97-316 SPR
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of
Defense’s Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) Program
Updated May 5, 1998
John D. Moteff
Specialist, Science and Technology Policy
Science Policy Research Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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ABSTRACT
This report describes the basic elements and issues of the Department of Defense's
(DOD) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program. It defines basic
activities supported by the program, presents budget trends, discusses the management of
program, and describes the infrastructure in which the program is implemented. This report
is for staff new to the area of defense research and for senior staff interested in historical
trends. This report will be updated periodically. For tracking Congressional action on the
current year’s budget, the reader is referred to the Issue Brief entitled Defense Research:
DOD’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program, by the same
author.

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Defense Research: A Primer on the Department of Defense’s
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Program
Summary
Over the last 10 years, the country has spent an average of $36 billion a year on
DOD’s RDT&E program. Over 80% of that goes toward the development or
demonstration of specific military systems or system components. Most of the rest,
between $4 billion and $5 billion per year, goes toward more fundamental research
and development in sciences and technologies identified as important to military
capabilities and operations (called the Technology Base program).
RDT&E funding for the last 10 years has remained relatively level in nominal
terms. However, when accounting for inflation, RDT&E funding peaked in FY87
and, except for one year (associated with the Gulf War), has declined ever since. The
decline has come primarily in those activities associated with developing specific
weapon systems. Technology Base funding has managed, for the most part, to keep
up with inflation during that time. Maintaining a healthy Technology Base program
(often referred to as DOD’s seed corn) is a continuing concern of Congress.
The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has been given
the responsibility of overseeing the overall RDT&E budget. Reporting to the
Undersecretary is the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), who
is responsible for overseeing the Technology Base Programs. The programs
themselves are managed by the Services and a variety of Defense Agencies. Each
Service and Defense Agency has its own process for planning its science and
technology investment. The DDR&E is responsible for publishing a DOD-wide
Science and Technology Strategy and Plan.
DOD’s RDT&E budget supports work at universities, private firms, non-profits,
federally financed research and development centers, Service-owned research
facilities, and other federally owned research facilities. DOD currently has over 80
Research and Development facilities and 26 Test and Evaluation Centers.
Some issues that Congress has been addressing and likely will continue to deal
with include: maintaining a healthy technology base investment; maintaining a proper
balance in the S&T program between Services and Defense Agencies; accelerating the
fielding of new technology; downsizing infrastructure; cross-servicing R&D; and
integration with the commercial sector.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Program Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Budget Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Investment Strategy and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Defense Research: A Primer on the Department
of Defense’s Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) Program
Introduction
This report describes the basic elements and issues of the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program.
Over the last 10 years, the country has spent an average of $36 billion a year on
DOD’s RDT&E program. Over 80% of that goes toward the development or
demonstration of specific military systems or system components. Most of the rest,
between $4 billion and $5 billion per year, goes toward more fundamental research
and development in sciences and technologies identified as important to military
capabilities and operations. Because it represents such a large investment and
supports the development of the nation’s high technology weapons systems, and the
technology base upon which those systems rely, Congress has shown considerable
interest in overseeing DOD’s RDT&E program. And, although its share of the
nation’s overall expenditure on science and technology research and development has
diminished over the years, the program still plays an important role in developing
certain key technologies that impact commercial products and the overall economy.
This report discusses the types of activities supported by the RDT&E program, trends
in the program’s budget, program management, and DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure.
Program Activities
DOD’s RDT&E program is one of the major elements of DOD’s total budget.
Other major elements include Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, and
Procurement. The RDT&E program supports a wide range of activities; from basic
research in science and engineering (e.g. physics, mathematics, materials, electronics)
to the full scale development of specific weapons systems (e.g., the F-22 fighter or the
Comanche helicopter).
The RDT&E budget is accordingly sub-divided into 7 separate activities: basic
research, applied research, advanced technology development, demonstration and
validation, engineering manufacturing development, management support, and
operational systems development. These 7 activities are designated as 6.1 through
6.7. A description of each is given in Figure 1.

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Figure 1
RDT&E Activities
6.1 Basic Research: Supports research
6.4 Demonstration and Validation:
that produces new knowledge in a
Supports the initial development and
scientific or technological area of
demonstration of a product designed
interest to the military. Areas include
specifically to meet an agreed upon set of
atmoshperic and space sciences, ocean
performance standards associated with a
sciences, biological and medical
validated operational need. Dem/Val, as it
sciences, chemistry, cognitive and
is often called, supports a formal acquisition
neural sciences, computer sciences,
program and typically involves a
electronics, materials science,
competition among different designs.
mathematics, mechanics, ocean
sciences, physics, and terrestical
6.5 Engineering & Manufacturing
sciences. For example, basic research
Development: Supports the continued
may study the electronic effects of
development and refinement of a
infrared radiation on a certain class of
specifically designed product that has
materials.
demonstrated it can meet performance
requirements and development of the
6.2 Applied Research: Supports the
necessary manufacturing processes needed
exploratory development and initial
to build that product.
maturation of new technologies for
specific military application (or further
6.6 Management Support: Supports the
developing existing technology for new
overhead costs associated with managing
military applications). An example
the RDT&E activities and running facilities.
would be studying the feasibility of
integrating infrared detecting materials
6.7 Operational Systems Development:
and electronics for night vision. Any
Supports the continued improvement and
hardware development would be
upgrading of products already in
primarily to demonstrate the capability
production.
of the technology to meet a military
need in a simulated or laboratory
environment.
6.3 Advanced Technology
Development: Supports larger scale
hardware development and integration
and experiments that can demonstrate
capability in more operationally
realistic settings. An example might be
equipping soldiers taking part in a
training operation with a new prototype
night vision goggle.
Funding for 6.1 and 6.2 activities constitute what is called DOD’s Technology
Base program and is often referred to as the “seed corn” of DOD’s technological
capabilities. It is here where new technologies and their potential for military
application are explored and developed (sometimes over long periods of time). A
number of the technologies utilized with such great effect during the Gulf War (e.g.
laser guided bombs, stealth, cruise missiles, night vision) can trace their origins to
Technology Base programs initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

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Advanced technology development (6.3) activities are meant to help technology
make the transition from the laboratory to the field. Among these activities are
Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs, conducted by the Services
individually for relatively unique Service needs) and Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstrations (ACTDs, managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in
cooperation with one or more of the Services for needs associated with joint
operations). Taken together, these first three activities (6.1-6.3) constitute what is
called DOD’s Science and Technology (S&T) program. The S&T program does
not support development in a formal acquisition program, although as one goes from
6.1 to 6.3, the connection to a specific military operational capability becomes more
important and apparent.
Funding for 6.4, 6.5 and 6.7 activities does support a formal acquisition program
where a specific new product (or product upgrade) is designed and developed to meet
a certified military requirement. The lion’s share of the RDT&E budget goes toward
support of these activities. The acquisition process is discussed in more detail later
in this report.
Budget Trends
RDT&E funding for the last 10 years has remained relatively flat in nominal
terms. However, when accounting for inflation, RDT&E funding peaked in FY87 and
has been declining ever since (see Figure 2). The steep increase in total RDT&E
funding during the early part of the 1980s was the result of increased support for the
development a specific new weapon systems associated with the Reagan
Administration’s build-up. The decline in total RDT&E since the last half of the
1980s is the result of a slowing down in the development of specific new weapon
systems associated with the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Figure 2. Total RDT&E Funding
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
current $
99 $

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While funding for total RDT&E increased during the Reagan build-up, funding
for Technology Base activities remained relatively flat (see Figure 3). With the end
of the Cold War and concerned that a drop in near-term weapons development might
adversely impact DOD’s ability to develop new weapons systems in the future led
Congress maintained and even increased slightly funding for the Technology Base.
After three years, however, faced with internal budget trade-offs, Congress has been
able to provided only level funding (in real terms) for the Technology Base program
since FY1995. As DOD and Congress seek to increase support for force
modernization in the next few years, 6.3 and 6.4 funding may increase again, relative
to the technology base.
Figure 3. Total RDT&E vs Tech Base
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
total RDT&E
tech base
Figure 4 shows that while Tech Base funding (6.1 and 6.2) as a whole has
remained relatively flat in recent years, Basic Research (6.1) has slowly eroded over
the last 6 years in constant dollars. This has generated some concern within the
university community where much of the Basic Research funding is spent. Figure 4
also shows a steady increase in support of Advanced Technology Development (6.3)
during the Reagan build-up and beyond. Part of this was due to the increase in
ballistic missile defense spending associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative,
much of which was considered Advanced Technology Development. Since FY94,
however, 6.3 activities, too, have leveled off.

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Figure 4. S&T Funding by Activity
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1962
1972
1982
1992
6.1
6.2
6.3
Management
Organization. The Secretary of Defense, through the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USDAT), has overall responsibility for
managing the total RDT&E budget. Reporting to the Undersecretary is the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) who oversees the S&T program.
While the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) provides guidance and final
approval of the RDT&E program and budget, it is the Service Departments (Army,
Air Force, and Navy) and Defense Agencies that develop the plans and budgets and
implement the RDT&E program. The Defense Agencies that manage significantly
large RDT&E programs include the Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA,
which only supports 6.1-6.3 activities), the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense itself (primarily through the
DDR&E). In addition, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, and Special Operations Command manage relatively
large RDT&E programs. Finally, there are the Director of Developmental Test and
Evaluation and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation who receive
RDT&E funds for carrying out their responsibilities for independent and/or joint
testing of new systems.
Figure 5 shows the relative share of the total RDT&E budget between Services
and Defense Agencies. Defense Agencies, primarily DARPA and BMDO, but also
OSD, have received an increasing share of the overall RDT&E budget as a reult of
their increased spending on S&T. The relative share between the Services partly
reflects the relative costs and complexities of the systems developed.

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Figure 5. Total RDT&E by Service (Agency)
25
20
15
10
5
0
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
army
navy
air force
def agencies
Investment Strategy and Planning. The following discusses S&T strategy and
planning separately from acquisition strategy and planning. While the two processes
do function somewhat independently of each other, they are intimately related. The
S&T program, especially the Technology Base component, develops future
generation(s) of technology, while acquisition programs bring that technology into the
next generation of equipment. There is a time lag between technology development
and the ability to get that technology into the field.
S&T Planning. In 1988, as part of its FY1989 defense authorizations (Section
823, P.L. 100-456), Congress instructed the USDAT to provide it with an annual plan
for developing the technologies that the Office of the Secretary Defense (OSD) felt
were most critical to ensure the long term qualitative superiority of U.S. weapons
systems. The plan is to include the rationale for selecting those technologies,
milestones associated with developing them, budgets allocated to developing them,
and the potential contribution industry and allies could make to their development.
Prior to this, there was no DOD-wide S&T strategy or plan to guide an integrated
approach to technology development among the Services or to provide Congress with
information useful for its oversight function. The first such plan was submitted in
1989. The process for generating the plan and the “look” of the plan has evolved
considerably since then. Figure 6 shows the current process.
The S&T investment strategy and planning process occurs at two levels and in
two directions. At one level, each Service has its own planning and review process
to ensure that its S&T program supports the current and long-term needs of its own
warfighting community. At a higher level, the DDR&E is responsible for ensuring
that the combined S&T programs compliment each other, serve the joint-warfighting
capabilities identified by Joint Chiefs of Staff and the area commanders-in-chiefs (as
stated in Joint Vision 2010 in the figure below) and address the National Security

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Science and Technology Strategy generated by the National Science and Technology
Council (also shown in figure below). The DDR&E is also responsible for ensuring
that redundancies and deficiencies in the individual S&T programs of the Services and
agencies are addressed. While warfighting needs are generally defined by the
warfighting community (top-down), the S&T community also provides the warfighter
with new opportunities as new technologies are conceived and matured (bottom-up).
Inter-Service and Agency coordination is facilitated by the Defense Science and
Technology Reliance project. The Army and Air Force formed Reliance in 1990,
primarily in response to the S&T planning process implemented in 1989. It expanded
to include the Navy, and now includes DARPA, BMDO, the Deputy DDR&E and
what used to be called the Defense Special Weapons Agency (which is currently
undergoing reorganization). Reliance is an interservice/agency forum where
agreements on joint planning, collocation of in-house R&D, and lead-service/agency
assignments are made. Reliance focuses primarily on those areas of common interest
to more than one Service (e.g. aviation, electronics).
Figure 6. S&T Planning Process
NSTC
National Security
Joint Vision
S&T Strategy
2010
Defense
S&T Strategy
D
Program
T
S
Objective
A
T
Memoranda
R
Reliance
A
A
G
&
Basic Research
Defense Technology
Joint Warfighting
Plan
Area Plan
S&T Plan
Budget
Service/Agency
S&T Plans
Reliance is responsible for developing the three plans listed in the figure below
(the Basic Research Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plans and the Joint
Warfighting Science and Technology Plan). These plans lay out basic roadmaps
for achieving certain military capabilities.
To achieve these levels of capability in the time required, specific Defense
Technology Objectives (DTOs) or, in the case of Basic Research, Strategic
Research Objectives (SROs) are identified. Each DTO (SRO) identifies a specific

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CRS-8
level of technological advancement or gain in knowledge that will be made, including
estimated dates, funding levels, the RDT&E Program Elements (P.E.s) which will
support that funding, and an explanation of how this effort will impact the
warfighter’s needs. Together over 300 DTOs are identified and account for about
50% of DOD’s total 6.2 and 6.3 funding. SROs account for about 67% of DOD’s
total basic research funding.
These plans and technology (strategic research) objectives are reviewed by
Technology Area Review and Assessment (TARA) teams. Program modifications or
recommendations are forwarded to the Defense Science and Technology Advisory
Group (DSTAG) chaired by the DDR&E, who then proposes any changes to the
Program Review Group (PRG) which is part of the Defense Resources Board which
prepares DOD’s budget. Any changes approved by the PRG are sent back to the
Service planners in the form of Program Decision Memoranda.
Acquisition Planning. The Deputy Secretary of Defense with the assistance of
the Defense Resources Board, decides whether to acquire a new military system. The
decision is based on military strategy, the mission capabilities needed to carry out that
strategy, the equipment needed to achieve those capabilities and the affordability of
developing and operating that equipment. Once a new acquisition program is begun,
6.4, 6.5 and 6.7 RDT&E funding supports certain phases of that program. A profile
of the acquisition process that is supported by the RDT&E budget is shown in Figure
7. It consists of Phases, separated by Milestone Decisions. These decisions are made
by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), chaired by the USDAT. Work done
during the Phases are managed by the Services or Agencies.
Figure 7. Acquisition Process
Milestones
0
I
II
III
Phase 0
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
Relevant
6.4
6.5
6.7
RDT&E
Phase 0
Concept Exploration
Phase I
Program Definition & Risk Reduction
Phase II
Engineering & Manufacturing Development
Phase III
Production, Deployment, Operational
Support
Before an acquisition program can begin, an operational component within one
of the Services must identify a broadly stated mission need that cannot be satisfied by
changes in tactics, doctrine, etc. If the materiel solution to this need is expensive

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enough, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff must review and approve it. At that point the USDAT reviews the JROC
request and chooses one or more concepts for further study (Milestone 0). Phase 0
(Concept Evaluation) involves short-term studies evaluating the feasibility of
competing concepts. At the end of Phase 0, the DAB assesses whether a new
acquisition program is warranted and, if so, approves (Milestone I) a baseline
acquisition strategy (which includes budgets, test and evaluation master plans, risk
assessments and mitigation efforts, etc.). A Milestone approval also agrees on what
needs to be demonstrated in the next phase of the program (exit criteria).
At this point, if the Deputy Secretary of Defense approves, a new program is
begun. Phase I (Program Definition and Risk Reduction) will further develop one or
more of the concepts studied in the previous phase, assessing advantages and
disadvantages, and demonstrating prototype equipment if necessary to reduce risks
(uncertainties). The acquisition strategy becomes more clearly defined as does the
specific system requirements. When the exit criterion for Phase I has been met, the
DAB decides whether to continue with one of the concepts (Milestone II). Phase II
(Engineering and Manufacturing Development) translates the most promising concept
into a stable, operational, affordable, and producible design. Also, during this time
the manufacturing and production processes are validated. Once a prototype of the
design demonstrates it can meet the requirements, low rate initial production is
authorized by the DAB. Low rate initial production provides operational components
for operational testing and to establish the initial production capability. At Milestone
III, the DAB approves Phase III (Production, Deployment, and Operational Support).
At this point RDT&E funds decline and Procurement funds take over.
Infrastructure
DOD’s RDT&E program supports work at universities, research institutes,
federally funded research and development centers (FFRDSs), private firms and
consortia, and at its own RDT&E facilities. Funds flow in different proportions to
different entities depending on the type of activity being funded. A large part of
DOD’s Basic Research program (almost 60%) goes to universities. About 25% goes
to DOD’s own R&D facilities. Most of the 6.2 and 6.3 work is performed in industry
(almost 50%) and at DOD’s own facilities (30%). Just about all of the 6.4, 6.5 and
6.7 funding goes to private firms.
DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure is divided into two groups: research and
development laboratories and test and evaluation centers. Laboratories are DOD
activities (cost centers) that perform one or more of the following activities: science
and technology, engineering development, systems engineering, and engineering
support of deployed materiel. There are over 80 DOD R&D laboratory facilities (e.g
Naval Research Laboratory). Test and Evaluation Centers are facilities and the
surrounding area (i.e. sea, air, ground, space) that are government-owned or
controlled, and which are used to collect T&E data and deliver T&E products (e.g.
reports). There are 26 T&E Centers (e.g. the Army’s White Sands Missile Range).
Each of the Services supports its own R&D laboratories and T&E centers. Each
manages them in its own way. It should be noted that DARPA and BMDO do not
have any R&D laboratories of their own. BMDO does operate the Joint National
Test Facility.

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CRS-10
FFRDC’s are not-for-profit organizations which are financed on a sole-source
basis, exclusively or substantially by a federal agency, to perform specific research and
development that the agency cannot do itself or contract from other organizations.
The federal government supports a total of 42 FFRDCs. Each is administered, by
contract, by an industrial firm, university, or other non-profit institution. DOD
supports 12 FFRDCs (at one point DOD supported 39). An example is the Lincoln
Laboratory, managed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and begun in
World War II to develop radar. About 3% of DOD’s total RDT&E budget goes to
FFRDCs.
As mentioned earlier, much of DOD’s 6.1 research is performed by grant or
contract at universities. Much of this is single-investigator research. However, 6.1
funding also goes to support centers of excellence and other “centers” at universities
that take a multi-disciplinary team approach.
Besides providing direct funding to private firms for various research and
development activities, DOD also provides indirect support for private firms’
independent research and development (IR&D). Based on negotiations between
the firm and DOD, DOD will allow firms to count as an expense on its DOD contracts
some share of the research and development the firm does with its own funds (and for
its own purposes). These cost allowances amount to $2 billion to $3 billion per year.
Issues
Issues that Congress has confronted and may continue to confront, relating to
DOD’s RDT&E budget include:
Maintaining a Healthy Technology Base Investment: The Technology Base
program is perceived as being DOD’s seed corn. Investments made here bear fruit
later in the form of more sophisticated equipment and capabilities. However, because
knowledge and information is the primary product at this stage in development, a
specific return on investment in the form of hardware or software is not always
immediate. In fact, it is not always clear, beforehand, whether a new technology will
ever prove useful. As a result, there is always concern within the S&T community
that pressures for nearer-term developments will crowd out the longer term
investment associated with Technology Base projects. The Technology Base program
has managed to keep pace with inflation over the years. However, investment in basic
research has eroded over the last 6 years and the Defense Agencies are controlling
more of the funding. What impact, if any, is this having on universities or on the
Services’ labs and on the ability of DOD to field high performance hardware and
software?
Accelerating the Transition of New Technology: The pace at which new
technology moves from the laboratory to a fielded system has always been of concern,
although the urgency to do so may have subsided with the end of the Cold War.
Scaling technology up in size and integrating it with other technologies can present
problems not identified in the laboratory. Trying to solve these “bugs” in an
acquisition program can delay the program and/or greatly increase the costs of the
program. Therefore, over the years more emphasis has been placed on technology
demonstrations as a way to solve these problems before beginning an acquisition

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program. In the last few years, technology demonstrations have also been proposed
as a way to quickly get new technologies into the field, short of a formal acquisition
program. While agreeing on the need for such demonstrations, Congress has been
cautious in support (especially of ACTDs). Even so, technology demonstrations have
increased as a share of the S&T program.
Downsizing Infrastructure: DOD’s downsizing since the end of the Cold War
focused initially on reducing force levels and reducing or delaying the development
of new weapons systems. The next phase of downsizing was directed at trying to
reduce infrastructure across the board. The Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process has been the instrument by which DOD and Congress have agreed
to close bases and other DOD facilities (in what is otherwise a highly politicized
process). Closure and consolidation of defense R&D facilities to the extent they have
occurred, have been a result of the BRAC process. In addition, DOD has been
reducing the RDT&E workforce since FY1992. Reductions are to continue into the
next century, at which point the workforce will have been reduced almost 30% from
FY1992 levels. Additional reductions to the acquisition workforce (which includes
RDT&E personnel) were mandated in the FY1998 Defense Authorizations (P.L. 105-
85, Section 912).
Although there have been some laboratory consolidations via BRAC, Congress
felt more could be done, especially in regard to cross-servicing (i.e. co-locating the
Services’ RDT&E activity or assigning lead responsiblity to a Service in a particular
technology area). Section 277 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996
(P.L.104-106) required DOD to develop a five-year plan, to be implemented between
FY2001 and FY2005, that would consolidate and restructure its laboratories and
T&E centers further (as much as is practical and possible). The process by which
DOD intended to draw up this plan was called Vision 21. Vision 21 had made some
progress in laying the groundwork for making further consolidations, but was later
consumed by the Quadrennial Defense Review process. Draft legislation related
specifically to laboratory and test center consolidation was dropped in favor of a
general request for two more BRAC rounds relating to DOD’s entire infrastructure.
Congress has not been receptive to any more BRAC rounds in this larger context.
Integration with the Commercial Sector: While DOD’s Technology Base
program has more or less kept pace with inflation over the years, it has not kept pace
with the level of technology development in the commercial sector, at least in some
technology areas. A prime example is microelectronics. While the semiconductor and
integrated circuits were developed with private funds, DOD (and the space program)
provided an early market for the devices and pushed the subsequent development of
those technologies. By the 1970s, however, DOD’s market share declined
significantly and commercial demands pushed new developments. Soon commercial
circuits outperformed circuits made for DOD. Part of the DOD’s articulated S&T
strategy over the last few years has been to piggy-back on the commercial sector’s
technology base efforts where it can. It has sought to do this by pursuing what it calls
dual-use programs. These programs seek to cooperatively develop technologies of
mutual benefit to DOD and the commercial sector, in a way that will accelerate their
use by both. While DARPA was given the lead in initiating these kinds of programs,
the Services too have been given the same authority. The Services, however, have

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CRS-12
been slow to make use of this authority. DOD’s Dual-Use Applications Program
(DUAP) is meant to stimulate Services into pursuing dual-use programs.
Other CRS Products
CRS Report 95-322. DOD’s Dual-Use Strategy, by John D. Moteff.
CRS Report 95-738. The difference Between DOD Programs That Develop Dual-
Use Technologies and DOD’s Dual-Use Technology Development
Programs—A Fact Sheet, by John Moteff.
CRS Report 95-489. DOD’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers
(FFRDCs), by Michael Davey.
CRS Issue Brief 89056. Cooperative R&D: Federal Efforts to Promote Industrial
Competitiveness, by Wendy Schact. (Updated regularly)
CRS Report 94-100. DOD Support for University-based Research, by Michael
Davey.
CRS Report 93-1051. DOD’s Independent Research and Development Program:
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