Order Code RS20241
Updated June 28, 1999
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Monopoly and Monopolization — Fundamental
But Separate Concepts in U.S. Antitrust Law
Janice E. Rubin
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Summary
Antitrust doctrine holds that viable competition will best protect consumers; it is
only concerned with the viability of individual competitors insofar as their fates affect
marketplace competitiveness. Moreover, the Rule of Reason generally modifie
1
d
“competition” with “reasonable.” Viewed in the context of the Rule of Reason, the
general prohibitions against monopolization and attempted monopolization contained in
section 2 of the Sherman Act and against monopolization in section 7 of the Clayton
Act, and the unlawfulness of “unfair acts” in commerce under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, require two things: first, an inquiry into whether an entity is in
fact a monopolist; and second, whether that monopolist has unlawfully monopolized the
market(s) within which it operates (the applicable, "relevant market," which may be
either product- or geographically based, or both). This Report will attempt to clarify the
difference between the concepts of “monopoly” and “monopolization”; and will touch
on the monopoly/monopolization thinking in the Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as illustrated in (1)
statements on merger enforcement made by current antitrust enforcement officials, since
such expressions are generally indicative of the agencies’ concerns about competitive
conditions and the effect of various market transactions, (2) the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, and (3) some observations on the Government actions against the Microsoft
and Intel Corporations.
1 Under Rule of Reason analysis the anticompetitive results of a transaction will, in all but
the few instances involving per se violations of the antitrust laws (e.g., price fixing, boycotts), be
balanced against any procompetitive effects that might be produced. Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits both the monopolization and attempted
monopolization of interstate or foreign trade or commerce.2 Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits mergers or acquisitions “where in any line of commerce or any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such [transaction] ... may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”3 Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibits “unfair acts” in commerce.4
A shorthand definition of “monopoly” is “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.”5 The significance of the ability to exclude competition is, however, as is
the ability to control prices, in the supposed deleterious effect of the lack of competition
on, consumers, who are presumed to benefit from the existence of largely competitive
markets, and not on the excluded competitors:
‘[t]he antitrust injury requirement obligates [complainants] to demonstrate, as a
threshold matter, “that the challenged conduct has had an actual adverse effect on
competition as a whole in the relevant market; to prove it has been harmed as an
individual competitor will not suffice.”’6
“... it is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of
competition, not competitors.’”7
But since there is no concept of “no fault” monopolization in United States antitrust law,8
absent a finding by a court of “guilty behavior,”9 there can be no finding of
“monopolization”: that is, a finding of “monopoly power” does not necessarily equate to
a finding of the monopolization prohibited by either section 7 of the Clayton Act or section
2 of the Sherman Act, or the “unfair practices” prohibited by section 5 of the FTC Act.
10
2 15 U.S.C. § 18.
3 15 U.S.C. § 2.
4 15 U.S.C. § 45.
5 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1956).
6 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. G.T. Britts Distributing, Inc., 1999 WL 199256, *2 (N.D.N.Y.
1999), quoting George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.
1998), which quoted Capitol Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947(1993).
7 Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 1999 WL 182173, *28 (D.
Kansas 1999), quoting Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993), which quoted Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in
Brown Shoe).
8 I.e., there is no “bright line” for the size beyond which an entity may grow before it is
deemed a “monopoly.” Attempts during the 1970s to create “no fault monopolization” were not
successful (e.g., S. 11667, 93d Congress, sponsored by Senator Philip Hart).
9 I.e., predatory pricing or tying the purchase of an unwanted product to the purchase of one
over which the seller has a monopoly. In this respect, note cases filed against Microsoft and Intel
by DoJ and the FTC, discussed, infra, beginning at p. 4.
10 “... [the] power that, [for example], automobile or soft-drink manufacturers [who,
(continued...)

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Practically, then, there must be a determination of the market(s) within which the alleged
monopolist operates (i.e., the relevant product market and/or the relevant geographic
market) in order to determine the extent to which he is actually capable of exercising any
meaningful price-controlling or competition-excluding power, or the extent to which he
has already done so.
There are at least four views of economic markets which provide some context to the
“relevant market” and subsequent monopolization determinations: free market, which
holds that (a) market forces produce the best allocation of resources, and (b) the non-
anecdotal evidence indicates no correlation between concentration and profits; centrist,
which is somewhat similar to the “free market” view that size and distribution don’t
necessarily signify the intensity of competition, but does believe that collusion is more
likely in concentrated markets; moderate structuralist, which emphasizes that the greater
the number of competitors in a market the more likely there will be downward pressure
on prices; and strict structuralist, which holds that competition is directly and inversely
related to concentration levels.
11
The "bottom-line" goal of U.S. antitrust policy should
be "to encourage producers to make and sell better products at lower prices and pass those
savings on to consumers."
12
The jointly issued Horizontal Merger Guidelines13 were promulgated in order to
inform the business community of the agencies’ (DoJ, FTC) governing philosophy and
“analytical framework” when they are reviewing the permissibility of proposed mergers.
The “Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions” section of the Introduction states
unequivocally that “mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power
or to facilitate its exercise, but goes on to note that while “competitively harmful” mergers
will be challenged, there is a “larger universe of mergers that [is] either competitively
beneficial or neutral.” Emphasizing that distinction, the
14
Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division testified:
Sometimes people complain about a merger solely based on its size. ... I want to
make clear[, however,] that antitrust analysis focuses on the specific competitive harms
that may be associated with a particular merger, not on its size in the abstract. Thus,
(...continued)
10
admittedly, produce non-standardized, differentiated products] have over their trademarked
products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly.” 351 U.S. at 393.
11 MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAW, ABA Monograph 7, 1981.
12 Pitofsky, Robert. Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 Georgetown Law Journal 195, 205 (note 3) (December 1992).
13 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
published and released April 2, 1992 [“Merger Guidelines” or “Guidelines”], reprinted at 1559
ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT (ATRR) (Special Supplement) (April 2, 1992). The
Merger Guidelines have, over the years, been revised and reissued (e.g., the April 1997 revision
(1806 ATRR 359, April 10, 1997) clarified the circumstances under which an “efficiencies”
defense might “save” an otherwise anticompetitive merger); the Guidelines are not binding on either
the Antitrust Division or the FTC (or, for that matter, the courts), but they are indicative of the
agencies’ thinking with respect to the competitive concerns inherent in all market transactions.
14 Merger Guidelines, § 0.1.

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for example, a big merger may not be challenged because the merging parties are not
competitors or potential competitors of one another and the merger does not raise any
vertical antitrust issues. At the same time, we may challenge a smaller merger that
involves the only two firms that make a particular product. The key for our review is
whether the merger will harm consumers, not the sheer size of the corporate entities
involved.15
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.16 is considered a landmark
monopolization case; there, in order to determine whether duPont’s dominance in the
cellophane wrapping market amounted to unlawful “monopolization,” it was ultimately
necessary for the Court to determine “whether [duPont] control[led] the price and
competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as [it is] charged with
monopolizing,”17 i.e., whether there was significant enough competition from non-
cellophane, flexible wrapping materials to dilute duPont’s admitted monopoly in the
cellophane wrapping market. The monopoly enjoyed by duPont in the cellophane
wrapping market was found not to amount to unlawful monopolization of the market for
flexible packaging materials.
18
Two recent filings appear to illustrate the antitrust enforcement agencies’ currently
existing differentiation between the existence of monopoly power and active
monopolization; the Antitrust Division’s suit against Microsoft and the FTC’s complaint
19
against Intel.20 In Microsoft, the Division acknowledged that “Microsoft possesses (and
for several years has possessed) monopoly power in the market for personal computer
operating systems,” and filed its actions not to challenge Microsoft’s monopoly status,
21
but rather, the company’s actions:
To protect its valuable, Windows monopoly against ... potential competitive threats, and
to extend its operating system monopoly into other software markets, Microsoft has
engaged in a series of anticompetitive activities. Microsoft’s conduct includes
15 Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, June 16, 1998 (emphasis added).
16 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
17 Id. at 392.
18 “... despite cellophane’s advantages it has to meet competition from other materials in every
one of its uses. ... We conclude that cellophane’s interchangeability with the other materials
mentioned suffices to make it a part of this flexible packaging material market.” 351 U.S. at 398,
400.
19 United States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98-1232, filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia on May 18, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as “Complaint”) “to
restrain anticompetitive conduct by defendant Microsoft Corporation ..., the world’s largest
supplier of computer software for personal computers ....” (Complaint ¶ 1).
20 In re Intel Corporation, Doc. No. 9288, filed June 8, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as Docket
No. 9288), settled May 17, 1999 by means of a Consent Decree; See,
<www..gov.ftc/opa/1999/9903/intelcom.htm> for details of the Consent Decree and
<www.gov.ftc/opa/1999/9904/intelst.htm> for FTC comments on the decree (open for comment
until May 24, 1999).
21 Complaint, ¶ 2.

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agreements tying other Microsoft software products to Microsoft’s Windows operating
system;
22 exclusionary agreements precluding companies or potential competitors from
distributing, promoting, buying, or using products of Microsoft’s software competitors
or potential competitors; and exclusionary agreements restricting the right of companies
to provide services or resources to Microsoft’s software competitors or potential
competitors.23
Similarly, in the charges against Intel Corporation by the FTC, the Commission acted
to restrain the "pattern of conduct ... that violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45," and not because of Intel's acknowledged monopoly
24
status.
25
As a monopolist, Intel can compete by producing better, cheaper and more
attractive products. It cannot act to cement its monopoly power by preventing
other firms from challenging its dominance. Intel has acted illegally. It has used its
monopoly power to impede innovation and stifle competition [by denying necessary
technical information to certain customers in retaliation for their suits against Intel to
enforce their (the customers') patents, allegedly infringed by Intel].26
Some observers view the present enforcement posture as evidence of the flexibility
and workability of the federal antitrust laws, although it is certainly possible to disagree
with the way(s) in which the antitrust enforcement agencies have acted with respect to
particular instances of proposed mergers or vis-a-vis specific, alleged monopolists. Given
the existing rationale of the antitrust laws, however, it is difficult to disagree with their
policy of prohibiting only those transactions/activities which they believe do/will, in fact,
harm competition. On the other hand, Congress is free to re-examine the century-old
antitrust statutes in order to change their focus.
22 Simply, “tying” is refusing to sell one product to a buyer unless the buyer agrees also to
take a designated second product (“you can’t buy X without Y”), thus precluding the buyer’s
choice concerning where to purchase each component, and foreclosing to other sellers a portion
of the market in the tied product.
23 Complaint, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
24 Introduction to FTC Docket No. 9288 (emphasis added).
25 Docket No. 9288, ¶ ¶ 4-10.
26 FTC Press Release Issued to Announce Agency's Filing Against Intel, June 8, 1998
(emphasis added).

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