Background and
Issues, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 94-593, Social Security Taxes: Where Do Surplus Taxes Go and How
are They Used? by David Koitz.
CRS Report 91-129, Social Security: Investing the Surplus, by Geoffrey Kollmann.
CRS Report 88-709, The Social Security Surplus: A Discussion of Some of the
Issues, by David Koitz.

---