97-936 GOV
October 10, 1997
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Congressional Oversight
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Government Division
Summary
Congressional oversight of policy implementation and administration, which has
occurred throughout the U.S. government experience under the Constitution, takes a
variety of forms and utilizes various techniques. These range from specialized
investigations by select committees, to annual appropriations hearings, to informal
communications between Members or congressional staff and executive personnel, and
to the use of extra congressional mechanisms, such as offices of inspector general and
study commissions. Oversight, moreover, is supported by a variety of authorities—the
Constitution, public law, and chamber rules—and is an integral part of the system of
checks and balances between the legislature and the executive.
Organization and Operations
Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal
agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation. Congress exercises this power
largely though its standing committee system. However, oversight, which dates to the
earliest days of the Republic, also occurs in a wide variety of congressional activities and
contexts. These include authorization, appropriations, and legislative hearings by standing
committees; specialized investigations by select committees; and reviews and studies by
congressional support agencies and staff.
Congress's oversight authority derives from its "implied" powers in the Constitution,
public laws, and House and Senate rules. It is an integral part of the American system of
checks and balances.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Principles and Purposes

Underlying the legislature's ability to oversee the executive are democratic principles
as well as practical purposes. John Stuart Mill, the British Utilitarian philosopher, insisted
that oversight was the key feature of a meaningful representative body: "The proper office
of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government." Woodrow Wilson
1
—a future President—describing Congressional Government, as a young scholar in
1885, equated oversight with lawmaking, which was usually seen as the supreme function
of a legislature. He wrote, "Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of
administration."
2
The philosophical underpinning for oversight is the Constitution's system of checks
and balances among the legislature, executive, and judiciary. James Madison, known as
the "Father of the Constitution," described the system in Federalist No. 51 as establishing
"subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
several offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other."
Oversight, as an outgrowth of this principle, ideally serves a number of overlapping
objectives and purposes:
! improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of governmental operations;
! evaluate programs and performance;
! detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and capricious
behavior, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct;
! protect civil liberties and constitutional rights;
! inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the public
interest;
! gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend existing
statutes;
! ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent; and
! prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives.
In sum, oversight is a way for Congress to check on, and check, the executive.
1 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London: Parker, Son, and
Bourn, 1861), p. 104.
2 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 297.

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Powers and Prerogatives
The U.S. Constitution
Although the Constitution grants no formal, express authority to oversee or
investigate the executive or program administration, oversight is implied in Congress's
impressive array of enumerated powers. The legislature is authorized to appropriat
3
e
funds; raise and support armies; provide for and maintain a navy; declare war; provide for
organizing and calling forth the national guard; regulate interstate and foreign commerce;
establish post offices and post roads; advise and consent on treaties and presidential
nominations (Senate); and impeach (House) and try (Senate) the President, Vice President,
and civil officers for treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
Reinforcing these powers is Congress's broad authority "to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."
The authority to oversee derives from these constitutional powers. Congress could
not carry them out reasonably or responsibly without knowing what the executive is
doing; how programs are being administered, by whom, and at what cost; and whether
officials are obeying the law and complying with legislative intent. The Supreme Court
has legitimated Congress's investigative power, subject to constitutional safeguards for
civil liberties. In 1927, the High Court found that, in investigating the administration of
the Department of Justice, Congress was considering a subject "on which legislation could
be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit."4
Statutes
The "necessary and proper" clause also allows Congress to enact laws that mandate
oversight by its committees, grant relevant authority to itself and its support agencies, and
impose specific obligations on the executive to report to or consult with Congress, and
even seek its approval for specific actions.
Broad oversight mandates exist for the legislature in several significant statutes. The
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601), for the first time, explicitly called
for "legislative oversight" in public law. It directed House and Senate standing committees
"to exercise continuous watchfulness" over programs and agencies under their jurisdiction;
authorized professional staff for them; and enhanced the powers of the Comptroller
General, the head of Congress's investigative and audit arm, the General Accounting
Office (GAO). The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) authorized each
standing committee to "review and study, on a continuing basis, the application,
administration and execution" of laws under its jurisdiction; increased the professional staff
3 Article I, Sec. 8 and Article II, Secs. 2 and 4.
4 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927); see also Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 187 (1957), and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).

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of committees; expanded the assistance provided by the Congressional Research Service;
and strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities of GAO. The Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) allows committees to conduct program evaluation
themselves or contract out for it; strengthens GAO's role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary,
and program-related information; and upgrades GAO's review capabilities.
Besides these general powers, numerous statutes direct the executive to furnish
information to or consult with Congress. For example, the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62) requires agencies to consult with Congress on their
strategic plans and report annually on performance plans and results. In fact, more than
2,000 reports are submitted each year to Congress by federal departments, agencies,
commissions, bureaus, and offices. Offices of inspector general, for instance, report their
findings about waste and abuse, and their recommendations for corrective action
semiannually; they are also instructed to issue special reports concerning particularly
serious problems. In addition, Congress creates commissions to study and make
recommendations for select policy areas that can also involve examination of executive
operations and organizations.
There is a long history behind executive reports to Congress. Indeed, one of the first
laws of the First Congress—the 1789 Act to establish the Treasury Department (1 Stat.
66)—called upon the Secretary and the Treasurer to report on public expenditures and all
accounts. The Secretary was also required "to make report, and give information to either
branch of the legislature ... respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or House
of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office."
Separate from such reporting obligations, public employees may provide information
to Congress on their own. In the early part of the 20 century, Congress enacte
th
d
legislation to overturn a "gag" rule, issued by the President, that prohibited employees
from communicating directly with Congress (5 U.S.C. 7211 (1994)). Current
"whistleblower" statutes guarantee the right of government employees to petition or
furnish information to Congress or a Member.
House and Senate Rules
Chamber rules also reinforce the oversight function. House and Senate rules, for
instance, provide for "special oversight" or "comprehensive policy oversight," respectively,
for specified committees over matters that relate to their authorizing jurisdiction. In
addition, House rules direct each standing committee to require its subcommittees to
conduct oversight or to establish an oversight subcommittee for this purpose . House
rules also call for each committee to submit an oversight agenda, listing its prospective
oversight topics for the ensuing Congress, to the House Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, which compiles and prints them.
The House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee, which have oversight jurisdiction over virtually the
entire federal government, moreover, are authorized to review and study the operation of
government activities to determine their economy and efficiency and to submit
recommendations based on GAO reports. House rules also require that the findings and
recommendations from its Government Reform and Oversight Committee be considered
by authorizing panels, if presented to them in a timely fashion.

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Activities and Avenues
Oversight occurs through a wide variety of congressional activities and avenues.
Some of the most obvious are highly publicized investigations by select committees into
a major scandal or into executive branch operations gone awry. Temporary select
committee inquiries into the Iran-Contra affair in 1987, intelligence agency abuses in 1975-
1976, and "Watergate" in 1973-1974 are cases in point. The precedent for this kind of
oversight actually goes back two centuries: in 1792, a special House committee
investigated the ignominious defeat of an Army force by confederated Indian tribes. By
comparison, congressional inquiries in the 104 and 105
th
Congresses into Whitewater
th
,
access to Federal Bureau of Investigation files, White House Travel Office firings, and
campaign financing have relied upon standing committees.
Although such highly visible endeavors are significant, they usually reflect only a
small portion of Congress's total oversight effort. More routine and regular review,
monitoring, and supervision occur in other congressional activities and contexts.
Especially important are appropriations hearings on agency budgets as well as
authorization hearings for existing programs. Separately, staff and support agency
examinations of executive operations and the implementation of programs provide for
additional oversight.
Selected References
Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1990).
Frederick M. Kaiser, "Congressional Oversight of the Presidency," Annals, vol. 499, Sept.
1988, pp. 75-89.
Walter J. Oleszek, "Legislative Oversight," Congressional Procedure and the Policy
Process (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996), pp. 300-323.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Investigators' Guide to Sources of Information, GAO
Report OSI-97-2 (Washington: 1997).
CRS Products
Congressional Oversight Manual (Washington: 1995).
CRS Report 97-382. Government Performance and Results Act: Implications for
Congressional Oversight, by Frederick M. Kaiser and Virginia A. McMurtry.
CRS Report 95-464. Investigative Oversight, by Morton Rosenberg.