

RADIO MARTI

ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB83105
UPDATED 05/22/84

AUTHOR:

Joel M. Woldman

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM

DATE ORIGINATED 06/21/83

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700

0523

ISSUE DEFINITION

S. 602, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act passed by both the Senate and House and signed into law by President Reagan on Oct. 4, 1983 as P.L. 98-111, provides for the establishment of a special, new, semi-autonomous Cuban service within the Voice of America (VOA). The proposed broadcasting, informally called "Radio Marti" after a nineteenth century Cuban nationalist hero, is intended mainly to provide news to Cuba about Cuba, particularly news not reported by Cuba's state-controlled media. It is now expected that limited regular Radio Marti broadcasts 4 hours each day to Cuba by the VOA will begin in late summer or early fall 1984.

Proponents of Radio Marti see it as an important foreign policy initiative in the respected tradition of RFE/RL, designed to promote the gradual evolution of the Cuban system by providing Cubans with objective information about their country and denying the Communist regime there its monopoly of public information. They considered the absence of an RFE/RL equivalent for Cuba as a major weakness in U.S. policy towards Latin America. Opposition to Radio Marti centers on the possible impact on domestic U.S. broadcasting interests of Cuban retaliatory measures, but some opponents also see the proposal as essentially propagandistic and counterproductive. Critics maintain that such broadcasting will complicate efforts to resolve long-standing broadcast interference problems with Cuba through negotiations, and might provoke retaliatory broadcasting that could prove detrimental to U.S. commercial radio interests. They also fear that the establishment of Radio Marti will further worsen U.S.-Cuban relations in general and argue that Cubans already have alternative radio sources of world news and entertainment. Concerns have also been raised about the cost of the program and of proposals to compensate U.S. private broadcasters for capital costs incurred to overcome the effects of present and future Cuban radio interference.

BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS

BACKGROUND

In June, 1983, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported out H.R. 5427, legislation to provide for radio broadcasting to Cuba, similar to legislation that had passed the House by a large margin in 1982 and had also been favorably reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but failed to come to a vote on the Senate floor in 1982. All versions of Radio Marti legislation had the same general purpose: to enable the United States to "provide for the open communication of information and ideas through the use of radio broadcasting to Cuba." The intent of radio broadcasting to Cuba, as expressed in all such proposals, was to further "the open communication of accurate information and ideas to the people of Cuba, in particular information about Cuba." Standards for the broadcasts were to be the same as those set for any other programs of the U.S. Information Agency's international broadcasting service, the Voice of America (VOA): "to serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective and comprehensive news."

In 1982, Congress amended legislation requested by the Administration to provide for oversight of any Radio Marti operations by the U.S. Board for

International Broadcasting (BIB), which has overseen and provided U.S. Government funds by grant to Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) since 1973. These stations, on which Radio Marti was modeled, seek to serve as a "surrogate home service" to the people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively. They provide information about those countries unavailable from their own government-controlled media. RFE and RL are not, however, governed by the VOA standards of objectivity, but have developed their own standards.

The Administration had intended Radio Marti to be operated by Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., an independent, non-profit corporation incorporated in September 1981, with funding from the Federal Government and perhaps some private sources. However, in response to concerns about how objective broadcasts under Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., would be, Congress specified that Radio Marti observe VOA stand be overseen by the BIB, in legislation reported in 1982. The House Foreign Affairs Committee bill specifically prohibited grants to Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., or any other corporation established to provide radio broadcasting to Cuba unless that corporation provided in its certificate of incorporation that its board of directors was the BIB and that the BIB would make all major policy decisions.

It also gave the BIB a choice of methods for broadcasting to Cuba -- either through grants to, or leases or contracts with a single entity with the sole purpose of broadcasting news to Cuba, commercial radio stations, or non-commercial educational stations, or other such means as the BIB determines would be effective. The only limitation imposed was that any broadcasting to Cuba on the medium wave (AM) radio band (between 535 kHz and 1605 kHz) other than leased time on commercial or non-commercial stations would have to be transmitted on the frequency used by the Voice of America (VOA) for its broadcasts.

The practical effect of these provisions was that broadcasting would either have been (1) on the VOA's medium wave AM frequency for broadcasting to the Caribbean region (now 1180 kHz), (2) over the AM frequencies of existing stations with which the BIB might enter into contract for the purposes of carrying its broadcasts, (3) over the short-wave band, and/or (4) at the fringes of the medium wave (AM) band -- below 535 kHz or above 1605 kHz. The House Energy and Commerce Committee version of H.R. 2453, and S. 602 provided two different proposals for placing Radio Marti programming under the auspices of the VOA. The House Energy and Commerce Committee bill simply mandated that any broadcasting to Cuba transmitted by any means but over a shortwave frequency be part of VOA programming. S. 602, however, provided for the establishment of a new Cuban service within the VOA framework.

The special Cuban service which S. 602 establishes will apparently be more autonomous than other VOA divisions as its chief and staff would be appointed by the Director of the United States Information Agency, of which VOA is a part, and the chief would report directly to both the head of the VOA and the USIA Director. S. 602 also mandated a special budget for the Cuban service of \$14 million in FY84, \$11 million in FY85, and no less than \$11 million thereafter. Although not specified in the bill, discussion on the floor of the Senate indicated that the Cuban service would be expected to broadcast 14.5 hours per day.

Much of the controversy over the original proposal in the 97th Congress resulted from the Administration's plans that Radio Marti would broadcast at

50 kilowatts on 1040 kHz. This, however, was the same frequency as a "clear channel" station, WHO, in Des Moines, Iowa, and the same frequency that Cuba had earlier claimed for a planned very high power (500 kilowatts) station. (No U.S. station is allowed to use more than 50 kilowatts.) Thus, the threatened retaliatory counterbroadcasting by Cuba could have seriously affected both Radio Marti and WHO.

As presented by the Reagan Administration to the 97th Congress, the Radio Marti proposal called for 14-15 hours per day of programming. This would include news, commentary and entertainment. As a "surrogate home service," the news and information would have a special emphasis on Cuban developments, especially the Cuban military presence in Africa and Central America, and the Cuban government's handling of the Cuban economy, with assessments of how these developments affect the average Cuban. A variety of other political and cultural programs would be offered. To attract a wide audience, the station would broadcast entertainment such as baseball, soap operas and many types of music.

The President has requested an FY85 appropriation of \$11,203,000 for Radio Marti, as part of the USIA budget.

POLICY ANALYSIS

Basic issues concerning Radio Marti relate to the utility of the basic concept to U.S. foreign policy objectives, its objectivity and credibility under the proposed operating framework, its cost, and the possible consequences for U.S. broadcasters and listeners resulting from the broadcast of a "surrogate home service" to Cuba.

Foreign Policy Considerations

Proponents view the establishment of a U.S. radio station broadcasting news to Cuba about Cuba as an extension of a longstanding and accepted foreign policy practice of broadcasting to Communist countries. Both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, it is agreed, have been recognized as effective in promoting the free flow of information in those countries. Those who look to RFE and RL as models for Radio Marti point to their success in building research and news gathering support systems as well as broad listenerships. Radio Marti proponents argue that, over the long run, providing Cubans with news withheld by their government and an alternative interpretation of events will lead to changes in Cuban society and actions which would be more compatible with U.S. interests. Proponents point to the highly restricted Cuban news media, which the Inter-American Press Association in 1982 described as "a system of controlled public opinion and information unique in the history of the Hemisphere," as evidence that Cuban foreign and domestic policies are possible only because the Cuban people are unaware of their full extent and impact.

The Reagan Administration claims that Radio Free Europe played an important role in encouraging the Polish Solidarity resistance movement, the Prague spring of 1968 and the growth of independent public opinion throughout Eastern Europe. Testifying in the House in March 1982, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders said "for a people bottled up in a system of oppression that they did not seek and cannot remove" the opportunity to listen to information not censored by the State "can be precious."

Broadcasting targeted at Communist countries is argued by Radio Marti proponents to be an important part of the world ideological struggle, and a useful component now missing in U.S. policy toward Cuba. They point to the number of hours that Communist countries spend on broadcasting, particularly in the Caribbean and Latin America as an indication of the importance which those countries place on the mass communication of ideas and viewpoints to influence world affairs. According to a Reagan Administration official, in 1982 Cuba broadcast 283 hours per week in all languages to the Western Hemisphere, of which 235 hours per week were in English to North America. The Soviet Union, according to Administration figures, last year broadcast 117 hours per week in English to North America and 334 hours per week in all languages to the entire Western Hemisphere. Other communist countries that broadcast to the Western Hemisphere are the People's Republic of China, some Eastern European countries, Vietnam, and North Korea. In light of these figures, proponents of Radio Marti consider the 84 hours per week Voice of America now broadcasts to the Caribbean region as a whole to be inadequate.

Some proponents of Radio Marti stress the long term nature of its goals and benefits, directing attention to the mid-term future following inevitable changes of leadership in Cuba, probable economic difficulties and uncertainties of direction without charismatic leadership. The cumulative effects of a countervailing news source over time are, they contend, more important than episodic, near term conflicts.

Those who oppose Radio Marti on foreign policy grounds argue that despite Administration disclaimers, it is part of a confrontationist policy towards Cuba that they view as counterproductive. Critics note that the proposal for Radio Marti was put forward at a time when the Administration was reportedly considering military action of some kind to deter Cuban support of Marxist guerrilla movements in the region. Opponents also note the seeming ease with which the station could be jammed. They have been concerned with statements by Administration officials that the U.S. might take action, possibly including the "surgical removal" of facilities broadcasting signals intended to jam Radio Marti or counterbroadcast over other U.S. stations.

Some opponents claim that even if the station is not jammed it will be unlikely to achieve its stated objectives because most Cubans, whose nationalism has often been anti-American in focus, will not be receptive to information directed exclusively at Cuba from a U.S. Government source. According to a New York Times report in 1981, the U.S. Interests Section in the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which provides a limited official U.S. consular and diplomatic presence, had argued that any discontent provoked by Radio Marti would stimulate emigration, rather than pressures for change on Castro's solidly entrenched regime. Critics have also charged that Castro has for two decades translated tangible signs of U.S. hostility to his government into domestic support for his policies, and he could use Radio Marti to mobilize support for and consolidate them. Proponents, however, see Castro's strong reaction and threats of retaliation as evidence that he fears the impact of Radio Marti.

Some critics are clearly suspicious that the basic purpose is propagandistic. An early proposal for radio broadcasting to Cuba developed by the Reagan Administration transition team openly acknowledged a propagandistic purpose. Assistant Secretary of State Enders acknowledged in congressional hearings that the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (the equivalent of an embassy in a country with which we have no diplomatic relations) had expressed concern that the broadcasts could be counterproductive. Concern has also been expressed that program content

would be susceptible to pressures from various political groups, including Cuban exile organizations, making it difficult to maintain the standards set for the station. Some proponents counter that the metamorphosis the concept has undergone since it was proposed and the legislatively mandated objectivity requirements are adequate protections against these problems.

Cost Effectiveness

Some concern has been expressed, even by supporters of the Radio Marti concept, that the proposal for a new government entity and the possible construction of new transmitting facilities are excessively costly. The proposal advanced in 1982 included a request for \$10 million to cover both capital and operating costs for FY82, including the purchase of a transmitter, antenna and broadcasting facilities, and \$7 million for operating costs for FY83. The legislation considered by the first session of the 98th Congress provided for several alternative ways to conduct Radio Marti broadcasts, and the costs would have varied according to which option was selected. By way of comparison, the FY84 budget for RFE/RL now approaches \$116 million annually, for much more extensive research, publications and broadcasting operations to 6 nations in 21 languages.

Both legislation considered by the 97th Congress and the legislation reported to the House in the first session of the 98th Congress had provisions for compensating U.S. broadcasters who are harmed by Cuban retaliatory radio interference. The legislation enacted, S. 602, includes a \$5 million fund to help broadcasters pay the capital and associated engineering and technical costs of overcoming Cuban radio interference -- whether related or not to the operation of Radio Marti. The House Energy Committee version of the bill established no limit on such compensation. (In 1982 the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost of mitigating massive Cuban interference with U.S. radio and television broadcasts could exceed \$40 million under "worst case" conditions.) Proponents argue that the interference problem is an uncontrollable business cost arising out of the failure of the U.S. Government to deal with the Cuban interference. Critics argue that a reimbursement fund is a give-away to private business interests, and that in most cases, the need to avoid interference among U.S. stations will prevent the Federal Communications Commission from approving increases in stations' operating power to mitigate the effects of Cuban interference.

Impact of Cuban countermeasures on U.S. broadcasters and listeners

By far the most concerted opposition to Radio Marti came from those concerned about the impact of expected Cuban retaliatory measures on U.S. broadcasters and their listening audience.

The issue of effect on U.S. broadcasters has two separate components. The first is the consequence in general for U.S.-Cuba telecommunications relations -- that is, would any form of broadcasting to Cuba exacerbate the already unfavorable situation of mutual interference and the possibility of continuing negotiations to resolve it? The second concerns direct Cuban retaliation to counter U.S. Radio Marti broadcasts which would affect specific U.S. stations or regions.

General impact on U.S.-Cuban telecommunications relations

U.S. and Cuban use of the airwaves has been, until recently, subject to regional agreements established through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized United Nations agency, and the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA), signed by the Bahama Islands, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the United States in 1950 and ratified by the U.S. in 1960. As a result of Cuba's withdrawal (after the required year's notice) from NARBA in 1981 and its failure to sign the final acts of the ITU's Regional Administrative Conference on Medium Frequency Broadcasting held at the end of 1981, Cuba is subject only to the basic provisions of the ITU charter and the associated international radio regulations treaty. A provision of the international radio regulations treaty sets forth the principle that stations broadcasting on the medium wave (AM) band shall not employ power exceeding that necessary to maintain economically an effective national service of good quality within the frontiers of the country concerned.

Radio interference has been a source of conflict between the United States and Cuba for many years. Some of this has been caused by Cuba's failure to use directional antennas, which are more costly than omni-directional antennas, for its broadcasting. Other interference has been intentional, however, and therefore in violation of the NARBA and ITU agreements. Examples include the rebroadcasting by Radio Havana of Radio Moscow at higher power levels than those permitted by NARBA and, in the past, the deliberate jamming of WQBA, a Miami, Florida, Spanish language station which can be heard in Cuba.

Although some broadcasters have complained that Castro never really abided by the terms of the NARBA treaty (which had been signed by the Batista government), and that deliberate interference has been a longstanding problem, others contend that the interference has only become a significant problem since about 1979.

In December 1979, Cuba raised concerns of U.S. broadcasters by submitting a list of operating and planned AM stations to the ITU in connection with the Region 2 AM Broadcasting Conference. This listed 188 stations, compared to the 174 stations already approved by NARBA of which Cuba at the time only operated 75-80. The plan also called for some of these stations to operate at very high power levels. Two of the stations, listed at 1040 kHz and 1160 kHz, would operate at 500 kilowatts, 10 times more than the maximum power level permitted by the U.S. for its domestic stations.

Cuba's request for 48 changes in its AM frequency allotment was turned down at the second session of the ITU's Region 2 (North and South America) conference in November and December of 1981 after the United States lobbied against it. The conference, however, did place U.S. use of 1180 kHz for the Voice of America's Radio Marathon transmissions and 1040 kHz for Radio Marti on List B of the ITU Region 2 Radio Plan. (Placement on list B conveys no right to protection from increased interference, according to a Federal Communications Commission official.) Unhappy with the results of the Region 2 conference, Cuba walked out without signing the final agreement. In a Dec. 14, 1981, statement, Cuba denounced plans for Radio Marti, reiterated a threat of retaliation, and scored the conference for approving a frequency assignment to a station established "with the manifest objective of subverting and destabilizing the internal order in our country."

Attempts have been made to solve interference problems by bilateral negotiations. The United States and Cuba held bilateral talks in April and August of 1981. Reportedly, U.S. officials were optimistic after those

meetings and a related meeting in Geneva in June 1981 that the Cubans were anxious to work out technical solutions to interference. This optimism reportedly dissolved as the ITU Region 2 conference neared and Radio Marti was announced.

Proponents of Radio Marti argue that the problem of Cuban interference would exist whether or not the United States initiated broadcasting to Cuba, and that in view of Cuba's announced plans for increasing the number and power of its stations the United States can already expect major new interference problems. Proponents generally doubt that Cuba would be responsive to any U.S. initiative aimed at diplomatically resolving the interference problem, and some see Cuba as engaging in "outlaw" behavior. South Florida broadcasters, who now experience serious interference problems, have unequivocally supported the Radio Marti concept. A resolution by the Florida Association of Broadcasters seemed to view Radio Marti as a form of retaliation aimed at stimulating responsible behavior on the part of Cuba. The resolution stated, in part, "be it resolved that the Florida Association of Broadcasters urges the United States Government to undertake a project to construct and operate radio facilities that will cause interference to Cuban radio operations and/or jam Cuban radio operations until such time that the illegal interference from Cuba ceases."

Some proponents suggest that Castro's threat to counter Radio Marti may be a bluff. Thus, they argue that the United States would set a bad precedent by allowing that threat to deter it from undertaking a radio service to Cuba similar to that broadcast to certain other Communist nations.

Opponents, including other industry groups such as the National Association of Broadcasters, see negotiations as the only long-term solution to the interference problem. Many opponents see the interference problem arising as much from Cuba's use of economic and political, rather than technical, criteria in selecting radio stations, which result in interference among stations in Cuba as well. Industry representatives have noted that many interference problems experienced by U.S. stations are caused by local Cuban stations as small as one watt. Cuba has complained that due to the large number of U.S. commercial stations it has been discriminated against in past regional frequency assignments, and visitors to Cuba have noted that U.S. stations, including both Florida stations and clear channel stations can be heard throughout the AM band.

Some U.S. broadcasters feel that due to its ideological and symbolic implications, the establishment of Radio Marti as a separate entity would have had more adverse impact on Cuba's willingness to negotiate radio interference problems than would incorporating broadcasting directed at Cuba into VOA programs, which they supported. The National Association of Broadcasters argued it had received loud and clear signals that Castro would consider the establishment of Radio Marti as a separate entity an act of aggression and would retaliate.

Potential impact of retaliation against Radio Marti on specific U.S. listening areas

Under legislation considered by the 97th Congress, the original proposed Radio Marti station would have broadcast on 1040 kHz. WHO (50 kw) of Des Moines, Iowa, which also uses the frequency, protested the use of that frequency in a prolonged campaign as WHO judged Cuban retaliatory broadcasting on Cuba's planned 500 kilowatt station would have interfered

with reception in 99.65% of WHO's broadcast area. Under S. 602, the legislation enacted, the only medium wave (AM) frequency which could specifically be assigned to Radio Marti is that of the Voice of America, which now broadcasts to Cuba on 1180 kHz on the medium wave band as well as on short wave frequencies. WHAM (50 kw) of Rochester, New York, WOWO (50 kw) of Fort Wayne, Indiana and KOFI (50 kw) of Kalispell, Montana, also broadcast on 1180 kHz but have not become active in opposing the use of that frequency for Radio Marti.

Proponents of Radio Marti doubt Cuba's ability to divert the quantity of electric energy needed for a sustained jamming and counterbroadcasting offensive against U.S. stations. They also claim that counterbroadcasting against U.S. stations would also affect stations in neighboring Central and South American nations with which Cuba wants to maintain good relations.

EXPANDED VOA BROADCASTING IN LIEU OF SEPARATE RADIO MARTI

S. 602 creates a special Cuban service within the VOA framework. Proponents of this approach argued that VOA has developed a credible image in Cuba which should be built on in any additional news about Cuba funded by the U.S. Government. Since VOA has only been sporadically jammed by Cuba, proponents of this approach argued that Cuba would be less likely to counter VOA broadcasting about Cuba by jamming or increased interference than that of Radio Marti.

Opponents of this approach argued that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty each have a separate identity and operation from VOA, and that Radio Marti should be treated no differently. They also alleged that VOA, because of its other obligations, would not be able to provide the full service envisioned for Radio Marti -- 14 hours per day of programming, particularly the programming specifically designed to attract a large Cuban audience.

Opponents to incorporating Radio Marti "home service" programming in the VOA also argued that the VOA charter forbids broadcasts of that type. From 1961 until 1974, VOA did broadcast "Cita Con Cuba," a morning and evening program of news, features, Cuban music, and vitriolic commentary directed at the Cuban audience. In testimony before the 97th Congress, Assistant Secretary of State Enders said that the reason for dropping the program was that it was "not consistent with the VOA mission." Reportedly, other reasons for ending broadcasts were the general softening of U.S. policy towards the Castro government and a lack of news on Cuba.

Whether VOA can under its current charter broadcast news about Cuba to Cuba has been open to interpretation. The VOA charter, enacted into law (22 USC Section 1463) in 1976, set forth the purposes of VOA in such general terms that it neither specifically prohibits nor specifically authorizes programming such as that suggested for Radio Marti. The purpose of the United States Information Agency, of which VOA is a part, set out in 22 USC Section 1431 is to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and its policies. Since the stated purpose of Radio Marti programming is to broadcast information about Cuba, VOA broadcasts of such materials could be interpreted as conflicting with the statutory purpose of USIA. Nothing, however, in the general authority for the USIA specifically prohibits dissemination of this type of information. In fact, this agency has in the past publicized conditions in Communist countries through various means, including the Voice of America.

The President's FY85 budget request for the U.S. Information Agency, which includes the "Voice of America Radio Marti Program," asked for an increase of \$1,103,000 for this function. The increase was justified with the explanation that it was needed "to provide full-year funding for the staff and program operations established in 1984." The increase would cover the addition of 10 positions to the 178 already funded for FY84.

The budget request also mentions "tentative" plans to begin "limited programming, perhaps four hours daily, in the spring," with the number of hours to increase "incrementally as additional staff members come on board, reaching at least 14-1/2 hours daily at full operations."

CUBAN OFFICIAL THREATENS JAMMING "AT THE LEVEL OF AGGRESSION"

Calling Radio Marti "yet another U.S. aggression," Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez told the Washington Post in a Havana interview published Mar. 14, 1984, that his government "was preparing to respond [to Radio Marti] at the level of the aggression." Rodriguez indicated that the relative troublesomeness of Cuban counter-broadcasts would be in proportion to the tone of Radio Marti programming. Cuban stations reportedly tested their ability to beam 250,000 watt counter-broadcasts to the United States in January 1984 and disrupted U.S. domestic broadcasts as far north as the Midwest.

LEGISLATION

97th Congress

H.R. 5427 (Zablocki et al.)

Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, authorizes appropriations for FY82 and FY83 for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc. Permits other funds to be granted if specified conditions were met, as well as making the Secretary of State responsible for overseeing the funds authorized until an appropriate oversight agency be designated. Authorized Federal agencies to provide property for and to perform administrative and technical support and services for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba, Inc., and for the Presidential Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba. Introduced Feb. 2, 1982, by request. Reported by House Committee on Foreign Affairs, with amendments, Mar. 24, 1982. Amended by Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance to limit Radio Marti to short wave transmissions May 13, 1982; this amendment was removed when the House Committee on Energy and Commerce approved the bill with other amendments July 13, 1982. House Committee on Foreign Affairs' version of the bill with amendments was approved by the House Aug. 10, 1982. Senate Foreign Relations Committee then considered H.R. 5427 in lieu of S. 1853, which had been introduced by request Nov. 16, 1981. The Committee approved the bill, with amendments, Sept. 9, 1982, and reported it to the floor.

98th Congress

P.L. 98-111, S. 602

As passed by the Senate on Sept. 13, 1983, and by the House on Sept. 29, 1983, P.L. 98-111 provides for the establishment within USIA's Voice of America (VOA) of a special Cuba service to broadcast "surrogate home service" programming to Cuba. To be named either "Voice of America Cuba Service" or

"Voice of America: Radio Marti Program," the Cuba service would be administered separately from other VOA functions, with the head of the Cuba service reporting directly to both the Associate Director for Broadcasting of the United States Information Agency (Director of the VOA), and to the Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA). The Cuba service's chief and staff would be hired by the USIA Director. As provided in this bill, the special Cuba service would operate in accordance with VOA standards and "in a manner not inconsistent with the broad foreign policy of the United States." The bill authorizes \$14 million for the Cuba service for FY84 and \$11 million for FY85, and mandates no less than \$11 million be obligated by USIA for the service in future years. The bill also authorizes \$54.8 million in each FY84 and FY85 for the modernization of VOA facilities and operation. As passed, S. 602 mandates a special bipartisan nine-member Advisory Board for Radio Broadcasting to Cuba be established within the Office of the President to review the service's activities. The bill also provides for USIA to arrange for periodic independent evaluations of Cuba service programming which would be forwarded to Congress with any recommendations for legislative action. Transmission would be over VOA's 1180 AM frequency and utilize VOA's Marathon, Florida broadcasting facilities. Other frequencies not on the "commercial" portion of the AM band could be used simultaneously if they are also used for all other VOA broadcasts to Cuba. Time could also be leased with certain restrictions from non-governmental shortwave stations for broadcasting Cuba service programming. If Cuban jamming of the service should exceed limits set by the bill, USIA could lease time on commercial or non-commercial educational AM band radio broadcasting stations for transmitting Cuba service and regular VOA programs. The service's broadcasts could be provided for by means of grants, leases, contracts, or any other means deemed appropriate by USIA. The bill also expresses the intent of Congress that the U.S. Government seek "prompt and full settlement" of U.S. claims against the Cuban government arising from Cuban interference with U.S. broadcasting. A \$5 million fund is authorized to compensate U.S. broadcasters for equipment, engineering, and technical expenses incurred in the past or in the future for mitigating the effects of direct Cuban interference. The bill also expresses the sense of Congress that the President should establish a task force on Cuban interference and seek practical and technical solutions to interference problems. President Reagan signed the measure into law on Oct. 4, 1983.

HEARINGS

- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,
and Finance. Radio broadcasting to Cuba. Hearing,
97th Congress, 2d Session. May 10, 1982. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 239 p.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations.
Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, and Judiciary, and Related Agencies.
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and related appropriations for 1983. Part
6. Radio broadcasting to Cuba. Hearing, 97th Congress,
1st Session. Mar. 24, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1982. pp. 539-582.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations.
Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual

Rights. International broadcasting: direct broadcast satellites. Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st Session. Oct. 23, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 129 p.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Hearings, 97th Congress, 2nd session. July 1, 27, and Aug. 19, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 548 p.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba. Hearing, 98th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 27, 1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 92 p.

REPORTS AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with additional views to accompany H.R. 5427. July 13, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 25 p. (97th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 97-479, part 2)

----- Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with dissenting views to accompany H.R. 2453. July 29, 1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 20 p. (98th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 98-284, part 2)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with dissenting and additional views to accompany H.R. 5427. Apr. 2, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 16 p. (97th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 97-479, part 1)

----- Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with dissenting and additional views to accompany H.R. 2453. June 29, 1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 17 p. (98th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 98-284, part 1)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. International shortwave broadcasting and direct broadcast satellites: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti, twentieth report. Dec. 11, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 25 p. (97th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 97-398)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with minority views to accompany H.R. 5427. Sept. 15, 1982. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982. 26 p. (97th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 97-544)

----- Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with minority views to accompany S. 602. June 21, 1983. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 21 p. (98th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 98-156, part 1)

----- Errata, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act. Report, together with minority views to accompany S. 602. Aug. 8, 1983.

Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983. 5 p. (98th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 98-156, part 2)

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

- 02/01/84 -- President Reagan requests an FY85 appropriation of \$11,203,000 for Radio Marti as part of USIA budget request.
- 11/04/83 -- President Reagan signed into law S. 602, Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, as P.L. 98-111.
- 09/29/83 -- House passed S. 602 (302-109).
- 09/13/83 -- Senate passed S. 602 by voice vote.
- 06/21/83 -- S. 602 reported favorably to Senate from Foreign Relations Committee with amendment.
- 02/24/83 -- S. 602 introduced by Senator Hawkins and referred to Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- 09/15/82 -- H.R. 5427 (Radio Broadcasting to Cuba) reported to Senate from Foreign Relations Committee with amendment.
- 08/10/82 -- H.R. 5427 passed House, amended (250-134).
- 07/13/82 -- H.R. 5427 reported to House from Energy and Commerce Committee with amendment.
- 04/02/82 -- H.R. 5427 reported to House from Foreign Affairs Committee with amendment.
- 09/23/81 -- Reagan administration announced plans for Radio Marti.