


CRS Report for Congress

Defense Budget: Role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

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DEFENSE BUDGET: ROLE OF THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

SUMMARY

In 1986, Congress addressed perceived inefficiencies in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Title II of Goldwater-Nichols broadened the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and created the position of Vice-Chairman. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), an instrument of the Chairman, assists him in assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs; the extent to which the program recommendations and proposals of the Armed Services conform with established priorities; and the validity of the program requirement recommendations identified by the regional combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the Services.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council conducts requirements analyses, validates mission needs and key performance parameters for weapons programs, and develops joint priorities for those needs. Since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols, Congress has manifested a growing interest in the JROC as an instrument of the Chairman of the JCS for integrating competing Service priorities.

The National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the JROC in the Department of Defense. According to this Act, which took effect on January 31, 1997, the Chairman of the JCS shall serve as the JROC Chairman. Prior to enactment of a statutory charter, the Vice Chairman has served as the Chairman of the JROC. The National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (H.R. 3230, Sec. 908) directs the Secretary of Defense to make available to the congressional defense committees JROC analyses, or justification, that supports a recommendation of the Chairman of the JCS to the Secretary and is subsequently approved. This legislation will bring greater congressional scrutiny to the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments of the JROC. If defense procurement spending continues to decline, in real terms, JROC analyses and recommendations are likely to be the subject of growing congressional and Service interest.

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DEFENSE BUDGET: ROLE OF THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, Congress addressed perceived inefficiencies in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.¹ Title II of Goldwater-Nichols designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and created the position of Vice Chairman. To assist the Chairman in providing a joint military perspective in terms of defense planning, programming, and budgeting, the Vice Chairman serves as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Among other duties, the JROC assists the Chairman in assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs; the extent to which the program recommendations and proposals of the military Services conform with established priorities; and the validity of the program requirement recommendations identified by the regional warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCS) and the Services.²

Given the significance of these specified duties of the JROC for the defense budget, and defense policy, it is not surprising that Congress has manifested a growing interest in the role of the JROC in defense programming and budgeting.³ Congressional interest in the JROC has been fostered by several recent events. First, during the spring of 1996, in his final appearance as Vice Chairman of the JCS (VCJCS) before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral William Owens offered the recommendation that the VCJCS should, in his capacity as Chairman of the JROC, testify during annual congressional defense budget hearings.⁴ Second, the JROC assisted the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS), General John Shalikashvili, in the formulation of a Chairman's Program Assessment which stated: "we risk future combat readiness of the U.S.

¹ For a detailed summary of the evolution of Goldwater-Nichols, see the Legislative History of Public Law 99-433 in "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986", *United States Code Congressional and Administrative News: 99th Congress-Second Session, Vol. 4, 1986* (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1987) pp. 2168-2189.

² Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, D.C.: February 7, 1995, pp. 1-2.

³ Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1995), pp. 4-5.

⁴ Robinson, John. "JCS Vice Chair Should Testify As Part of Budget Process--Owens", *Defense Daily*, March 1, 1996. p. 312.

military if we fail to adequately fund recapitalization," --considerably increased expenditure on weapon system modernization--starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 1997.⁵ JROC members were subsequently invited to testify before the House National Security Committee to discuss the role of the Council in determining military requirements. During this hearing, the JROC confirmed having recommended to DoD's civilian leadership that procurement spending reach \$60 billion in FY '98.⁶ Third, in his annual report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense William Perry cited, as one of the five most needed future Joint Warfighting Capabilities of the U.S. identified by the JROC: "To counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction and future ballistic and cruise missiles."⁷ The role of the JROC in establishing requirements for a ballistic missile defense has attracted congressional interest in the past.⁸ Last, the report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, recommended strengthening the charter of the JROC "over joint requirements formulation, and increasing the technical and analytic capacity of the Joint Staff to better assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman."⁹

Perhaps the greatest reason for congressional interest in the JROC is the notion that interservice rivalry causes redundant military capabilities and inefficient defense spending. The JROC has been viewed by some as a forum for integrating the respective programs of the Armed Services, thereby reducing redundant capabilities, and costs.

The purpose of this report is to review the basic issues and past legislation concerning the Joint Requirements Oversight Council as a context for understanding ongoing policy debates.

⁵ Scarborough, Rowan. "Shalikashvili Lost Battle to Raise Spending for New Weapons Now", *The Washington Times*, March 8, 1996. p. A1. For a discussion of the Chairman's Program Assessment see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1995), pp. 20-23. The Chairman's Program Recommendation provides programming advice from the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense prior to the issuance of the Defense Planning Guidance. The Chairman's Program Assessment assesses the extent to which Military Department programs conform to strategic plans. (p. 21).

⁶ Scarborough, Rowan. "For the Bang, Brass Want Bigger Bucks", *The Washington Times*, March 28, 1996, p. A4.

⁷ Perry, William J. *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1996), p. 136.

⁸ See "Pentagon's JROC Steps Up Role in Guiding Defense Policy, Procurement", *Inside the Pentagon*, December 24, 1992, p. 9.

⁹ Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, p. ES-8.

The JROC is chaired by the VCJCS. The permanent membership consists of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. As an instrument of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, the mission of the JROC derives from the Chairman's functions and DOC Acquisition Directives. The current charter of the JROC directs that the Council shall assist the CJCS in carrying out his responsibilities:

- to assess military requirements for defense acquisition programs
- as spokesman for the commanders of the combatant commands on operational requirements
- to assess warfighting capabilities
- to assign a joint priority among major programs meeting valid requirements, identified by the CINCs, Services, and others
- to assess the extent program recommendations and budget proposals of Military Departments and DOC components conform with established priorities

The JROC is guided by the following missions:

- to assist the VCJCS in carrying out his responsibilities as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
- review all warfighting deficiencies that may necessitate major defense acquisition programs and validate that such deficiencies cannot be satisfied by nonmaterial means (changes in doctrine, tactics, training, or organization)
- review and approve the military need for all potential major defense acquisition programs and validate performance objectives and thresholds in the acquisition program baseline for all such programs prior to any milestone consideration by the DAB
- identify, evaluate, and designate potential candidates for joint acquisition programs
- resolve cross-Service requirements issues
- in reviewing military needs and acquisition programs, place emphasis on ensuring interoperability, pursuing opportunities for joint or multi-Service applications, eliminating unnecessary duplication in programs, and promoting economies of scale.

1. JROC CHARTER MCM-14-95 (Extract)

THE EVOLUTION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND CHARTER OF THE JROC

The role of the JROC within the defense budget process has been evolutionary. Legislation, primarily the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, strengthened and placed added responsibilities upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; that has compelled change to organizations that support him. Although the JROC has evolved to assist the CJCS in the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, its origin predates that legislation. Prompted by a 1983 Defense Science Board recommendation, the Joint Chiefs established the Joint Requirements Management Board (JRMB) in 1984 to examine joint requirements, coordinate systems development, and avoid duplication. The board consisted of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, who rotated the duties of Chairman, and the Director of the Joint Staff. The Packard Commission recommended an enhanced role for the JRMB, "as a senior voice for the user commands . . . and the technical and procurement side of the Department of Defense," and in assisting the Chairman in overseeing the needs of the CINCs throughout the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System process.¹⁰ The Packard Commission made further recommendations concerning the JRMB that influenced the creation of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.¹¹

Additional legislation which preceded the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the 1985 DOC Authorization Act (P.L. 99-433), required the Chairman of the JCS to serve as spokesman for the combatant CINCs regarding their operational requirements. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established the position of the Vice Chairman of the JCS, yet the VCJCS did not become a member of the JCS until enactment of the DOC Authorization Act for FY 1993 (P.L. 102-484).

Several of the functions required of the Chairman of the JCS by the Goldwater-Nichols Act concern his advice to the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs and budgets. The Chairman advises the Secretary on: the integrated priorities of the CINCs' requirements; the extent to which the program and budget proposals of the military departments conform with established strategic plans and CINC requirements; and how well military requirements justify acquisition programs.

¹⁰ See the Congressional Research Service Report, Keith Berner and Steve Daggett, "A Defense Budget Primer", March 9, 1993, 93-317 F, for an explanation of the PPBS.

¹¹ For a discussion of the Packard Commission's recommendations and the role of the Joint Requirements Management Board, see the testimony of James Woolsey in U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Reorganization of the Department of Defense; Hearings. March 11, 1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1987 (99th Congress, second session. House. hearing no. 99-53.), p. 773.

An important additional requirement placed upon the Chairman is the responsibility of submitting alternative program recommendations and budget proposals that are within projected resource levels and guidance provided by the Secretary.¹² Through legislation, Congress has designated the CJCS a source of advice to aid integration of the individual service program recommendations--within budget ceilings established by the President.

The Chairman's added responsibilities have influenced directly the evolution of the JROC, and sustained congressional attention. In performing its original mission, assessing military requirements for defense acquisition and developing mission needs statements, the JROC (as an instrument of the Chairman of the JCS and Secretary of Defense) was involved with a confluence of congressional concerns: implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, mission integration, acquisition reform, and overseeing needs of the combatant CINCs.

Informed by a 1989 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report, *Defense Organization: Progress and Concerns at JCS Combatant Commands* and an Institute for Defense Analyses study of the implementation of the Packard Commission reforms within DoD, the House Armed Services Committee staff expressed concern with the JROC's inability to make either "tough decisions on tradeoffs and operational requirements" or programmatic tradeoffs based on the integrated priorities lists (IPLs) of the combatant CINCs.¹³

As the JROC has evolved, these two criticisms (that the IPLs of the CINCs are not provided in a standard format, and therefore cannot be sensibly prioritized; and second, that the JROC does not make tradeoffs between Service program recommendations) have been consistent.¹⁴ A 1990 GAO Report assessed the Chairman of the Joint Staff's performance in providing advice on requirements, programs and budgets and concluded that the CJCS had not yet fulfilled the goals of mission integration:

"According to DOD, . . . [t]he Chairman recommends alternatives to service program proposals . . . as a participant in numerous DOD reviews throughout the planning, programming, and budgeting cycle. Although we agree with DOD, we also believe that the Chairman's

¹² Title X, U.S. Code. Armed Forces, sections 153 (a)(4) (A), (B), (C), (D), and (F).

¹³ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Department of Defense Implementation of the Packard Commission Report of 1986*; Hearings. May 11, 1989. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, 1990 (101st Congress, First Session. House. Hearings. H.A.S.C. no. 101-33), p. 29. GAO/NSIAD-89-83, *Defense Reorganization: Progress and Concerns at JCS and Combatant Commands*, March 1989.

¹⁴ For example, a recent GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-96-72, *U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions*, pg. 33, states that the JROC Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments that informed the CJCS' 1995 guidance, "did not explore ways to reduce costs by suggesting specific trade-offs among major modernization proposals."

alternatives to service program proposals are, in terms of jointness, more restrictive than may be his force program alternatives presented at the front-end of the process."¹⁵

While both the GAO conclusion, and the DOD response may have been accurate at the time, they reflect the fact that the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols has been a gradual process. Since publication of the GAO Report, the Chairman of the JCS has introduced a Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) into the defense budget process which provides his advice early enough in the PPBS, "to influence the Defense Planning Guidance."¹⁶ The JROC's ability to conduct weapon assessments which fulfill joint program requirements and, provide programming advice to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense, has become a controversial aspect of the Council's evolution (the CPR and Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment will be discussed below). Each of the Services, and the CJCS, has had to adapt to new JCS processes and organization.

In a written response to a question by the House Armed Services Committee, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood observed that, the "Vice Chairman, JCS does not exercise authority independent from the CJCS." Moreover, the JROC "acts in an advisory capacity to the VCJCS." Atwood's response, offered in hearings held during 1989 following the release of Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's Defense Management Review, was accurate.¹⁷ First, the duties of the VCJCS, including serving as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and Chairman of the JROC, were delineated in a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act specified that the VCJCS shall perform "such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense."¹⁸ Second, the missions of the JROC, as an instrument

¹⁵ GAO/NSIAD-90-76, *Defense Reorganization: Roles of Joint Military Organizations in Resource Allocations*, June 1990, p. 19. The Chairman serves on the Defense Resources Board. The DRB is the senior DoD resource allocation board and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Vice Chairman of the JCS is also the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, which is chaired by the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology.

¹⁶ Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995), p. 20. Also see Robert Holzer, "Pentagon Chiefs Get New Policy Weapon", *Defense News*, Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 1995, pg. 1. Holzer's article states that the CPR are an improvement over the CINC Integrated Priority Lists.

¹⁷ House Armed Service Committee Hearings, *Department of Defense Implementation of the Packard Commission Report of 1986*, July 12, 1989, p. 132. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *Defense Management Report to the President*.

¹⁸ Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Duties of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff," April 15, 1987. An attachment to Secretary Weinberger's Memorandum endorsed by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, D.O. Cooke, interestingly states that the

of the CJCS and Secretary of Defense, were prescribed in a charter. Nevertheless, the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Management Review concluded that the role and charter of the JROC should be strengthened. The Defense Management Review (DMR) stated that the JROC would assume a broader role "in the threshold articulation of military needs and the validation of performance goals and baselines for all Defense Acquisition Board programs at their successive Milestones." Under a revised charter the JROC would: review all deficiencies that necessitated the development of a major weapons system; review Service and CINC mission needs "as distinct from any potential system or program"; assign a joint priority for meeting the need; and forward an approved mission need statement to the DAB. The VCJCS as Vice Chair of the DAB would participate in program Milestone reviews and reconfirm an existing mission need.¹⁹ As Admiral William Crowe has written, the Joint Chiefs "knew that almost every weapons program that had suffered large cost overruns or fallen short of performance expectations had gotten into trouble because it had not gone through the DAB processes meticulously."²⁰ Thus, the DMR sought to tie the user (the CINCs and the Services) to procurement which focused on mission capabilities.

In the House Report which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (H.R. 4739), the Armed Services Committee concluded that the charter and staff of the JROC were insufficiently structured to meet the objectives of the DMR. Section 1031 of the bill sought to establish the JROC in law. The bill attempted to strengthen the VCJCS as Chairman of the JROC and to alleviate any reliance upon the use of Service representatives by requiring the Joint Staff to serve as the JROC staff. In conference the House receded to the Senate bill, which contained no similar provision. The conferees did direct DOC to consider changes to the JROC charter which reflected their concern with the issues of JROC staffing, and the tradeoff between program requirements and cost.²¹

During his VCJCS confirmation hearings of 1990, Admiral David Jeremiah pledged to lead the JROC in a "ground floor examination" of the nation's

CJCS duties recommended by Admiral Crowe, "represent a substantial beginning towards institutionalizing the functions of the Vice Chairman". Cooke would further describe the duties as "internal responsibilities of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

¹⁹ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, *Defense Management Report to the President*, pp.7, 17-18. The current duties of the JROC (conducting requirements analyses, validating mission needs and key performance parameters, and developing recommended joint priorities for those needs) greatly reflect the recommendations of the DMR. See Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Subject: Defense Acquisition, March 15, 1996.

²⁰ Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., *The Line of Fire: From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 305.

²¹ National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1991, *United States Code Congressional and Administrative News*: 101st Congress-Second Session, 1990, Vol.6 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990), pp.2963, 3052-54 and 3198-99.

military requirements after the Cold War. In response to questions of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1992, Admiral Jeremiah detailed changes recommended by the JROC to service programs. Such recommendations ranged from declaring some programs "not affordable", to redefining quantities required to meet mission needs, to outright termination of other programs.²²

Admiral Jeremiah's successor, Admiral William Owens, came to the position of VCJCS following service as the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments (N8). There he headed the Requirements Resources Board which attempted to integrate surface warfare, submarine, and aviation program issues into six primary issue areas: joint strike warfare, littoral or coastal warfare, regional surveillance, strategic deterrence, space and electronic warfare, strategic sealift and defense of sealift. As Chairman of the JROC, Admiral Owens, in 1994, introduced the Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) to the JROC. The JROC considers programs in light of ten assessment areas: strike; land and littoral warfare; strategic mobility and sustainability; sea, air and space superiority; deterrence/counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; command and control; information warfare; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; regional engagement/presence; and joint readiness.²³ The 1995 revision of the JROC charter broadened the Council's missions from determining requirements to assessing warfighting capabilities.²⁴ The JWCA process assisted the JROC in fulfilling this mission. The JWCA process will be discussed below.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L.104-106) directed the Secretary of Defense to establish a Joint Requirements Oversight Council in the Department of Defense. The statutory charter for the JROC formally directed the Chairman of the JCS to serve as JROC Chairman. The functions of the Chairman JCS, as Chairman of the JROC, may only be delegated to the VCJCS. The charter, according to the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act, is to take effect on January 31, 1997.

The House National Security Committee Report on H.R. 3230 noted concern with "the difficulties it has encountered in receiving the most cursory

²² U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee*, Second Session, 102d Congress; Hearings. February 20, 1992. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1992), S. hrg. 102-983, p. 24. "Pentagon's JROC Steps Up Role in Guiding Defense Policy, Procurement", *Inside the Pentagon*, December 24, 1992, pp. 9-10.

²³ Holzer, Robert. "U.S. Navy Creates Council to Direct Budget", *Defense News*, December 14-20, 1992, p.12. Eric Rosenberg, "Navy Throws Out Traditional Budget Formulation Methods", *Defense Week*, October 5, 1992, p. 7. "Pentagon's JROC Steps Up Role in Guiding Defense Policy, Procurement", *Inside the Pentagon*, December 24, 1992, p. 9.

²⁴ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, D.C.: February 7, 1995, pp. 1-2.

information associated with analysis performed by the JROC resulting in decisions to terminate or rephase military programs." Specifically, the House National Security Committee expressed concern with the requirements generation process for, and management of, DOC unmanned aerial vehicle programs.²⁵ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (H. R. 3230, Sec. 908.) directs the Secretary of Defense to make available to the congressional defense committees (the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate, and the Committees on National Security and Appropriations of the House of Representatives) JROC analyses or justifications that support a recommendation of the CJCS to the Secretary that is subsequently approved. This provision subjects Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments to congressional scrutiny.

Further evolution of the JROC will be influenced by several factors. First, the Commission on Roles and Missions observed that the JROC required a greater ability and willingness "to address DOD needs in the aggregate."²⁶ To improve the ability of the JROC to address requirements in the aggregate, the CORM recommended "increasing the technical and analytic capacity of the Joint Staff to better assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman." For the JROC to play an increased role in determining joint requirements that focus on program tradeoffs early in the acquisition process, a commensurate increase in the Council's analytical ability and decisionmaking authority will be required. Would such change require an increase to the size of the Joint Staff? Would such change infringe on the respective Services' responsibilities to "organize, train and equip" under Title 10? These issues will be addressed below.

Second, the JROC will certainly play a role in the development and implementation of the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010. The Joint Warfighting Center will conduct a series of war games and advanced simulations that will inform the JROC. General Ralston, the current VCJCS, has been charged with implementing Joint Vision 2010.²⁷

Third, the JROC will continue to conduct requirements analyses, validate mission needs statements and key performance parameters, and develop joint priorities for those needs. The JROC will also play a significant role in furthering the development of joint command and control capabilities. The JROC validates the "Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) certification of mission need and operational requirements

²⁵ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on National Security. *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997: Report on H.R. 3230*. May 7, 1996. Washington, D.C. Govt. Print. Office, 1996 (104th Congress, Second Session. Report 104-5630, pp. 99, 214-215, and 331.

²⁶ Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, ES-8.

²⁷ Holzer, Robert. "Shalikashvili Offers 2010 Battlefield Vision", *Defense News*, May 5-12, 1996, p. 4.

documents for conformance with C4 policy and doctrine, architectural integrity, and interoperability standards."²⁸ In the development of requirements and programs for Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), the JROC will receive analytical support from the C4ISR Decision Support Center. Thus, the JROC will play a role in the future development of any "system of systems."²⁹

Last, General Ralston will alter JROC processes by establishing a review board which will screen issues prior to their consideration by the Council. The new panel resembles the Operations Deputies Group, which screens issues before they are considered by the JCS. The purposes of the new panel are to provide ongoing review of CINC requirements and issues, and to resolve issues that do not need detailed consideration by the JROC.³⁰

ISSUES

The evolution of the JROC's role in the defense budget process has served to fulfill two important goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By examining the requirements of the CINCs' Integrated Priorities Lists, and prioritizing them across Service and functional lines, the JROC represents the CINCs, and provides a joint perspective to DOC programming issues. The Vice Chairman, as a member of the Defense Acquisition Board, represents the CINCs during program milestone reviews and throughout the PPBS. Nevertheless, decremental defense spending has further concentrated Congressional interest in "mission integration"³¹, issues related to the requirements generation process, and the functions of the JROC.

²⁸ Department of Defense Directive, Subject: Defense Acquisition, Number 5000.1, March 15, 1996, p.11.

²⁹ Douglas Berenson "DISA, Joint Staff Examine relation of Joint C4ISR Battle Lab, Other Facilities", *Inside the Pentagon*, April 25, 1996. "Defense Authorizers Press for New Force Review", *Aerospace Daily*, April 25, 1996, p.1. Admiral Owens' view of the Revolution in Military Affairs has been set forth in *High Seas: The Naval Passage to An Uncharted World* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), "A Report on the JROC and the Revolution in Military Affairs", *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1995, pp. 47-53 and "System-Of-Systems", *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1996, p. 47.

³⁰ Holzer, Robert. "U.S. Military Brass Forms New Panel to Review Priorities", *Defense News*, May 27-June 2, 1996. p. 9.

³¹ The term mission integration was defined by the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1985, "The principal organizational goal of Doc, both in 1949 and now, is the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military missions." See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change; Staff Report*. October 16, 1985. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985 (99th Congress-1st session. Senate. Print no. 99-86), p. 2.

Moreover, the Secretary of Defense is supported by four decision-making processes that also inform the determination of Service roles, missions, functions and the allocation of defense resources. The Joint Strategic Planning System and the Requirements Generation System are managed by the Joint Staff and support the CJCS. The Acquisition Management System and PPBS support the Secretary and are managed by the OSD staff. Even with the legislative role of Congress, "many decisions involving roles, missions, and functions are tacitly decided in one or more of these processes." As the staff of the CORM reported:

[i]n shaping the DoD program and budget and determining how best to accomplish national security objectives, the Secretary must decide among differing, and often sharply conflicting, views of requirements and priorities. These decisions ultimately determine 'who will do what'(roles, missions, and functions) in the defense establishment of the next century. Such decisions involve the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders in chief. . . of the unified commands, the OSD staff, the Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff.³²

Given the tacit nature of DoD decision-making support processes in determining Service roles and missions, the expansion of JROC's focus beyond acquisition issues to Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments, inevitably created concern within the respective Military Departments and Services.³³ The expansion of the JROC's focus has raised several issues of concern to Congress. Any future expansion of the JROC's role in recommending weapon program "trade-offs" raises additional issues for Congress concerning the independence of the JROC, and the erosion of Military Service mission and power. Issues of potential concern to Congress regarding the JROC are examined below.

JOINT WARFARE CAPABILITY ASSESSMENTS

The Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessment(JWCA) process, introduced into the JROC by Admiral William Owens, was intended to examine aggregate US military capabilities, detect capability gaps, eliminate redundancies, "and suggest methods to correct these deficiencies."³⁴ Recalling the U.S. Navy's Joint

³² This quote is extracted, and the above discussion of decision-making processes derives from, the Process Team Report to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, "Roles, Missions, and Functions: Future Challenges and Options", p. 1.

³³ See Maj. F.G. Hoffman, USMCR, "Jointness and Institutional Stewardship", *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 1995, p. 59.

³⁴ CMDR. William J. Toti, USN, "It's Broke! Fix It!: Why the Joint Staff's JWCA Process Doesn't Work", *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1996, p. 28. Commander Toti's article contains a detailed explanation of the entire JWCA process, and his view of its flaws. For a contrasting view, see Admiral William A. Owens USN (Ret.), "Understanding the JWCA Process", *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1996, p. 14.

Mission Areas established by Owens as Director of Requirements and Resources (N8), JWCA's span ten assessment areas, each coordinated by a sponsor within the Joint Staff directorate.

Warfighting requirements for each assessment area are conducted by a team of action officers assembled by the Joint Staff and consisting of Service and Agency members. These warfighting requirements are then compared to Service programs, "both fielded and planned--that are intended to address each requirement."³⁵ JWCA's, in theory, identify issues concerning redundant capabilities, requirement excesses, and capability gaps. Once such issues are identified, the assessment team proposes solutions to the JROC. Upon approval from the JROC the proposed solutions are discussed with the warfighting CINCs. Following consultation with the CINCs, the list of program recommendations is submitted by the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense. Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments also inform the Chairman's Program Recommendation, which is intended to provide the Chairman's programming advice to the Secretary of Defense early enough in the PPBS process to influence the Defense Planning Guidance.³⁶

According to Admiral Owens, the purposes of the JWCA process are to: bring a "better high-level joint military perspective to bear on the way the nation allocates its defense resources"; generate issues and information to stimulate the discussions of the JROC; and serve to educate the officers who conduct the assessments. Based on Owens' standard, the JWCA process is a "success story."³⁷ In a narrow sense, the JWCA process also fulfills the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By assessing weapons within a framework of mission areas and CINC requirements, the JROC provides a joint perspective throughout the PPBS. Second, the JWCA process provides information to the CJCS for the evaluation of alternative budget proposals. The JWCA process also allows for the consideration of CINC requirements through the submission of Integrated Priorities Lists.

The JWCA process in practice, nevertheless, has been criticized in several regards. First, the operational research methodology used by assessment teams has been characterized as inconclusive and flawed. Second, the JWCA process depends upon Service expertise and consensus among the CINCs and within the JROC. Last, JWCA's have been criticized for failing to identify trade-offs between weapons systems.³⁸

³⁵ Toti, *Ibid.*, p. 28.

³⁶ See Lovelace and Young, p. 20 and Toti, *Ibid.*, pp. 28-32.

³⁷ Owens, "Understanding the JWCA Process", p.14.

³⁸ See Erlich, Jeff and Philip Finnegan, "Senators Envision Renewed Military Strategy", *Defense News*, June 24-30, 1996, p. 1. The authors quote one Congressional source, in a discussion of aviation requirements, as saying "Even if the JROC did its job, [and weighed the aircraft one against the other], Congress would just avoid its advice."

Each of the criticisms of the JWCA process identified above concerns the question of JROC staffing and the ultimate mission of the JROC. The JROC, viewed more expansively as the joint military body which should propose Service missions and force structure, may not be adequately served by the JWCA process.³⁹ The CORM recognized that as the responsibilities of the CJCS have expanded under Goldwater-Nichols, "there has been no proportional increase in the Joint Staff's planning and analysis capabilities." Critics say that one unintended byproduct of tasking the Joint Staff with JWCAs is that the Joint Staff marginalizes multipurpose weapons systems.⁴⁰ The Military Services possess the institutional expertise and depth in their respective spheres of warfighting. Thus, it appears that the JROC must either sacrifice independence by turning to the Services for analytical support, or offer independent assessments which may be subject to criticism by the Military Services and Departments.

Expanding the Joint Staff's planning and analysis staff would require explicit action and considerations by Congress.⁴¹ Providing the JROC with an expanded staff may: duplicate capabilities now resident within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; weaken the responsibilities and power of the respective Services to train and equip their forces; and place greater emphasis on the near term interests of the CINCs. Giving an expanded capability to the JROC would certainly subject future JWCAs to the oversight of Congress and the interest of the Services. Moreover, if the Vice Chairman were to recommend program cancellations that were seen as threatening to the core competencies of a Service, based on a JWCA, consensus within the JROC might be sacrificed.⁴²

³⁹ The contrasting views of the JROC, as either a consultative, advisory body intended to add a joint perspective to programming decisions, or as a body which should propose changes to military force structure, are captured in the DOC comments attached to GAO/NSIAD-96-72, *U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions*, May 1996.

⁴⁰ As William Toti observed, "While overlap was encouraged in Navy JMAs (Joint Mission Assessments), it is structurally minimized in the Joint Staff's JWCAs. That is, one JWCA team leader is reluctant to add work to an already overloaded team by analyzing a system he knows another team is already looking at." see Toti, "It's Broken! Fix It!", p. 32. Thus, JWCAs are likely to rely on the support of Service staffs, contractors, or defense agencies.

⁴¹ One author, Commander Mark C. Nesselrode in "The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1995, p. 114, argues for strengthening the JROC and the Joint Staff and further subordinating the Service staffs to the CJCS.

⁴² Admiral Owens noted that "JROC members cannot, of course, be expected to divorce themselves from Service positions. Yet collectively, JROC with the CINCs constitutes a repository of profound military insight and experience, and the rank of its members permits JROC to act as a corporate body, capable of developing consensus views that transcend individual service perspectives." William A. Owens, "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 57.

Second, such a decision may deny a warfighting capability desired by a CINC. Expanding the capability of the Joint Staff to conduct JWCA's would strengthen the Vice Chairman in relation to the Service Chiefs. Provided an enhanced JWCA process, any mission needs statement or program assessment rendered by the JROC would still be subject to review by the Defense Resources Board, the CJCS, Deputy Secretary and Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and Congress. Last, regardless of any JWCA finding, questions of roles and missions and military force structure remain matters of political judgment.

INTEGRATED PRIORITIES LISTS

The warfighting Commanders in Chief submit their formal program priorities to the CJCS and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs). The JROC balances the IPLs against the Program Objective Memoranda submitted by the Services, and ensures that the programmatic needs of the CINCs are represented by the Services.⁴³ Where the needs of the CINCs are unmet, the JROC advises the CJCS. The Chairman is then to offer alternative program recommendations to the Secretary in the Chairman's Program Assessment. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, as Chairman of the Defense Resources Board, must make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to weapons programs. The Chairman of the JCS and Secretary of Defense must attempt to balance the near term interests of the CINCs with the long term responsibilities of the Services.

The IPLs submitted by the CINCs to the JROC are not in a uniform or standardized format. CINCs, moreover, identify priorities in terms of capabilities, not specific weapons systems. As Lt. General Neal, deputy CINC of U.S. Central Command stated, the CINC:

lays on the table those capabilities and requirements that he needs. He would prefer to not say 'I don't need an F-22. He would prefer to say, 'I need this capability,' and leave it to the service chiefs to come up with trying to meet that capability.

Therefore, assessments of weapons systems produced by the JWCA teams must be balanced against the capabilities requested by the CINCs. This process does not provide for the JROC to simply produce a list of CINC priorities, compare it to Service program recommendations, and recommend the cancellation of weapons programs that might be considered redundant. Again, so doing requires: an analytical judgement that one Service or platform could best meet the requirement, a political judgement that other Services should not develop

⁴³ Lovelace and Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, p. 18. The authors reason that the Chairman's Program Recommendation should rely on the IPLs to balance CINC requirements against Service recommendations. A contrasting view is that the JROC has further increased the power of the CINCs in relation to Service programs, see Beth Jannery, "Vice Chairman Says Service Chiefs Are Key Players in DOC Decisionmaking", *Inside the Navy*, July 3, 1995, p.1.

similar capabilities, and acceptance of risk that the analytical judgement is correct. Warfighting CINCs prefer overlapping capabilities to mitigate the uncertainties of combat. An expansion of the JROC role would certainly be questioned by the Services, and require an expanded analytic capability. The JROC may advise the Chairman on program priorities, yet is not a decisionmaking body.

JROC LEADERSHIP

During the final appearance of Admiral William Owens as VCJCS before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senators expressed concern that the role of the JROC in the defense budget process would be weakened upon his departure. Despite the assurance of Owens that the roles of the JROC and VCJCS were institutionalized, others have expressed concern that the integrity of the JWCA process was tied to the Admirals' leadership.⁴⁴

Prior to, and during his tenure as VCJCS, Adm. Owens had repeatedly expressed a vision of the future American military. This vision integrated three aspects of warfare into a system of systems: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command, control, communications, computer applications, and intelligence processing; and precision force. To Owens, harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs required employing the JROC to integrate Service priorities and programs. The law (Goldwater-Nichols) in his view, required as much. He doubted whether the Services could resolve doctrinal differences to achieve mission integration in a period of declining resources:

History reveals a tendency for the services to diverge rather than coalesce during periods of relative fiscal austerity. That is, each service tends to put planning priority on assuring and protecting core competencies at the expense of those capabilities that support and facilitate operations of the other services. It is easier to be joint in word and deed in times of fiscal largess; parochialism is stronger when budgets draw down.⁴⁵

Given Owens' declared intentions to challenge Service priorities and programs, it should come as no surprise that the methodology for assessing Service

⁴⁴ Grossman, Elaine M. "Joint Warfare Capability Assessment Process Has Yet To Meet Potential", *Inside the Pentagon*, August 17, 1995, p.15. John Robinson, "JCS Vice Chair Should Testify as Part of Budget Process--Owens", *Defense Daily*, March 1, 1996, p. 312.

⁴⁵ Admiral William A. Owens, USN (Ret.), "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 55. For a discussion of Admiral Owens' view of the Revolution in Military Affairs see High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), "System-Of-Systems", *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1996, p.47. and Owens, A Report on the JROC and the Revolution in Military Affairs, *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 1995.

requirements, the JWCA, would be closely scrutinized. "From the start, the JWCA process has been controversial because it has been seen as enlarging the role of the JCS vice chairman and the warfighting. . .CINCs in the budget planning cycle."⁴⁶ Clear from Owens' writing and performance was his intention of advancing joint institutions and capabilities.

General Joseph W. Ralston was sworn in as VCJCS on March 1, 1996. In a February 16 speech before the Air Force Association he described the need to maintain a structural balance between the near term needs of the CINCs and the long term needs of the Services. Early in his tenure as VCJCS, Ralston has explored ways to further integrate the advice of the warfighting CINCs into the procurement process. He has also directed the creation of a review group intended to screen issues before they are discussed by the JROC.⁴⁷

Though General Ralston has not widely articulated a need for further expansion of the JROC's mission, several issues are certain to arise during his tenure as VCJCS. First, a review of the National Military Strategy is pending as part of the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review. The VCJCS, as Chairman of the JROC, will be confronted with matching military requirements to any new strategy. Second, the VCJCS has been tasked with implementing Joint Vision 2010. Last, General Ralston will have to review issues related to the staffing the JWCA.

CONCLUSION

The evolution, and processes of the JROC, have forwarded the goals of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. First, through the submission of Integrated Priorities Lists, the combatant Commanders in Chief inform the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of their respective program requirements. The Chairman, with the JROC as his agent, then assesses the extent to which the respective Program Objective Memoranda proposed by the Military Departments conform with the priorities of the CINCs. The Chairman then issues a Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).⁴⁸ Within the CPA, the Chairman is provided the opportunity to fulfill his responsibilities in accordance with the functions prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act: specifically, submitting alternative program recommendations. General Ralston, as VCJCS, is reportedly examining avenues

⁴⁶ Grossman, Joint Warfare Capability Assessment Process Has Yet To Meet Potential, p. 14.

⁴⁷ Michael B. Donley concludes that the JROC is successfully making the transition to General Ralston's leadership, and that the creation of a two or three star level committee should provide greater quality control over JWCA products. Michael B. Donley, "Progress Towards 'Jointness'", Hicks & Associates, Inc., June 27, 1996.

⁴⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Issued January 30, 1990, 1st Revision March 17, 1993, Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. VI 1-3.

for increasing the involvement of the CINCs in JROC recommendations and assessments.⁴⁹ Moreover, while the CINCs must be concerned with near term capabilities, their requirements must be balanced against the long term needs of the Services. As Air Force Chief of Staff, General Ronald Fogelman, has stated, the "Services have a responsibility under Title 10 to organize, train and equip. . . as they execute that responsibility, they must take a longer view regarding anticipated capabilities that CINCs of the future will require."⁵⁰

Second, the JROC has advanced the goal of mission integration by evaluating programs within the context of capabilities assessment areas. These assessment areas "compel interaction across organizations" and, contribute to the discussions of the Council members, thereby providing a joint military perspective on defense budget issues.⁵¹ Despite the GAO finding that the 1995 CPR "did not explore ways to reduce costs by suggesting specific trade-offs among modernization proposals,"⁵² past JROC assessments have resulted in trade-offs and program cancellations. JROC JWCA's have led to the decisions to: retire the Air Force EF-111, leaving the Navy EA-6B to "subsume the Air Force mission"; cap procurement of the B-2; and support procurement of the C-17 rather than the Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft.⁵³

Criticism of the JROC takes two tacks. First, the methodology of the JWCA process is seen to be flawed and reportedly lacks analytical rigor. Second, that program decisions made by the JROC reflect force structure change (and resource savings) at the margin, which frequently reflects program decisions made earlier by the Service in question.⁵⁴ Fully meeting these critiques would seem to require considerable change to the JROC's capability and authority.

⁴⁹ Holzer, Robert. "U.S. Military Brass Forms New Panel to Review Priorities", *Defense News*, May 27-June 2, 1996. p.9.

⁵⁰ Grossman, Elaine M. "Pentagon Wrestles With How Much Acquisition Authority To Give CINCs", *Inside the Pentagon*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 22, 1996, p. 10.

⁵¹ Admiral William A. Owens, USN, "JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 1994, p. 57.

⁵² GAO/NSIAD-96-72, *U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions*, May 1996, p. 33.

⁵³ See Grossman, Elaine M. "Joint Warfare Capability Assessment Process Has Yet To Meet Potential", *Inside the Pentagon*, August 17, 1995, p.1.

⁵⁴ A challenge for the JROC identified by Michael Donley is the lack of attention given to infrastructure and support, "estimated at over 50 percent of total Doc resources." While there is "sentiment that the JROC should stay focused on critical joint warfare issues and leave infrastructure and support issues to OSD and the Services. . . it will be difficult for the CJCS to make broad recommendations on resource allocation unless he is focused on the total Doc budget." This too could require expanded JROC/JWCA analytic support. *Progress Towards "Jointness"*, p. 5.

These changes would require consideration and action by the Congress, Secretary of Defense and the Services.

The staff of the CORM recognized that, due to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the responsibilities of the Joint Staff to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs have expanded. The involvement of the JROC in weapons capabilities assessments "has created a much more complex set of demands for which existing Joint Staff support is inadequate."⁵⁵ Any addition to the size or capability of the Joint Staff, or direct support of JROC JWCA's specifically, is, for good or ill, likely to replicate expertise resident either in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the Services. Such a change might also centralize authority in the Office of the CJCS. Robert Murray says, the CJCS has neither the staff, time, detailed information, nor expertise, to be further immersed in the PPBS.⁵⁶ Some observers are concerned that further expansion of the JROC's analytical capability may also weaken the role of the Services as "keepers of the operational art."⁵⁷ Further strengthening of the CJCS, if at the expense of the Services or OSD, would require careful consideration.

Last, the JROC advises and assists the CJCS. The JROC does not possess the authority to either alter Service roles and missions, nor to threaten a program which supports a Service core competency. Such authority resides elsewhere in the defense budget, and political processes. Moreover, were the VCJCS to render a program recommendation which was perceived to threaten a core competency, his decision would certainly be revisited throughout the phases of the PPBS, and congressional authorization and appropriations processes. Responsibilities assumed, or granted to the JROC would need to be supported with added analytical capability. As Warner Schilling recognized in his study of the FY 1950 defense budget:

there were no definitive answers to the questions the Joint Chiefs faced. Information, analysis, and discussion could take them far--but not far enough. In the end, if there was to be a resolution of these

⁵⁵ Process Team Report to the CORM, p. 40.

⁵⁶ Murray, Robert. "Reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", *The Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Critical Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), p. 64.

⁵⁷ A recent memorandum written by Maj. Gen. Charles Link, Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, expresses concern over the ability of joint staffs to provide the expertise required for weapons assessments. General Link's memo, which concerns the DOC Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, reportedly reflects many of the issues related to the expanded role of the JROC. See Jason Sherman, "Army Agrees With Air Force Official's Concern Over Weapons Mix Study", *Inside the Army*, June 3, 1996, p. 1.

doctrinal differences, it would require a large element of guess and a determined exercise of power.⁵⁸

Such a decision is partly political in nature and would certainly require the attention of Congress. Ten years after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JROC has evolved to support the Chairman of the JCS in fulfilling his responsibilities under that legislation. As resources appropriated for defense procurement continue to decline, the processes and assessments of the JROC are likely to demand the attention of the Services and the Congress.

⁵⁸ Schilling, Warner R. Paul Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) p. 175.

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