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NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

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Abstract

This report summarizes the key issues in the 1998 Senate floor debate on NATO enlargement. It includes as appendices the Resolution of Ratification approved by the Senate on April 30, 1998, a record of the final vote on the Resolution, texts of key amendments considered in the debate, and a summary of executive reporting requirements included in the Resolution. Other CRS reports relating to this topic include IB 95076, *NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance* and CRS Reports 98-214, *NATO Policy: Selected Legislation in the 103^d, 104th, and 105th Congresses*; 97-708, *NATO's Evolving Role and Missions*; and 97-1041, *Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and Subsequent Accessions: Historical Overview*. This report will not be updated.

NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

Summary

The 1998 Senate debate on the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was spread across eight days from March 17 to April 30. Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was favored by the leadership of both parties, and during the debate the Resolution of Ratification was widely expected to pass. Opponents of NATO enlargement structured most of their arguments and amendments as expressions of concern about the future of the Alliance as it moves into the 21st century. The Senate gave its advice and consent on April 30, voting 80-19 in favor of ratification.

The central point of contention between supporters and opponents of NATO enlargement was a disagreement over if and how NATO should change its Strategic Concept to fit the post-Cold War world. Supporters of enlargement generally believed the Alliance should continue its evolution into a versatile defender of Western interests. Opponents viewed such evolution as not conforming to the terms of the 1949 Washington Treaty.

The American share of enlargement costs concerned Senators on both sides of the debate. Supporters tended to accept lower cost estimates and to declare that enlargement was a worthwhile expense. Opponents worried that the Senate was signing a “blank check” which could spiral out of control, and sought to lower the U.S. share of the NATO's common costs from the current level of around 25 percent.

Two issues with open-ended implications played key roles in the debate. The first was Russia. Opponents were concerned that adding the three applicants would bolster extreme factions in Russia and strain United States-Russia relations. Most supporters cited Alliance efforts to engage Russia and to aid its transition to democracy; they argued that Russia would eventually see NATO's defensive nature. The second issue was how enlargement would affect European stability and U.S. security. Supporters focused on the need to maintain U.S. engagement in Europe and its ability to meet new security threats. Opponents warned of Russia becoming a regional destabilizer and argued that adding three countries to those the United States is committed to defend would further stretch what many considered an already overburdened military.

Little debate took place about any moral responsibility the West might have concerning the past injustices done to the three applicants; these issues, however, were clearly important to many enlargement supporters. Many viewed enlargement as the fulfillment of American promises during the Cold War and a way by which the West could redeem itself for the abandonment of Eastern Europe in the wake of the Second World War.

Two conditions on ratification were also debated by the Senate. The first mandated a three year pause before any future rounds of accession; the second linked NATO and European Union membership. The sponsors of the resolution of ratification argued that such conditions would limit NATO's effectiveness.

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NATO: Senate Floor Consideration of the Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland

Introduction

On April 30, 1998, the U.S. Senate, by a vote of 80-19, gave its advice and consent to the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty. The wide-ranging debate included consideration not only of the qualifications of the three candidates but, perhaps more importantly, of the quality of the Alliance itself. Senators discussed NATO's evolving mission, cost and questions of burdensharing, relations with Russia and other matters. This report summarizes the main issues in the debate.

Strategic Concept

The question of how, if at all, NATO should adapt its mission to fit the security environment of the post-Cold War world sparked some of the Senate's most contentious debate. From the outset of the debate, enlargement was linked to the development of NATO's Strategic Concept and the degree to which it should focus on new missions beyond collective defense. Many supporters of enlargement believed a broader mission profile would strengthen NATO by ensuring its relevance in a new European security structure. Others argued that the redefinition of the Strategic Concept amounted to "treaty creep" -- that is, it would create a NATO organization beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty. Senators John Ashcroft (R-Missouri), John Kyl (R-Arizona), and Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico) introduced amendments designed to give the Senate a voice concerning the Alliance's transition toward its new roles.

The Future of the Alliance

Supporters. Most Senators who advocated adding the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance also supported using NATO to meet the new security challenges that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Senator John McCain (R-Arizona) entered into the *Congressional Record (CR)* a statement by the New Atlantic Initiative, an organization composed primarily of former government officials. The statement declared that NATO has rightfully closed the door on its successful mission to prevent Soviet domination of Western Europe, but that "Its larger purpose of ensuring peace and freedom in Europe and the Atlantic region endures." It outlined a new identity for NATO, as "an alliance aiming to promote peace and stability in the Atlantic region, devoted to the spread and consolidation of democratic ways in Europe, and capable of protecting Western interests against such

future threats as may emerge.” The statement tied this vision of the future to the legislation at hand, pronouncing, “Crucial to this process of adaptation is NATO's willingness to admit new members ... Otherwise it will remain a relic of the Cold War of diminishing relevance to the contemporary world.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2200) Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) said that “NATO has already begun a kind of transition expanding its mission to include other tasks.” The Alliance, he said, “has an expanded vision of the range of potential rivalries within Europe to global threats, such as terrorism or nuclear proliferation, but also a greater willingness to undertake certain kinds of missions to cope with those threats.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3848)

Supporters of enlargement and an expanded role for the Alliance contended that the original text of the North Atlantic Treaty provided for the new missions being proposed for NATO. (These missions are often referred to as “non-Article 5” missions because they would not be in response to a direct attack on a member's territory, which, under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, would be considered an attack against all members.) Specifically, they cited Article 4 of the Treaty, which reads: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Senator William Roth (R-Delaware) spoke about the flexibility of the 1949 treaty:

Some fifty years ago, the drafters of the Washington Treaty included provisions not only to provide for the territorial defense of the North Atlantic region, but also for the possibility of common action to protect other interests of the North Atlantic Community. It was the United States that insisted upon this provision -- Article 4 of the Charter -- and a construction of the Charter that would permit actions beyond the narrow scope of territorial defense. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3861)

Senator Roth went on to cite a memorandum recounting a press conference given by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 18, 1949: “Asked if there was no limiting clause the Secretary stated that there was no limiting clause. ... Asked if the Treaty stipulated that if armed attack should originate outside of the area no action might be taken, the Secretary replied in the negative.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3862)

Yet while they argued that non-Article 5 missions are acceptable under the terms of the Washington Treaty, proponents of enlargement reaffirmed the centrality of Article 5 to the mission of the Alliance. Senator Roth said, “The resolution makes crystal clear that the Senate firmly believes that NATO's first priority must be the mission of collective defense.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3861) He pointed out that Section 3(B)(i) of the protocols on accession states that “in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members.”

Opponents. Senators against enlarging the Alliance and broadening its operational purview argued that NATO is straying from its original mission and that the Washington Treaty is far more limited than supporters of enlargement claim.

Senator Ashcroft began by questioning NATO's transition from a Cold War institution to its current security role. He said:

We have to ask ourselves at this juncture, “What is the purpose of the treaty?” Is it appropriate or possible to change the treaty, without amending the treaty, just by beginning to lean everyone in one direction, to turn the treaty to one side or another, or begin to assert that there are new things to be considered because the treaty is evolving? I have to tell you ... I don't believe in treaty evolution any more than I believe in the evolution of the Constitution. (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3627)

Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) also expressed concern that the proposed evolution of NATO's mission would create an institution different from what the founders of the Alliance envisioned: “It is my concern that the President's vision of a new NATO will signal the end of NATO as a defensive alliance and begin its role as a regional peacekeeping organization.” (*CR*, 23 March 1998, S2446) Senator Warner said, “...we are in danger of turning this fine Alliance into a 'mini-UN.’” (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2275) Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) entered into the *Congressional Record* an address he gave to a meeting of the Associated Press in celebration of its 150th anniversary; his remarks surveyed the resolution of ratification's mention of Article 4-based missions (Section 3(B)(ii)) and asked, “Does this not read suspiciously like a license to get into a fight just about anywhere?” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3612)

Challenging the notion that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows the type of changes to NATO's mission being proposed, Senator Ashcroft asked, “Is this what was intended when this NATO agreement came into existence? Was it designed to have this kind of elasticity? ... Not according to the folks who presided in the U.S. Senate in 1949 when this great treaty organization was ratified.” He then quoted Senator Tom Connally (D-Texas), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1949: “Let us not forget that this treaty is limited in scope. Its main purpose is to maintain the peace and security of the North Atlantic area. We do not propose to stretch its terms to cover the entire globe.” (*CR*, 27 March 1998, S3628) Senator Ashcroft argued that Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty was designed to play a supporting role to Articles 5 and 6, the latter of which specifies what is to be considered an attack on a member of the Alliance, limits NATO to actions of collective defense:

The geographic scope of the article V commitment was defined explicitly in article VI to make sure there was not any confusion. ... It said the United States would defend ... the territory of NATO members -- not the interests, not the commercial transactions, but the territory of the NATO members. ... undergirding NATO's collective defense mission was the purpose of Article IV. Article IV was not a loophole for any military operation the North Atlantic Council could dream up. (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3628)

Ashcroft Amendment

Senator Ashcroft introduced an amendment (No. 2318) designed to prevent NATO from taking on missions he believed would require amendment of the

Washington Treaty. He said his amendment would “make sure that the Senate will not be endorsing what I call ‘treaty creep’ where we just allow a creeping mission to get us to the place where we are no longer able to sustain those things which ought to be sustained.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3629) The amendment stipulated that the United States would oppose all NATO military operations unless:

- the operation is intended for the purpose of collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on the territory of an Alliance member; or
- the operation is in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

Senator Ashcroft described the purpose of his amendment:

My amendment is tailored not to constrain NATO’s effectiveness in the future, nor is it intended to micromanage NATO’s military planning from the Senate floor. The central portion of the amendment is taken directly from the North Atlantic Treaty itself. My amendment states that any military operation outside Article V must be based on the principle of collective defense, namely, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2284)

The amendment faced strong opposition, led by Senator Roth, from supporters of NATO enlargement. Senator Roth argued against the amendment, saying, “At its best this amendment is unnecessary to achieve the goals of its sponsors. At its worst, the amendment would undercut the Alliance’s will and capability to defend the security interests of the North Atlantic community of democracies.” The fact that NATO acts only by consensus made the amendment unnecessary, he said, because the United States can never be forced to participate in a NATO operation. He argued that the authors of the Washington Treaty did envision non-Article 5 missions and that the United States should not set the precedent of unilaterally reinterpreting the Washington Treaty, an action which he said “runs counter to the spirit and traditions of the Alliance” and would encourage the other members of the Alliance to do the same. Senator Roth closed by asking, “In a world of rogue states with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons increasingly at their disposal, why would we ... want to ... discard one of the best vehicles through which to prompt allied support for U.S. security interests?” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3861)

In the closing hours of the debate on April 30, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) made a motion to table the amendment. The roll call vote succeeded, with 82 yeas and 18 nays, and the amendment was tabled.¹

Kyl Amendment

On April 28th, prior to the vote on the Ashcroft amendment, Senator Kyl introduced Amendment No. 2310, which added to the Resolution of Ratification a statement of the Senate’s “understanding” of U.S. policy toward NATO’s Strategic

¹ The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of 30 April 1998, p. S3862. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

Concept. Senator Kyl argued that the Senate should have a voice in the revision of the Strategic Concept:

In my view, the current resolution focuses too much on what NATO should not be and should not do. The resolution does not attempt to lay out a comprehensive set of principles to guide development of the strategic concept. And so this proposed amendment will establish the Senate's vision of the future of NATO and, I hope, help to lay the foundation for American positions on the strategic concept. (*CR*, 28 April 1998, S3695)

He went on to say, "Our principal objective here ... is to ensure that NATO remains an arm of U.S. power and influence. NATO ... must remain the principal foundation for the security interests of its members. This means NATO must be prepared to defend against a range of common threats to our vital interests." (*CR*, 28 April 1998, S3695) The amendment identified post-Cold War concerns like weapons of mass destruction and access to natural resources as legitimate. However, the amendment tempered its recognition of the threats of ethnic or religious rivalries and historic disputes with a statement that only threats of this type occurring in the North Atlantic area should be within NATO's purview.

Senator Kyl's amendment faced little opposition. Senators Warner and Moynihan asked for several points of clarification, but both eventually voted in favor of the amendment. The Senate approved the amendment by a vote of 90 yeas to 9 nays.²

Bingaman Amendment

Senator Bingaman's amendment, No. 2324, sought to set a condition on future rounds of accession. Senator Bingaman said that his amendment "would withhold inviting additional countries other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO membership until after NATO has approved a revised strategic concept." (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3631) He said, "Right now we in the Senate are being called upon to sign up to a policy of enlarging the alliance without a clear, coherent explanation of how expansion of NATO will serve NATO's strategic interests. I am concerned because NATO itself does not seem to have an agreed upon strategic military mission." (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3630-S3631) With a new Strategic Concept due to be approved at the 1999 Washington summit, the Senator argued that his amendment was not likely to cause a delay in future enlargement processes.

Despite Senator Bingaman's statement that he had "great difficulty seeing why anyone would object to this," Senator Biden asked his colleagues to reject the amendment. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3854) Senator Biden argued that, if implemented, the amendment could be a tool for those wishing to slow down or stop the process of enlargement; by refusing to agree to a new Strategic Concept, any NATO member could quietly stop enlargement. The amendment, Senator Biden said, would provide

² The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 28, 1998, p. S3698. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

a “pocket veto,” for a country opposed to enlargement but unwilling to make its case publicly. Senator Bingaman’s amendment failed by a vote of 23 yeas to 76 nays.³

Costs / Burdensharing

Senators on both sides of the debate were concerned with how much the enlargement of NATO would cost the Alliance generally and the United States in particular. Estimates of the total cost of enlargement cited in the debate ranged from \$1.5 billion to \$125 billion (the cost would be shared among the 19 members of an enlarged Alliance). Senators who questioned the costs of the process focused on the potential for enlargement to become an open-ended financial commitment; in general, supporters concentrated on the non-monetary benefits of enlargement and expressed confidence in the lower cost estimates.

Opponents. Critics of the figures given by the Administration and by NATO complained that no accurate estimate of the cost involved in admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland was available for them to examine. The estimates that were available -- prepared by the U.S. Government, NATO itself, and several non-governmental organizations -- all made assumptions of force size and strategic posture that were highly debatable in the rapidly changing European security environment. Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) said, “I have seen projections range from \$125 billion down to \$1.5 billion. When you have that wide a variance, something is very strange.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2145) Senator Harkin went on to mention a problem with current cost estimates:

Another piece of the puzzle we are missing is how new members are to address their military shortfalls. Although the shortfalls were to be identified in December 1997, the countries’ force goals will not be set until this spring. In other words, we are without a plan to address the force goals and the price tag associated with it. I am very uncomfortable signing the American taxpayer’s name to a potentially ballooning blank check. (CR, 17 March 1998, S2145)

Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho) expressed similar concerns: “... all of this cost related information will be made available to Congress only after the Senate’s advice and consent to expansion is final and irrevocable. That means if the information is not satisfactory to the Senate, we will have no recourse.” (CR, 23 March 1998, S2446)

Historian John Lewis Gaddis, in a *New York Times* opinion piece inserted into the *Congressional Record*, identified another source of ambiguity: “What will expansion cost? The Administration’s estimate ... sounds like a bargain, but the estimate assumes no change in the current security environment. Has it occurred to the Administration that the act of expanding NATO, especially if former Soviet states are included, could itself alter the current security environment?” (CR, 28 April 1998, S3704)

³ The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 30, 1998, p. S3863. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 2.

Senator Harkin was also vocal on the issue of burdensharing. Currently the United States pays approximately 25 percent of NATO's common operational costs; opponents of enlargement worried that the addition of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland would create upward pressure on the U.S. share of costs. These fears were exacerbated by the recent trend among European countries toward reducing defense spending and conflicting reports of whether or not the French had agreed to help pay the cost of enlargement. Senator Harkin introduced an amendment (No. 2312) stipulating that the United States would be limited to paying no more than 25 percent of the expenditures involved in integrating the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the Alliance. He stated, "What my amendment says is what is good for one side ought to be good for another. ... If 25 percent is good for the common budgets, it ought to be good for the national budgets." The amendment was defeated by a roll call vote of 76 nays to 24 yeas.⁴

Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) introduced two amendments designed to reduce the U.S. share of the Alliance's common budget and to impose tighter congressional control over expenses incurred in the process of integrating the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO's command structure. Senator Stevens originally introduced both amendments (Nos. 2065 and 2066) on March 23, 1998 (CR, S2437-S2438) and later said, "My original intent in proposing these amendments was to bring some greatly needed accountability to the critical issue of recognizing and clarifying all the costs to the United States to enlarge the NATO alliance." (CR, 30 April 1998, S3845) Amendment No. 2065 stipulated that none of the costs involved in admitting new members to the Alliance could be paid by the United States unless Congress specifically authorized the funds. Amendment No. 2066 would have cut off all U.S. funding to NATO beyond the current fiscal year unless the Secretaries of State and Defense certified to the Congress that the United States would contribute no more than 20 percent of the total common budget. The effect of this second amendment would be an immediate 5 percent cut in the share of NATO's common budget paid by the United States.

Both of Senator Stevens' amendments were significantly modified through negotiation with the supporters of ratification. Inserted into Amendment No. 2065 was the language "other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO," which left intact the existing channels of authorization for common budget funding but asserted congressional control over any additional assistance given to new Alliance members. The second amendment, No. 2066, was broken into two parts over the course of the debate. The first section of the revised amendment was a non-binding statement of the "sense of the Senate" which declared that the President should, every year for five years beginning in fiscal year 1999, propose to NATO a one percent reduction in the share of the common budget paid by the United States. The second section of the amendment carried the force of law and stipulated that the total U.S. commitment to the NATO common budget in any fiscal year after October 1, 1998 may not exceed the total of all such payments made in fiscal year 1998, unless specifically authorized by the Congress.

⁴ The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 28, 1998, p. S3687. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 3.

In their original forms, both of Senator Stevens' amendments were opposed by the sponsors of the Resolution of Ratification. Upon further negotiation, however, both were accepted as "friendly" amendments and passed by voice votes. Senator Stevens voted in favor of the final text of the Resolution of Ratification.⁵

Supporters. Many Senators who advocated enlargement also expressed concern about the financial burden that would be borne by the United States. They differed from their opponents, however, in that they were generally satisfied with the studies that produced lower cost estimates. Enlargement supporters also proposed that the United States would reap money-saving benefits from the stability they expected an enlarged Alliance to create.

Advocates balked at some of the estimates of the cost of enlargement. Senator Biden called the high-end figures "bizarre." (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3638) The Department of Defense (DoD) in February 1997 provided the Congress with a report projecting the cost of enlargement to be between \$27 and \$35 billion; the DoD study encompassed both costs to all 19 national defense budgets as well as NATO common budget funds. NATO itself studied the issue after the July 1997 invitations to join had been made to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; NATO's December 1997 figure, which was restricted to increases in the common budget, was approximately \$1.5 billion. This estimate subsequently was accepted by both the DoD and the General Accounting Office (GAO). Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) argued that the NATO study should be accepted by the Senate as reliable because it was conducted with the knowledge of which countries had been invited (earlier estimates had planned for the possible inclusion of a fourth country) and more precise information regarding the state of the Polish, Hungarian, and Czech military establishments than had previously been available. Senator Levin said, "... that original estimate of the administration was way off and it was way high, and the revised estimate done by NATO after on-site visits and looking only at the direct costs resulting from the increase in the size of NATO, that assessment has been approved by the GAO and by the DoD." (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2254)

Other Senators chose to focus on the non-monetary benefits of NATO enlargement. Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) spoke on this point:

... opponents of enlargement point to the cost. ... But ... what is the cost of not enlarging NATO? I believe the cost of not enlarging NATO will be far higher. ... What will be the cost to European security? What will be the cost to the new democracies of Eastern Europe? ... What would be the long-range cost to America of failing to prepare NATO for the 21st century? The cost would be instability in Europe and the increased chance of being pulled into yet another conflict. The cost of preventive security is always less than the cost of war. (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2197)

⁵ Acceptance of Amendment No. 2065 can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 28, 1998, p. S3859; acceptance of Amendment No. 2066 can be found in the *Record* of the same day, p. S3847. The texts of both amendments can be found in Appendix 3.

Senator Max Cleland (D-Georgia) concurred: “For a long time I have asked myself the question, ‘Can we afford it?’ ... I now ask myself, ‘Can we afford not to do it?’” (CR, 29 April 1998, S3748)

Many supporters of accession also noted that while the dollar-value of U.S. contributions to the common budget might increase in an enlarged NATO, the percentage contribution would decrease slightly from the current level of around 25 percent. Nonetheless, advocates of enlargement fought to defeat Senator Harkin’s amendment requiring a percentage spending cap. Senator Biden argued that the amendment was a “hamstringing of our national defense budget, unrelated to NATO.” (CR, 28 April 1998, S3670) He claimed it would hinder U.S. interests by prohibiting bilateral weapons sales or other defense assistance to the new Alliance-member countries unless the other nations of the Alliance were willing to pay 75 percent of the cost.

Russia

Concerns. A key point in the Senate’s debate was the issue of how Russia would respond to having a NATO member state abutting its westernmost border (Kaliningrad, Russia’s isolated piece of territory on the Baltic Sea). Given the history of the Alliance as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism during the Cold War, several Senators worried that NATO expansion would poison the U.S.-Russia relationship at a time when the nurturing and engagement of the newly democratic regime in Moscow are widely viewed as critical to its longevity.

Opponents of enlargement argued that, having spent much of the past fifty years fighting the Cold War in part to break through the “Iron Curtain” imposed on Europe after World War II, NATO should not take actions which might simply replace the old lines with new ones. Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minnesota) said, “... there is peace between states in Europe, between nations in Europe, for the first time in centuries. We do not have a divided Europe, and I worry about a NATO expansion which could redivide Europe and again poison relations with Russia.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257) Opponents said that the accession to the Alliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland -- three invitees in a field of twelve hopefuls -- would create an “us versus them” atmosphere instead of fostering the idea of a unified Europe.

The current danger to Alliance members, it was argued, is not the threat of attack by the once-powerful Russian military but instead its continued deterioration as a competent fighting force: Senator Wellstone said, “The Russian military has collapsed, the Russian Army’s ability to quell tiny, ill-equipped Chechen forces raises doubts about Russia’s capability to threaten its former Eastern bloc allies in the foreseeable future.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257) Security measures designed for the proper storage of Russia’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction are breaking down, increasing the likelihood of proliferation of such weapons among rogue states. NATO enlargement, opponents argued, makes Russian cooperation on initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar program to safeguard nuclear weapons less likely and therefore exacerbates the threat of proliferation.

Lastly, there was the contention that NATO enlargement was simply the wrong way to treat the former Soviet Union in the wake of its defeat in the Cold War. The concern was voiced that NATO expansion would strengthen nationalistic and anti-democratic forces in Russia and that it would, as former Ambassador George F. Kennan stated in an often-cited *New York Times* opinion piece, “impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2259) Senator Bob Smith (R-New Hampshire) said that enlargement “is basically kicking the Russians for no reason. History tells us that this is unwise.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2108) Senator Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) entered into the *Congressional Record* an opinion piece by historian John Lewis Gaddis that compared the current Russian situation to that of postwar Germany and argued that the West should not make the same mistakes it made with the Weimar Republic after World War I. Although in the end he voted in favor of ratification, Senator Roberts said that by enlarging NATO “We are poking the Russian bear.” (CR, 28 April 1998, S3703) Opponents of enlargement argued that western policy should strive to strengthen democratic forces in Russia; enlargement, they argued, will only bolster hard-line nationalist and communist elements in the Russian political arena and weaken democratic forces by wounding national pride and creating a sense of insecurity among the Russian public. Senator Wellstone argued:

... European security and stability is greatly dependent on Russia’s successful transition to democracy. That, I think, is the central point. A democratic Russia is unlikely to threaten its neighbors. I am worried, I am terribly worried. I think this is a profound mistake. I think this NATO expansion could threaten that democracy in Russia, and I think, if we do not have a successful transition to democracy in Russia, that, in turn, threatens European security and stability. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257)

With the rise of such anti-democratic forces, opponents argued, will come increasing intransigence in the area of arms reduction. The communist-dominated Russian Duma has yet to follow the Senate in ratifying the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), and Kennan believed that “it might make it much more difficult, if not impossible” to secure ratification of this treaty and others, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. (CR, 19 March 1998, S2259)

Responses. Proponents of NATO enlargement, led by Senators Roth and Biden, countered each objection raised by the opposition with contrasting interpretations of Russian behavior in the face of accession by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

Responding specifically to the notion, advanced chiefly by Senator Moynihan, that tensions along the Poland-Russia border would be increased by Poland’s membership in the Alliance, Senator Biden noted that since NATO’s inception in 1949 Norway has bordered Russia’s heavily fortified Kola Peninsula without incident. In the same speech on April 30, Senator Biden reasserted the position that was central to the proponents’ stance on the issue of Russia: the Alliance is defensive in nature, and thus “NATO simply does not threaten Russia. Never did -- never will.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3870) He cited evidence that American troop levels as part of NATO deployments have declined from a peak of over 300,000 during the Cold War to around 100,000 today and that the trend is toward still

smaller numbers; NATO at the end of the Cold War abandoned forward-deployed, stationary defenses for less obtrusive rapid deployment forces. Senator Biden further noted that the Alliance publicly stated in December 1996 that it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members” and in March 1997 it stated that there was no need to deploy combat troops in the new member countries. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3870)

Senator Roth characterized as “dead wrong” the argument that NATO enlargement punishes Russia when it is weak just as the Versailles Treaty punished a defeated Germany. He cited the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed on 27 May 1997, which “provid[ed] the foundation for not only enhanced consultation, but also unprecedented defense cooperation.” (*CR*, 17 March 1998, S2111) Russian troops today serve with NATO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since 1991 the West has contributed nearly \$100 billion to aid democratic and economic reforms in Russia. Senator Biden noted U.S. support for Russian efforts to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Trade Organization and for the inclusion of Russia in what has become the G-8 conference of leading industrial nations.

Advocates of enlargement argued that an expanded NATO should not poison relations with Russia. Senator Biden expressed hope that “over time Moscow can come to realize that enlargement of NATO by moving the zone of stability eastward to Central Europe will increase her own security, not diminish it.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2181-2) Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, advanced another view of Russian behavior as a reason for enlargement, saying: “Some have said that NATO expansion is unnecessarily provocative to Russia. ... If anything, it will make it easier for us to maintain friendly relations with Russia, because an expanded NATO will shut off Russia’s avenue to more destructive patterns of behavior.” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3604)

Conceding that differences exist with Russia over such issues as its failure to ratify START II and its policies in the Middle East, proponents of ratification insisted that these disagreements were not caused by the prospect of NATO enlargement. Senator Biden offered an explanation of the Duma’s opposition to START II: “Russian Communists and ultranationalists were against ratifying START II before NATO enlargement was even a gleam in the eyes of Lech Walesa and Havel, let alone U.S. policy. Why were the Russian Communists and ultranationalists against it? ... Because American arms control negotiators did a heck of a job, and Russia knew it.” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3640) As evidence of Russian cooperation with the West, he cited the Duma’s ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and President Boris Yeltsin’s pledge to ratify START II.

Senator Biden also cited data from a March 14, 1998 Gallup Poll which showed the Russian public to be in favor of allowing the three candidate states to join the Alliance. He said, “... 53 percent say Poland should be allowed to join NATO. ... 57 percent say the Czech Republic should be allowed to join NATO; 54 percent say Hungary should be allowed to join NATO, and 25 percent had no view on the matter.” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3639) Senator Biden argued that the polling data confirmed that most Russians had accepted NATO enlargement: “Don’t you kind of

find it fascinating that a majority of the Russian people say these countries should be able to join? ... So let's give the Russians a little credit for being intelligent, thinking people who are not captives of outdated, ideological propaganda. From the Gallup Poll I read you, clearly they are not.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3640)

In response to the contention that enlargement will damage the prospects of democracy's success in Russia, proponents argued that refusing to expand NATO would in fact be more detrimental than enlargement might be because it would give hard-line nationalists and communists a victory over democrats, who had tacitly accepted enlargement as reality. Senator Roth declared: “Moscow will always have its own independent motivations. Unfortunately, there are still those in Moscow who reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve Russia's sphere of influence. Let us not give credibility to the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy by acceding to these demands.” There was further concern that by changing course because of Russian misgivings, NATO would effectively give a veto to Russia over what ostensibly are internal decisions. Several Senators reacted strongly against giving Russia undue influence, including Senator Christopher Bond (R-Missouri), who stated, “Do not let the Russians run our foreign policy.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2259)

NATO enlargement was also put forth as a hedge against the possibility that Russia will be resurgent or that its experiment with democracy might fail at some point in the future. Senator Gordon Smith (R-Oregon) said, “We cannot be certain what the European security environment will look like in three, five, or ten years, but if we act now, we will be better prepared for any outcome.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2261) If Russia does attempt to regain parts of its empire, an enlarged NATO will be ready. According to Senator Roth, “...the bottom line is that if Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their own defensive security arrangements, then NATO's role in Central and Eastern Europe is even more important.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2111)

European Stability / American Security

Stability and security were frequently cited among the many reasons for NATO's creation in 1949 and its continued endurance today. The preamble of the Washington Treaty states that members of the Alliance “seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” Thus, central to the Senate's debate on enlargement were questions of if and how stability and security would be enhanced if the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were to join the Alliance. The Senate was divided: supporters of the Resolution of Ratification felt that enlargement would create a safer and more stable Europe, while opponents of ratification believed the process would instead create dangerous instability in the European security environment.

Supporters. Advocates of NATO enlargement looked to the past performance of the Alliance as an indicator of the stable environment they expected to exist in Europe if the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were to become members of NATO. Noting the relative tranquility and well-being of the North Atlantic area since the creation of the Alliance, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-Alaska) said

enlargement “ensures and enhances the prospects for peace, prosperity, and harmony throughout Europe. ... an expanded NATO will make the world safer simply because we are expanding the area where wars will not happen. ... I think this will bind these countries closer together and ensure stability throughout the continent.” (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2250) Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) agreed: “What is at stake here and now is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved.” (*CR*, 27 March 1998, S3617) Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) said that NATO membership would “heighten the sense of security within those three countries not only through the extension of NATO’s military guarantee but also through the psychological benefits of being ... a member of the NATO club, and interactions within the alliance will clearly help to strengthen the new democracies and their abilities to assimilate themselves into Europe both economically and politically, and obviously militarily within NATO’s integrated force structure. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3848)

Many Senators cited the historical ties between European stability and American security and promoted NATO enlargement as a way to maintain U.S. engagement in Europe. Senator William Roth spoke about this link:

[The vote before the Senate] is about America’s role in Europe and the ability of the transatlantic community to respond to challenges of the future -- both of which hinge on whether the United States wishes to remain a European power and whether we desire a unified, democratic, and larger Europe to remain linked to America. ... Throughout its history, Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great powers, and too many conflicting nationalist policies, each creating friction with the other. Twice in this century, these dynamics pulled America into wars on the European continent. ... And the potential for them to create conflict in the future is all too real unless we seize opportunities like the one before us. ... As [Czech Republic President] Vaclav Havel put it, ‘If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.’ Every time America has withdrawn its influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot afford. (*CR*, 17 March 1998, S2111)

Senator Joseph Biden offered similar thoughts, saying “For political, economic, strategic, and cultural reasons, Europe remains an area of vital interest to the United States of America. We are a European power, and for our own safety’s sake, in my view, we must remain a European power. Stability on that continent is fundamental to the well-being of our country.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2176) Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) viewed a U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement as a small price to pay to avoid being drawn into another European war. She said, “It has often been said that vigilance is the price of freedom. NATO remains a form of vigilance.” (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2256)

Enlargement was linked to NATO’s ongoing transition from a purely collective defense alliance to one with a broader agenda for action. Senator Kerry said, “[The three applicants’] membership will enhance stability in Central Europe and strengthen NATO itself through the acquisition of additional forces and personnel

to cope with future threats and missions.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3848) Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) delineated some of these new threats:

We have civil wars, ...; we have hot spots caused by ethnic and regional tensions ...; we have international crime, drugs, and terrorism; and we have the very real threat of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. NATO must meet the needs of these new threats, and I believe it will do so by changing and expanding. Europe’s new democracies will help us meet these challenges. ... These new democracies will contribute to America’s security by making NATO stronger. They are adding troops and equipment. They will provide additional strategic depth to NATO. (CR, 18 March 1998, S2196 - S2197)

Opponents. The Senators arguing against NATO enlargement were joined by several of their colleagues who favored enlargement in general but expressed concerns about enlargement’s affect on stability and security. This group worried that admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance would create unnecessary instability in an already volatile Eastern European security environment.

Several Senators were concerned that enlargement would replace Europe’s old “Iron Curtain” dividing line with a new one further east. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) asked, “Would enlargement result in a more united and secure Europe? More united, probably yes. But what if expansion does not extend to the republics of the former Soviet Union, or even to certain other Eastern European countries. Then we have simply created a new dividing line between those inside NATO and those that are excluded.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3858) Senator Wellstone argued that rather than bringing the nations of Europe closer together, as many supporters claimed it would, “NATO expansion would re-create a dividing line in Europe, only further to the east than the original cold war dividing line, and I do not consider that to be progress for the world.” (CR, 19 March 1998, S2257)

Many of the concerns of Senators opposed to enlargement focused on the West’s relationship with Russia. These concerns are dealt with in detail in a separate section of this report, but some aspects of the debate may be mentioned here as well. Senator Bob Smith said, “... I cannot imagine a worse long-term strategy for European security than jeopardizing United States-Russian relations.” (CR, 17 March 1998, S2108) The deteriorating state of the Russian nuclear arsenal was at the forefront of several Senators’ minds during the debate. In his previously cited address to a meeting of the Associated Press, Senator Moynihan said, “Allow me to suggest that wandering in this void we may stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia. This would come about not from Russian strength, but from Russian weakness. This is an idea we find difficult to absorb and understandably so. But we had better do. Russians have been trying to tell us this.” (CR, 27 April 1998, S3613) Senator Moynihan also entered into the *Record* a letter from former Ambassador Paul Nitze: “... the open-ended expansion being proposed for the alliance points toward increasing friction with post-Communist Russia for years to come. Driving Russia into a corner plays into the arguments of those most hostile to forging a productive relationship with the United States and its allies. It is not a

sound basis for future stability in Europe, particularly when no current or projected threats warrant extending the alliance.” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3611)

Senator Bingaman, although a supporter of the final resolution, thought that other national security problems should have higher priority than NATO enlargement:

The question of whether we admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO needs to be judged in the overall context of our security needs in this post-cold war period. ... New threats dominate our national security agenda. ... They are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and regional instability created by rogue states ..., the specter of accidental nuclear launch and other high priority military threats. Those are the immediate security concerns we have. ... it does not strike me that enlarging NATO is likely to help us meet those threats. ... I am concerned that this near-sighted emphasis on NATO enlargement may increase rather than decrease our threat to security interest in Europe. At best, NATO enlargement is a distraction in that it diverts our attention from other higher priority concerns and alternative solutions, and, at worst, it could undermine our ability to address these more immediate threats ... (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3630)

Senator Leahy, a ratification opponent, conceded that “NATO would probably not suffer, it might even benefit” from the proposed round of expansion. He worried, however, that the current round would create pressure for future enlargements; the prospect of such pressure concerned him because he believed that adding all of the proposed twelve new participants to the Alliance’s system of consensus among members would make NATO “unwieldy, even less decisive, and weakened,” thereby reducing European stability. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3858)

Moral Responsibility / Historical Injustices

Most of the debate in the Senate focused on the strategic and policy implications of NATO enlargement. Several Senators advocating the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland suggested that the United States had a responsibility, as the principal defender of democracy in the world and as a key player in deciding the structure of the post-World War II world, to admit these three nations to the Alliance. Several Senators made specific references to the ties between the people of United States and the populations of the three candidate states.

Opponents of NATO enlargement generally chose to concentrate on some of the less emotional issues of accession instead of moral responsibility, but some Senators did express concern for the candidate nations that were left out of this round of enlargement and for Russia. Senator John Warner said, “I do believe this replaces, symbolically, the Iron Curtain that was established in the late forties, which faced west, with now an iron ring of nations that face east to Russia.” (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2271)

Moral Responsibility. Having fashioned itself as a bastion of freedom during the period of oppression of Central and Eastern Europe by Nazi and communist regimes, some Senators viewed enlargement as a way in which the United States could fulfill the rhetorical promises made to these oppressed countries. Senator Carl Levin argued that if the Senate were to reject enlargement, “we will be effectively dimming the flame of liberty that sustained these courageous peoples through decades of first Nazi and then communist darkness.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3814) Senator John McCain said, “Protecting freedom was the beacon of our policy in Europe during the cold war. It would be an incomprehensible tragedy for us to abandon that stance now when the opportunities for freedom in Central Europe are greater than ever and the risks are far lower than at any time during the cold war.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2199) Senator Gordon Smith spoke of the American dream:

In America, we often talk about the American dream. But really it isn't America's dream, it is a human dream. It is a dream that all people aspire to. It is just that we enjoy it in great abundance -- life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And we must continue to defend it in the world for our sakes, not just for theirs. (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2260)

Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Connecticut) viewed enlargement as an extension of the original purpose of the NATO alliance, which he described as, “a military alliance in defense of a principle.” He asked his fellow Senators: “Will we now turn our backs on [the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland] and the principle, the idea, the value of freedom that motivated us throughout the cold war and motivates them today? I hope not. I do not think so. I do not believe we will.” (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3625)

Historical Injustices. The circumstances of the coerced inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in the communist bloc at the end of the Second World War often was cited in the arguments made by proponents of accession. The “Big Three” conference at Yalta in 1945 was widely viewed as the moment at which Central and Eastern Europe were lost to communist domination, but perceptions of blame differed among Senators; some faulted Soviet leader Josef Stalin, while others said that these conquered nations were “sold out” by the West.

Senator McCain espoused the first view: “Let us be clear, these countries were forced into communism against their will by an occupying power. ... While the United States and NATO staunchly defended freedom in the West, we could do little in the East other than offer our moral support, because the risk of nuclear war was too great.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2198) Senator Smith of Oregon said, “I suggest one of many reasons that we should expand NATO is that we have a moral obligation to live up to the terms that were made at Yalta but went unfulfilled.” (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2260)

Other Senators chose to focus on the mistakes made by the West following World War II. Senator Helms spoke about what he perceived as the West's mistakes at Yalta:

... half of the 20th century ago, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were consigned to communist domination because of expedient and short-

sighted policies of the West. ... In approving this resolution the Senate has the opportunity to remedy this historical injustice of Yalta ... By accepting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO, we reconnect them to the democratic West -- a union that was severed by first Hitler, then Stalin. (*CR*, 17 March 1998, S2106-S2107)

Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-Maryland) mentioned her own Polish heritage and said, "I know that the Polish people did not choose to live behind the Iron Curtain. They were forced there by the Yalta agreement, by Potsdam, and because they and the Baltic States and the other captive nations were sold out by the free world." (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2196)

Mandated Pause

Senator John Warner sponsored an amendment to the Resolution of Ratification (No. 2322) which would have mandated a three year pause to considering additional states for membership after the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance. This amendment garnered more support than others proposed by opponents to NATO enlargement, but it was rejected by a vote of 59 nays to 41 yeas.⁶

Arguments in favor. Those Senators in favor of mandating a three year pause after the current round of enlargement centered their argument around some uncertainties involved in the current round of accession: the cost of enlargement and the difficulty of integrating the new members' militaries into the NATO command structure, the current state of NATO's Strategic Concept, and the pressure future Presidents may face to enlarge the Alliance further.

Senator Warner based much of his argument on the presupposition that the protocols of accession would, at the end of the day, be approved by the Senate. He proposed a three year pause as a period of time during which the costs and challenges of the first round of enlargement could be analyzed. He declared that he offered the amendment "because we don't know what the costs are of this first round. ... We don't know how quickly these three new nations can bring themselves up in terms of military interoperability with NATO forces today ... and how long it will take them to be a positive, full partner with NATO and not what I would regard as a user of NATO security" (*CR*, 19 March 1998, S2272) Senator Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota) concurred, saying, "Let's wait for three years before we admit any more nations into NATO. Let's pause and try to understand what all of this will cost, what exactly is the threat, and what our response should be." (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3835) Senator Warner later went on to say, "I say to my colleagues, think of the American taxpayer. ... We do not have a firm estimate of the costs and therefore in all probability there will be an expense to the American taxpayer associated with including these three countries." (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3844)

⁶ The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 30, 1998, p. S3844. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 4.

Senator Warner also noted that NATO will not approve an updated Strategic Concept until the 1999 Washington summit. He and other Senators critical of the timing of enlargement argued that NATO's guiding strategic document should logically first be agreed upon, with enlargement to follow. Senator Warner said:

We are also asked to approve this measure without full knowledge as to the strategic concept of what NATO is and is not going to do in the years to come. We are operating under a 1991 doctrine today. ... Ironically, it is not until ... the summit at which these three nations will be admitted when NATO will finalize the doctrine for the future. ... I ask you, is that the way to do business? Not in my judgment. And that is why I say if three are a reality, then we should stop and study a reasonable period of time. Let another President, let the American people ... have a careful examination of what NATO brings forth a year from today as to the new mission and adoption. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3827-S3828)

Senator Warner believed that the current round of accession would create pressure for the United States and other NATO governments to move quickly toward another period of enlargement. He argued that by mandating a three year pause before the next round of accession, his amendment would alleviate this pressure and allow for careful analysis of issues of enlargement. He said:

I think the next President should be given the opportunity to assess the merits and such disadvantages as may arise by virtue of the accession of three more nations before we leap forward under pressure, which will be unrelenting. That pressure will begin the day 1 year from now when these three nations will be accessed. ... The march will begin to bring in other nations perhaps numbering as many as nine. I say to my colleagues, should not the next President be given the opportunity to study the record, make an assessment, and then give his advice or her advice ... to the people of the United States? (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3827)

Arguments in opposition. Supporters of the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, most of whom opposed Senator Warner's amendment, argued that mandating a three year pause was both unnecessary and impractical.

Senator Biden tried to reassure those Senators advocating a pause that the first round of enlargement would not instigate a flood of new Alliance members. He declared, "There is no urgency to move to the next round." and offered his own opinion that "we should say that there will be no second round until all these three nations are fully integrated into NATO's integrated command structure." Using a parenting analogy to make his point, Senator Biden said, "Let's not argue about what college our daughter is going to when she is only two years old." (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2186) Senator John McCain argued that a mandated pause was "scarcely necessary, given there will be a de facto pause as the alliance absorbs the first round of new members." (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2202)

In response to Senator Warner's contention that a three year pause would shield a future President from pressure for a second round, opponents of the amendment contended that the measure instead would "tie our own hands and those of a future

President.” (*CR*, 18 March 1998, S2202) Senator Charles Robb (D-Virginia) argued that legislating a required pause would limit the options of future Administrations:

Critical national decisions based on carefully reasoned and supported judgements are subjugated to an artificial time line that could actually end up proving harmful to our military interests. We need to be flexible rather than arbitrary about future entrants into NATO: If the first round goes well, the Partnership for Peace program will keep the door open for new members. Present and future security considerations will then dictate the pace and scope of enlargement. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3837)

Senator Roth declared that “NATO enlargement is ... driven by moral imperatives, strategic self-interest, and objective criteria concerning military readiness and political and economic reform.” He said, “any proposal to freeze enlargement ... subordinates these factors to an arbitrary timeline.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3839)

Several Senators stated that the amendment would contravene Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty -- which states that membership is open to “any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area” -- thereby removing an incentive for other European nations to prepare for NATO accession. Senator Roth said that the amendment “would send a dangerous message to the reformist governments of Central Europe. They would suppose -- and not incorrectly -- that the United States is slamming the door shut concerning their possible accession into the Alliance.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3839) Senator Spencer Abraham (R-Michigan) said that mandating a three year pause “would send exactly the wrong signal at this critical point in history ... and will only lead to further feelings of abandonment and exclusion by nations wanting to join the West.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3836)

Lastly, opponents of the amendment worried that requiring a pause before the next round of enlargement would further strain already tenuous relations with the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and strengthen nationalist forces in Russia. Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) praised NATO's open-door entrance policy:

To retract the open-door policy ... would risk undermining tremendous gains that have been made for peace throughout the region. The result of a “closed-door” policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure and, thus, inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past. (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3618)

Senator Roth expressed concerns about Russia, saying, “an arbitrary freeze on NATO enlargement would harm Russia's historic reconciliation with NATO and the United States. A freeze would appear to give Moscow a veto over enlargement. It certainly would be interpreted as a victory ... by those who still advocate a Russian sphere of influence.” (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3839)

Linking NATO and European Union Membership

Opponents of enlargement argued during the Senate's debate that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland should not be admitted to the Alliance until they have secured membership in the European Union (EU). This position was taken by Senators Moynihan and Warner, who cosponsored an amendment to the protocols of accession stipulating such a NATO-EU link. Advocates of enlargement countered that making prior EU membership a condition for NATO membership was unwise given the differing missions of the two organizations and the relevant interests of the United States.

Arguments in favor. Senator Moynihan, the amendment's lead sponsor, argued that the risks of NATO enlargement -- specifically involving Russia -- outweigh the costs:

Ambassador [Richard] Holbrooke said, what? Because Brussels won't expand the European Union, NATO expansion must fill a void. Is it filling a void because they cannot agree on a common agricultural policy in Europe? So filling a void to bring back the prospect of nuclear war, is that worth it? ... Give them access to a global market they have never been allowed into. Give them a common agricultural policy that will give their farmers a living. This is what they deserve. ... Poland has had enough in this 20th century. We do not want another period of hostilities that could lead not just to war but to annihilation. (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3616-S3617)

Senator Wellstone buttressed Senator Moynihan's argument with the contention that many of the declared goals of NATO expansion -- democracy, stability, open markets -- could be achieved by pressuring the European Union to admit the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe. He said, "The European Union, that is where we should be using our leverage as a nation -- expand the European Union. That is about markets, that is about democracy." (*CR*, 27 April 1998, S3616)

Senator Warner focused on the costs involved in the integration into the NATO command of the militaries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. He cited the wide divergence among the various estimates of these costs and argued that EU membership would be a signal that the three countries' economies are prepared to handle the economic burdens of NATO membership:

There is a blank check involved in these votes today. EU membership would be a way to evaluate the economic ability of these three countries to meet their financial obligations to NATO. Should those financial obligations fall short ... guess who is going to pick it up. The United States of America, in participation with nations and other countries, by virtue of the EU giving their imprimatur on these countries will be further assurance that they will have economic productivity and the like to generate the dollars to meet their requirements to pay the bill to upgrade their militaries... All of that is going to be a very, very hefty bill. I would like to see the EU pronounce their economic viability as nations, which gives us a certain amount of assurance in return that the American

taxpayer will not be picking up a greater and greater portion of their obligation to modernize their forces. (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3823)

Arguments in opposition. Advocates of NATO enlargement fought to defeat Senator Moynihan's amendment. Most Senators concentrated on the contrasting missions of the two entities and on what type of voice the United States would have if a link between NATO and EU accession were to be established.

Senator Roth spoke about the proposed NATO-EU link. He began by mentioning a key difference between NATO, a military alliance, and the European Union: "The EU is a strictly political-economic organization of which the United States is not a member and has no say." He agreed that EU enlargement is "highly desirable" and noted that the Resolution of Ratification before the Senate stated that the official policy of the United States is to encourage EU enlargement. The Moynihan amendment, Senator Roth argued, "is inconsistent with the Washington Treaty. Article 10 of the Treaty states that membership in NATO is open to ... 'any European State in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.'" Senator Roth pointed out that five current NATO-member nations -- the United States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, and Turkey -- are not members of the EU. "Are they any less effective members of the Alliance because they are not part of the EU?" he asked. "The answer is unambiguously no." Requiring EU membership of NATO-candidate countries would create an artificial "second tier" for non-EU countries, he argued. Norway has in fact chosen not to join the EU based on an assessment of its own interests, as could the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland even if they were to be invited. According to Senator Roth, requiring them to join would create "an arbitrary standard that is not necessarily a reflection of a NATO aspirant's state of economic and political well-being." (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3825)

Several Senators objected to the prospect of basing NATO accession on membership in an organization of which the United States is not a member. Senator Biden called it "sheer folly" and asked, "Why would we want to place such a key element of our national security decisionmaking in the hands of the European Union -- an organization to which we do not belong?" (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3825) Senator Gordon Smith said, "... the European Union may be many things, but it is certainly not a substitute for U.S. leadership in Europe." (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3822) Senator Roth spoke on this issue as well:

... by conditioning NATO membership on attainment of EU membership, this amendment would strip the Alliance of control over its own future -- specifically its decisions over future membership -- and transfer it over [to] the European Union. The EU is not a transatlantic organization. It has no effective security or defense capability or policy for that matter. ... Do we really want the EU to have such significant influence over NATO? (*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3825)

Senator Roth closed his remarks by summarizing the arguments of those opposed to the amendment: "In one fell swoop, this amendment would: impose an unprecedented restriction upon the Washington Treaty; transfer key decisions over NATO's future to the EU...; demote the United States to a new second-class tier of

Alliance members; and, thereby weaken U.S. leadership of NATO.” (CR, 30 April 1998, S3825) On April 30, 1998, the Moynihan amendment was defeated, 83-17.⁷

The Final Vote

The Resolution of Ratification, as amended during the Senate's consideration, came to a vote late in the evening of April 30. At the request of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Mississippi), all 99 Senators present and voting took their assigned seats in the chamber, rising to cast their vote when called by the Clerk of the Senate. The final tally found 80 Senators in favor, 19 against. One Senator had left Washington earlier in the day on official business.⁸

⁷ The tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 30, 1998, p. S3844. The text of the amendment can be found in Appendix 5.

⁸ The final tally of votes can be found in the *Congressional Record* of April 30, 1998, p. S3907.

Appendix 1: Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic

Congressional Record, 4 May 1998, S4217-S4220

(The text of resolution of ratification to the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as agreed to by the Senate on April 30, 1998, reads as follows:)

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO DECLARATIONS AND CONDITIONS.

The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (as defined in section 4(7)), which were opened for signature at Brussels on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States of America and other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, subject to the declarations of section 2 and the conditions of section 3.

SEC. 2. DECLARATIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following declarations:

(1) REAFFIRMATION THAT UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN NATO REMAINS A VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.--The Senate declares that--

(A) for nearly 50 years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of the countries in the North Atlantic area against all external threats;

(B) through common action, the established democracies of North America and Europe that were joined in NATO persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring the survival of democratic government in Europe and North America throughout the Cold War;

(C) NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in European security affairs;

(D) the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America can be more equitably shared through an alliance in which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members;

(E) the security and prosperity of the United States is enhanced by NATO's collective defense against aggression that may threaten the territory of NATO members; and

(F) United States membership in NATO remains a vital national security interest of the United States.

(2) STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT.--The Senate finds that--

(A) notwithstanding the collapse of communism in most of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies face threats to their stability and territorial integrity, including those common threats described in section 3(1)(A)(v);

(B) the invasion of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic, or their destabilization arising from external subversion, would threaten the stability of Europe and jeopardize vital United States national security interests;

(C) Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, having established democratic governments and having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements of membership, including those necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of all NATO members, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area; and

(D) extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability in Central Europe, deter potential aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and its NATO allies.

(3) SUPREMACY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN NATO DECISION-MAKING.--The Senate understands that--

(A) as the North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body of NATO, the North Atlantic Council will not subject its decisions to review, challenge, or veto by any forum affiliated with NATO, including the Permanent Joint Council or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any nonmember state participating in any such forum;

(B) the North Atlantic Council does not require the consent of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty in defense of the North Atlantic area, including the deployment, operation, or stationing of forces; and

(C) the North Atlantic Council has direct responsibility for matters relating to the basic policies of NATO, including development of the Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in section 3(1)(F)), and a consensus position of the North Atlantic Council will precede any negotiation between NATO and non-NATO members that affects NATO's relationship with non-NATO members participating in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council.

(4) FULL MEMBERSHIP FOR NEW MEMBERS.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, will have all the rights, obligations, responsibilities, and protections that are afforded to all other NATO members.

(B) POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.--The Senate endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which are not legally binding and do not in any way preclude any future decisions by the North Atlantic Council to preserve the security of NATO members.

(5) NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. The Senate finds that it is in the interest of the United States for NATO to develop a new and constructive relationship with the Russian Federation as the Russian Federation pursues democratization, market reforms, and peaceful relations with its neighbors.

(6) THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.--

(A) SENSE OF THE SENATE. It is the sense of the Senate that--

(i) the central purpose of NATO is to provide for the collective defense of its members;

(ii) the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is a fundamental institution for the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, crisis prevention, and post-conflict rehabilitation and, as such, is an essential forum for the discussion and resolution of political disputes among European members, Canada, and the United States; and

(iii) the European Union is an essential organization for the economic, political, and social integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe.

(B) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. The policy of the United States is--

(i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and

(ii) to encourage actively the efforts of the European Union to expand its membership, which will help to stabilize the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

(7) FUTURE CONSIDERATION OF CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

(A) SENATE FINDINGS. The Senate finds that--

(i) Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that NATO members by unanimous agreement may invite the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European state in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;

(ii) in its Madrid summit declaration of July 8, 1997, NATO pledged to “maintain an open door to the admission of additional Alliance members in the future” if those countries satisfy the requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(iii) other than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented to invite, or committed to invite, any other country to join NATO in the future; and

(iv) the United States will not support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic), unless--

(I) the President consults with the Senate consistent with Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties); and

(II) the prospective NATO member can fulfill the obligations and responsibilities of membership, and its inclusion would serve the overall political and strategic interests of NATO and the United States.

(B) REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENSUS AND RATIFICATION.--The Senate declares that no action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full membership of NATO, approved by the national procedures of each NATO member, including, in the case of the United States, the requirements of Article II, section 2,

clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (relating to the advice and consent of the Senate to the making of treaties), will constitute a security commitment pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(8) PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.--The Senate declares that--

(A) the Partnership for Peace between NATO members and the partnership for Peace countries is an important and enduring complement to NATO in maintaining and enhancing regional security;

(B) the Partnership for Peace serves a critical role in promoting common objectives of NATO members and the Partnership for Peace countries, including

(i) increased transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes;

(ii) ensuring democratic control of defense forces;

(iii) maintaining the capability and readiness of Partnership for Peace countries to contribute to operations of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe;

(iv) developing cooperative military relations with NATO; and

(v) enhancing the interoperability between forces of the Partnership for Peace countries and forces of NATO members;

(C) NATO has undertaken new initiatives to further strengthen the Partnership for Peace with the objectives of

(i) strengthening the political consultation mechanism in the Partnership for Peace through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

(ii) enhancing the operational role of the Partnership for Peace; and

(iii) providing for expanded involvement of members of the Partnership for Peace in decision-making and planning within the Partnership;

(D) enhancement of the Partnership for Peace promotes the security of the United States by strengthening stability and security throughout the North Atlantic area;

(E) the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of new NATO members in the future must not undermine the ability of NATO and the Partnership for Peace countries to achieve the objectives of the Partnership for Peace; and

(F) membership in the Partnership for Peace does not in any way prejudice application or consideration for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(9) REGARDING PAYMENTS OWED BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO VICTIMS OF THE NAZIS.--

(A) DECLARATION.--The Senate declares that, in future meetings and correspondence with European governments, the Secretary of State should

(i) raise the issue of insurance benefits owed to victims of the Nazis (and their beneficiaries and heirs) by these countries as a result of the actions taken by any communist predecessor regimes in nationalizing foreign insurance companies and confiscating their assets in the aftermath of World War II;

(ii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to provide a full accounting of the total value of insurance company assets that were seized by any communist predecessors and to share all documents relevant to unpaid insurance claims that are in their possession; and

(iii) seek to secure a commitment from the governments of these countries to contribute to the payment of these unpaid insurance claims in an amount that reflects

the present value of the assets seized by any communist governments (and for which no compensation had previously been paid).

(B) DEFINITION.--As used in this paragraph, the term “victims of the Nazis” means person persecuted during the period beginning on March 23, 1933 and ending on May 8, 1945, by, under the direction of, on behalf of, or under authority granted by the Nazi government of Germany or any country allied with that government.

SEC. 3. CONDITIONS.

The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

(1) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--

(A) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--The Senate understands that the policy of the United States is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in subparagraph (F)), which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming revision of that document will reflect the following principles:

(i) FIRST AND FOREMOST A MILITARY ALLIANCE.--NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic unity.

(ii) PRINCIPAL FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO MEMBERS.--NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats.

(iii) PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.--Strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects United States vital national security interests.

(iv) UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ROLE.--The United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.

(v) COMMON THREATS.--NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-Cold War environment, including--

(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe;

(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other unconventional delivery means;

(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and other possible transnational threats; and

(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.

(vi) CORE MISSION OF NATO.--Defense planning will affirm a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission.

(vii) CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMMON THREATS.--NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.

(viii) INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.--The Integrated Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance by embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and ensuring unity of command.

(ix) NUCLEAR POSTURE.--Nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in nuclear roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response by NATO members to military aggression.

(x) BURDENSARING.--The responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members.

(B) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.--The Senate declares that--

(i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of NATO must continue to be the collective defense of the territory of all NATO members; and

(ii) NATO may also, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, on a case-by-case basis, engage in other missions when there is a consensus among its members that there is a threat to the security and interests of NATO members.

(C) DEFENSE PLANNING, COMMAND STRUCTURES, AND FORCE GOALS.--The Senate declares that NATO must continue to pursue defense planning, command structures, and force goals to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the requirements of other missions agreed upon by NATO members, but must do so in a manner that first and foremost ensures under the North Atlantic Treaty the ability of NATO to deter and counter any significant military threat to the territory of any NATO member.

(D) REPORT.--Not later than 180 days after the date of adoption of this resolution, the President shall submit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report on the Strategic Concept of NATO. The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include--

(i) an explanation of the manner in which the Strategic Concept of NATO affects United States military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area, including the broader strategic rationale of NATO;

(ii) an analysis of all potential threats to the North Atlantic area (meaning the entire territory of all NATO members) up to the year 2010, including the

consideration of a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe, emerging capabilities of non-NATO countries to use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons affecting the North Atlantic area, and the emerging ballistic missile and cruise missile threat affecting the North Atlantic area;

(iii) the identification of alternative system architectures for the deployment of a NATO missile defense for the entire territory of all NATO members that would be capable of countering the threat posed by emerging ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing nuclear powers, together with timetables for development and an estimate of costs;

(iv) a detailed assessment of the progress of all NATO members, on a country-by-country basis, toward meeting current force goals; and

(v) a general description of the overall approach to updating the Strategic Concept of NATO.

(E) BRIEFINGS ON REVISIONS TO THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT.--Not less than twice in the 300-day period following the date of adoption of this resolution, each at an agreed time to precede each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Senate expects the appropriate officials of the executive branch of Government to offer detailed briefings to the appropriate congressional committees on proposed changes to the Strategic Concept of NATO, including--

(i) an explanation of the manner in which specific revisions to the Strategic Concept of NATO will serve United States national security interests and affect United States military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area;

(ii) a timetable for implementation of new force goals by all NATO members under any revised Strategic Concept of NATO;

(iii) a description of any negotiations regarding the revision of the nuclear weapons policy of NATO; and

(iv) a description of any proposal to condition decisions of the North Atlantic Council upon the approval of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any NATO-affiliated forum.

(F) DEFINITION.--For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "Strategic Concept of NATO" means the document agreed to by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991, or any subsequent document agreed to by the North Atlantic Council that would serve a similar purpose.

(2) COSTS, BENEFITS, BURDENSARING, AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.--

(A) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that--

(i) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will not have the effect of increasing the overall percentage share of the United States in the common budgets of NATO;

(ii) the United States is under no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments; and

(iii) the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO does not detract from the ability of the United States to meet or to fund its military requirements outside the North Atlantic area.

(B) ANNUAL REPORTS.--Not later than April 1 of each year during the five-year period following the date of entry into force of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, which may be submitted in an unclassified and classified form, and which shall contain the following information:

(i) The amount contributed to the common budgets of NATO by each NATO member during the preceding calendar year.

(ii) The proportional share assigned to, and paid by, each NATO member under NATO's cost-sharing arrangements.

(iii) The national defense budget of each NATO member, the steps taken by each NATO member to meet NATO force goals, and the adequacy of the national defense budget of each NATO member in meeting common defense and security obligations.

(iv) Any costs incurred by the United States in connection with the membership of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO, including the deployment of United States military personnel, the provision of any defense article or defense service, the funding of any training activity, or the modification or construction of any military facility.

(v) The status of discussions concerning NATO membership for countries participating in the Partnership for Peace.

(C) UNITED STATES FUTURE PAYMENTS TO THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.--

(i) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES SHARE OF NATO'S COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS.--It is the sense of the Senate that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President should--

(I) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent; and

(II) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under subclause (I), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to carry out the United States proposal.

(ii) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES FOR NATO.--Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in fiscal year 1998.

(iii) DEFINITIONS.--In this subparagraph:

(I) COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.--The term "common-funded budgets of NATO" means--

(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget of NATO; and

(bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO.

(II) UNITED STATES PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO.--The term "United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO" means the percentage that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO

represents to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets during that fiscal year.

(D) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED.--No cost incurred by NATO, other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose.

(E) REPORTS ON FUTURE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO.--

(i) Reports prior to commencement of accession talks.-- Prior to any decision by the North Atlantic Council to invite any country (other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic) to begin accession talks with NATO, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report regarding each country being actively considered for NATO membership, including--

(I) an evaluation of how that country will further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area;

(II) an evaluation of the eligibility of that country for membership based on the principles and criteria identified by NATO and the United States, including the military readiness of that country;

(III) an explanation of how an invitation to that country would affect the national security interests of the United States;

(IV) an up-to-date United States Government analysis of the common-funded military requirements and costs associated with integrating that country into NATO, and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by NATO members, including the United States; and

(V) a preliminary analysis of the implications for the United States defense budget and other United States budgets of integrating that country into NATO.

(ii) UPDATED REPORTS PRIOR TO SIGNING PROTOCOLS OF ACCESSION.--Prior to the signing of any protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of any country, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in classified and unclassified forms--

(I) updating the information contained in the report required under clause (i) with respect to that country; and

(II) including an analysis of that country's ability to meet the full range of the financial burdens of NATO membership, and the likely impact upon the military effectiveness of NATO of the country invited for accession talks, if the country were to be admitted to NATO.

(F) REVIEW AND REPORTS BY THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE.-- The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a review and assessment of the evaluations and analyses contained in all reports submitted under subparagraph (E) and, not later than 90 days after the date of submission of any report under subparagraph (E)(ii), shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees setting forth the assessment resulting from that review.

(3) THE NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT AND THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate the following:

(A) IN GENERAL.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation with a veto over NATO policy.

(B) NATO DECISION-MAKING.--The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation any role in the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-making, including--

- (i) any decision NATO makes on an internal matter; or
- (ii) the manner in which NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or plans, prepares for, or conducts any mission that affects one or more of its members, such as collective defense, as stated under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(C) NATURE OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL.-- In discussions in the Permanent Joint Council--

(i) the Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO's basic strategy, doctrine, or readiness is negotiated with the Russian Federation, and NATO will not use the Permanent Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Paris on November 19, 1990;

(ii) any discussion with the Russian Federation of NATO doctrine will be for explanatory, not decision-making purposes;

(iii) any explanation described in clause (ii) will not extend to a level of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces, and any such explanation will be offered only after NATO has first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters;

(iv) NATO will not discuss any agenda item with the Russian Federation prior to agreeing to a NATO position within the North Atlantic Council on that agenda item; and

(v) the Permanent Joint Council will not be used to make any decision on NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness.

(4) REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.--

(A) PROGRESS REPORT.--Not later than January 1, 1999, the President shall submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees on the progress of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in satisfying the security requirements for membership in NATO.

(B) REPORTS REGARDING PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.--Not later than January 1, 1999, and again not later than the date that is 90 days after the date of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit a detailed report to the congressional intelligence committees--

(i) identifying the latest procedures and requirements established by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and methods; and

(ii) including an assessment of how the overall procedures and requirements of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for the protection of intelligence sources and methods compare with the procedures and requirements of other NATO members for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

(C) DEFINITIONS.--In this paragraph:

(i) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.--The term “congressional intelligence committees” means the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

(ii) DATE OF ACCESSION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY BY POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC.--The term “date of

accession to the North Atlantic Treaty by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic” means the latest of the following dates:

- (I) The date on which Poland accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty.
- (II) The date on which Hungary accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty,
- (III) The date on which the Czech Republic accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(5) REQUIREMENT OF FULL COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF CAPTURED AND MISSING UNITED STATES PERSONNEL FROM PAST MILITARY CONFLICTS OR COLD WAR INCIDENTS.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that each of the governments of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are fully cooperating with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War incidents, to include--

- (A) facilitating full access to relevant archival material; and
- (B) identifying individuals who may possess knowledge relative to captured and missing United States personnel, and encouraging such individuals to speak with United States Government officials.

(6) TREATY INTERPRETATION.--

(A) PRINCIPLES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION.--The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally-based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.

(B) CONSTRUCTION OF SENATE RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION.--Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall be construed as authorizing the President to obtain legislative approval for modifications or amendments to treaties through majority approval of both Houses of Congress.

(C) DEFINITION.--As used in this paragraph, the term “INF Treaty” refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, done at Washington on December 8, 1987.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

In this resolution:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.--The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations, the Committee on National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.--

(2) NATO.--The term “NATO” means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(3) NATO MEMBERS.--The term “NATO members” means all countries that are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(4) NATO-Russia founding act.--The term “NATO-Russia Founding Act” means the document entitled the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation”, dated May 27, 1997.

(5) NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.--The term “North Atlantic area” means the area covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as applied by the North Atlantic Council.

(6) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.--The term “North Atlantic Treaty” means the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 (63 Stat. 2241; TIAS 1964), as amended.

(7) PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. The term “Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic” refers to the following protocols transmitted by the President to the Senate on February 11, 1998 (Treaty Document No. 105-36):

(A) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Poland, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.--

(B) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of Hungary, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.

(C) The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Czech Republic, signed at Brussels on December 16, 1997.--

(8) UNITED STATES INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION.--The term “United States instrument of ratification” means the instrument of ratification of the United States of the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.--

Appendix 2: Amendments Relating to the Strategic Concept

Executive Amendment No. 2318 (Ashcroft) (CR, 28 April 1998, S3793-S3794)

In section 3(1), strike “(A) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.--” and all that follows through “interests of NATO members.” at the end of paragraph (1)(A) and insert in lieu thereof the following new condition:

(2) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE.--

(A) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION.--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that--

(i) NATO is and will remain a defensive military alliance, and that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for the collective self-defense of NATO members against armed attack, continues to constitute the heart of that treaty; and

(ii) the United States will only support a military operation under the North Atlantic Treaty that is commenced on or after the date of adoption of this resolution of ratification--

(I) if the operation is intended for the purpose of collective self-defense in response to an armed attack on the territory of a NATO member; or

(II) in response to a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of a NATO member.

(B) CONSTRUCTION.-- The Senate declares that nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty, the Strategic Concept of NATO, or any other document setting forth the fundamental purposes, objectives, or missions of NATO shall be construed as altering the constitutional authority of the Congress or the President.

(C) EXCLUSIONS FROM MEANING OF “NATO MILITARY OPERATION”.-- The term “NATO military operation” does not include any NATO training mission or exercise.

(3) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--

Executive Amendment No. 2310 (Kyl) (CR, 27 April 1998, S3657)

In paragraph (1) of section 3, after “(1) THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--” insert the following:

(A) POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO.--The Senate understands that the policy of the United States is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO (as defined in subparagraph (F)), which adapted NATO's strategy to the post-Cold War

environment, remain valid today, and that the upcoming revision of that document will reflect the following principles:

(i) **FIRST AND FOREMOST A MILITARY ALLIANCE.**--NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. NATO's success in securing peace is predicated on its military strength and strategic unity.

(ii) **PRINCIPLE FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO MEMBERS.**--NATO serves as the principal foundation for collectively defending the security interests of its members against external threats.

(iii) **PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF UNITED STATES VITAL NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.**--Strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects United States vital national security interests.

(iv) **UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP ROLE.**--The United States maintains its leadership role in NATO through the stationing of United States combat forces in Europe, providing military commanders for key NATO commands, and through the presence of United States nuclear forces on the territory of Europe.

(v) **COMMON THREATS.**--NATO members will face common threats to their security in the post-Cold War environment, including--

(I) the potential for the re-emergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe;

(II) rogue states and non-state actors possessing nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver these weapons by ballistic or cruise missiles, or other unconventional delivery means;

(III) threats of a wider nature, including the disruption of the flow of vital resources, and other possible transnational threats; and

(IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders.

(vi) **CORE MISSION OF NATO.**--Defense planning will affirm a commitment by NATO members to a credible capability for collective self-defense, which remains the core mission of NATO. All NATO members will contribute to this core mission.

(vii) **CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO COMMON THREATS.**--NATO's continued success requires a credible military capability to deter and respond to common threats. Building on its core capabilities for collective self-defense of its members, NATO will ensure that its military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and force goals promote NATO's capacity to project power when the security of a NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of willing partners among NATO members. This will require that NATO members possess national military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts.

(viii) **INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE.**--The Integrated Military Structure of NATO underpins NATO's effectiveness as a military alliance by embedding NATO members in a process of cooperative defense planning and ensuring unity of command.

(ix) **NUCLEAR POSTURE.**--Nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. A credible NATO nuclear deterrent posture requires the stationing of United States nuclear forces in Europe, which provides an essential political and military link between Europe and North America, and the widespread participation of NATO members in

nuclear roles. In addition, the NATO deterrent posture will continue to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any potential aggressor about the nature of the response by NATO members to military aggression.

(x) BURDENSARING.--The responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe will be more equitably shared in a manner in which specific obligations and force goals are met by NATO members.

Executive Amendment No. 2324 (Bingaman)

(CR, 30 April 1998, S3854)

At the appropriate place in section 3 of the resolution, insert the following:

() UNITED STATES POLICY LIMITING NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF NATO IS REVISED.-- Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that, until such time as the North Atlantic Council agrees on a revised Strategic Concept of NATO, it is the policy of the United States not to support the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty of, or the invitation to begin accession talks with, any European state, other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic.

Appendix 3: Amendments Relating to Costs and Burdensharing

Executive Amendment No. 2312 (Harkin)

(CR, 28 April 1998, S3667)

In section 3(2)(A), strike “and” at the end of clause (ii).

In section 3(2)(A), strike “(iii)” and insert “(iv)”.

In section 3(2)(A), insert after clause (ii) the following:

(iii) any future United States subsidy of the national expenses of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic to meet its NATO commitments, including assistance described in subparagraph (C), may not exceed 25 percent of all assistance provided to that country by all NATO members.

At the end of section 3(2), insert the following new subparagraph:

(C) ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE DESCRIBED. -- The assistance referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii) includes --

- (i) Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Control Export Act;
- (ii) transfers of excess defense articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
- (iii) Emergency Drawdowns;
- (iv) no-cost leases of United States equipment;
- (v) the subsidy cost of loan guarantees and other contingent liabilities under subchapter VI of chapter 148 of title 10, United States Code; and
- (vi) international military education and training under chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Executive Amendment No. 2065 (Stevens)

(CR, 30 April 1998, S3859)

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) REQUIREMENT OF PAYMENT OUT OF FUNDS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED. -- No cost incurred by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), other than through the common-funded budgets of NATO, in connection with the admission to membership, or participation, in NATO of any country that was not a member of NATO as of March 1, 1998, may be paid out of funds available to any department, agency, or other entity of the United States unless the funds are specifically authorized by law for that purpose.

Executive Amendment No. 2066 (Stevens)

(CR, 30 April 1998, S3847)

At the end of section 3(2) of the resolution, add the following:

(C) UNITED STATES FUTURE PAYMENTS TO THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO. --

(i) SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING UNITED STATES SHARE OF NATO'S COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS. -- It is the sense of the Senate that, beginning with fiscal year 1999, and for each fiscal year thereafter through the fiscal year 2003, the President should --

(A) propose to NATO a limitation on the United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO for that fiscal year equal to the United States percentage share of those budgets for the preceding fiscal year, minus one percent; and

(B) not later than 60 days after the date of the United States proposal under subparagraph (A), submit a report to Congress describing the action, if any, taken by NATO to carry out the United States proposal.

(ii) ANNUAL LIMITATION ON UNITED STATES EXPENDITURES FOR NATO. -- Unless specifically authorized by law, the total amount of expenditures by the United States in any fiscal year beginning on or after October 1, 1998, for payments to the common-funded budgets of NATO shall not exceed the total of all such payments made by the United States in the fiscal year 1998.

(iii) Definitions.--In this subparagraph:

(I) COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO. -- The term "common-funded budgets of NATO" means--

(aa) the Military Budget, the Security Investment Program, and the Civil Budget of NATO; and

(bb) any successor or additional account or program of NATO.

(II) UNITED STATES PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE COMMON-FUNDED BUDGETS OF NATO. -- The term "United States percentage share of the common-funded budgets of NATO" means the percentage that the total of all United States payments during a fiscal year to the common-funded budgets of NATO represents to the total amounts payable by all NATO members to those budgets during that fiscal year.

Appendix 4: Warner and Moynihan Amendments

Executive Amendment No. 2322 (Warner)

(*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3826)

At the appropriate place in section 2 of the resolution, insert the following:

() UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING FURTHER ENLARGEMENT OF NATO. — Prior to the date of deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that it is the policy of the United States not to encourage, participate in, or agree to any further enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three years beginning on the earliest date by which Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Executive Amendment No. 2321 (Moynihan)

(*CR*, 30 April 1998, S3817)

At the end of section 3 of the resolution (relating to conditions), add the following:

() DEFERRAL OF RATIFICATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT UNTIL ADMISSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE EUROPEAN UNION.

(A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED: Prior to the deposit of the United States Instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have each acceded to membership in the European Union and have each engaged in initial voting participation in an official action of the European Union.

(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION: Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as an expression by the Senate of an intent to accept as a new NATO member any country other than Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic if that country becomes a member of the European Union after the date of adoption of this resolution.

Appendix 5: Executive Responsibilities, as Stipulated in the Resolution of Ratification Passed by the Senate on April 30, 1998

October 27, 1998 (180 days after the date of adoption):

Sec. 3(1)(D)

The President must submit to the Congress a report on the Strategic Concept of NATO. The report will be provided in both classified and unclassified forms and will include:

- an explanation of how the Strategic Concept affects the responsibilities of the U.S. military, both within and without the North Atlantic area
- a forecast of potential threats to all Alliance members, including consideration of “a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe,” the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and ballistic missile technology among non-NATO countries affecting the North Atlantic area
- options for the deployment, as well as timetables for development and an estimate of costs, of a missile defense system covering all member countries that would be capable of countering the threat of “emerging ballistic and cruise missile systems in countries other than declared nuclear powers, as well as in countries that are existing nuclear powers”
- a country-by-country assessment of progress toward meeting NATO’s current force goals
- a description of NATO’s approach to updating its Strategic Concept

January 1, 1999

Sec. 3(4)(A)

On or before January 1, 1999, the President must submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees assessing the progress of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in reaching the security requirements of NATO membership

Sec. 3(4)(B)

On or before January 1, 1999, and again no later than 90 days after the accession to the Alliance of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the Director of Central Intelligence must submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees that includes:

- explanation of the latest “procedures and requirements” implemented by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the protection of intelligence sources and methods
- an overall assessment of the general procedures and requirements of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland for the protection of intelligence sources and methods and a comparison of such procedures and requirements with those of other NATO members

February 24, 1999 (300 days after the date of adoption):

Sec. 3(1)(E)

At least twice during this 300 day period, the Senate will be briefed by the appropriate executive branch officials on proposed changes to NATO's Strategic Concept. The briefings will precede each Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council and will include:

- a specific explanation of how revisions to the Strategic Concept will serve U.S. national security interests and affect the responsibilities of the U.S. military both within and without the North Atlantic area
- if force goals are to be revised, a timetable for implementation of these goals by all Alliance members
- an account of any negotiations concerning the NATO's nuclear weapons policy
- an account of any proposal to "condition decisions of the North Atlantic Council upon the approval" of the UN, the OSCE, or any other NATO-affiliated organization

April 1, 1999 - April 1, 2003

Sec. 3(2)(B)

On or before April 1 of each year following the entry into force of the Protocols of Accession (May 21, 1998), the President must submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in both unclassified and classified forms, that includes the following information:

- the amount each Alliance member contributed to the common budget of NATO during the preceding calendar year
- the proportional share required of, and paid by, each Alliance member under NATO's burden-sharing agreements
- the national defense budget of each Alliance member, the efforts made by each member to meet NATO force goals, and an assessment of the adequacy of each member's defense expenditures in meeting "common defense and security obligations"
- any cost borne by the United States that is connected to the membership of Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic in NATO, including "the deployment of U.S. military personnel, the provision of any defense article or defense service, the funding of any training activity, or the modification or construction of any military facility"
- the status of any discussions concerning future NATO membership for members of the Partnership for Peace

General Requirements

Sec. 3(2)(E)(i)

Prior to any future decision by the North Atlantic Council to invite any country to begin accession talks with NATO, the President must submit a report on each country being considered to the appropriate congressional committees that includes:

- evaluation of how that country will contribute to the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to the security of the North Atlantic area
- evaluation of the fitness of that country for Alliance membership based on the criteria of NATO and the United States, including that country's "military readiness"
- evaluation of how an invitation to that country would affect U.S. national security interests
- a current analysis by the U.S. Government of the commonly funded military requirements and costs associated with integration of that country into the Alliance, and an analysis of the shares of those costs to be borne by each NATO member
- analysis of any implications of that country's integration for the U.S. defense and other budgets

Sec. 3(2)(E)(ii)

Prior to the signing of any future protocols of accession, the President must submit to the appropriate congressional committees, in classified and unclassified forms, a report that includes:

- an update of the information provided in the report required by Sec. 3(2)(E)(i)
- analysis of that country's ability to meet the financial demands of Alliance membership, and the likely impact on NATO's military effectiveness if that country were to be admitted

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