97-684 GOV
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Congressional Appropriations Process:
An Introduction
Updated August 3, 1999
Sandy Streeter
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
This report describes the annual appropriations cycle from the President’s submission of his
annual budget through enactment of the appropriations measures. It describes the three types
of appropriations measures—regular appropriations bills, continuing resolutions, and
supplemental bills. It explains the spending ceilings for appropriations bills that are
associated with the budget resolution and the sequestration process, including a description
of the mechanisms used to enforce the ceilings. It also explains the authorization-
appropriations process, which prohibits certain provisions in some of the appropriations bills.

The Congressional Appropriations Process:
An Introduction
Summary
Congress annually considers 13 or more appropriations measures, which provide
funding for activities such as national defense, certain income security programs
(primarily housing subsidies), education, anti-crime programs, and general
government operations such as the administration of federal agencies. Congress has
developed certain rules and practices for the consideration of appropriations
measures, referred to as the appropriations process.
Generally, the appropriations process includes the
! Annual appropriations cycle;
! Spending ceilings for appropriations associated with the annual budget
resolution;
! Spending ceilings established in the sequestration process; and
! Prohibitions against certain language in appropriations measures that violate
separation of the authorization and appropriations functions into separate
measures.
There are three types of appropriations measures. Regular appropriations bills
provide most of the funding that is provided in all appropriations measures for a fiscal
year, and must be enacted by October 1 of each year. If regular bills are not enacted
by the deadline, Congress adopts continuing resolutions to continue funding generally
until regular bills are enacted. Supplemental bills are considered later and provide
additional appropriations.
Appropriations measures are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees. These committees control only about one-third of total
federal spending provided for a fiscal year. The House and Senate authorizing
committees control the rest.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Annual Appropriations Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
President Submits Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Congress Adopts Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Timetable for Consideration of Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Work of the Appropriations Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
House and Senate Floor Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
House and Senate Conference Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Presidential Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Types of Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Regular Appropriations Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Distribution of Funding Among Regular Appropriations Bills . . . . . . 13
Continuing Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Supplementals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Spending Ceilings for Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Budget Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Enforcement of Budget Resolution Ceilings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Emergency-Designated Discretionary Spending . . . . . . . . 26
Sequestration Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Relationship Between Authorization and
Appropriations Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Rescissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
CRS Info Packs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CRS Fact Sheets on the Budget Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Congressional Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Number of Regular Appropriations Bills Packaged in a Single Measure,
FY1977-FY1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 2. Distribution of FY1999 Enacted Discretionary Spending by
Appropriations Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 3. Number of Regular Appropriations Bills Enacted Separately and in
Continuing Resolutions, FY1977-FY1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 4. FY1999 Appropriations Committees’ Provisional
302(a) Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Table 5. Discretionary Spending Limits, as Adjusted, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . 21
Table 6. House Appropriations Committee’s 302(b) Allocations for FY1999 . 22
Table 7. FY1999 Sequestration Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Congressional Appropriations Process:
An Introduction
Introduction
Congress annually considers 13 or more appropriations measures, which provide
funding for activities such as national defense, certain income security programs
(primarily housing subsidies), education, anti-crime programs, and general
government operations such as the administration of federal agencies. Congress has
developed certain rules and practices for the consideration of appropriations
measures, referred to as the appropriations process.
Generally, the appropriations process includes the:
! Annual appropriations cycle;
! Spending ceilings for appropriations associated with the annual budget
resolution;
! Spending ceilings established in the sequestration process; and
! Prohibitions against certain language in appropriations measures that violate
separation of the authorization and appropriations functions into separate
measures.
When considering appropriations measures, Congress is exercising the power
granted to it under the Constitution, which states, “No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law ...”1 The power to
appropriate is exclusively a legislative power. The executive branch may not spend
more than the amount appropriated, and it may use available funds only for th
2
e
purposes established by Congress.3
The President also has an important role in the appropriations process by virtue
of his constitutional power to approve or veto entire measures and his various duties
imposed by statute, such as submitting an annual budget to the Congress.

1 Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 9.

2 The Antideficiency Act (31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)). This prohibition was derived from a statute
enacted in 1870 (16 Stat. 251). U.S. General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal
Appropriations Law
, 2 Edition, Vol. 2, GAO/OGC-91-5 (Washington: GPO, July 1991),
nd
pp. 6-10 through 6-12.
3 31 U.S.C. 1301(a). This requirement was originally enacted in 1809 (2 Stat. 535). U.S.
General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, 2 Edition, Vol. 1,
nd
GAO/OGC-91-5 (Washington: GPO, July 1991), pp. 4-2.

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This report discusses the annual appropriations cycle, spending ceilings, and
relationship between authorization and appropriations measures.
Annual Appropriations Cycle
President Submits Budget
The President initiates the appropriations process by submitting his annual
budget for the upcoming fiscal year to Congress. The Presiden
4
t is required to submit
his annual budget on or before the first Monday in February.5 Congress has provided
extensions of the deadline both statutorily and, sometimes, informally.
The President recommends spending levels for the various programs and
agencies of the federal government in the form of budget authority, or BA, since
Congress provides budget authority instead of cash to agencies. Budget authority
represents the legal authority for federal agencies to make obligations requiring either
immediate or future expenditures (or outlays). These obligations (for example,
entering into a contract to construct a ship or purchase supplies) result in outlays,
which are payments from the Treasury, usually in the form of checks, electronic funds
transfers, or cash disbursements.
For example, an appropriations act might provide $3 billion in new budget
authority for FY2000 to the Defense Department to construct four ships. That is, the
act gives the Department legal authority to sign contracts to build the ships. The
department can not commit the government to pay more than $3 billion. The outlays
occur when the contractor cashes the government check for building the ships.
Generally, appropriations are a type of budget authority. Appropriations
measures provide new budget authority (as opposed to previously enacted budget
authority). Typically, appropriations must be obligated in the fiscal year for which
they are provided. In the above example, the Defense Department would be required
to sign the construction contracts during FY2000.
Not all new budget authority provided for a fiscal year is expended that year.
For example, although Congress provides $3 billion in budget authority for FY2000
to construct four ships, the outlays may occur over several years, until the project is
completed:
! FY2000, no outlays;
! FY2001, $0.5 billion;
! FY2002, $1.0 billion; and
! FY2003, $1.5 billion.

4 Congress provides spending for fiscal years, in contrast to calendar years. Fiscal years begin
on October 1 and end the following September 30. Fiscal Year 1999 (FY1999) began on
October 1, 1998.
31 U.S.C. 1105(a).
5

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A total of $3.0 billion in outlays is spent over four fiscal years.
As Congress considers appropriations measures providing new budget authority
for a particular fiscal year, discussions on the resulting outlays only involve estimates.
Data on the actual outlays for a fiscal year are not available until the fiscal year has
ended.
When the President submits his budget to Congress, the agencies provide
detailed justification materials to the House and Senate appropriations
subcommittees, which have jurisdiction over funding for the particular agencies.

Congress Adopts Budget Resolution
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, as amended,
(the Congressional Budget Act)6 requires Congress to adopt an annual budget
resolution.7 During the 24 fiscal years that Congress has considered budget
resolutions, Congress has eventually adopted a budget resolution in every year except
one—FY1999. There is no penalty if the budget resolution is not completed.
Usually, the budget resolution is Congress’s response to the President’s budget.
The budget resolution must cover at least five fiscal years: the upcoming fiscal year
plus four additional fiscal years.
The budget resolution is never sent to the President, nor does it become law. It
does not provide spending authority or raise or lower revenues, but is instead a guide
for Congress to use as it considers various budget bills, including appropriations and
tax measures.
The budget resolution sets total new budget authority and outlay levels for each
fiscal year covered by the resolution. It also distributes federal spending among 20
functional categories, such as national defense, agriculture, and transportation, and
sets similar levels for each function. The resolution also includes revenue floors for
each fiscal year.
Total new budget authority and outlays are distributed among both the House
and Senate committees with jurisdiction over spending, thereby setting spending
ceilings for each committee (see Allocations section under Budget Resolution).8
6 2 U.S.C. 601-688 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); P.L. 93-344 (88 Stat. 297); amended by the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, P.L. 99-177 (99 Stat. 1037,
1038); further amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation
Act of 1987, P.L. 100-119 (101 Stat. 754); further amended by the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990, P.L. 101-508 (104 Stat. 1388-573 to 1388-630); further amended by the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, P.L. 103-66 (107 Stat. 312); and further amended by the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997, P.L. 105-33 (111 Stat. 251).

7 Budget resolutions are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Budget Committees.
8 The committee ceilings are usually provided in the joint explanatory statement that
accompanies the conference report to the budget resolution.

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The Congressional Budget Act provides an April 15 deadline for final
congressional adoption of the budget resolution. However, Congress frequently does
not meet this deadline and there is no penalty if it is not met.
The Congressional Budget Act generally prohibits House or Senate floor
consideration of revenue or spending measures for a fiscal year until Congress adopts
the budget resolution. However, even if the budget resolution is not in place, th
9
e
House may begin considering the regular appropriations bills without violating the act
after May 15.
10
No such provision exists in the Senate. Anticipating a delay of congressional
adoption of the FY1999 budget resolution, the Senate approved S.Res. 209 on April
2, 1998. This resolution allowed the Senate to consider the FY1999 regular
appropriations bills even though Congress had not completed the budget resolution.
S.Res. 209 provided interim spending allocations to the Senate Appropriations
Committee that was to have expired upon completion of the FY1999 budget
resolution.
Timetable for Consideration of Appropriations Measures
Traditionally, the House of Representatives has initiated consideration of
appropriations measures. The House Appropriations Committee has jurisdiction over
appropriations measures and ordinarily begins the legislative process by reporting the
13 regular appropriations bills separately to the full House.
Generally, the House Appropriations Committee begins reporting the bills in
May or June, completing all or almost all of them by the annual August recess. The
full House begins consideration of the regular appropriations bills in May or June as
well, passing most by the recess.
11
Prior to the 105 Congress (CY1997 and CY1998
th
12), the Senate usually did not
initiate its own appropriations bills; instead, it considered and amended House-passed
bills both in committee and on the floor. The Senate Appropriations Committee,
which has jurisdiction over appropriations measures, occasionally originated an
appropriations bill when there was a significant delay in House consideration.
During CY1997, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported 11 original
regular appropriations bills and, the following year, reported 13 original bills.
9 For details, see §303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended by §10107 of the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251).
10 Section 303(b) of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended. Of the three types of
appropriations measures, regular appropriations bills have traditionally provided agencies
most of their budget authority (see Types of Appropriations Measures below).

11 The House typically passes all 13 regular appropriations bills. However, a rare exception
occurred when the House did not pass the FY1999 Labor-Health and Human Services-
Education regular bill.
1 CY1997 and CY1998 refers to calendar years 1997 and 1998, in contrast to fiscal years.
2

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Generally, the Senate Appropriations Committee begins reporting the regular
appropriations bills to the full Senate in June or July. All of the measures are reported
before the August recess or in September. The Senate begins passing the bills in June
or July and completes most of the bills by the end of September. However, recently
the Senate has not passed all 13 regular appropriations bills. In such cases
13
,
differences between the Senate Appropriations Committee-reported bill and the
House-passed bill were resolved in conference on an omnibus appropriations
measure.14

During the fall, the Appropriations Committees are usually heavily involved in
conferences to resolve differences between the two chambers. Relatively little or no
time is left before the fiscal year begins to resolve what may be wide disparities
between the House and Senate, to say nothing of those between Congress and the
President. Congress is usually faced with the need to enact one or more temporary
continuing resolutions pending the final disposition of the regular appropriations
bills.15
Some variations from prior practice on completion of the bills have occurred
during the 104 Congress (CY1995-CY1996) and 105
th
Congress. In the 104
th
th
Congress, for FY1996, Congress did not complete action on regular appropriations
bills until seven months into the fiscal year. Conversely, for FY1997, Congress
completed action on all regular appropriations measures by the start of the fiscal year,
in part by consolidating several bills into an omnibus appropriations measure.
Work of the Appropriations Committees
After the President submits his budget, the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees hold full committee and subcommittee hearings on the segments of the
budget under their jurisdiction. The 13 appropriations subcommittees in each house
hold more detailed hearings on the agencies’ justifications, primarily obtaining
testimony from agency officials.
Each appropriations subcommittee has jurisdiction over one regular
appropriations bill. Each House appropriations subcommittee is paired with a Senate
appropriations subcommittee, both having jurisdiction over the same agencies and
programs. For example, the House and Senate agriculture appropriations
subcommittees have jurisdiction over the agriculture regular appropriations bill.
After the hearings have been completed and the House Appropriations
Committee has received its committee spending ceilings from the budget resolution,
the House appropriations subcommittees begin to mark up the regular bills under their

13 The Senate never passed as separate measures one of the FY1996 regular bills, four of the
FY1997 bills, and three of the FY1999 bills.
14 Omnibus appropriations measures package more than one regular appropriations bill
together in a single measure, see Regular Appropriations Bills below.

15 For a description of continuing resolutions, see Types of Appropriations Measures below.

CRS-6
jurisdiction and report them to the full committee. The House Appropriation
16
s
Committee considers each subcommittee’s recommendations separately. The
committee may adopt amendments to a subcommittee bill and then report the bill as
amended to the House floor for action.
Traditionally, the Senate Appropriations Committee had waited until it received
a House-passed regular appropriations bill and before it drafted its version. The
Senate appropriations subcommittee reported the House-passed bill to the full
committee with several amendments distributed throughout the bill. The number of
17
amendments in each bill would range from a few to over 100. The full committee
considered subcommittee recommendations and made any changes it considered
appropriate. The full committee then reported the bill with recommended
amendments to the Senate for floor consideration.
As mentioned previously, during the 105 Congress, the Senate Appropriations
th
Committee reported almost all regular bills as Senate bills instead of waiting to amend
the House-passed bills.
House and Senate Floor Action
After the House or Senate Appropriations Committee reports an appropriations
bill to the House or Senate, the bill is brought to the floor. At this point,
Representatives or Senators are generally provided an opportunity to propose floor
amendments to the bill.
House. Prior to floor consideration of a regular appropriations bill, the House
generally considers a special rule reported by the House Rules Committee setting
16 If Congress is late in completing action on the budget resolution, the appropriations
committees sometimes use temporary committee spending ceilings and begin the process.
Regarding markup, the chairman usually proposes a draft bill (the chairman’s mark).
The chairman and other subcommittee members discuss amendments to the draft and may
agree to include some (referred to as marking up the bill). Regular appropriations bills are
not introduced prior to full committee markup. The bill is introduced when the House
Appropriations Committee reports the bill; a bill number is assigned at that time. The House
rules allow the House Appropriations Committee to originate a bill. In contrast, most House
committees do not have such authority.

17
The Senate Appropriations Committee infrequently reported a complete substitute
amendment to a House-passed regular bill (for example, the FY1997 foreign operations bill
(H.R. 3540)).

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parameters for floor consideration of the bill. If the House adopts the special rule,
18
it usually considers the appropriations bill immediately.
The House considers the bill in the Committee of the Whole of which all
Representatives are members. A special rule on an appropriations bill usuall
19
y
provides for one hour of general debate on the bill. The debate includes opening
statements by the chairman and ranking minority member of the appropriation
20
s
subcommittee with jurisdiction over the regular bill, as well as other interested
Representatives.
After the Committee of the Whole debates the bill, it considers amendments.21
Amendments must meet requirements of the:
! House standing rules and precedents, for example, amendments must be
germane to the bill;
! Authorization-appropriations process, which enforces the relationship between
authorization and appropriations measures (see Relationship Between the
Authorization and Appropriations Measures
below);
! Congressional budget process (see Allocations section under Budget
Resolution); and
! Special rule providing for consideration of the particular bill.
If an amendment violates any of these requirements, any Representative may raise a
point of order to that effect. If the presiding officer rules the amendment out of
order, it cannot be considered on the House floor. The special rule may waive any of
these requirements, thereby allowing the House to consider the amendment.
During consideration of individual regular appropriations bills, the House
sometimes sets additional parameters, either by adopting a rule or by unanimous
consent
. The House agrees to the parameters only if no Representative objects. For

18 Because the regular appropriations bills must be completed in a timely fashion, House Rule
XIII, clause 5, provides that these appropriations bills are privileged. This allows the House
Appropriations Committee to bring appropriations bills directly to the floor in contrast to
asking the Rules Committee to report a special rule. The latter method is used for most major
measures.
In recent years, the House Appropriations Committee has usually used the special rule
procedure, however. These special rules typically include waivers of certain parliamentary
rules regarding the consideration of appropriations bills and certain provisions within them.
Special rules may also be used for other purposes, such as restricting floor amendments.
1 House Rule XVIII, clause 3, requires that appropriations measures be considered in th
9
e
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union (Committee of the Whole) before
the House votes on passage of the measures (see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, The Legislative Process on the House Floor: An Introduction, by Stanley
Bach, CRS report 95-563 GOV (Washington: periodically updated).

20 A ranking minority member of a committee or subcommittee is the head of the minority
party members of the particular committee or subcommittee.
21 They generally consider amendments by going through the bill in order. The presiding
officer asks if there are any amendments to the paragraph (or title) under consideration.

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example, the House sometimes agrees to limit debate on individual amendments by
unanimous consent.
After the Committee of the Whole completes consideration of the measure, it
reports the bill with any adopted amendments to the full House. The House then
votes on the adopted amendments and passage. After House passage, the bill is sent
to the Senate.
Senate. The full Senate considers the bill as reported by its Appropriations
Committee. The Senate does not utilize the device of a special rule to set parameters
for consideration of bills. Before taking up the bill, however, or during its
consideration, the Senate sometimes sets parameters by unanimous consent.
When the bill is brought up on the floor, the chairman and ranking minority
member of the appropriations subcommittee make opening statements on the contents
of the bill as reported.
In most cases in which the Senate Appropriations Committee reports several
committee amendments to the House-passed bill, the amendments are adopted by
unanimous consent. When committee amendments are controversial, they are
sometimes considered separately, and referred to as excepted committee amendments.
That is, they are excepted from the unanimous consent agreement by which most of
the committee amendments were adopted.
The Senate then considers various eligible floor amendments. Amendment
22
s
must meet requirements under the Senate standing rules and precedents, the
authorization-appropriations process, and the congressional budget process. The
specifics of the Senate and House requirements differ. As in the House, the Senate
may sometimes waive some of these rules.23
When the Senate Appropriations Committee reports a Senate bill, the Senate
only considers floor amendments. After the amendments have been considered, the
Senate waits for the House to send its bill to the Senate and amends the House-passed
bill with a substitute amendment that contains the text of the Senate bill as amended
on the Senate floor.
House and Senate Conference Action
Generally, members of the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees
having jurisdiction over a particular regular appropriations bill, the chairmen of the

22 The Senate, in contrast to the House, does not consider floor amendments in the order of the
bill. Senators may propose amendments to any portion of the bill at any time unless the
Senate agrees to set limits.
It does so either by unanimous consent or, in some cases, by motion.
23

CRS-9
full committees, and the ranking minority members of the full committees meet to
negotiate over differences between the House- and Senate-passed bills.
24
Under House and Senate rules, the negotiators (or conferees or managers) are
generally required to remain within the scope of the differences between the positions
of the two chambers. Their agreement must be within the range established by the
25
House- and Senate-passed versions. For example, if the House-passed bill
appropriates $3 million for a program and a separate Senate amendment provides $5
million, the conferees must reach an agreement that is within the $3-5 million range.
However, these rules are not always followed.26
In cases in which the Senate adopts several amendments to the House-passed bill
and the conferees reach agreement, a conference report containing the agreements
together with a joint explanatory statement (or managers’ statement) providing an
explanation of the agreements is sent to both houses. If the conferees do not reach
agreement on one or more amendments, they separately report those in disagreement
and do not include them in the conference report.
During 1995-1996, in 14 of 18 cases in which a Senate-passed version contained
several amendments to a House-passed bill, the conferees included all the amendments
in the conference report. In four cases, the conferees included all except one
amendment, which was reported in disagreement.
When the Senate passes a single substitute amendment to a House bill, th
27
e
conferees must reach agreement on all points of difference between the House and
Senate versions before reporting the conference report in agreement. When this
occurs, the conference report proposes a new conference substitute for the bill as a
whole. The conferees attach a joint explanatory statement explaining the new
substitute.

24 If the Senate (or House) does not pass a bill, informal negotiations typically take place on
the basis of the reported version of that chamber. For example, the House passed the FY1999
Interior bill, but the Senate did not. Negotiations then ensued over the House-passed version
and the Senate reported-version. Frequently, the compromise is included in a conference
report on an omnibus appropriations measure (see Regular Appropriations Bill below). The
final version of the FY1999 Interior bill was incorporated in the conference report to the
FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill (P.L. 105-277), which included eight regular
appropriations bills.
House Rule XXII, clause 9, and Senate Rule XXVIII, paragraphs 2 and 3.
25

26 Generally, before the House considers a conference report on an appropriations measure,
it adopts a special rule waiving all points of order against the conference report and its
consideration, including points of order that the conference report goes beyond the scope of
the differences. In the Senate, a 1995 precedent rendered its rule on this point effectively
unenforceable (see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Recent Senate
Decision Concerning Conference Reports
, by Stanley Bach, CRS general distribution
memorandum (Washington: Oct. 16, 1996)).
27 Single substitute amendments are used because the Senate Appropriations Committee
reported either a single substitute amendment to the House-passed bill or an original Senate
bill.

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Usually, the House considers conference reports on appropriations measures first
because it traditionally considers the measures first. The first house to consider a
conference report has the option of voting to recommit the report to the conference
for further consideration, rejecting the conference report, or adopting it. After the
first house adopts the conference report, the conference is automatically disbanded;
therefore, the second house has two options—adopt or reject the conference report.
After a conference report is adopted, the amendments reported in disagreement are
considered sequentially.
Conference reports cannot be amended in either the House or Senate. However,
amendments reported in disagreement may be amended.
If the conference report is rejected, or is recommitted by the first house, the
conferees negotiate further over the matters in dispute between the two houses. The
28
measure cannot be sent to the President until both houses have agreed to the entire
text of the bill.
Presidential Action
After Congress sends the bill to the President, he has 10 days to sign or veto the
measure. If he takes no action, the bill automatically becomes law at the end of the
10-day period. Conversely, if he takes no action when Congress has adjourned, he
may pocket veto the bill.
If the President vetoes the bill, he sends it back to Congress. Congress may
override the veto by a 2/3 vote in both houses. If Congress successfully overrides the
veto, the bill becomes law. If Congress is unsuccessful, the bill dies.29

28 Technically, if either house rejects the conference report, the two houses normally agree to
further conference, usually appointing the same conferees.
29 On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled the Line Item Veto Act (100 Stat. 1200)
unconstitutional. Under the Line Item Veto Act, the President was authorized to cancel, in
whole, any dollar amount of discretionary spending provided in an appropriations measure,
listed in an accompanying report, or identified elsewhere, such as in another law. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Line Item Veto Act violated explicit Constitutional requirements
for enacting legislation. The Constitution requires that three steps be taken before a bill
becomes law: 1) the House passes a bill; 2) the Senate passes the bill containing the identical
text; and 3) the President signs the bill containing the identical text or does not veto it within
ten days. The Supreme Court stated that the Line Item Veto Act “...authorize(s) the President
to create a different law, one whose text was not voted on by either House of Congress or
presented to the President for signature.” Therefore, the Line Item Veto Act is
unconstitutional.

CRS-11
Types of Appropriations Measures
Regular Appropriations Bills
Annually, Congress considers 13 regular appropriations bills. Their complete
names and the familiar forms of those names are as follows:
! Agriculture, rural development, Food and Drug Administration, and related
agencies (Agriculture);
! Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related
agencies (Commerce-Justice-State);
! Department of Defense (Defense);
! District of Columbia (DC);
! Energy and water development (energy and water);
! Foreign operations, export financing, and related programs (foreign operations
or foreign assistance);
! Department of the Interior and related agencies (Interior);
! Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and related
agencies (Labor-HHS-Education);
! Legislative branch (Leg. Branch);
! Military construction (Mil. Con.);
! Department of Transportation (Transportation);
! Treasury, Postal Service, and general government (Treasury); and
! Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
independent agencies (VA-HUD).
Generally, Congress provides appropriations in lump-sum amounts by grouping
related activities together (referred to as accounts) and providing budget authority for
each account it chooses to fund. For example, the FY1997 energy and water act
provided an appropriation of $1.2 billion for the “Construction, General” account of
the Army Corps of Engineers. Some of the activities funded in this account were
construction projects regarding flood control and shore protection.
Regular appropriations measures may also include provisions setting aside funds
within an account for a more specific purpose (referred to as an earmark). For
example, within the FY1997 appropriation for the Corps’ “Construction, General”
account, Congress earmarked $3 million for Red River Emergency Bank Protection
in Arkansas.30
The appropriations committees include most earmarks in committee reports and
the joint explanatory statements that accompany conference reports. Although
earmarks in committee reports and joint explanatory statements do not have the force
of law, agencies generally follow these guidelines set by the appropriators since the
agencies require annual appropriations.
30 For more information, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
Earmarks and Limitations in Appropriations Bills, by Sandy Streeter, CRS report 98-518
GOV (Washington: periodically updated).

CRS-12
Appropriations measures may also provide transfer authority.31 Transfers shift
budget authority from one account or fund to another. For example, if the Corps of
Engineers moved budget authority from the “Construction, General” account to the
“Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies” account, that would be a transfer.
Agencies are prohibited from making such transfers without specific statutory
authority.
In contrast, agencies may generally shift budget authority from one activity to
another within an account without such statutory authority; this activity is referred to
as reprogramming. The appropriations subc
32
ommittees have established notification
and other oversight procedures for the various agencies to follow regarding
reprogramming actions. Generally, these procedures differ with each subcommittee.
Congress has traditionally considered and enacted each regular appropriations
bill separately. Over the past 23 years (FY1977-FY1999), Congress has used two
other practices as well. During 12 of those years, Congress generally began
consideration of 13 separate bills, but ultimately packaged two or more regular
appropriations bills together in one measure.
Packaging regular appropriations bills can be an efficient means of resolving
outstanding differences within Congress and between Congress and the President.
The negotiators can make more convenient trade-offs between issues among several
bills.
Packaging, as Table 1 shows, was used for 9 consecutive fiscal years beginning
in FY1980. The first two of those years (FY1980-FY1981) occurred while President
Jimmy Carter was in the White House, while the remaining seven were during Ronald
Reagan's presidency. Since that time, however, it has only been used three times.
Congress packaged appropriations bills twice (FY1996-FY1997) in President William
Jefferson Clinton's first term, and once (FY1999) thus far in his second term. No
regular appropriation bills where packaged while George Bush was President
(FY1990-FY1993).
In contrast, during two years of the Carter Administration, three years of the
Clinton Administration, and all four years of the Bush Administration, none of the
regular bills were packaged.
Congress has also used another practice: instead of providing funding for the
entire fiscal year in regular appropriations bills, at times it has provided the entire
funding in continuing resolutions (see the discussion on full-year continuing
resolutions in Continuing Resolutions below).
31 Authorization measures may also provide transfer authority. For information on
authorization measures, see Relationship Between the Authorization and Appropriations
Measures
below.

32 Agencies may not shift budget authority that has been earmarked within an account in an
appropriations act.

CRS-13
Distribution of Funding Among Regular Appropriations Bills. Congress
divides budget authority and the resulting outlays into two categories: discretionary
and mandatory spending. Appropriations measures include both types of spending.
Discretionary spending is controlled by annual appropriations acts, which are under
the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Mandatory
spending is controlled by legislative acts under the jurisdiction of the authorizing
committees (principally the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees).
Table 1. Number of Regular Appropriations Bills Packaged in a Single
Measure, FY1977-FY1999
Presidential
Number of Bills
Fiscal Year
Administration
Packaged
1977
Ford
0
1978
Carter
0
1979
0
1980
2
1981
5
1982
Reagan
3
1983
6
1984
3
1985
8
1986
7
1987
13
1988
13
1989
0
1990
Bush
0
1991
0
1992
0
1993
0
1994
Clinton
0
1995
0
1996
5
1997
6
1998
0
1999
8
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Appropriations, Budget Estimates,
Etc.
, committee prints, 94th Cong., 2nd sess.-103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976-
1994); and U.S. Congress, House, Calendars of the U.S. House of Representatives and History of
Legislation, 94th-105th Congresses
(Washington: GPO, 1976-1998).
Discretionary spending provides funds for a wide variety of activities, such as
those described in the Introduction, while mandatory spending predominantly

CRS-14
provides funds for entitlement programs. Of total actual outlays for FY199
33
8
($1,651 billion), only 34% was discretionary spending; the remaining 66% was
mandatory spending.

All new budget authority in discretionary spending is provided in annual
appropriations measures. Some new budget authority in mandatory spending,
predominantly appropriated entitlements, is also provided in appropriations measures.
Appropriated entitlements are funded through a two-step process. First,
authorizing legislation is enacted to set program parameters (through eligibility
requirements and benefit levels, for example); then the Appropriations Committees
must provide the budget authority needed to meet the commitment. The
Appropriations Committees have little control over the amount of budget authority
provided, since the amount needed is the result of previously enacted commitments
in authorization law. For FY1998, approximately 66% of the outlays allocated to the
Appropriations Committees was discretionary spending, while the remaining 34% was
mandatory spending.
Instead of directly controlling outlays, Congress controls discretionary spending
by setting levels of new budget authority for specific activities, programs, and
agencies in annual appropriations measures. Congress could, for example, provide
$2.5 billion in new budget authority to build the four ships in the example mentioned
earlier, instead of $3 billion.
Congress also controls mandatory spending by controlling budget authority. It
does not, however, generally control this form of budget authority by setting specific
spending levels. It controls mandatory spending by establishing parameters for
government commitments in permanent law, such as Social Security benefit levels and
eligibility requirements.
Table 2 provides the distribution of enacted FY1999 discretionary spending by
appropriations subcommittee, as of Oct. 21, 1998. Three appropriations
subcommittees (Defense, Labor-HHS-Education, and VA-HUD) had jurisdiction over
most of the new discretionary budget authority (72%); one of three, the Defense
subcommittee, had jurisdiction over almost half of the discretionary spending. For
FY1999, the Defense subcommittee had 45% of all the discretionary new BA; the
Labor-HHS-Education bill, 15%; and the VA-HUD bill, 12%. Ten subcommittees
had jurisdiction over the remaining 28% of new discretionary budget authority.
33 Entitlements are statutory requirements that government payments be made to any
individual or unit of government that meets eligibility criteria established in the law.
Entitlements are a binding obligation on the government and eligible recipients have legal
recourse if the obligation is not met. Examples of entitlements include Social Security
benefits, Medicare benefits, federal retirement benefits, and unemployment compensation.

CRS-15
Table 2. Distribution of FY1999 Enacted Discretionary Spending by
Appropriations Subcommittee
(new budget authority in billions of dollars)
Percentage of
Subcommittee
Amount
Total
Agriculture
19.608
3.4
Commerce-Justice-State
34.750
6.0
Defense
257.897
44.8
District of Columbia
0.620
0.1
Energy and Water Development
21.696
3.8
Foreign Operations
31.625
5.5
Interior
14.071
2.4
Labor-HHS-Education
83.811
14.5
Legislative Branch
2.559
0.4
Military Construction
8.660
1.5
Transportation
13.482
2.3
Treasury
16.089
2.8
VA-HUD
71.311
12.4
Total
a
576.179
99.9
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current Status of Discretionary Appropriations,
Table 2 (compiled Oct. 21, 1998), http://www.cbo.gov, visited March 8, 1999.
Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
a
Continuing Resolutions
If action on one or more regular appropriations measures has not been completed
by the beginning of the fiscal year, the agencies funded by these bills must cease
nonessential activities due to lack of budget authority. Traditionally, continuing
appropriations
have been used to maintain temporary funding to agencies or
programs until the regular bills are enacted. Such appropriations continuing funding
are usually provided in a joint resolution, hence the term continuing resolution.
In November and again in December 1995, FY1996 continuing resolutions
expired and some regular appropriations bills had not been enacted. As a result,
nonessential activities stopped and federal workers hired to perform those services did
not report for duty.
In 18 of the past 23 years (FY1977-FY1999), Congress and the President have
not completed action on a majority of regular bills by the start of the fiscal year. In
six years, they did not finish any of the bills by the deadline. They completed action
on all 13 bills on schedule only four times.
Traditionally, Congress passes a few short-term continuing resolutions to
provide funding until action is completed on all the regular bills. In contrast to

CRS-16
funding practices in regular appropriations bills (i.e., providing appropriations for
each account), short-term continuing resolutions generally provide funding with
formulas. For example, the short-term continuing resolution could provide that
funding levels for each activity in the regular bills covered will be the lowest of the
following: the amount provided last year, the amount provided in the House-passed
bill, or the amount provided in the Senate-passed bill. Short-term continuing
resolutions frequently base the formulas on the latest House and Senate action on the
regular bills covered.
In addition to short-term continuing resolutions, Congress also sometimes
enacts full-year continuing resolutions. These measures provide full-year funding in
the continuing resolution for the outstanding regular bills, instead of eventually
enacting each regular bill separately. In 13 of the past 23 years, Congress has enacted
full-year continuing resolutions (see Table 3). Recently, the funding method for these
continuing resolutions is similar to the regular bills; formulas are not used.
During the FY1996 budget confrontation between the 104th Congress and the
Clinton Administration, Congress used a another type of continuing resolution.
Traditionally, continuing resolutions provide funding for all activities in the
outstanding regular appropriations bills. However, in 1996, Congress provided
targeted appropriations which separated activities from the outstanding regular bills
and distributed them among three continuing resolutions. Congress distributed
funding for activities in four of the six outstanding regular bills among the three
continuing resolutions. Funding for most of the activities in the fifth regular bill
(Foreign Operations) were provided in one of these continuing resolutions and
funding for the most of the activities in the sixth bill (District of Columbia) in another.
From FY1977 through FY1999, Congress enacted on average three continuing
resolutions per year. (For FY1996, Congress enacted 14 continuing resolutions. )
34

34 Two of the bills providing continuing appropriations did not originate as appropriations
bills. The two bills originated as (1) a bill regarding the conveyance of a National Marine
Fisheries Service laboratory and (2) a bill authorizing an extension of most-favored-nation
treatment to Bulgarian products. Subsequently, Congress adopted amendments to both bills
that provided continuing appropriations.

CRS-17
Table 3. Number of Regular Appropriations Bills Enacted Separately
and in Continuing Resolutions, FY1977-FY1999
Fiscal
Presidential
Enacted
Enacted in Continuing
Year
Administration
Separately
Resolution
1977
Ford
13
0
1978
Carter
12
1
1979
12
1
1980
10
3
1981
8
5
c
1982
Reagan
9
4
1983
6
7
1984
10
3
1985
5
8
1986
6
7
1987
0
13
1988
0
13
1989
13
0
1990
Bush
13
0
1991
13
0
1992
12
1
1993
13
0
1994
Clinton
13
0
1995
13
0
1996
7
6d
1997
7
a
0
1998
13
0
1999
5b
0

Sources: U.S. Congress, House, Calendars of the U.S. House of Representatives and History of
Legislation
, 94th-105th Congresses (Washington: GPO, 1976-1998); and U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Appropriations, Budget Estimates, Etc., committee prints, 94th
Cong., 2nd sess.-103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976-1985).

a Six regular bills were packaged in one omnibus regular bill. They were not funded in a continuing
resolution.
b Eight regular bills were packaged in one omnibus regular bill. They were not funded in a
continuing resolution.
c Congress provided full-year funding for five regular bills in a supplemental appropriations and
rescissions bill. The supplemental included a simple extension of a CR to the end of the fiscal
year.

d An FY1996 continuing resolution (P.L. 104-99) provided full-year funding for the FY1996 foreign
operations regular bill; however, the continuing resolution provided that the foreign operations
measure be enacted separately (P.L. 104-107). It is included in this amount.

CRS-18
Supplementals
During the fiscal year, Congress frequently considers one or more supplemental
appropriations measures that provide additional funds for specified activities. For
example, during FY1998 (the spring of calendar year 1998), Congress considered one
FY1998 supplemental. Supplementals may provide funding for unforeseen needs,
such as funds to recover from an earthquake or flood, or to increase or provide
funding for other programs. Sometimes Congress includes supplemental
appropriations in regular bills and continuing resolutions. Supplemental
appropriations measures provide appropriations by account and may include
earmarks.
During calendar year 1998, the following appropriations measures were enacted
into law:
! One FY1998 supplemental;
! Five FY1999 separate regular appropriations bills;
! Eight FY1999 packaged in the FY1999 omnibus bill; and
! Six FY1999 short-term continuing resolutions.
Spending Ceilings for Appropriations Measures
Congress has established two processes for establishing and enforcing spending
ceilings for appropriations measures. First, Congress established the congressional
budget process through which it annually sets spending ceilings associated with the
budget resolution and enforces those ceilings with parliamentary rules, or points of
order
, during congressional consideration of appropriations bills. Second, Congress
35
established the sequestration process. Under this process, Congress by statute has
established certain discretionary spending ceilings that are enforced by automatic
across-the-board reductions if enacted spending exceeds the ceilings.36
35 The congressional budget process was established by the Congressional Budget Act (for
citation, see footnote 6).

36 A sequestration process was originally established by the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985 (or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings)(P.L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037,
1038). Congress enacted major revisions in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754). As an amendment to
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress established the current sequestration process in the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573 to 1388-630). This Act
was subsequently amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66,
107 Stat. 312), Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251), Transportation
Equity Act for the 21 Century (P.L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107), and Internal Revenue Service
st
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685).

CRS-19
Budget Resolution
Allocations. As mentioned previously, the budget resolution distributes the total
new budget authority and outlays among the House and Senate committees with
jurisdiction over spending, including the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees. Through this allocation process, the budget resolution sets total
spending ceilings for each House and Senate committee (referred to as the 302(a)
allocations
).
37 Table 4 provides the original provisional 302(a) allocations to the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees for FY1999.
38
The discretion to establish discretionary spending ceilings in the budget
resolution for the Appropriations Committees is limited. The Budget Enforcement
Act of 1997 established discretionary spending limits (or caps) for FY1998 through
FY2002 (see Table 5).39 These limits are enforced by sequestration (see
Sequestration Process below) and parliamentary rules in the Senate (see Enforcement
of Budget Resolution Ceilings
below). While the House Budget Committee may
(and for FY1999 did) report a FY1999 budget resolution with lower discretionary
spending ceilings, the sequestration enforcement mechanism constrains efforts to
increase the ceilings.
After the Appropriations Committees receive their 302(a) allocations, they divide
their allocations among their 13 subcommittees. This subdivision is referred to as the
302(b) allocations.
40 Table 6 provides a House Appropriations Committee’s 302(b)
subdivision of discretionary and total spending for FY1999. Making 302(b)
allocations is within the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, and they typically make revisions to reflect the action on the
appropriations bills.
37 This refers to section 302(a) of the Congressional Budget Act. Typically, these are
provided in the joint explanatory statement that accompany the conference report to the budget
resolution.

38 Anticipating a delay in completion of the FY1999 budget resolution, the Senate and House
Appropriations Committees received provisional 302(a) allocations for FY1999. The House
adopted a special rule providing for consideration of the first FY1999 regular appropriations
that included interim 302(a) allocations for the House Appropriations Committee. The Senate
adopted S.Res. 209, which provided interim 302(a) allocations for the Senate Appropriations
Committee. The provisional allocations to both Appropriations Committees were to expire
upon completion of the FY1999 budget resolution.
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 provides for specified increases in the 302(a)
allocations under certain conditions. See section 302(a)(5) of the Congressional Budget Act
for guidelines for allocations absent completion of the budget resolution.

39 The data provided in Table 5 was compiled on July 8, 1998. Since then, the Office of
Management and Budget has periodically adjusted the ceilings due to statutory requirements.
The out-of-date information is provided here in order to demonstrate the relationship between
the discretionary spending limits and the 302(a)/302(b) allocations. The information is
contemporary to the data in Tables 4 and 6. The most current data is available from the
Congressional Budget Office.
This refers to section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act.
40

CRS-20
Table 4. FY1999 Appropriations Committees’ Provisional
302(a) Allocations
(in billions of dollars)
Spending
House
Senate
Discretionary
Defense
New Budget Authority

271.570
Outlays

266.635
Non-Defense
New Budget Authority

255.450
Outlays

289.547
Violent Crime Reduction
New Budget Authority

5.800
Outlays

4.953
Total Discretionarya
New Budget Authority
531.961
(532.820)
Outlays
562.277
(561.135)
Mandatoryb
New Budget Authority
298.105
299.159
Outlays
290.858
291.731
Sources: H.Res. 477 and S.Res. 209 (105th Congress).
a The differences between the House and Senate Committees’ discretionary amounts are due to
adjustments included in the House amounts that were not included in the Senate amounts.
After the Senate Appropriations Committee received it’s allocations, the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (P.L. 105-178) was enacted and the House adopted the
conference report to H.R. 2676, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of
1998 (P.L. 105-206). Both provide discretionary spending adjustments. The House
Appropriations Committee received it’s allocations after this action and the allocations reflect
these adjustments.
b The differences between the House and Senate Committees’ mandatory amounts reflect differing
score keeping practices.

CRS-21
Table 5. Discretionary Spending Limits, as Adjusted, FY1999-FY2002
Compiled July 8, 1998 (in billions of dollars)
a
Category
Mass
Violent Crime
Fiscal Year
Defense
Non-defense
Highway
Transit
Reduction
General
FY1999
New Budget Authority
271.570
254.591


5.800
(531.961)
Outlays
266.635
264.403
21.885
4.401
4.953
(562.277)
FY2000
New Budget Authority


4.500
531.626
Outlays
24.436
4.761
5.554
533.120
FY2001
New Budget Authority


540.951
Outlays
26.204
5.190
537.744
FY2002
New Budget Authority


549.981
Outlays
26.977
5.709
533.671
Source: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, CBO March (1998) Baseline Caps; Changes by Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century; and Title IX of conference report to H.R. 2676, IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 6/26/98.
a The data provided in Table 5 was compiled on July 8, 1998. Since then, the Office of Management and Budget has
periodically adjusted the limits due to statutory requirements. The out-of-date information is provided here in order
to demonstrate the relationship between the discretionary spending limits and the 302(a)/ 302(b) allocations. The most
current data is available from the Congressional Budget Office.

CRS-22
Table 6. House Appropriations Committee’s 302(b) Allocations for FY1999
(in billions of dollars)
Discretionary Spending
Mass
Violent Crime
Total
Subcommittee
Defense
Non-defense
Highway
Transit
Reduction
Total
Spendinga
Agriculture
New Budget Authority
13.587
13.587
54.645
Outlays
14.002
14.002
47.089
Commerce-Justice-State
New Budget Authority
.386
26.558
5.512
32.456
33.010
Outlays
.370
26.132
4.683
31.185
31.740
District of Columbia
New Budget Authority
.491
.491
.491
Outlays
.484
.484
.484
Energy and Water Development
New Budget Authority
12.019
8.720
20.739
20.739
Outlays
11.772
8.742
20.514
20.514
Foreign Operations
New Budget Authority
12.475
12.475
12.520
Outlays
12.525
12.525
12.570
Interior
New Budget Authority
13.370
13.370
13.428
Outlays
14.029
14.029
14.087
Labor-HHS-Education
New Budget Authority
81.396
.156
81.552
301.985
Outlays
80.080
.141
80.221
301.667
Legislative Branch
New Budget Authority
2.360
2.360
2.454
Outlays
2.340
2.340
2.434
Military Construction
New Budget Authority
8.235
8.235
8.235
Outlays
9.100
9.100
9.100
National Security

CRS-23
Discretionary Spending
Mass
Violent Crime
Total
Subcommittee
Defense
Non-defense
Highway
Transit
Reduction
Total
Spendinga
New Budget Authority
250.499
.027
250.526
250.728
Outlays
244.965
.027
244.992
245.194
Transportation
New Budget Authority
.300
11.639


11.939
12.621
Outlays
.300
13.347
21.885
4.401
39.933
40.611
Treasury-Postal Service
New Budget Authority
13.068
.132
13.200
26.639
Outlays
12.295
.129
12.424
25.863
VA-HUD
New Budget Authority
.131
70.900
71.031
92.571
Outlays
.128
80.400
80.528
101.782
Total
New Budget Authority
271.570
254.591


5.800
531.961
830.066
Outlays
266.635
264.403
21.885
4.401
4.953
562.277
853.135
Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Suballocations to Subcommittees, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Authority and
Outlays
, http://www.house.gov/appropriations, approved June 16, 1998.
Includes discretionary and mandatory spending.
a

CRS-24
Enforcement of Budget Resolution Ceilings. Certain spending ceilings
associated with the budget resolution are enforced through points of order raised on
the House and Senate floor when the appropriations measures are brought up for
consideration. Points of order are not self-enforcing. A Representative or Senator
must raise a point of order that a measure, amendment, or conference report violates
a specific rule. Generally, if a Member raises a Congressional Budget Act point of
order and the presiding officer rules that the measure, amendment, or conference
report violates the parliamentary rule, it may not be considered on the floor.
House. Two key House points of order are the 302(f) and 311(a). Thes
41
e
points of order apply to all appropriations measures reported by the committee as well
as amendments and conference reports to the measures.
The 302(f) point of order prohibits floor consideration of appropriations that
exceed the committee or subcommittee allocations of new budget authority (the
302(a) or 302(b) allocations, respectively). In effect, this point of order applies to
total discretionary spending (and any mandatory spending initiated on the
appropriations measures). For example, the discretionary spending provided in the
42
reported FY1999 Commerce-Justice-State bill could not exceed the Commerce-
Justice-State subcommittee’s total discretionary spending allocation for
FY1999—$32.456 billion (see Table 6).43
The 311(a) point of order prohibits floor consideration of appropriations that
would exceed the total new budget authority or outlay ceilings in the budget
resolution. As various spending bills for a fiscal year are enacted, the amount of total
new budget authority enacted and the resulting outlays accumulate and the budget
resolution ceilings are eventually reached. An appropriations bill that would go over
either of the ceilings is subject to the 311(a) point of order. If all the spending bills
stay within their committee spending ceilings, a bill will not exceed the total ceilings
These refer to sections 302(f) and 311(a), respectively, of the Congressional Budget Act.
41
42 It does not effect increased mandatory spending that the appropriators are required to
provide. For example, if the House Appropriations Committee was required to increase new
budget authority for unemployment compensation due to a recession, such budget authority
would not be subject to the point of order.

43 Although the 302(f) point of order in the House enforces only new budget authority ceilings,
under House rules amendments must also remain within the total discretionary new budget
authority and outlay levels provided in the bill. Due to the 302(f) point of order, Members
frequently must decrease budget authority in a bill for certain activities in order to finance
increases in funding for other activities and to stay within the 302(a) or 302(b) allocations (the
decreases are referred to as offsets).
Frequently, the increases and offsets Members prefer are not located in the same place
in the bill, and the affected segments are considered at different times on the House floor.
Generally, under House precedents, an amendment is subject to a point of order if it amends
the bill in more than one place or if it amends a segment of the bill not yet under floor
consideration (see House Procedure, Chapter 27, sec. 8.1). House Rule XXI, clause 2(f),
protects offset amendments from these points of order if they do not increase budget authority
or outlays in the bill. The rule also protects offset amendments from a demand that the
amendments be divided and voted on in segments.

CRS-25
established in the budget resolution. However, in the past, some spending bills have
exceeded their committee ceilings, thereby making bills subject to the 311(a) point of
order. This point of order typically affects the last funding measures considered for
a fiscal year (such as the supplementals).44
The House may waive or suspend either of these points of order by adopting, by
majority vote, a special rule waiving the particular point of order prior to floor
consideration of the appropriations bill.
Senate. Three key Senate points of order are the 302(f), 312(b), and 311(a).45
These points of order apply to all appropriations measures, both those reported by the
committee and amended on the floor. They also apply to amendments, motions, and
conferences reports to these measures.
In the Senate, the 302(f) point of order prohibits floor consideration of
appropriations that exceed the subcommittee allocations in total new budget
authority, total outlays, and each discretionary spending limit in new budget authority
and outlays. As in the House, this point of order, in effect, applies to total
discretionary spending (and any mandatory spending initiated on the appropriations
measures). Appropriations cannot exceed any of the Senate subcommittee
discretionary spending allocations.
The 312(b) point of order prohibits floor consideration of appropriations that
exceed any of the discretionary spending limits in Table 5 (although the
“General”column for FY1999 is not separately enforceable). For FY1999, there are
separate defense and non-defense limits, while for FY2000 they are combined into a
single general category. The 311 point of order in the Senate is the same as in the
House; however, it does not include the Fazio Exception.
Senators may make motions to waive any of these points of order at the time the
issue is raised. Currently, a vote of three-fifths of all Senators (usually 60 Senators)
is required in the Senate to approve a waiver motion for any of these points of order.
46

44 In the House, the Fazio Exception exempts certain appropriations from the 311(a) point of
order. If the total for appropriations bills remains within the Appropriations Committee’s
total allocation, the appropriations are excepted from the 311(a) point of order (see §311(c)
of the Congressional Budget Act, as amended).
45 These refer to sections 302(f), 312(b), and 311(a), respectively, of the Congressional
Budget Act.
4 In both the House and Senate certain appropriations provisions are exempt from th
6
e
Congressional Budget Act points of order. If a specific appropriation is designated as an
emergency under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, the appropriation
is not subject to the points of order. In addition, the Congressional Budget Act provides
allowances for continuing disability reviews, earned income tax credit compliance initiatives,
the International Monetary Fund, and arrearages for international organizations, international
peacekeeping, and multilateral development banks.

CRS-26
Emergency-Designated Discretionary Spending. Any discretionary spending that
both Congress and the President designate as emergency spending under the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act is effectively exempt from the
Congressional Budget Act points of order and sequestration (see below). The
allocations and discretionary spending limits are automatically adjusted to compensate
for the emergency-designated spending. Emergency-designations were originally
designed as a safety valve so that discretionary spending for emergencies, such as
disaster assistance, could be expeditiously enacted.
Congress typically includes its emergency-designation language after the
appropriation for each account to be protected in the appropriations bills,
amendments, and conference reports. In the Senate, such designations for non-
defense discretionary spending are subject to a point of order (sec. 206 of the FY2000
Budget Resolution, H.Con.Res. 68). In order to waive this point of order, a three-
fifths vote is required.
Sequestration Process
Congress established in statute discretionary spending limits in both new budget
authority and outlays for FY1991 through FY2002 (for an example, see Table 5).47
The statute requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to make specific
48
periodic adjustments to the discretionary spending limits.49
These spending limits are enforced through sequestration. If Congress enacts
appropriations measures that exceed one of the discretionary spending limits in new
budget authority or outlays, the President is required to issue an order providing for
47 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251)divided FY1999
discretionary spending into three categories: defense, non-defense, and violent crime reduction.
This Act continued the violent crime reduction limit through FY2000, but combined the
defense and non-defense limits into one category (general) for FY2000-FY2002
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (P.L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107)
separated the highway and mass transit activities from the FY1999 non-defense and the
FY2000-FY2002 general categories and established two additional categories—highway and
mass transit. It also reduced the FY1999 non-defense and FY2000-FY2002 general
categories. The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-
206, 112 Stat. 685) provided amendments to the Transportation Act changing some of the
spending levels.
The defense, non-defense, general, and violent crime reduction limits are in both budget
authority and outlays, while the highway and mass transit limits are only in outlays.

48 OMB is an agency in the Executive Office of the President. Its duties include assisting the
President in preparing the budget and formulating the government’s fiscal program, making
recommendations regarding budget proposals and relevant legislation, and controlling the
administration of the federal budget. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration,
Office of the Federal Register, The United States Government Manual 1994/1995
(Washington: GPO, July 1994), pp. 97-99.

49 The adjustments are the amounts of certain enacted appropriations for those activities
described in footnote 46 plus allowances for estimating differences in outlays and changes in
concepts and definitions.

CRS-27
an automatic across-the-board reduction to eliminate the excess within that category.
This automatic reduction permanently cancels budget authority and other budgetary
resources for nonexempt programs.
Table 7 provides a possible FY1999 sequestration scenario. For FY1999,
Congress established separate spending limits in new budget authority and outlays for
defense activities, non-defense activities, and violent crime reduction activities and
spending limits in outlays for highway and mass transit activities. OMB compares
each limit to the total enacted amount funding the particular activities. Since the
enacted amount of new budget authority for defense activities in the scenario exceeds
the limit by $10 billion, an automatic across-the-board cut in new defense
discretionary budget authority (and other budgetary resources) would be triggered to
eliminate the excess budget authority. Funding for only defense programs, projects,
and activities would be reduced.
A similar sequestration in non-defense new budget authority (and other
budgetary resources) would occur. In calculating non-defense outlays, OMB must
add any excess in highway or mass transit outlays to the non-defense outlays. In the
non-defense scenario, a sequestration would be required to eliminate $6 billion in
excess outlays ($5 billion non-defense outlays plus $1 billion mass transit outlays).
This sequestration scenario would only effect nonexempt non-defense programs,
projects, and activities. There would be no sequestration of the highway, mass transit,
or violent crime reduction activities.
Table 7. FY1999 Sequestration Scenario
(billions of dollars)
Discretionary Spending
Category
Limit
Enacted Amount
Difference
Defense
New Budget Authority
272.
282.
+10.
Outlays
267.
267.

Non-defense
New Budget Authority
255.
255.

Outlays
264.
269.
+5.
Highway
New Budget Authority



Outlays
22.
22.

Mass Transit
New Budget Authority



Outlays
4.
5.
+1.
Violent Crime Reduction
New Budget Authority
6.
6.

Outlays
5.
5.


CRS-28
During a calendar year, sequestration may occur for either of two separate fiscal
years. In the spring and summer, sequestration may occur if individual supplemental
appropriations acts enacted before July 1 exceed any of the discretionary spending
limits.
50 Any such enactment occurring during the last quarter of the fiscal year (i.e.,
between July 1 and September 30), however, would not cause an automatic across-
the-board reduction, but would instead cause the appropriate discretionary spending
limits for the next fiscal year to be reduced by the amount of the difference.
At the end of the session, sequestration may occur if the combined 13 regular
appropriations measures and continuing resolutions, as enacted, exceed the
discretionary spending limits. For example,
51
if the total enacted FY1999 regular bills
had exceeded FY1999 limits, sequestration would have occurred (as demonstrated in
Table 7).52
Relationship Between Authorization and
Appropriations Measures
Congress has established an authorization-appropriations process which provides
for two separate types of measures—authorization measures and appropriations
measures. These measures perform different functions and are to be considered in
sequence. First, the authorization measure is considered and then the appropriations
measure.
Authorization acts establish, continue, or modify agencies or programs. For
example, an authorization act may change the structure or establish or modify
programs within the Commerce Department. The authorization act also authorizes
appropriations for specific agencies and programs, frequently setting spending ceilings
for them. Authorization acts may provide permanent, annual, or multi-year
Sequestration will be triggered 15 days after enactment
50
51 This sequestration would occur on the same day as any sequestration tied to enforcement
of the “pay-as-you-go” procedure for mandatory spending and revenues measures. See U.S.
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Manual on the Federal Budget
Process
, by Allen Schick and Robert Keith, CRS Report 98-720 GOV, (Washington: updated
periodically).
52 As mentioned previously, statutorily required adjustments to the discretionary spending
limits are made periodically. In October 1998, CBO estimated that the net effect of the
adjustments to the FY1999 discretionary spending limits increased the limits. As a result, the
amount of defense and non-defense spending enacted was within the budget authority limits.
The entire defense adjustment was due to emergency-designated funds ($8.321 billion). Forty
percent of the non-defense adjustment was due to emergency-designated funds ($13.123
billion), 55% was due to International Monetary Fund spending ($17.861 billion), and the
remaining 5% ($1.532 billion) was due to four additional activities.
CBO estimated that the outlays exceeded the limits established for defense, non-defense,
and mass transit spending. However, CBO’s calculations are only advisory. OMB made the
final determination regarding the application of the sequestration process and determined that
the enacted appropriations were within each of the limits. (See CBO’s Final Sequestration
Report for Fiscal Year 1999
, http://www.cbo.gov, visited Nov. 2, 1998.)

CRS-29
authorizations. Annual and multi-year authorization acts require re-authorizations
when they expire. Congress is not required to provide appropriations for an
authorized program.
Authorization measures are under the jurisdiction of authorizing committees such
as the House Transportation and Infrastructure and Education and the Workforce
Committees, or the Senate Judiciary and Energy and Natural Resources Committees.
Most congressional committees are authorizing committees. Major non-authorization
committees include the House and Senate appropriations and budget committees.53
Appropriations measures provide new budget authority for the program, activity,
or agency previously authorized.
The authorization-appropriations process enforces separation of these functions
into separate measures with points of order prohibiting certain provisions in
appropriations measures. The House and Senate prohibit, in varying degrees
54
,
language in appropriations bills providing unauthorized appropriations or legislation
on an appropriations bill
(or riders).
Unauthorized appropriations are new budget authority in an appropriations
measure for agencies or programs whose authorization has expired or was never
authorized, or whose budget authority exceeds the ceiling authorized. Riders refer
to language in appropriations measures that change existing law, such as establishing
new law, or amending or repealing current law.
House rules prohibit unauthorized appropriations and riders in regular
appropriations bills and supplementals, which provide funds for more than one
purpose or agency (referred to in the House as general appropriations bills).
However, House rules do not prohibit such language in continuing resolutions. The
House prohibition applies to bills reported by the House Appropriations Committee,
amendments, and conference reports. The House may adopt a special rule waiving
this rule prior to floor consideration of the appropriations bill or conference report.55
Unauthorized earmarks are allowed in House Appropriations Committee reports and
joint explanatory statements because the rule applies only to the text of the bills,
amendments, and conference reports.
In the Senate, unauthorized appropriations and riders are treated differently. The
Senate rule regarding such language applies to regular bills, supplementals which
53 The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have
jurisdiction over some authorization measures, all revenue measures, and some mandatory
spending measures.

54 House Rule XXI, clause 2; House Rule XXII, clause 5; and Senate Rule XVI. House rules
also prohibit appropriations in authorization measures, amendments, or conference reports
(Rule XXI, clause 4, and Rule XXII, clause 6).

55 The special rule may provide a waiver for specified provisions or all provisions in the bill
that are subject to the point of order. The special rule may also provide a waiver for specific
amendments. Generally, special rules waive points of order against all provisions in all
conference reports on general appropriations measures.

CRS-30
provide funds for more than one purpose or agency, and continuing resolutions
(referred to in the Senate as general appropriations bills).
This Senate rule applies only to amendments to general appropriations bills, such
as, those:
! Introduced on the Senate floor;
! Reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee to the House-passed
measure; or
! Proposed as a substitute for the House-passed text.
This rule does not apply to provisions in Senate bills or conference reports. For
example, this rule did not apply to provisions in S. 1005, the FY1998 Defense
appropriations bill, as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. But it did
apply to provisions in H.R. 2107, the FY1998 Interior bill, as reported by the Senate
Appropriations Committee, since this version of the bill consisted of amendments to
the House-passed bill.56
The Senate rule is less restrictive than the House on unauthorized appropriations.
For example, the Senate Appropriations Committee may report committee
amendments containing unauthorized appropriations. An appropriation is considered
authorized if the Senate previously passes the authorization bill during the same
session of Congress. In contrast, in the House, the authorization bill must be
approved by both houses and signed by the President.
Although the Senate rule generally prohibits unauthorized appropriations in non-
committee amendments, Senators rarely raise this point of order because of
exceptions to the rule. Unauthorized earmarks are allowed in Senate Appropriations
Committee reports and joint explanatory statements, as in the House.

56 The Senate rule reflects Senate practices at the time the rule was established. As mentioned
earlier, the Senate Appropriations Committee traditionally reported amendments to the House-
passed appropriations bill, instead of reporting an original Senate bill. Therefore, the rule’s
prohibition only applies to amendments, both committee and floor amendments. Recently, the
Senate Appropriations Committee began reporting most or all of the bills as original Senate
bills.

CRS-31
The Senate rule prohibits riders in both Senate Appropriations Committee
amendments and non-committee amendments. It also prohibits non-german
57
e
amendments.
The division between an authorization and an appropriation is limited to
congressional consideration of appropriations measures. If unauthorized
appropriations or riders remain in a measure as enacted, either because no one raised
a point of order or the House or Senate waived the rules, the provision will have the
force of law. Again, unauthorized appropriations are generally available for obligation
or expenditure.
Rescissions
Rescissions cancel previously enacted budget authority. To continue the earlier
example, after Congress enacts the $3 billion to construct the four ships, it may enact
legislation canceling the budget authority prior to its obligation. Rescissions are an
expression of changed or differing priorities. They may be used to offset increases in
budget authority for other activities.
The President may recommend rescissions to Congress, but it is up to Congress
to act on them. Under Title X of the Congressional Budget Act, Congress mus
58
t
pass a bill approving the President’s rescissions within 45 days of continuous session
of congress
or the budget authority must be spent.
In practice, this usually means that funds proposed for rescission not
approved by Congress must be made available for obligation after about 60
calendar days, although the period can extend to 75 days or longer.59
57 In March 1995, the Senate set a precedent that in effect struck prior precedents setting
standards for defining a rider. This action effectively made the prohibition against riders
inoperative. On July 26, 1999, the Senate adopted S.Res. 160 restoring those precedents.
(For more information, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, S.Res.
160 and Reversing the Hutchison and FedEx Precedents
, by Paul S. Rundquist, CRS report
RS20276.)
Under Senate precedents, an amendment containing a rider may be considered if it is
germane to language in the House-passed appropriations bill. That is, if the House opens the
door by passing a rider in an appropriations bill, the Senate has an “inherent right” to amend
it. Prior to 1995, amendments containing riders were routinely considered using the defense
of germaneness
. However, since the current practice of the Senate Appropriations Committee
to report original Senate bills, rather than the House-passed bill with amendments, there is no
House language to which a rider could be germane. Therefore, the defense of germaneness
is generally no longer available.
Title X is referred to as the Impoundment Control Act.
58
5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,
9
Item Veto and Expanded
Impoundment Proposals, by Virginia A. McMurtry, CRS Issue Brief 89148, updated March
15, 1999 (Washington: continually updated), p. 3.

CRS-32
In response to the President’s recommendation, Congress may decide not to
approve the amount specified by the President, approve the total amount, or approve
a different amount. In 1998, for instance, President Clinton proposed rescinding $2.1
million appropriated for maritime guaranteed loan subsidies. Congress did not
concur. Also in 1998, the President proposed rescinding $737,000 of the
appropriated funds for the Bureau of Indian Affair’s construction account. Congress,
in response, exceeded the President’s request and rescinded $837,000 of these funds
in the FY1998 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-174).
Congress may also initiate rescissions. An example is the rescission of $11.2
million for FY1998 for the Health professions education fund included in the same
supplemental. Rescissions can be included in either separate rescission measures or
any of the three types of appropriations measures.

CRS-33
For Additional Reading
CRS Reports
CRS Report 98-648 GOV. Appropriations Bills: What are “General Provisions?,”
by Sandy Streeter.
CRS Report 98-558 GOV. Appropriations Bills: What is Report Language?, by
Sandy Streeter.
CRS Report 97-947 GOV. The Appropriations Process and the Congressional
Budget Act, by James V. Saturno.
CRS Report 97-930 GOV. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997: A Fact Sheet, by
Robert Keith.
CRS Report 96-934 GOV. Congressional Budget Resolutions: Formulation,
Content, and Historical Information, by Jennifer Suttle.
CRS Report RS20095. The Congressional Budget Process: A Brief Overview, by
James V. Saturno.
CRS Report 97-892 GOV. Continuing Appropriations Acts: Brief Overview of
Recent Practices, by Sandy Streeter.
CRS Report 98-518 GOV. Earmarks and Limitations in Appropriations Bills, by
Sandy Streeter.
CRS Report 98-726 GOV. Government Performance and Results Act and the
Appropriations Process, by Sandy Streeter.
CRS Report 93-729 S. The House Appropriations Process, 1789-1993, by Louis
Fisher.
CRS Report 98-721 GOV. Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, by Robert
Keith.
CRS Report 98-720 GOV. Manual on the Federal Budget Process, by Allen Schick
and Robert Keith.
CRS Report 97-865 GOV. Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process,
by James V. Saturno.
CRS Report 97-611 GOV. Proposals for an Automatic Continuing Resolution, by
Robert Keith.

CRS-34
CRS Info Packs
Info Pack 012B. Budget Process Info Pack, prepared by the Information Research
Division.
CRS Fact Sheets on the Budget Process
http://www.loc.gov/crs/legproc/newformat/CRSFactSheets/FactSheetMenuNF.
html#BudgetProcess
Congressional Documents
United States Congress. House. Rules of the House of Representatives: 106th
Congress, by Jeff Trandahl, Clerk of the House of Representatives. January 7,
1999.
United States Congress. House. House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents
and Procedures of the House. 104 Cong., 2d. S
th
ess., 1996. Washington: GPO,
1996.
United States Congress. House. Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives.
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 1982. Washington: GPO, 1982.
United States Congress. Senate. Riddick’s Senate Procedure. 101 Cong., 2d Sess.,
st
1992. Washington: GPO, 1992.