Order Code IB98025
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Campaign Finance: Constitutional
and Legal Issues of Soft Money
Updated February 4, 2000
L. Paige Whitaker
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Definitions of Hard and Soft Money in Federal Elections
Political Party Soft Money
Corporate and Labor Union Soft Money
Issue Advocacy
106th Congress Legislation
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Reports

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Campaign Finance: Constitutional
and Legal Issues of Soft Money
SUMMARY
“Soft money” has become one of the
personnel and their families or by a labor
major issues in the area of campaign financing
organization directed at its members and
in federal elections. The controversy
families on any subject; (2) nonpartisan voter
surrounding this issue is due to the perception
registration and get-out-the-vote activities by
that soft money may be the largest loophole in
a corporation that are directed to its
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).
stockholders, executive or administrative
Soft money is broadly defined as funds that are
personnel and their families or by a labor
raised and spent according to applicable state
organization to its members and their families;
laws; that would be impermissible, under the
and (3) the establishment and administration of
FECA, to spend directly in federal elections
a political action committee (PAC) or a sepa-
and that may have an indirect influence on
rate segregated fund (SSF).
federal elections. This Issue Brief discusses
three major types of soft money: political party
Spending on issue advocacy communica-
soft money, corporate and labor union soft
tions is another use of soft money that has
money, and soft money used for issue advo-
gained popularity. Issue advocacy typically
cacy communications.
occurs when a group, such as a for-profit or
non-profit corporation or labor organization,
Political party soft money is those funds
pays for an advertisement that could be inter-
raised by the national parties from sources and
preted to favor or disfavor certain candidates,
in amounts otherwise prohibited in federal
while also serving to inform the public about a
elections by the FECA. In accordance with
policy issue. However, unlike communications
the applicable state law, it is then largely
that expressly advocate the election or defeat
transferred to state and local political parties
of a clearly identified candidate, the Supreme
for grassroots and party-building activities,
Court has ruled that issue ads are constitution-
overhead expenses, and issue ads. Much of
ally protected First Amendment speech and
the current legislation would subject the con-
cannot be regulated. Hence, they may be paid
tributions, expenditures, or transfers of na-
for with soft money.
tional political parties, for any activity that
might affect the outcome of a federal election,
As in the 105th Congress, many of the
to the limitations, prohibitions, and source
106th Congress bills focus on political party
restrictions of the FECA. Although the courts
soft money—subjecting contributions, expen-
have not had occasion to address this issue
ditures, or transfers of national political parties
specifically, it appears that such a restriction
to the limitations, prohibitions and reporting
on political party soft money would arguably
requirements of the FECA. Other bills would
pass constitutional muster.
restrict corporate and labor union soft money.
Another major reform proposal would subject
Certain corporate and labor union activi-
certain types of advocacy communications to
ties are expressly exempt from regulation
FECA regulation, either fully or just insofar as
under the FECA and can therefore be paid for
disclosure requirements.
with soft money. These exempt activities are:
(1) communications by a corporation directed
This issue brief supersedes CRS Issue
at stockholders, executive or administrative
Brief 96036.

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On January 24, 2000, by a 6 to 3 vote, the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, No. 98-963, upheld Missouri state campaign contribution limits and
reaffirmed its landmark 1976 precedent in Buckley v. Valeo that the government can
regulate campaign contributions. The Court noted that it has consistently found that less
justification is required in order to uphold limits on campaign contributions than is required
to uphold limits on campaign expenditures. In his dissent, however, Justice Kennedy warned
that the Court’s decision undermines free speech protections and will add to the
proliferation of “covert speech” in the form of soft money.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Definitions of Hard and Soft Money in Federal Elections
The terms “soft money” and “hard money” are not defined in federal election law or
regulations. However, the FEC broadly describes “soft money” as “funds that are prohibited
under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq., either because
they come from a prohibited source, see 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b, 441c and 441e, or because the
amount exceeds the contribution limits in 2 U.S.C. § 441a.” Memorandum from Lawrence
M. Noble, General Counsel, FEC to the Commissioners of the FEC (June 6, 1997).
Sometimes referred to as nonfederal funds, soft money often includes corporate and/or labor
treasury funds, and individual contributions in excess of federal limits, which cannot legally
be used in connection with federal elections, but can be used for other purposes. (Federal
Election Commission Twenty Year Report, p. 19 (April 1995)) Similarly, Common Cause
has defined “soft money” as “funds raised by Presidential campaigns and national
congressional political party organizations purportedly for use by state and local party
organizations in nonfederal elections, from sources who would otherwise be barred from
making such contributions in connection with a federal election, e.g., from corporations and
labor unions and from individuals who have reached their federal contribution limits.” See
Common Cause v. Federal Election Commission, 693 F.Supp. 1391, 1392 (D.D.C. 1987).
For the purposes of this issue brief, “soft money” will be used to describe funds that are not
subject to regulation under the FECA, but appear to be raised and spent in an attempt to
affect federal elections.
The term “hard money,” also undefined under federal election law and regulations, is
typically used to refer to funds raised and spent in accordance with the limitations,
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of the FECA. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441b(a).
Unlike soft money, hard money may be used in connection with a federal election. Under the
FECA, hard money restrictions apply to contributions and expenditures from any “person,”
as defined to include, “an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor
organization, or any other organization or group of persons, but such term does not include
the Federal Government or any authority of the Federal Government,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(11).
This Issue Brief discusses three major types of soft money: political party soft money,
corporate and labor union soft money, and soft money used for issue advocacy.
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Political Party Soft Money
Political party soft money funds are raised by the national parties from sources and in
amounts prohibited in federal elections by the FECA and are then largely transferred, in
accordance with applicable state law, to state and local political parties for grassroots and
party-building activities, overhead expenses, and issue ads. Since the 1979 FECA
Amendments, certain grassroots, voter-registration, get-out-the-vote, and generic party-
building activities are exempt from FECA coverage. 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(viii),(ix).
Therefore, money raised and spent for these activities is not regulated and hence, is
considered political party soft money.
Although the courts have not had occasion to address this issue specifically, it appears
that subjecting the contributions, expenditures, or transfers of national political parties, for
any activity that might affect the outcome of a federal election, to the limitations, prohibitions,
and reporting requirements of the FECA, would arguably pass constitutional muster.
In the landmark Buckley v. Valeo case, the Supreme Court made it clear that the right
to associate is a “basic constitutional freedom,” and that any action that may have the effect
of curtailing that freedom to associate would be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. 424
U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)). But the Court
further asserted that the right of political association is not absolute and can be limited by
substantial governmental interests such as the prevention of corruption or the prevention of
even the appearance of corruption. 424 U.S. at 27-28.
Employing this analysis, the Buckley Court determined that limitations on contributions
can pass constitutional muster if they are reasonable and only marginally infringe on First
Amendment rights in order to stem actual or apparent corruption resulting from quid pro quo
relationships between contributors and candidates. The Court noted that, unlike an
expenditure limitation, a reasonable contribution limitation does “not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates and campaign
issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political
parties.” 424 U.S. at 20-38.
It could be argued that eliminating political party soft money by subjecting it to the limits
and restrictions of the FECA would not significantly impact political debate because many
other methods of expression under the FECA would still be available to a person seeking to
make political contributions. For example, persons could: contribute directly to a candidate,
to a PAC that would support a certain candidate, to the political party of such a candidate in
accordance with FECA-regulated contribution limits (also known as “hard money”
contributions), to state parties for state activities, or make independent expenditures on behalf
of the candidate. It could be further argued that prohibiting political party soft money would
stem corruption or the appearance thereof that could result from quid pro quo relationships
between large-dollar soft money contributors and federal office candidates who benefit from
political party soft money expenditures. The Court in Buckley found that preventing
corruption or the appearance thereof, which can be presented by such quid pro quo
relationships, would constitute a substantial governmental interest warranting reasonable
infringement on First Amendment rights. 424 U.S. 26-27. Hence, under Buckley, it appears
that a prohibition on political party soft money could arguably pass constitutional muster.
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The FEC reported on March 19, 1997, that during the 1995-96 election cycle,
Republican national committees had raised $138.2 million for their non-federal or soft money
accounts and spent $149.7 million, an increase of 178% and 224%, respectively, over this
same time period in the 1991-92 election cycle. The Democratic national committees raised
$123.9 million and spent $121.8 million in that same period, a 241% increase in receipts in
their soft money accounts and a 271% jump in spending from the 1992 cycle.

On November 18, 1998, the Federal Election Commission held a public hearing
regarding a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to prohibit national political parties from raising
or spending soft money. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in the July 13,
1998 Federal Register and the FEC is currently reviewing comments received.
Corporate and Labor Union Soft Money
Generally, contributions and expenditures by corporations, labor unions, membership
organizations, cooperatives, and corporations without capital stock have been prohibited in
federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b. The FECA, however, provides for three exemptions from
this broad prohibition, that is, contributions and expenditures for: (1) communications by a
corporation to its stockholders, executive or administrative personnel and their families or by
a labor organization to its members or families on any subject; (2) nonpartisan voter
registration and get-out-the-vote activities by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and
executive and administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization aimed at
its members and their families; and (3) the establishment, administration and solicitation of
contributions to a separate segregated fund (commonly known as a political action committee
or PAC or SSF) to be utilized for federal election purposes by a corporation, labor
organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(A)-(C); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(a)(2)(i)-(iii).
In Communication Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), the Supreme
Court held that labor unions are not permitted to spend funds exacted from dues-paying
non-union employees under an agency shop agreement for certain activities unrelated to
collective bargaining when those employees object to such expenditures. According to the
Court, Congress’ purpose in providing the union shop was to force employees to bear their
fair share of the costs of labor-management negotiations and collective bargaining activities,
but not to force employees to support unrelated labor union political activities they oppose.
As a result of Beck, non-union employees in an agency shop agreement can request a refund
of that portion of their dues used by the union for political activities. Accordingly, if workers
exercise their rights under Beck, labor unions would lose some soft money funds which would
otherwise be available for election-related expenses. Campaign finance reform legislation that
simply codifies the Beck decision, without expanding on the Court’s ruling, would appear to
be constitutional.
Issue Advocacy
Spending on issue advocacy communications is another use of soft money that has
gained popularity in recent federal election cycles. Issue advocacy communications are paid
for by a group, such as a for-profit or non-profit corporation or labor organization, for
advertisements that could be interpreted to favor or disfavor certain candidates, while also
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serving to inform the public about a policy issue. The Supreme Court has ruled that unlike
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate, issue ads are constitutionally protected First Amendment speech and cannot be
regulated. Hence, they may be paid for with unregulated soft money. Currently, however,
in the federal circuit courts, an apparent conflict exists as to precisely which types of
communications constitute First Amendment protected issue advocacy.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court held that campaign finance
limitations apply only to “communications that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” A footnote to the opinion says that
the limits apply when communications include terms “such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’
‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’” Buckley, supra
at 44 n.52; See 11 C.F.R. 101.22(a). Communications without these ‘magic words’ are often
classified as issue advocacy, thus falling outside the scope of the FECA.
More recently, in the 1986 decision of Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., (MCFL), the Supreme Court continued to distinguish between issue
and express advocacy, holding that an expenditure must constitute express advocacy in order
to be subject to the FECA prohibition against corporate use of treasury funds to make an
expenditure “in connection with” any federal election. 479 U.S. 238, 249-250 (1986). In
MCFL, the Court ruled that a publication urging voters to vote for “pro-life” candidates,
while also identifying and providing photographs of certain candidates who fit that
description, could not be regarded as a “mere discussion of public issues that by their nature
raise the names of certain politicians.” Instead, the Court found, the publication effectively
provided a directive to the reader to vote for the identified candidates and ergo, constituted
express advocacy. 479 U.S. at 249-250.
In FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987),
the Ninth Circuit presented the following three-part test to determine whether a
communication may be considered issue advocacy:
First, even if it is not presented in the clearest, most explicit language, speech is ‘express’
for the present purposes if its message is unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of
only one plausible meaning. Second, speech may only be termed ‘advocacy’ if it presents
a clear plea for action, and thus speech that is merely informative is not covered by the Act.
Finally, it must be clear what action is advocated. Speech cannot be ‘express advocacy of
election or defeat of a candidate’ when reasonable minds could differ as to whether it
encourages a vote for or against a candidate or encourages the reader to take some other
kind of action. Id. at 864.
On July 6, 1995, the FEC promulgated regulations defining “express advocacy” in a manner
consistent with the test espoused in Furgatch. 60 Fed. Reg. 35292, 35304 (codified at 11
C.F.R. 100.22) (effective Oct. 5, 1995. 60 Fed. Reg. 52069 (Oct. 5, 1995).
However, in Maine Right to Life Committee v. FEC, 914 F.Supp. 8 (D. Maine 1996),
aff’d per curiam 98 F.3d 1 (1st. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 52 (Oct. 6, 1997), the
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion that the FEC surpassed its authority when
it included a “reasonable person” standard in its definition of “express advocacy.” The court
reasoned that such a standard threatened to infringe upon issue advocacy, an area protected
by the First Amendment. Maine Right to Life, 914 F.Supp. at 12. The Fourth Circuit
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reached a similar conclusion in FEC v. Christian Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir.
1997). Recently, the FEC declined to revise its definition of “express advocacy.” See 63 Fed.
Reg. 8363 (Feb. 19, 1998). The FEC’s primary reason for this decision is “its belief that the
definition of ‘express advocacy’ found at 11 CFR 100.22(b) is constitutional.” Id. at 8264.
As a result of this apparent conflict in the federal circuit courts, it is unclear as to precisely
which types of communications constitute express advocacy versus which types of
communications constitute First Amendment protected issue advocacy.
Another form of issue advocacy that has been widely used is the distribution of “voter
guides.” The distribution of voter guides by the Christian Coalition between 1990 and 1994
is currently at issue in FEC v. Christian Coalition, No.96 CVO 1781 (D.D.C.July 30, 1996).
One argument being made by the FEC is that since these voter guides declare candidates’
stands on issues as either “good” or “misguided,” the Christian Coalition is expressly
advocating the election of candidates from a particular party. Thus, the FEC argues, the
Christian Coalition is making independent expenditures that are subject to FECA reporting
requirements.
Soft money spent for issue advocacy communications is sometimes confused with
independent expenditures. Although both types of expenditures are purportedly independent
(Justice Kennedy argues that, by nature, practically all expenditures are coordinated with a
candidate and, thus, cannot be considered independent. Colorado Republican Committee v.
FEC, 518 U.S. 604(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment, dissenting in part)), only
independent expenditures are subject to the FECA. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. Recently, the
Supreme Court, in Colorado, held that the First Amendment would prohibit the application
of the provision in the FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3), limiting political party expenditures
made independently and without any coordination with a candidate or his or her campaign.
The Colorado decision essentially banned any limitations on political party expenditures when
they are made independently of a candidate’s campaign. However, since a political committee
making independent expenditures is still subject to FECA restrictions on the sources and the
amount of contributions it may receive from a person, 11 C.F.R. § 110.0(d), an independent
expenditure cannot be considered soft money.
In a 6-0 vote, on December 10, 1998, the Federal Election Commission rejected its
auditors’ recommendation that the 1996 Clinton and Dole campaigns repay $7 million and
$17.7 million, respectively, because the national political parties had closely coordinated their
soft money issue ads with the respective presidential candidates and, accordingly, the
expenditures would be counted against the candidates’ spending limits.
106th Congress Legislation
H.R. 417 (Shays-Meehan)
Party Soft Money. Prohibits national party committees from soliciting, receiving,
directing, transferring, or spending soft money; prohibits state and local party committees
from spending soft money for federal election activity, including: (1) voter registration drives
in last 120 days of a federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote drives, and
generic activity in connection with an election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot;
and (3) communications that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate with intent of
influencing that election (regardless of whether it is express advocacy); allows state party
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spending on specific activities exclusively devoted to non-federal elections; bans party
committees’ use of soft money to raise funds; prohibits federal candidates, officeholders, and
their PACs from raising soft money in connection with a federal election, or money from
sources beyond federal limits and prohibitions in non-federal elections; requires disclosure by
national parties of all activity (federal and non-federal) and by state and local parties of
specified activities that might affect federal elections; removes building fund exemption.
Corporate/Labor Soft Money. Requires labor unions, corporations, and national banks
to disclose promptly all exempt activities (but only internal communications referring to
federal candidates) once threshold level is reached; requires labor unions to give reasonable
notice to dues-paying non-members of rights to disallow political use of their funds.
Issue Advocacy. Defines “express advocacy” communications as advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate by (1) using explicit phrases, or words or slogans that in
context can have no other reasonable meaning than election advocacy; (2) referring to a
candidate in a paid radio or television broadcast ad that appears in the affected state within
60 days of the election (or, for president and vice president, within 60 days of a general
election, regardless of where it appears); or (3) expressing unmistakable, unambiguous
election advocacy, when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events.
Exempts from “express advocacy” definition printed or internet voting guides and records of
at least one candidate (but would allow inclusion of statements of agreement or disagreement
with candidate positions) that are not coordinated with a candidate or party (but allows
questions to and responses from candidates regarding guides) and that contain no words or
phrases that in context have no reasonable meaning other than election advocacy. Amends
definition of “expenditure” under FECA to include a payment (1) for a communication
containing express advocacy, and (2) for a communication that refers to a clearly identified
candidate, in coordination with a candidate or his or her agent or party, for the purpose of
influencing a federal election. Prohibits publicly-funded presidential candidates from
coordinating issue advocacy with parties, if paid for with soft money. Prohibits consideration
of background music (but not lyrics) in determining whether an advertisement constituted
express advocacy.
Introduced January 19, 1999; jointly referred to Committees on House Administration,
Education and the Workforce, Government Reform, Judiciary, Ways and Means, and Rules.
[Similar to H.R. 2183—passed by House in the 105th Congress]. Ordered reported
unfavorably by House Administration Committee August 2, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-297, Pt. 1).
Passed House, as amended, September 14, 1999.
H.R. 1867 (Hutchinson)
Party Soft Money. Prohibits national party committees from raising, soliciting,
directing, or spending soft money; prohibits federal candidates/officeholders from raising soft
money in connection with a federal election, money from sources beyond federal limits and
prohibitions in non-federal elections, or soft money in connection with, or for a
communication that identifies, a federal candidate (exempts home-state party fundraiser
attendance); bans inter-state-party transfers of non-federal funds.
Issue Advocacy. Requires disclosure (to Clerk of House/Secretary of Senate) of
broadcast communications referring to federal candidates — by name, representation, or
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likeness, including amount spent and identification of spender, once spending exceeds
$25,000 a year for one or $100,000 for all federal candidates.
Introduced May 19, 1999; referred to Committee on House Administration. Ordered
reported without recommendation August 2, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-294).
H.R. 1922 (Doolittle)
Party Soft Money. Requires disclosure of all national party transfers of funds to state
and local parties; requires state and local parties to file copies with the FEC of any disclosure
reports required under state law. Introduced May 25, 1999; referred to Committee on House
Administration. Ordered reported without recommendation August 2, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-
296, Pt. 1).
H.R. 2668 (Thomas)
Party Soft Money. Requires disclosure by national parties of all funds transferred to
state and local affiliates, whether or not funds are regulated by federal election law; requires
state and local parties to file copies with the FEC of any disclosure reports required under
state law. Introduced August 2, 1999; referred to Committee on House Administration.
Ordered reported favorably August 2, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-295).
S. 1593 (McCain-Feingold)
Party Soft Money. Prohibits national party committees from soliciting, receiving,
directing, transferring, or spending soft money; prohibits state and local party committees
from spending soft money for federal election activity, including: (1) voter registration drives
in last 120 days of a federal election; (2) voter identification, get-out-the-vote drives, and
generic activity in connection with an election in which a federal candidate is on the ballot;
and (3) communications that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate with intent of
influencing that election (regardless of whether it is express advocacy); allows state party
spending on specific activities exclusively devoted to non-federal elections; bans party
committees’ use of soft money to raise funds; prohibits federal candidates, officeholders, and
their PACs from raising soft money in connection with a federal election, or money from
sources beyond federal limits and prohibitions in non-federal elections; requires disclosure by
national parties of all activity (federal and non-federal) and by state and local parties of
specified activities that might affect federal elections; removes building fund exemption.
Corporate/Labor Union Soft Money. Requires labor unions to give reasonable notice
to dues-paying non-members of rights to disallow political use of their funds.
Introduced Sept. 16, 1999; referred to Committee on Rules and Administration; on
Oct. 19, 1999, the Senate failed to invoke cloture. [Based on more comprehensive measure
— S. 26, introduced earlier in the 106th Congress, which, in turn, was similar to proposals
considered in the 105th Congress]
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CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on House Oversight. Hearings on campaign finance
reform held October 30, 31 and November 6, 7, 1997 and February 5, and 26, 1998.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Hearings on
“Investigation of Campaign Financing in ‘96 Elections” held October 8, 9, November
6, 7, 13, 14, December 9, 1997, February 25, 26, March 4,18 and April 23, 1998.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Hearings on “Campaign
Finance Investigations: Alleged campaign finance irregularities during the 1996
campaign” held July 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31 and September 4, 5, 9,
10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30 and October 7, 8, 9, 22, 23, 29 and 30, 1997.
A final report was released by the committee on March 5, 1998; a minority report was
attached to the larger document.
(See [http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/sireport.htm])
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Judiciary. Hearings on “Term limits vs. Campaign
finance reform” held February 24, 1998.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Rules and Administration. Hearings on “The
campaign finance system for presidential elections: The growth of soft money and other
effects on political parties and candidates” held May 14, 1997.
—— Are political contributions voluntary? (focus on union dues). Hearings held June 25,
1997.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief 87020. Campaign financing, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Issue Brief 97045. Campaign fundraising controversy and investigation, by Kevin J.
Coleman, Joseph E. Cantor, Jack Maskell, Marie B. Morris, and L. Paige Whitaker.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 97-973. Business and labor spending in U.S. elections, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report RS20346. Campaign finance bills in the 106th Congress: Comparison of Shays-
Meehan, as passed, with McCain-Feingold, as revised, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report RL30162. Campaign finance bills in the 106th Congress: House, by Joseph E.
Cantor.
CRS Report RL30166. Campaign finance bills in the 106th Congress: Senate, by Joseph E.
Cantor.
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CRS Report RL30299. Campaign finance debate in the 106th Congress: Comparison of
measures under House consideration, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report 97-324. Campaign finance legislation in the 105th Congress, by Joseph E.
Cantor.
CRS Report 98-26. Campaign finance reform activity in the 100th - 104th Congresses, by
Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report 98-282. Campaign finance reform: A legal analysis of issue and express
advocacy, by L. Paige Whitaker.
CRS Report 97-1040. Campaign financing: Highlights and chronology of current federal
law, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report 97-816. Campaign fund-raising controversy and investigation: A Chronology,
by Kevin J. Coleman.
CRS Report 97-555. Compulsory union dues and agency fee objectors, by Gail McCallion.
CRS Report 96-929. Independent expenditures by political parties: Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, by John Contrubis.
CRS Report 96-484. Political spending by organized labor: Background and current issues,
by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report 97-91. Soft and hard money in contemporary elections: What federal law does
and does not regulate, by Joseph E. Cantor.
CRS Report 97-618. The use of union dues for political purposes: A legal analysis, by John
Contrubis and Margaret Mikyung Lee.
Selected World Wide Web Site
Federal Election Commission:
[http://www.fec.gov]
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