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## A U.N. Rapid Reaction Force? A Discussion of the Issues and Considerations for U.S. Policymakers

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## Summary

U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recently called for Member States to consider creating a special U.N. force for U.N. peacekeeping operations. In a January 1995 report he proposed that the U.N. consider establishing a "strategic reserve" rapid reaction force (RRF), perhaps of battalion-sized units, to deploy when emergency needs for peacekeeping troops arise. They would be stationed in their home countries, but would be trained to the standards, use the same operating procedures and equipment, participate in regular joint exercises, and otherwise be maintained at a high state of readiness in order to respond quickly to a U.N. call for their deployment.

Although proposals for a U.N. force dedicated to peace operations were made by former presidents Bush and Reagan, and by presidential candidate William J. Clinton, the Clinton Administration backed away from the concept. In its May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), the Administration stated that the United States "does not support a standing U.N. army..." The Clinton Administration supported, however, the establishment of the U.N. Standby Forces system, through which Member States formally commit individuals and units to be provided within a specified period of a U.N. request for peacekeeping assistance, in order to enable the U.N. to structure peacekeeping forces more effectively. (The United States has not "earmarked" troops in advance for the system, but has provided a list of specific military capabilities that could be made available for peacekeeping operations.)

The Secretary-General's RRF proposal raises many concerns among U.N. Member States, particularly whether it is politically desirable and financially feasible. A February 1995 consensus statement of the U.N. Security Council on the Secretary-General's report did not specifically mention the rapid reaction force proposal. It stressed the "importance of improving the capacity of the U.N. for rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations," and stated that the first priority "should be the further enhancement of the existing standby arrangements...."

There are many factors -- and problems -- to be considered in creating an effective "on-call" rapid reaction force. Among these are how to provide effective command and control, intelligence collection and processing, and adequate, cost-effective logistics support. For the United States, there are broad strategic, budgetary, political, and military implications, as well. The Clinton Administration has opposed the idea of a RRF because it would reduce the flexibility of U.S. strategic planning, and could compromise the United States' ability to respond to other crises. The United States might be called upon to bear a significant part of the cost of maintaining a RRF, which could be high, but must be weighed against savings that might accrue from having a force to deploy before conflict escalates and becomes more costly to contain. Among the domestic political considerations of establishing an RRF is the possible reduction of congressional and other domestic input into the decision-making process on peacekeeping operations. Among the issues for the U.S. military is whether the U.N. would rely on the United States' unique lift capabilities to deploy the RRF.

## **ABSTRACT**

This report, completed in June 1995, discusses the content and context of the January 1995 proposal by then-United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that U.N. Member States consider the creation of a special rapid reaction force to perform U.N. peacekeeping operations. It contains brief background information on similar proposals and a description of the current UN "standby forces" system. It reviews the concerns and issues raised by the Boutros-Ghali proposal, including political acceptability, financing, and the problems of force design and operation. It concludes with an analysis of the strategic, budgetary, political and military implications for the United States. This report will not be updated.

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# A U.N. Rapid Reaction Force? A Discussion of the Issues and Considerations for U.S. Policymakers

## Introduction

U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's recent call for U.N. Member States to consider the creation of a special force to perform U.N. peacekeeping operations has provoked renewed scrutiny of U.N. capabilities to promote global peace and security. In the early 1990s, similar proposals for creating a U.N. force dedicated to peace operations were made by President George Bush, former President Ronald Reagan, and presidential candidate William Clinton.<sup>1</sup> The concept of a special U.N. force appealed to U.S. policymakers at that time as a means to share the burden with other nations for dealing with conflicts and promoting international stability. As questions were raised about the United Nations' ability to serve U.S. interests in conducting peacekeeping operations, the Clinton Administration backed away from the concept. In its May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), the Administration stated that the United States "does not support a standing U.N. army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in U.N. operations."

Nevertheless, Members of Congress have raised questions about the proposal. This report was written to provide background on the proposal and to clarify some points that U.S. policymakers would need to consider in judging its possible merits.

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<sup>1</sup> In a September 1992 address to the United Nations General Assembly, then-President George Bush recommended that nations develop and train military units specifically for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief, and make them available at short notice when requested by the Security Council. That December, in an address to the Oxford Union Society, former President Ronald Reagan suggested that nations "work toward a standing U.N. force--an army of conscience--that is fully equipped and prepared to carve out human sanctuaries through force if necessary."

As a presidential candidate, William J. Clinton suggested exploring the idea of a "UN Rapid Deployment Force that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression; preventing mass violence against civilian populations; providing humanitarian relief; and combatting terrorism. It would not be a large standing army but rather a small force that could be called up from units of national armed forces and earmarked and trained in advance." See: Vital Speeches, Vol LVIII, no. 14, May 1, 1992, p 424.

## **The Proposal: History, Context, Content and Rationale<sup>2</sup>**

In a report issued in early January 1995, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali invited international attention to the idea of creating a "rapid reaction force" that would be on call to the United Nations.<sup>3</sup> In a single short paragraph, the Secretary-General proposed that the United Nations consider establishing a "strategic reserve" rapid reaction force of units, perhaps of battalion size, to deploy when emergency needs for peacekeeping troops arise. They would be contributed by an unspecified number of countries and "would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment" and participate in joint exercises at regular intervals. They would be stationed in their home countries but maintained at a high state of readiness. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized that a rapid reaction force would be "a complicated and expensive arrangement," but argued that the time had come to undertake it.<sup>4</sup>

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that he had concluded "that the United Nations does need to give serious thought to the idea" after his problems in mounting an expanded U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda mandated by the Security Council in May 1994. None of the 19 governments that had agreed to have troops available on a standby basis (see next section), agreed to contribute forces for Rwanda.<sup>5</sup>

In proposing the rapid reaction force, Boutros-Ghali specifically stated that it would be used for *peacekeeping* missions. The term "peacekeeping" is sometimes used as a generic term for many types of peace operations, with a wide range of risk, but, for the United Nations, it has come to acquire a specific meaning. As defined

<sup>2</sup> Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in International Relations.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations. Secretary-General. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992- ). Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. New York, United Nations, 1995. P. 11. (United Nations [document] A/50/60; S/1995/1). Hereinafter cited as United Nations document A/50/60.

<sup>4</sup> The framers of the U.N. Charter anticipated the need for the U.N. Security Council to have armed forces, assistance, and equipment available on its request although not for "peacekeeping," which was not provided for in the Charter. Article 43 of the Charter stated that U.N. Member States were to conclude agreements with the Council specifying the numbers and types of forces, degree of readiness, and conditions under which personnel and equipment would be provided for enforcement actions. These agreements were never negotiated, although the U.N.'s Military Staff Committee formulated 41 draft articles encompassing basic principles to govern the organization of U.N. armed forces. For background and discussion, see: Goodrich, Leland M., Edvard Hambro and Anne P. Simons. Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents. Third and revised ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Pp. 314-326.

<sup>5</sup> Over the past two years, there have been a number of significant delays in placing forces in the field after the Council had set up or expanded the mandate and size of an operation. For example, on Feb. 5, 1993, the Security Council, in S/RES/806 (1993), increased the mandate of the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) and expanded the size of the operation to include three infantry battalions. One infantry battalion was not fully deployed until January 1994, nearly a year later.

by, Boutros-Ghali in his June 1992 "An Agenda for Peace" report, peacekeeping refers to the presence of U.N. personnel, with the consent of all parties concerned, to create and maintain conditions conducive to a political settlement by the parties in conflict. These are generally viewed as relatively safe operations, in contrast to *peace enforcement* operations, which take place in situations where not all parties have agreed to a U.N. presence. (See appendix I for definitions of peacekeeping and other types of peace operations.) The Clinton Administration views the Secretary-General's terminology and intent as limiting the use of the proposed rapid reaction force to the traditional U.N. peacekeeping operations. From the context of the proposal in the Secretary-General's report, other States may interpret the proposed uses of the force differently.

The January 1995 document is the first major report in which Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has supported a "rapid reaction force" by name. In two proposals contained in his June 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, he recommended Security Council action that might have resulted in a rapid reaction force-type capability.<sup>6</sup> First, in an effort to secure the "ready availability of armed forces on call," Boutros-Ghali recommended that the Security Council initiate the negotiations called for in Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, to make special agreements with Member States to provide the Security Council with armed forces, assistance, and facilities on a permanent basis. Such agreements would enable the Council to take military action under Chapter VII, Article 42 of the U.N. Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security.<sup>7</sup> Boutros-Ghali expected these forces would respond to "outright aggression, imminent or actual," but predicted they were "not likely to be available for some time to come."

His second proposal sought to respond to the more likely situation in which a cease-fire had been agreed to, but not complied with. This case might require a larger force, which he called a Peace Enforcement Unit (PEU), to assist or replace those engaged in monitoring the cease-fire. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended that the Security Council consider the use of such "peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance." PEUs, available on call, would consist of volunteer troops from member states who would be more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces, and would need extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation would be under the authority of the Security Council and under the command of the Secretary-General.

While these proposals have been discussed, they have not mustered sufficient support for Security Council implementation. Instead, the Secretary-General has focused on the implementation of a third proposal of his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* -- a U.N. Standby Forces System.

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<sup>6</sup> United Nations. Secretary-General (Boutros-Ghali, 1992- ). *An Agenda for Peace*; preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on Jan. 31, 1992. New York, United Nations, 1992. P. 12-13. (United Nations [document] A/47/277; S/24111). Hereinafter cited as United Nations document A/47/277.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations [document] A/47/277, p. 12-13.

## Current U.N. Standby Forces System<sup>8</sup>

The United Nations is in the process of obtaining commitments from Member States for individuals and units that they could make available for U.N. peacekeeping in a short period of time. Developed since early 1993 by a special planning team, the Standby Forces System is intended to enable the United Nations to design coherent forces for a full peacekeeping operation, which can number into the tens of thousands. Participating States are expected to provide promised individuals and units within seven days to four weeks of a U.N. request, depending on their function. Units would be deployed for a six-month period and individuals for one year. Member States would be able to decide, on a case by case basis, whether to deploy these troops when requested.

As of early May 1995, 41 countries had expressed their willingness to participate in standby arrangements with the United Nations, and two of them have entered into formal agreements. At least two countries, the United States and Germany, have publicly announced they will not " earmark " troops in advance under the standby system initiative. The total number of troops promised to the system, formally or informally, may reach some 75,000 when agreements are completed. Those offered cover a broad range of military specialties. On Jan. 5, 1995, Jordan became the first country to sign a formal standby arrangement agreement with the United Nations. In its Memorandum of Understanding, Jordan pledged to earmark "civilian and military specialists and civilian police" to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. On May 9, 1995, Denmark became the second country to conclude a memorandum of understanding, pledging to provide military personnel and resources.

To assist the United Nations in its planning under the standby arrangements system data base, the United States has provided a list of "specific military capabilities that could be made available for peacekeeping operations." These include: (1) strategic airlift and sealift; (2) logistics, including logistics headquarters support; (3) strategic communications, medical, engineer, information (intelligence), and civil affairs and psychological operations support; (4) contracting and contract management services; and (5) personnel support for U.N. headquarters staff functions.

Although the United States declined to formally commit troops to the Standby Forces System, it endorsed the concept as it was being developed. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) of May 3, 1994, which sets forth the Clinton Administration's peace operations policy, recommended that "to eliminate lengthy, potentially disastrous delays after a mission has been authorized" the United Nations establish a data base of "specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations." PDD-25 was issued a month before the U.N. standby arrangements team presented its proposal to Member States.

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<sup>8</sup> Prepared by (name redacted), Special list in International Security Affairs.



According to U.S. officials, the Clinton Administration has encouraged other countries to indicate available forces for inclusion in the data base, with one caveat. The Clinton Administration cautions nations with which the United States has mutual security agreements that any commitments they make to the United Nations should not impair their ability to fulfill those agreements.

PDD-25 also called for other arrangements to speed the deployment of troops. U.S. and U.N. personnel are currently working on one recommendation, the development of pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support and modest air-lift capability for new missions. In preliminary planning stages are arrangements for a trained civilian reserve corps to assist in the administration, management, and execution of U.N. peace operations, and a professional peace operations training program. Another PDD-25 recommendation was the establishment of a rapidly deployable headquarters team.

The Secretary-General's proposal for a stand-by rapid reaction force would seem to differ in two respects from the current stand-by arrangements system. The first difference concerns the discretion that Member States would have to deploy troops on a case-by-case basis. Participation in the current system is voluntary, with Member States able to refuse to deploy forces if they choose. In his January report, however, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that "the value of this arrangement [the rapid reaction force] would of course depend on how far the Security Council could be sure that the force would actually be available in an emergency." This seems to express an intent to make participation in a "rapid reaction" force mandatory, with Member States agreeing to relinquish their right to refuse to deploy if their forces are called upon. The second difference concerns size and purpose of the arrangement. While the standby system provides a data base for a full range of peace operations, the rapid reaction standby arrangement is intended to provide a smaller number of forces for immediate deployment for *peacekeeping* operations.

## **Issues for the United Nations<sup>9</sup>**

The concept of a U.N. standby rapid reaction force, regardless of how it might be translated into reality, would raise a number of concerns among U.N. Member States. The concept would be addressed by more than just the 15 members of the U.N. Security Council because decisions about funding both a rapid reaction force and the possible Secretariat infrastructure accompanying it, would be considered by the U.N. General Assembly.

### **Political Acceptability**

For U.N. Member States, the fundamental issue falls under the rubric of Article 2, paragraph 7 (Article 2 (7)) of the U.N. Charter on non-intervention of the organization in the internal or domestic jurisdiction of individual Member States. Most governments do not view the United Nations as a separate, independent, and interventionist world government, but as a tool to protect their territorial integrity

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<sup>9</sup> Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in International Relations.

and national sovereignty from intervention. The question is whether Member States want the Security Council -- a body of 15 members -- to have automatic access to what might be perceived as a ready-made army that might be used to intervene in their affairs.

### **Initial Response of the Security Council**

On Feb. 22, 1995, the President of the U.N. Security Council read a statement setting forth the Council's consensus views at the end of the first stage of its consideration of the Secretary-General's report. The Council did not refer to the rapid reaction force proposal, but indicated that it shared the Secretary-General's concern on the availability of troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations. It also reiterated the "importance of improving the capacity of the United Nations for rapid deployment and reinforcement of operations." The "first priority in improving the capacity of rapid deployment," the Council stated, "should be the further enhancement of the existing stand-by arrangements..."

On Jan. 18-19, 1995, 42 U.N. members participated in a Security Council discussion on the Secretary-General's report.<sup>10</sup> Representatives from 20 of those nations made some comment or reference to the rapid reaction force proposal. The following comments illustrate the concerns that some U.N. members have with granting the Security Council *carte blanche* authority over such an enterprise. The Indonesian representative, for example, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, said that the idea "required greater clarity concerning the scope and circumstances under which" a rapid reaction force "would be deployed." The proposal, he went on, "needed very careful scrutiny of its cost implications, and even more of the modality of its establishment and use, of the need for consent before such a force might be deployed, and of its command and control structure." The Russian delegate stated that the idea of such a force "would require a very careful examination of a number of issues in connection with the Charter."

The Honduran representative, speaking on behalf of the Central American countries, noted that the Central American countries favored creation of a rapid reaction force, and called for "further clarification of the circumstances in which such a force would be deployed." He continued, "the Council's decision-making process should be as transparent as possible, offering more opportunities for countries affected by the decisions to present their positions before the start of formal consultations." The Brazil delegate doubted that agreement could easily be reached on the rapid reaction force and would not favor creating one before its financial and other implications were thoroughly considered.

On the other hand, the Netherlands representative embraced the proposal, mentioning that their foreign minister had argued in favor of such a force with an all-volunteer, professional U.N. brigade at the service of the Security Council which could be rapidly deployed in a crisis situation. The Latvian delegate welcomed the proposal, observing that Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were setting up a joint peacekeeping force called the BALTBAT. He anticipated that BALTBAT could become a part of the rapid reaction force.

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<sup>10</sup> The following is based on a review of the U.N. press release coverage of that debate.

## Financing Questions

Two major financing questions are raised by the rapid reaction force proposal. One is whether U.N. Member States could reasonably be expected to pay for maintaining and deploying a rapid reaction force. The second is how it would be financed.

**Current Funding Difficulties.** The United Nations already has difficulties collecting funds from Members for peacekeeping operations. Currently, most U.N. peacekeeping operations are funded through special assessed accounts set up by the General Assembly. Although payment of peacekeeping assessments is a legal obligation under Article 17 of the U.N. Charter, U.N. members continue to pay late, (after 30 days of receipt of the bill) or not at all. At the end of 1994, 105 U.N. members, owed nearly \$1.282 billion in outstanding contributions to U.N. peacekeeping accounts for calendar year 1994 and prior years' assessments.

This arrearage has affected the Secretary-General's ability to mount and conduct operations. During July 1994, for example, the cash flow situation for the peacekeeping operations accounts was low enough to compel Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to take a number of emergency measures to reduce or delay expenditure in the peacekeeping operations. These included instructing all peacekeeping missions to reduce expenditures to the maximum extent possible, and postponing all but the most urgent procurement and all but the most essential recruitment.<sup>11</sup> At that time, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali also halted reimbursements to troop-contributing countries.

A major part of the budget for each operation is used to reimburse troop-contributing countries. As of Aug. 31, 1994, the United Nations owed about \$1 billion to some 70 states for their troop and equipment contributions to peacekeeping missions.<sup>12</sup> Many of these countries cannot continue to fund their peacekeeping operations assessments and pay their soldiers participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations for an unlimited time period without reimbursement. Thus, when the Secretary-General seeks forces for another operation or to expand or provide for rotation for an already established operation, he finds some countries reluctant to respond affirmatively.

A potential source of funding, especially for startup or expansion purposes is the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund which was set up in December 1992, with an initial target of \$150 million. The fund received \$65.1 million, but, between November 1993 and October 1994, made loans to four peacekeeping operations totaling \$64.9 million. This has reduced the fund's balance to \$204,353.

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<sup>11</sup> Letter dated July 21, 1994, from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly. United Nations document A/48/973, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Statement by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. General Assembly proceedings for Wednesday, Oct. 12, 1994, 28<sup>th</sup> Meeting. United Nations document A/49/PV.28, p. 20.

Certain other peace and security actions authorized by the Council, such as monitoring sanctions and enforcing no fly zones, are financed by the member states taking part in the action, at no cost to the United Nations. The United States has been an active participant in these peace support operations, but their cost has had a negative impact on the United States' political willingness to support U.N. peace operations.

**Financing a Rapid Reaction Force.** Any decision on financing would include a response to the question: Who will pay for what? One approach might be to divide funding responsibilities for a rapid reaction force between troop contributing governments and the collective U.N. membership. This option would make the determining factor the status of units assigned to the force. When units are stationed in their home country, then their government might be financially responsible for their salaries and upkeep. When they have been deployed and are in the service of the United Nations, then the U.N. might be financially responsible for them. That would still leave open questions about who would fund activities such as joint training exercises, and the purchase of equipment, such as integrated communications equipment.

## Considerations for Force Design<sup>13</sup>

The Secretary-General pointed to two problems in the current design of peacekeeping forces that arguably could be overcome by the creation of an on-call rapid reaction force: a lack of "interoperability" and the slowness of deployments. Because U.N. peacekeeping forces are drawn from over 30 countries, they often lack interoperability, i.e., the ability to provide mutual support and act effectively together. Interoperability and response time problems might be substantially reduced, if, as envisioned by the Secretary-General, peacekeeping forces regularly trained together, used the same equipment, and were available for immediate deployment. Such a rapid reaction force could reduce the tactical and operational level difficulties in command, coordination, and communication that have faced U.N. commanders in the past. There are, however, many problems unique to designing peacekeeping forces that lead some to argue that a "predesignated" rapid reaction force might be no more efficient than the current system.

One problem common to all military operations, but more troublesome in the case of peace operations, is determining the size and composition of a military force needed to fulfill the missions it is to perform and the objectives it is to achieve. In the case of the Secretary-General's proposal, both the size and the missions are unclear. The Secretary-General has stated that the force would be used "when there was an emergency need for peacekeeping," but has not specified a total size for the rapid reaction peacekeeping force. He suggested only that it "might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries," which could mean anywhere from

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<sup>13</sup> Prepared by Steven R. Bowman, Analyst in National Defense.

under 10,000 to over 20,000 troops<sup>14</sup> Whether that would be adequate would depend on what type of "peace" mission was envisioned.

## **Design Problems Created by the Nature of Peacekeeping Operations**

For *peacekeeping* operations, a situation where a stable truce is in place and troops are deployed to prevent or contain an inadvertent outbreak of hostilities or to oversee the fulfillment of a peace settlement, mission objectives are likely to be fairly clear, as is the composition of the force required. Lightly armed, well-disciplined infantry units generally suffice. In more complicated *peace enforcement* situations that are still politically and militarily volatile, the number and complexity of the tasks required multiplies significantly (see appendix I). This in turn increases personnel and equipment requirements. If only initial peacekeeping deployments or the simplest of peacekeeping operations were undertaken with the proposed rapid reaction force, then a force of 10,000 to 20,000 could be adequate. But, for more ambitious operations, significantly greater numbers would probably be required.<sup>15</sup>

On paper, *peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement* operations present very different missions and objectives, but in practice this distinction is not as clear. Most military analysts emphasize that peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be considered as adjacent points on a sliding scale of escalation, but rather as wholly different operations requiring very different force design from the outset. Yet, what start out as "peacekeeping operations" do escalate, often because international and domestic political considerations have resulted in overly optimistic initial assessments of a situation to which forces are deployed.<sup>16</sup> Further, the Security Council's multiple mandates authorizing recent peace operations, and the political/military realities encountered by U.N. forces on the ground, have served to blur the distinction. These factors have sometimes led to inadequate or inappropriate force composition for assigned missions and objectives, and could well continue to present problems for an "on call" force.

Other military factors in designing a force package for any peace operation -- including the nature of potentially hostile forces, weather, terrain, and local infrastructure -- present significant challenges to those creating a rapid reaction force

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<sup>14</sup> The size of a battalion usually varies between 400 to 1,000 troops, depending on the country and the battalion's specialty. As of Jan. 31, 1995, 23 countries contributed over 1,000 troops to U.N. operations, and nine more contributed between 400-1,000. Most proposals currently advocated tend to focus on a force of about 10,000 troops, a size that is generally thought to reflect more what is politically attainable than what may be needed operationally.

<sup>15</sup> By way of comparison, over 36,000 U.N. troops are currently deployed in the former Yugoslavia, in addition to 4,000 personnel in Italy providing air support, and 17 naval vessels in the Adriatic.

<sup>16</sup> The former Yugoslavia and Somalia stand out as examples where humanitarian/peacekeeping operations began with limited objectives, and incrementally became involved in peace enforcement combat operations. This led to a mismatch of U.N. mandates and available forces, and significant tensions among U.N. and associated commanders.

design before knowing its destination or mission. Some, including NATO's former Supreme Commander General John Galvin, have argued against a designated standby force on the grounds that forces must be custom-tailored to a particular operation. Most military analysts judge it less risky for both personnel and the success of the mission to provide appropriate forces at the outset, rather than have to augment, re-structure, or replace the intervention force at a later date.<sup>17</sup>

Several other reservations and criticisms are expressed concerning the use of "predesignated" standby forces rather than continuing with an improving ad hoc system. These are described below.

### **Interoperability**

Although some interoperability problems would undoubtedly be solved by an "on-call" rapid reaction force, others may not. Proponents of a standby force emphasize the desirability of standardized equipment within U.N. forces, particularly in the area of communications. The creation of a rapid reaction force would facilitate standardization. (Identical equipment is not so important as compatibility of equipment and related fuels and ammunition, and procedures and training.) Although there is little question that incompatible equipment or donated equipment unfamiliar to participating troops has created difficulties at the tactical and operational levels, analysts do not agree on whether -- aside from communication reforms currently under way -- standardized equipment procurement could realistically be achieved.

### **Political Considerations**

The United Nations has traditionally designed its forces to ensure participation by units from many nations as a means of maintaining a credible international mandate. It most likely would also give great weight to political considerations in the composition of a rapid reaction force. Yet, critics of U.N. operations believe that the United Nations' desire for broad participation in its forces has hindered operational effectiveness, and there may be added drawbacks to the effectiveness of an "on-call" force. For instance, regional and cultural sensitivities as well as political factors could preclude participation by some national units in certain operations.

### **Affordability**

Many Member States may not be able to afford to retain units intended primarily for peacekeeping. For one, in long-term operations, U.S. forces have a general rule of thumb, that for every unit deployed there is a second unit preparing for deployment, and a third returning and refurbishing. Although the ratio would vary from nation to nation, and would depend on the number and length of deployments, a commitment of one unit to a rapid reaction force might actually mean a commitment of two or more units.

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<sup>17</sup> Dennehy, Capt. Edward, et. Al. A Blue Helmet Combat Force. Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Policy Analysis Paper 93-01.

Though now often volunteered for U.N. operations, some national contingents are never adequately equipped when they arrive. Because some nations cannot afford to adequately equip their own forces, some analysts suggest that only those nations able to field competently led and adequately equipped units be permitted to participate in a rapid reaction force. The drawback to this approach, aside from narrowing international representation, is that it would increase the burden on a relative handful of U.N. members, primarily the Security Council Permanent Five and the nations of Western Europe, who can field such forces.

### **Significant Net Gain?**

The numerous difficulties in designing a rapid reaction force cause some analysts to question whether the interoperability advantages of such a force would offset disadvantages and whether such a force would be a significant improvement over the standby forces system that is currently being developed. Critics argue that the benefits of a rapid-reaction stand-by force are gained primarily at the tactical and operational level, and are actually marginal to the overall success of a U.N. peace operation, regardless of its mission.<sup>18</sup> They find that slow response, disparate units, and incompatible equipment have never been at the heart of a U.N. operation's failure, but that failures have rather stemmed from other factors.

Some also question whether significant time would actually be saved by having a rapid reaction force on call. Analysts have pointed out that while straightforward peacekeeping missions are the easiest to respond to quickly (fewer troops, less equipment), they are most often the missions in which response in a matter of one or two days is not critical, that offer the opportunity for significant advance planning, and present little problem in raising troops. If a truce or peace settlement is underway, a small initial U.N. presence has generally been adequate until the main body of troops has arrived.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, while rapid insertion of U.N. forces to enforce a peace could be very desirable at times, the heavier ground combat contingents required for this type of operation take the greatest time to tailor and transport. In addition, these are precisely the operations that many nations would not choose to have an "on-call" rapid reaction force perform.

## **Considerations for Force Operations**

### **Command and Control<sup>20</sup>**

A U.N. rapid reaction force (RRF), no matter how constituted, would require effective command and control to achieve its peacekeeping objectives. Having a good command and control system would become more critical for those crises that

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<sup>18</sup> Diehl, Paul F. *International Peacekeeping*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1993. P. 118. See also, chapter III, especially pp. 67-69, 90, and chapter V., pp. 113-119.

<sup>19</sup> Diehl, p. 116.

<sup>20</sup> Prepared by Ed Bruner, Specialist in National Defense.

were time-sensitive or militarily risky. There are a number of possible solutions, each with pros and cons, in regard to potential military effectiveness and political acceptability. Although possible, the idea of commanding with an "international committee," a group of military officers from different countries, would most likely be rejected in favor of the more proven concept of unified command under a single individual -- especially when the likelihood of combat requires a capability for making hard and rapid decisions. A single commander for multinational forces is recommended under current U.S. joint doctrine. Who that commander should be will likely be the most contentious part of the command and control debate.

**Leadership.** Three possible options for providing the RRF commander are:

- The RRF commander could be a professional soldier appointed indefinitely on a full-time basis by the Security Council and/or Secretary-General to serve at their pleasure. Advantages are that the individual selected could mold his staff and RRF training to his standards, provide institutional stability and continuity, and become a true peacekeeping professional ready for immediate deployment. Disadvantages are that he could become "captive" to the U.N. bureaucracy and politics, and become removed from his military roots. For such reasons, at a given time of crisis he might not enjoy the confidence of the RRF contributing states, the parties to the regional conflict, or the U.S. Congress;
- The RRF commander could be appointed on a rotating basis, perhaps annually, from among qualified officers belonging to forces of the troop contributing states. Such an arrangement could ensure some continuity of leadership, without as much U.N. political baggage. This arrangement would likely seem fair and workable to most, but -- as in any lottery -- the wrong crisis could occur on the wrong officer's watch;
- The RRF commander could be selected from a qualified pool at the time of crisis. This could ensure designation of a commander all parties would have confidence in, barring political obstructiveness for other reasons. This commander might not be as immediately available or prepared for his role as the permanent or rotating commander, but measures such as briefings and training could be instituted by the United Nations and contributing states to keep all potential candidates adequately prepared.

Selection of the commander is important, but provides only part of the command and control system. Two other important components of that system are communications and the commander's staff.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> For background information, see CRS Report 94-487, Military Command, Control, and Communications: Basic Facts and Selected Issues of C3.



**Communications.** The successful RRF commander must have reliable communications. He must have equipment with global capabilities in order to talk with U.N. headquarters, selected supporting nations, and any external intelligence sources he is authorized. He should provide or otherwise ensure communications downward to all his major subordinate headquarters. He will desire the capability to access regional communications systems or provide nets that allow him to talk with key regional actors, including the major non-U.N. protagonists.

There are several possible sources of communications for the RRF commander. The United Nations could purchase and maintain a mobile set of communications for deploying with the RRF. One or more nations could provide tailored communications companies or battalions as their contribution to the RRF. In the case of *ad hoc* selections of commanders, the nation supplying the RRF commander might also provide some or all of his communications. In many cases, however, the most desirable and responsive communications components would be beyond the capabilities of most nations to provide on short notice; some capabilities might reside only with NATO or the United States. In the end, some combination of all these sources might be required. Artful design and engineering would be required to ensure a flexible and interoperable system at a reasonable cost. The United States might consider ear-marking communications units as politically less costly than combat unit contributions.

**Staff.** The RRF commander would require a substantial, competent staff to assist him in meeting his many and diverse responsibilities for peacekeeping. As with other elements of command and control, there is a range of sources for such a staff. At the high-competence, high-cost end, the United Nations could maintain a complete, full-time staff ready to go. At the low-cost, riskier end, an *ad hoc* staff could be formed from among the participating countries. A totally *ad hoc* staff would likely be unacceptable, however, since some advance staff planning would be required prior to deployment of the rapid reaction force. Some planning can, of course, be done by the current U.N. military staff, but most of that staff would have to remain in place to handle U.N.-level responsibilities once the rapid reaction force deployed. It is likely, therefore, that at least a cadre staff should be maintained full-time, and fleshed out by various means at the time of crisis.

The "military" side of a standing staff could be relatively lean, as its functions are fairly standard and augmentation could be made easily with officers familiar to the RRF commander or volunteered from the forces of the contributing nations. Certain cells or elements could be plugged in when specific requirements were defined, e.g., for fire support, intelligence exploitation, airspace management, logistics management, etc. The cadre staff would handle the standard functions of administration, intelligence, operations (to include planning and training), and logistics.

The "civilian" side of a standing staff might demand more U.N. resources than the military, since certain unique talents would be required. Here, however, the U.N. might draw on experienced personnel from past U.N. operations, all of which have been provided with a civilian administrative staff by the Secretary-General from among existing U.N. staff. Probable functions needed are legal (to interpret U.N. policies and various laws), public relations and media, finance and administration (to

pay for local acquisition of services and employees, to include interpreters), liaison with key local governmental and non-governmental organizations (to include international NGOs), diplomatic advice and services, and civilian intelligence collection. Some of these functions could be performed by military staffers and specialized units, but they might not be tailored as closely to U.N. procedures and goals. The U.N. is currently seeking to establish a trained civilian reserve corps that could be a low-cost source of skilled augmentees for staffing peacekeeping operations; the Clinton Administration intends to participate in that initiative.

A standing staff cadre, however large or small, would not only contribute to a more rapid response during a crisis, but could also use non-crisis time to enhance the overall effectiveness of future U.N. peacekeeping activities. The total staff could work at developing their procedures and doctrinally melding the military and civilian assets into a seamless peacekeeping capability. They could monitor emerging events and anticipate future unique requirements for the RRF. They could provide mobile training teams to help individual national units prepare for their missions, at the same time becoming more familiar with the capabilities and characteristics of those units.

Some might see a possibility that such an international staff could become too efficient and powerful, perhaps influencing the RRF commander and the Secretary-General in ways opposed to the wishes of the U.S. Congress -- or the cadre could remain professional and apolitical. A staff composed in large part of loaned military personnel could be perceived as less threatening than a staff of permanent U.N. employees, and would probably be less costly.

## **Intelligence<sup>22</sup>**

The establishment of a U.N. rapid reaction force would not necessarily require drastic revisions of current U.N. arrangements and practices regarding intelligence. Rather, a continuation or slight upgrading of current efforts to improve information and intelligence collection and processing would probably be adequate.

Both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have sought to provide better intelligence to U.N. peacekeeping operations and improve intelligence gathering and processing capabilities in support of those operations. One of the widely recognized shortcomings of U.N. operations has been the lack of adequate basic information and intelligence, such as maps and data on the disposition of potentially hostile forces, as occurred in Cambodia. Where more extensive information and intelligence has been available, such as in Somalia, its utility may have been lessened by a lack of precision, or it may not have been transmitted in a timely manner to the force commanders who needed it.<sup>23</sup>

Currently, information and intelligence for U.N. peacekeeping operations is processed at a situation center at U.N. Headquarters in New York, which monitors

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<sup>22</sup> Prepared by Richard A. Best, Jr., Analyst in National Defense

<sup>23</sup> See: U.S. General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions, GAO/NSIAD-94-9, December 1993, p 34, and CRS Report 94-394F, Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements, May 6, 1994.

U.N. peacekeeping operations throughout the world. The situation center, staffed by military officers from several countries, was created in 1993 to maintain a continuous 24-hour a day link with peacekeeping forces. Its intelligence component is supported largely by the U.S. Department of Defense. The United States has donated an intelligence processing system, the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System, to facilitate the transmission and dissemination of information on peacekeeping operations.

The United States provides intelligence to the situation center on a daily and *ad hoc* basis. After interagency coordination to ensure protection of sensitive sources and methods, intelligence from U.S. agencies is forwarded by DOD's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, which then provides it to the situation center. DOD personnel at the U.S. Mission and at the situation center monitor the information transferred, provide feedback on its utility, and frame and facilitate requests for additional information. U.N. Headquarters staff use intelligence from U.S. and other sources to plan peacekeeping operations and to inform peacekeeping personnel in the field.

Data from the U.S. Intelligence Community is provided directly to U.N. peacekeeping forces in two ways. Information and intelligence that is provided to the situation center is forwarded by U.N. officials in New York to the head of the peacekeeping operation. Other data (usually more tactical and time sensitive in nature) is provided by U.S. personnel involved in the peacekeeping operation directly to the local U.N. Commander.

To assist a rapid reaction force, the U.N. situation center could be expanded and its role in preserving a larger database and an institutional memory enhanced. While standing by, the force would probably not require large volumes of current intelligence. Training in using intelligence for peacekeeping operations would be important, as would familiarization with the types of intelligence available, and with standard collection and analysis formats and procedures.

Washington currently has in place a system to weigh the costs and benefits of releasing any intelligence to the United Nations. Those who administer the system are, however, aware that the security of information supplied cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, reports have circulated that classified material from U.S. sources was not only provided to non-U.S. forces in Somalia, but was left behind unprotected when the forces pulled out earlier this year.<sup>24</sup> (Senator Olympia J. Snowe has introduced legislation, S. 420, that would bar the provision to the United Nations of any intelligence information involving sensitive sources and methods of intelligence gathering.) Moreover, it is recognized that countries that cooperate with the United States on one peacekeeping operation may oppose U.S. interests on other occasions. These factors would not change were a rapid reaction force established, unless it were composed of U.S. forces only or of forces from countries with which the U.S. already has a very close intelligence-sharing relationship. A related question might be raised: if the United Nations' were to develop an independent intelligence

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<sup>24</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith. Intelligence documents mishandled in Somalia. Washington Post, Apr. 19, 1995, A26.

gathering capability for a rapid reaction force, might that capability be used someday against U.S. interests?

Some suggest that consideration might be given to establishing U.N. satellites to give the organization an independent collection capability. Such a system would, however, be costly and would probably not provide the capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance systems.

Some might argue that the U.S. role as the main provider of intelligence to U.N. operations may give it leverage over the use of a rapid reaction force, in addition to the United States' Security Council veto. It is impossible, however, to predict the extent to which the United Nations will be dependent on U.S.-supplied intelligence in the future or the extent to which the absence of U.S.-supplied intelligence would hinder a peacekeeping operation. In some areas, other countries have better information and U.S. assistance may not be required.

## **Logistics<sup>25</sup>**

Some argue that the absence of adequate logistics support has presented serious problems for U.N. peacekeeping and observer operations. Whether the creation of a rapid reaction force would significantly alleviate logistics difficulties in carrying out future U.N. peacekeeping missions or be less expensive than the way it was done in the past remains to be seen.

The term "logistics" applies to just about everything needed to arm, equip, and sustain a force to perform its mission. This includes weapons and ammunition, clothing and equipment, transport, rations, communications equipment, spare parts and maintenance, medical care and medical supplies and whatever air and sealift is needed to move the force to where it is needed. It takes about four to six logistics personnel to support each combat soldier on the modern battlefield. The same or somewhat lower ratios would probably be needed for peace operations, including peacekeeping, depending on the type and mission of the deployment.

Having a standby U.N. rapid reaction force might offer many advantages by facilitating a high degree of advance planning, acquisition, and prepositioning of some of the support needed for a typical operation, particularly if a permanent logistics office were established at the United Nations. There is also considerable advantage in knowing the actual makeup of a preplanned force and the equipment it is likely to need, especially if time is of the essence in getting the force in place. Knowing in advance that a unit was likely to be part of a peacekeeping operation would allow unit personnel to become familiar with the kinds of equipment and vehicles they will be working with, even if there is not enough equipment to actually issue on a permanent basis. Support personnel would have time to learn how to maintain equipment and order repair parts through a common supply system.

There would also be logistics disadvantages associated with having a standby force. Military planners in every country have a penchant for planning for every eventuality rather than risk being criticized for forgetting something once the

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<sup>25</sup> Prepared by James P. Wooten, Specialist in National Defense

operation is under way. The result might be costly overstocking and wastage supplies and materiel. Some effort and material would also be wasted on units that would never be called upon, either because they were not needed or their government reneged on its commitment once an emergency arose. Supplies might also be repositioned in the wrong place and not be available when the force deploys.

Other logistics problems arise from the major differences in the status of training and the quality and sophistication of equipment belonging to each unit. Because of these differences, support can not always be tailored to accommodate all forces. Logistics support, however, must be reasonably compatible with the needs of the entire military force or commanders can expect breakdowns in performance or efficiency.

Some analysts argue that United Nations logistics capabilities can be improved even if a rapid reaction force is not created. A more efficient military planning cell within U.N. headquarters which would include expanded logistics planning might be created. Efforts to arrange logistics contracts with private contractors might be intensified.

## Considerations for the United States

### Strategic, Budgetary and Political Considerations<sup>26</sup>

For the United States, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's proposal presents many practical and political problems. The Clinton Administration opposes the idea of a rapid reaction standby force for the same reasons that it has declined formally to commit units to the standby forces system described earlier. It would reduce the flexibility of U.S. **strategic** planning. In an Apr. 14, 1994, statement, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Karl F. Inderfurth indicated that a formal commitment to the standby forces system was "impractical" given U.S. bilateral and multilateral security obligations worldwide. Such a commitment might reduce U.S. ability to respond to other crises by tying up U.S. forces or eliminating the U.S. capacity to withdraw its troops from a lesser priority peacekeeping operation to a crisis of higher priority to U.S. interests. In some circumstances, this lack of flexibility might lessen the deterrent effect of U.S. force.

Some claim, however, that a standby rapid reaction force would, in effect, give the United Nations a saber to rattle, provide a greater deterrent to third world conflicts, and thus serve U.S. strategic interests. It might also give "teeth" to other U.N. actions taken to stem conflicts, such as sanctions, even before such a force was deployed. In such a case, a standby force would provide a greater "force multiplier" than current arrangements for multilateral peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, the existence of a committed standby force might tempt the U.N. Security Council and others to resort to its use more quickly, in cases where other measures might be more appropriate.

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<sup>26</sup> Prepared by (name redacted), Special list in International Security Affairs.

Questions can be raised about the potential effect of a standby rapid reaction force on the development of regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping initiatives. The U.N. Charter states that the settlement of disputes should be dealt with, where appropriate, at the regional level. The existence of a standby rapid reaction force might provide an inducement for U.N. Security Council to preempt regional efforts because it had more efficient means to deal with problems, thus debilitating regional efforts and organizations. On the other hand, the U.N. Security Council might offer to use a rapid reaction force to back regional efforts, thus strengthening them.

Because of the uncertainty of the cost of such a force, **budgetary** considerations are a matter of extreme concern. The actual cost to the United States of a U.N. rapid reaction force would depend, of course, on the force's structure, its uses, and how funding responsibilities would be divided between contributing countries and the collective U.N. membership. Some argue that the cost to individual nations of maintaining a few thousand men and their equipment exclusively for peacekeeping would be high. While that cost might be absorbable for the United States and other industrialized countries, it could be taxing, if not exorbitant, for developing countries. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the United States and other wealthy countries might find themselves called upon to underwrite the cost of the standby units offered by others.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials and other opponents concede proponents' point that the capacity to deploy peacekeeping troops more quickly could prevent the escalation of conflicts in some cases, which could make it not only desirable for humanitarian reasons but also cost-effective. Some argue that many lives might have been saved if peacekeeping forces had gone in sooner in Rwanda and, initially, in greater force in Somalia, although others doubt that greater speed or numbers would have significantly altered the course of events.

There are domestic **political** implications for the United States, as well. Although the United States maintains the power in the U.N. Security Council to veto or alter proposed peacekeeping operations, a U.S. commitment to a rapid reaction force might well reduce congressional and other domestic input into the decision-making process on peacekeeping operations. Although perhaps not problematic if the use of the rapid reaction force were confined to simpler peacekeeping operations, commitments to "borderline" cases might raise controversy.

This could become a greater problem if the United States needed to draw on reserve units to fulfill its peacekeeping commitments. The U.S. military maintains a high proportion of the military personnel who perform support functions in the reserve forces. These are the very specialties that the United States typically provides the United Nations for peacekeeping operations. Thus, there may be circumstances in which it would be necessary to draw on reserves to fulfill U.S. peacekeeping commitments.

## Military Considerations

**Airlift and Sealift**<sup>27</sup>. Because the United States stands alone in terms of being able to move troops and equipment in emergency situations, it is likely that the United States would be asked to perform the bulk of the airlift mission and, possibly, the sealift mission as well. The United States has provided such support for NATO allies on many occasions and has provided aircraft support for virtually every past and ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operation without major adverse incident or criticism. Other nations have large commercial maritime assets, but none has the ability to move entire military units together with their weapons and equipment like the United States, with its standing fleet of fast sealift ships with roll-on/roll-off capability.

Moving a large military force and its equipment under short notice is a complex and costly operation, especially when the force must deploy quickly. This is especially true when moving a combat force into a hostile environment, and by every measure the task becomes more difficult and costly as the force gets larger and the expected level of combat intensity increases. It would not be difficult to move the rapid reaction force suggested by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali if it were limited to the more traditional type of *peacekeeping* mission. However, air and sealifting a large multinational combat force into actively hostile conditions may be unacceptably risky under present circumstances.

**U.S. Forces Considerations**<sup>28</sup>. The United States would face a number of issues in deciding what types of military forces to commit to a rapid reaction force and how to structure its forces to accommodate that commitment. An important decision would be whether troops committed to the rapid reaction force would also perform other missions or whether special, dedicated peacekeeping units would be formed whose primary mission would be to train for and perform peacekeeping operations. (Boutros-Ghali's proposal that these troops train together might indicate his preference for dedicated units. Current U.S. peacekeeping policy, as stated in PDD-25, explicitly excludes the possibility of creating dedicated peacekeeping units.) Current debate over the effects of peace operations on military skills, on career potential, and on recruitment and retention, will be relevant to that decision.

A critical factor in maintaining war fighting skills is continual training. With the increase in peace operations in the early 1990s, some military analysts claimed that peace operations did not require war fighting skills and took away from the time necessary for practicing such skills, thus threatening the readiness of the fighting force. Analysts now concede that these missions provide troops with the opportunity to perform and refine some skills that would be employed during a war.

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<sup>27</sup> Prepared by James Wootten, Specialist in National Defense

<sup>28</sup> Prepared by Patrice K. Curtis, Analyst in Developing Countries

Maneuvering skills, running observations posts and checkpoints, employing cordon and searches, and disarming potential combatants illustrate some of the techniques that soldiers have had an opportunity to use in "real world" situations. In Somalia, for example, cordon and search techniques were used for the first time since Vietnam. Nonetheless, these same observers argue that many critical combat skills are not used during peace operations, such as the use of heavy weapons systems.

One particular problem for some units is that the effective operation of weapons systems -- particularly marksmanship skills -- deteriorates substantially without continued training. While "sustainment" training can be undertaken after troops are deployed on a peacekeeping mission, live fire training may be offensive to a host country or to other multilateral forces. Opponents to peace operations claim that, in such cases, training would be terminated, further lessening opportunities for troops to exercise weapons skills.

Another problem would be maintaining military staff and unit operations skills in troop movement. Troop maneuvering during peace operations is generally limited to squads or platoons. In the event of a Major Regional Contingency (a conflict of the size of the Korean, Vietnam, or Persian Gulf Wars), the movements of U.S. troops are likely to be at a battalion level or above. Staffs must therefore be able to move battalion-size or larger units, as well as integrate other elements of military power such as the use of aircraft, naval gunfire, and artillery. Peace operations usually do not provide an opportunity to exercise these skills.

In addition, peace operations require specialized training that can take time from combat and other military training. Need for additional peace operations skills have been identified, which may place greater training requirements on forces deployed for peacekeeping operations. These include: commander training in conflict negotiation and mediation; staff training to emphasize cooperation with diverse militaries and organizations; and training for all military personnel in a basic understanding of the customs, cultures, religious practices, politics, and historical background of the country or countries involved. Additional training, therefore, may be required depending on the specific needs of the mission. Military planners generally regard four to six weeks of such specialized training as necessary to prepare troops for peace operations.

The problems of maintaining certain combat skills during peace operations, particularly in peacekeeping operations, and the requirements for additional training may argue for the creation of dedicated units for a rapid reaction force. The utility and cost-effectiveness of dedicated units would depend to some extent on the type of forces committed and the number and length of deployments.

Another problem for creating dedicated peacekeeping units may be difficulties in attracting and retaining military personnel. There are already many questions about the effect of peace operations on a military officer's career advancement, and on the retention of troops, and these factors would have to be taken into consideration.



## Appendix I: Defining Peace Operations

As both the number and type of U.N. peace operations have multiplied, the U.S. Army has constructed a matrix to provide both a conceptual and practical framework for force design. It demonstrates the very different demands placed upon forces engaged in different types of peace operations.

<b>Peace Operations</b>	
<b>Type</b>	<b>Missions</b>
<p><b>Peace Making</b></p> <p>Also known as "conflict resolution." Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, i.e., through negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means.</p>	<p>Military-to military liaison, security assistance, preventive deployment, show of force.</p>
<p><b>Peacekeeping</b></p> <p>The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all parties concerned, to allow contending forces that wish to stop fighting to separate with some confidence that they will not be attacked in order to create conditions conducive to a political settlement. Normally involves United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.</p>	<p>Monitor existing peace arrangements.</p>
<p><b>Peace Enforcement</b></p> <p>Actions taken when traditional peacekeeping is not sufficient to keep the peace or when the safety of peacekeeping forces is threatened by actions of one or more parties to the conflict. Differs from peacekeeping in that it allows forces to use measured but sufficient force to restore peaceful conditions after peace has been broken or peacekeeping forces threatened. It usually is taken without the full consent of one or more parties to the conflict.</p>	<p>Application of armed force to compel compliance, forcible separation of belligerents, restore order, guarantee/deny mobility, establish protected zones, protect humanitarian assistance.</p>
<p><b>Peace Building</b></p> <p>Actions taken to forestall future eruptions between the parties to the conflict. Includes disarming warring parties, controlling and destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training and supporting security personnel, monitoring elections, promoting human rights practices, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting political participation.</p>	<p>Restore civil authority, rebuild infrastructure.</p>

*Sources:* Adapted from a chart of peace operations missions prepared by the Department of the Army. Descriptions of peace operations purposes and activities are taken from *Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Activities: A Discussion of Terminology*, by (name redacted), CRS Report 93-1017 S, Nov. 26, 1993.

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