An initial continuing appropriations resolution for FY2017 (P.L. 114-223) was enacted 9/29/2016 and provided appropriations for the DOD at 99.5% of FY2016 appropriated levels through 12/9/2016. A second continuing resolution, (P.L. 114-254), enacted on December 10, 2016, that provides funding for those agencies at a rate equivalent to 99.8% of the FY2016 appropriated levels. A third continuing resolution (H.J.Res. 99/P.L. 115-30) was enacted April 28, 2017, and extending P.L. 114-254 to May 5, 2017. This table only summarizes congressional action on full-year defense appropriations bills.

H.R. 5293, S. 3000, and H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31

Issue

Congressional Funding Changes

Rescissions of funds appropriated in previous fiscal years

Rescinds $2.3 billion

Rescinds $4.1 billion

Rescinds $5.1 billion

Reductions to draw down excess cash balances in revolving funds

Cuts $336 million

Cuts $706.5 million

Cuts $867 million

Facilities maintenance and repair ($9.6 billion requested)

Adds $1.6 billion

Adds $154 million

Adds $148.0 million

Readiness improvement lump-sum additions

Adds $3.9 billion

Adds $2.5 billion

Adds $801 million

Shipbuilding procurement and conversion ($18.4 billion requested)

Adds $3.2 billion

Adds $2.1 billion

Adds $2.8 billion

FY2017 Aircraft procurement request lower than projected by 12% ($4.3 billion)

Adds $5.4 billion

Adds $1.5 billion

Adds $3.4 billion

Administration Policy Initiatives

Administration efforts to close Guantanamo Bay detention site

Prohibits closure of Guantanamo Bay facility (Section 8128); restricts transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. or other countries (Sections 8097, 8099)

Restricts transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. or other countries (Sections 8097, 8099)

Prohibits closure of Guantanamo Bay facility (Section 8127); restricts transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay to U.S. or other countries (Sections 8101, 8103)

Provide 1.6% raise in military basic pay

Adds $340 million to cover the cost of the 2.1% raise authorized by House NDAA

Funds the Administration proposal

Adds a total of $1.3 billion to fund the additional end strength authorized by the NDAA and a 2.1% pay raise

Cut end-strength by 27,015 active and 9,800 reserve component personnel

Adds $3.2 billion to fund added end-strength authorized by House NDAA

Funds the Administration proposal

Plan a Base Realignment and Closure round

Cuts $3.5 million slated for BRAC planning

Cuts $3.5 million slated for BRAC planning

Cuts $3.5 million slated for BRAC planning

Congressional Policy Initiatives

Medical R&D ($1.0 billion requested)

Adds $735 million

Adds $915 million

Adds $1.28 billion

Science and Technology (S&T) R&D ($12.5 billion requested)

Adds $654 million

Adds $254 million

Adds $1.51 billion

Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2017 NDAA included provisions intended to make DOD more agile and adaptable to meet emerging threats. At least in modified form, many of these initiatives were incorporated into the compromise final version of S. 2943.

Following are selected provisions of S. 2943, as enacted, that address the organization of the DOD leadership and the National Security Council:

• Section 921 extends from two years to four years the terms of office of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also requires that their terms be staggered and that the Vice-Chairman be ineligible for service as chairman or any other position in the armed forces, a limitation which the President can waive if deemed in the national interest. Similar provisions had been included in both H.R. 4909 (Section 907) and the Senate-passed version of S. 2943 (Section 921).
• Section 903 limits the number of persons assigned to the Joint Staff to no more than 2,069 of whom no more than 1,500 can be military personnel on active duty. The original Senate bill included the ceiling on the number of active-duty military personnel assigned to the Joint Staff, but it also included limits on the number of civilians assigned to the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force (Section 904).
• Section 1085 provides that the professional staff of the National Security Council (NSC) shall include no more than 200 persons, approximately half the number of staff of the Obama Administration NSC. The original Senate bill would have capped the size of the NSC staff at 150 persons, while H.R. 4909 would have required Senate confirmation of the President's National Security Advisor if the staff exceeded 100 persons.
• Section 923 elevates the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to the status of a combatant command which is the same status as Strategic Command, European Command, Central Command and DOD's other major operational arms. Section 911 of H.R. 4909 was similar.
• Section 922 is intended to enhance the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) to provide bureaucratic advocacy and support for the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the same way that the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force support those services. Section 923 of the original Senate bill was similar.

As enacted, the FY2017 NDAA includes several provisions intended to rebalance the way DOD manages risk in developing and procuring weapons systems. Despite Administration objections, the bill's Section 901 would divide the authority over the entire weapons acquisition process—from the earliest phases of research and development to production and sustainment—between two senior DOD officials. This authority is currently vested in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L). Pursuant to S. 2943, the AT&L position will be replaced by an Under Secretary for Research and Engineering and an Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, a move for which House and Senate conferees on the bill expressed the following rationale:

The conferees believe the technology and acquisition missions and cultures are distinct. The conferees expect that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering would take risks, press the technology envelope, test and experiment, and have the latitude to fail, as appropriate. Whereas the conferees would expect that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to focus on timely, cost-effective delivery and sustainment of products and services, and thus seek to minimize any risks to that objective.

The original Senate-passed version of S. 2943 had a similar provision (Section 901). As enacted, the bill provides that these organizational changes will take effect on February 1, 2018.

The enacted NDAA also includes provisions intended to make DOD's weapons acquisition process more agile, among which are the following:

• Section 805 requires that, to the maximum extent practicable, major weapons systems will be designed following a "modular open system approach" intended to make it relatively easy to add, remove, or update major components of the system, thus facilitating competition among suppliers to provide incremental improvements. The House bill had included a similar provision (Section 1701).
• Section 806 would make various changes to the rules governing the development of major weapons systems including changes intended to require that programs incorporate only "mature" technologies. In other words, DOD would not gamble on unproven technologies which, if not realized, would delay or stymie procurement of the proposed new weapon.

The enacted version of the NDAA also includes several provisions relating to DOD contracting procedures, among which are the following:

• Section 829 modifies DOD's acquisition regulations to establish a preference for fixed-price contracts (rather than contracts that reimburse the contractor's costs and provide an additional fee). The enacted provision allows more flexibility for the use of other types of contracts than had the corresponding provision (Section 827) in the original, Senate-passed version of S. 2943.
• Section 813 limits the circumstances under which DOD could award a contract to the bidder who submitted the lowest price, technically acceptable (LPTA) offer. Contracting by the LPTA rule bars the government from paying a higher price for a proposal it deems technically superior to (or offered by a more reliable contractor than) the lowest-price proposal. Similar provisions had been included in the House-passed bill (Section 847) and in the original Senate bill (Section 825).
• Section 885 requires a report to Congress on the bid protest process by which the award of a DOD contract can be challenged on grounds that the award violated relevant laws and regulations. Such protests are adjudicated by the GAO. The House-passed bill contained a similar provision (Section 831). The original Senate-passed bill (in Section 821) would have required the protestor (if it was a large contractor) to cover the cost of the process if GAO denied all elements of the protest.

The enacted version of S. 2943 includes in Subtitle E of Title XII several dozen provisions on "security cooperation," defined as programs, activities, and other interactions of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) with the security forces of other countries that are intended to increase partner country capabilities, provide U.S. armed forces with access, or promote relationships relevant to U.S. national security interests.

Statutes governing security cooperation have been enacted piecemeal over time and are scattered through U.S. Code and public law (such annual NDAAs). In the debates over the FY2017 defense funding bills, DOD and the congressional defense committees developed various proposals to streamline the existing security cooperation authorities and facilitate congressional oversight.

The agreed on provisions, consolidated into a new Chapter 16 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code, govern:

• Military-to-military engagements, exchanges, and contacts, including payment of personnel expenses and the extension of such authorities to nonmilitary security personnel (with the concurrence of the Secretary of State);
• Combined exercises and training with foreign forces;
• Operational support and foreign capacity building, including logistics support, supplies, and services associated with operations that the U.S. military is not directly participating in; defense institution building; and authority to train and equip foreign forces as well as sustain such support; and
• Educational and training activities, including foreign participation in service academies and other DOD-sponsored programs, such as the DOD State Partnership Program, the Regional Centers for Security Studies, and the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.

For active-duty and reserve component military personnel costs, the original FY2017 budget request included $135.3 billion in the base budget and $3.6 billion in OCO, for a total of $138.8 billion.²⁸ The Administration also proposed reductions in military manpower and changes in military compensation—some of which were incorporated into the budget request—that would reduce the rate at which personnel cost-per-troop increased.

The annual personnel budget is driven partly by the number of military personnel, measured in terms of authorized end strength.²⁹ Over the past decade, authorized active duty end strengths have shifted in response to the build-up and draw-down associated with conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Army has seen the biggest end strength reductions in the past five years, dropping from a peak of nearly 570,000 in 2011 to a little under 475,000 at the end of FY2016—a reduction of nearly 17%. The Administration's budget would have continued that trajectory, reaching an Army end-strength of 460,000 by the end of FY2017, with a goal of reaching 450,000 by the end of FY2018.

The Marine Corps has also seen substantial reductions in recent years, dropping from peak active-duty end strength of 202,000 in 2010 to 184,000 in FY2016 with the budget proposing an additional cut to 182,000, which would amount to a 10% reduction from the peak year.

Source: National Defense Authorization Acts for FY2001 to FY2017.

The enacted version of the NDAA came closer to the House's provisions on endstrength, authorizing 24,000 more personnel than requested, including 16,000 Army troops.

Army

475,000

460.000

480,000

460.000

476,000

+16,000

Navy

Marine Corps

Air Force

Army Reserve

Navy Reserve

Marine Corps Reserve

Air Force Reserve

Army National Guard

Air National Guard

H.R. 1301—the version of the FY2017 defense appropriations bill passed by the House on March 8, 2017-added to the request a total of $1.3 billion to fund both the higher end-strength authorized by the NDAA and a higher military pay raise than the Obama Administration had requested.

In addition to shrinking the force size, a major theme in recent defense budget debates has been an effort to reduce the rate of increase in military compensation costs. A number of proposals accompanying this year's budget request seek to further rein in the rate at which those costs increase.

Section 1009 of Title 37, United Stated Code provides a set formula for calculating automatic annual increases in military basic pay indexed to the annual increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI), a government measure of changes in private sector wages and salaries.³⁰ However, that law also gives the President authority to specify an alternative pay adjustment that supersedes the automatic adjustment.³¹

Source: Increase in ECI from Bureau of Labor Statistics; provision enacted into law from relevant NDAA.

For FY2017, the Obama Administration attempted to continue that recent trend, proposing a 1.6% increase in basic pay for military personnel rather than the 2.1% increase that would result from the ECI calculation. Assuming the lower pay raise allowed the Administration to save approximately $264 million.

The Senate-passed version of S. 2943 reflected the Administration's proposal. However, the enacted version of the bill included a provision from the House-passed NDAA mandating a pay raise that would match the ECI projection.

The first House-passed version of the FY2017 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5293) added $340 million to the budget request. H.R. 244, the version of the FY2017 defense appropriations bill that was enacted, added to the request a total of $1.3 billion to fund both the higher end-strength authorized by the FY2017 NDAA and a higher military pay raise than the Obama Administration had requested.

Of the nearly $3.5 billion originally requested in FY2017 for acquisition of armored combat vehicles, more than 80% was allocated to upgrade the Army's current fleet of Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Stryker 8x8 armored troop carriers, and Paladin self-propelled artillery. The remainder of the request was to continue development of three new vehicles: a troop carrier for support roles (designated AMPV), a new amphibious landing vehicle for the Marine Corps (designated ACV)³², and a combat vehicle with a tank-like cannon that will be light enough to be dropped by parachute with airborne troops.

The original budget request also included $735.4 million for continued development and the third year of procurement funding of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) intended ultimately to replace nearly 17,000 of the High-Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or "Humm-vees" used by the Army and Marine Corps.³³

The original budget request included $480 million to continue upgrading the Army's fleet of M-1 Abrams tanks, the newest of which was manufactured in 1994. Subsequently, the Army asked Congress to increase that amount by $172 million to be transferred from other parts of the Army budget request. The House and Senate versions of the NDAA each authorized the increased amount with the House bill also authorizing an additional $140 million for M-1 modifications. As enacted, the NDAA authorized the revised total request ($652 million with $72 million of the increase authorized as OCO funding) but not the additional House increase.

The initial House-passed FY2017 defense appropriations bill would have provided for M-1 improvements all but $4 million of the $652 million requested by the Army plus $80 million. The Senate committee version of that bill—S. 3000—would have provided $652 million, the amount of the revised request.

As enacted, the consolidated appropriations bill (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31) provides $664 million for M-1 improvements, a net addition of $12 million to the Army's adjusted request.

As requested, the versions of the NDAA passed by the House and Senate, as well as the enacted version, authorized $595 million to continue modernizing the Army's fleet of Paladin 155 mm. cannons and their associated ammunition carriers. In addition to modernizing the vehicles' electronic components, the Army is replacing their tracked chassis (manufactured in the 1970s and 1980s and refurbished since then) with new chassis based on the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.

The initial House-passed appropriations bill would have provided the total requested amount, while the Senate committee-approved S. 3000 would have cut $31 million. The enacted appropriations bill provides $584 million for Paladin modernization, cutting $10 million from the request on account of anticipated contract savings.

The budget requested $727 million to continue developing various upgrades and installing them in the Army's fleet of Stryker wheeled armored troop carriers. Some of the funds will be used to install on some older Strykers a V-shaped underside to partially deflect the blast of a buried landmine. Other funds will be used to enhance the firepower of Strykers based in Europe by replacing their .50 caliber machine guns with a 30 mm. cannon.

The Senate-passed version of the NDAA trimmed $11 million from the request and the enacted version of the bill followed suit.

The initial House-passed defense appropriations bill would have cut $4 million from the Stryker request while the Senate committee-approved S. 3000 would have cut $34 million on grounds that those funds would not be needed in FY2017.

The initial House-Senate defense appropriations compromise (H.R. 1301) would have provided $701 million from Stryker procurement, cutting $26 million from the request on grounds that it was not justified. However, the enacted appropriations bill restored $8 million of that reduction, providing a total of $709 million.

The budget requested $184 million to continue development of a new tracked vehicle designated the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) that would replace thousands of Vietnam-era M-113 vehicles as battlefield ambulances and mobile command posts, and filling other combat support roles. The new vehicle will be based on the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FY2017 funds would be used to complete production of 29 prototype AMPVs slated for shakedown testing at government test sites.

The enacted version of the NDAA authorized the full amount requested, as had both the House and Senate versions of that bill. Similarly, the House-passed and Senate committee versions of the initial defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5293 and S. 3000, respectively) would have provided the full amount requested for AMPV, as does the enacted bill.

The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. Concerns over the current and future size and capability of the Navy have intensified with the recent shift in the international security environment to a situation featuring renewed great power competition.³⁶

The Navy's original FY2017 budget requested funding for the procurement of seven new ships—two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), and one LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship. The Navy's FY2017-FY2021 five-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 38 new ships, compared to the five-year plan sent to Congress in 2015, which projected funding of 48 new ships during this period.

The original budget request included $5.1 billion to continue procuring Virginia class attack submarines at a rate of two per year under a ten-ship multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for FY2014-FY2018. The Navy's FY2017-FY2021 five-year shipbuilding plan proposes including in one of the two Virginia-class boats projected for FY2019, and in all Virginia class boats procured in FY2020 and subsequent years, the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)—an additional ship section that will increase the boat's payload of Tomahawk cruise missiles from 12 to 40. The budget request included $98 million to continue development of the VPM. The Navy's FY2016 budget submission proposed building some, but not all, Virginia class boats procured in FY2020 and subsequent years with the VPM.

The Senate version of the NDAA would have authorized the amounts requested for the submarine and for VPM development, but the House version of that bill and the enacted version of S. 2943 also authorized an additional $85 million in "advance procurement" (AP) funding to buy components for boats that primarily would be funded in future budgets.

The Senate committee version of the first defense appropriations bill S. 3000 would have provided the requested amounts for the submarines and the VPM, while the House-passed version (H.R. 5293) would have added $85 million to the amount requested for the subs.

Like the initial House-passed appropriations bill, the enacted bill added $85 million to the $5.1 billion requested for submarines.

The Navy's originally proposed FY2017 budget included a $1.29 billion increment of the estimated $12.9 billion in procurement funding for CVN-79, the second Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier. The budget also requested $1.37 billion in AP funding for CVN-80, the third ship in the class.³⁹

One issue for Congress during its consideration of the FY2017 request was whether to provide AP funding in FY2017 for the procurement of materials for CVN-81, the fourth ship in the class (which is scheduled for procurement funding in FY2023). Earlier funding for the fourth ship would permit a combined purchase of materials for CVN-80 and CVN-81 and thereby reducing the combined procurement cost of the two ships. The Navy's proposed FY2017 budget did not request any AP funding for CVN-81; the Navy's plan was to request initial AP funding for CVN-81 in FY2021.

The enacted version of the NDAA, like the versions passed by the House and Senate, authorizes the full amount requested for the second and third ships, a total of $2.7 billion The House version also would have authorized an additional $263 million for AP funding for the fourth carrier in the class, but that was not included in the final version of the authorization bill.

The House-passed version of the initial defense appropriations bill would have followed suit with the House-passed NDAA, providing an additional $263 million for the fourth carrier, while the Senate committee-approved S. 3000 would have trimmed $20 million from the overall $2.66 billion carrier request.

Congress in recent years has pushed back against Navy proposals for operating and modernizing its force of 22 Aegis cruisers. When the Navy proposed retiring seven of the ships years before the end of their service lives, Congress rejected the proposal. When the Navy then proposed taking 11 of the 22 ships temporarily out of service for modernization, and then returning them to service years later as one-for-one replacements for the other 11 ships in the class, Congress modified the Navy's proposed schedule. In its proposed FY2017 budget, the Navy once again asked to modernize the 11 ships along the Navy's preferred schedule, rather than the modified schedule directed by Congress.

The House-passed NDAA and the enacted version of the bill (S. 2943) each contained a provision (Section 1024) that requires the Navy to modernize the 11 ships on the schedule directed by Congress. The Senate-passed NDAA contained a provision (Section 1011) that would have allowed the Navy to retire some of the cruisers if certain prescribed criteria were met.

Both House and Senate versions of the initial defense appropriations bill rejected the Navy's proposal for the cruisers, as does the enacted appropriations bill.

The FY2017 request included $3.3 billion to continue procurement of DDG-51 destroyers at an average rate of two ships per year under a 10-ship MYP contract for FY2013-FY2017. As part of its markup of the Navy's FY2016 budget, Congress had provided $1.0 billion in additional procurement funding to help pay for the procurement of an additional DDG-51. The Navy's proposed FY2017 budget noted this $1.0 billion in funding but did not include an additional ship in its shipbuilding plan. The $433 million needed to complete the funding for this additional destroyer, however, was included as the second item on the Navy's FY2017 Unfunded Requirements List (URL).

The House and Senate versions of the NDAA each authorized the $3.3 billion requested for the destroyers with the House bill approving an additional $433 million and the Senate bill an additional $50 million for the ship that Congress partially funded in the FY2016 budget. The enacted version of the bill authorized the request plus $50 million.

In addition to providing the $3.3 billion requested for the destroyers in FY2017, the House-passed version of the initial defense appropriations bill would have added $433 million for the partially funded FY2016 ship as does the enacted bill (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31). The Senate committee-approved version of the first bill (S. 3000) would have added $404 million for the FY2016 ship.

In December 2015, then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter directed that the LCS program be reduced from a planned total of 52 ships to a planned total of 40 ships, that annual procurement quantities of LCSs be reduced during the Navy's FY2017-FY2021 five-year shipbuilding plan, and that the Navy choose one of the two current LCS builders, so that LCSs procured in FY2019 and subsequent years would be produced by only one builder. Reflecting this direction, the Navy's proposed FY2017 budget requested $1.1 billion for the procurement of two LCSs, rather than the three LCSs that had been projected for FY2017 under the FY2016 budget submission.

In addition to authorizing the funding requested for two LCSs, the House version of the NDAA would have authorized an additional $384.7 million for a third ship. The enacted version of that bill did not included authorization for a third ship and followed the Senate-passed version of the bill in trimming $28.0 million from the request for two ships.

The enacted appropriation bill cuts $36 million from the $1.1 billion requested for two LCSs but would add $475 million for a third ship of this type.

In recent years, LHA-type amphibious assault ships—carrier-like ships designed to carry some 1,700 Marines and a mix of aviation assets—have been funded using split funding (i.e., two-year incremental funding). The Navy's FY2017 budget submission proposes using split funding—$1.6 billion requested in FY2017 and a plan to request $1.7 billion in FY2018—to procure an amphibious assault ship designated LHA-8.

The enacted NDAA, like the House and Senate versions of that bill, authorized the $1.6 billion requested for the ship in FY2017. The initial House-passed appropriations bill would have reduced the funding by $64 million, while the Senate committee version would have provided the amount requested.

In their initial FY2017 budget requests, the Army and Air Force chose to delay their previously planned aircraft purchases, and the Navy planned to meet its aviation modernization goals by inviting Congress to add funds to its budget request to pay for so-called "unfunded requirements." Army officials emphasized that the service's FY2017 budget request gave priority to readiness over modernization.⁴³ Within the Army's modernization budget, helicopter programs felt the brunt of the budget squeeze. The Army's $3.9 billion budget request for aircraft procurement in FY2017 (which includes modernization as well as the acquisition of new aircraft), amounted to less than one-third of the service's FY2016 aircraft procurement account.

The budget squeeze confronting the Air Force's modernization plans has been widely recognized. The simultaneous attempt to modernize Air Force fighters with the F-35, bombers with the B-21, trainers with the T-X, and other systems has created a classic "bow wave" of acquisitions, in which systems already being procured and others moving from development into procurement exceed the available procurement budget.⁴⁵ The Air Force original FY2017 budget submission attempted to relieve some of that budget pressure by deferring planned acquisitions.

F-35A Joint Strike Fighter

The FY2017 request included $4.4 billion for 43 F-35A Lightning II fighters, five fewer than projected in the FY2016 budget request. All told, the Air Force's new plan would acquire 45 fewer F-35A's during the period FY2017-FY2021 than had been planned in January 2016.

The enacted NDAA, like the Senate version of that bill, authorizes the requested amount for 43 of the fighters. Besides approving that amount, the House-passed NDAA also would have authorized $691 million for 5 additional aircraft.

The initial House-passed defense appropriations bill would have provided a total of $4.8 billion, adding to the requested amount $352 million for five additional F-35As. The Senate committee version of that bill (S. 3000) would have cut the FY2017 procurement amount by $418 million, but would have added $100 million to the $405 million requested for advance procurement funds with the aim of supporting the higher FY2018 production rate that had been planned prior to the FY2017 budget submission.

The enacted appropriation provides a net increase of $201 million to the $4.4 billion requested for 43 F-35As. The bill cuts $294 million from the amount requested on account of "efficiencies" and adds $405 million for five additional aircraft.

KC-46A Pegasus Tanker

The enacted NDAA, like both the House and Senate versions, authorized the $2.9 billion requested for 15 KC-46A mid-air refueling tankers. However, all three versions of the legislation cut the $262 million requested to continue development of the aircraft by more than 50%, to $122 million on grounds that the program had unspent funds from prior years' appropriations and had encountered fewer problems than the budget request had anticipated.

The enacted appropriation (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31) cuts the procurement request by $167 million—double the amount that would have been cut by the initial House-passed appropriations bill—while cutting $32 million from the tanker's R&D request.

Reductions in planned aircraft procurement also were evident in the Army's original FY2017 request, which would procure 110 helicopters instead of the 144 projected in 2015. Army leaders attributed these deferrals primarily to budget concerns and force structure issues resulting from the recently issued report of the National Commission on the Future of the Army.⁴⁶

Specifically, the FY2017 budget request included:

• $929 million for 74 UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters (26 fewer than projected last year);
• $565 million for 22 CH-47 Chinook helicopters (5 fewer than projected last year); and
• $1.1 billion to remanufacture 52 AH-64 Apache helicopters (5 fewer than projected last year).

The enacted version of the FY2017 NDAA—like the version passed by the Senate—authorized the originally requested amounts for these programs. The House-passed version would have added a total of $703 million for 41 additional helicopters.

Navy officials have been telling congressional defense committees in recent years that the service has too few strike fighters—aircraft designed for both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. This is, in part, because of tight budgets and, in part, because of delays in fielding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which is intended gradually to supplant the fleet of F/A-18s that have equipped Navy and Marine Corps squadrons since the 1980s. Over the course of the past three fiscal years (FY2014-FY2016), Congress has added to the Administration's budget requests a total of $2.9 billion for 32 aircraft of the F/A-18 type, including 27 equipped for electronic warfare, which are designated as E/F-18Gs.

The original FY2017 Navy budget request included $185 million for 2 F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters of the most recent E and F models, $891 million for 4 F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (the version of the F-35 designed to operate from aircraft carriers), and $2 billion for 16 F-35Cs which is the Marine Corps' version of the JSF, designed for short take-off, vertical landing (STOVL) operations from large amphibious landing ships.

However, the Navy also sent Congress an "unfunded requirements list" (URL) requesting an additional 14 Super Hornets and 6 additional F-35s. In the letter to Congress accompanying the URL, the Chief of Naval Operations stated

Our legacy strike fighters (F/A-18A-D) are reaching end of life faster than planned due to use and wear. Improving the inventory of F/A-18F and F-35C aircraft will help reconcile a near term (2018-2020) strike fighter inventory capacity challenge, and longer term (2020-2035) strike fighter model balance within the carrier air wing. It will reduce our reliance on legacy-model aircraft which are becoming increasingly expensive and less reliable.⁴⁷

The Navy linked its avowed strike fighter shortage to its proposal—as a part of the FY2017 budget—to reduce the number of carrier air wings from 10 to nine. In recent years, the number of carrier air wings has usually been one less than the number of carriers in commission, in recognition of the fact that, at any given moment, one carrier is undergoing a lengthy mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul and thus cannot deploy.

The Navy's proposal to reduce the number of carrier air wings from 10 to 9 would mean that the number of air wings would be two less than the number of carriers since the Navy's carrier force is scheduled to increase from 10 to 11 next year with the commissioning of the first Gerald R. Ford-class carrier. Navy officials have testified that in light of how the Navy now operates and maintains the carrier force, it will now make sense for the number of carrier air wings to be two less than the number of carriers. The Navy might need legislative relief to implement its proposal—Section 1093 of the FY2012 NDAA requires the Navy to maintain 10 carrier air wings.⁴⁸

Similarly, the initial House-passed FY2017 defense appropriations bill would have added to the Navy's aircraft request a total of $1.8 billion for the additional F/A-18s and JSFs mentioned in the Navy's URL while the Senate committee version (S. 3000) would have funded only the aircraft requested in the budget.

The enacted appropriation (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31) includes—in addition to the amounts requested—$979 million for 12 F-18E/Fs and $757 million for six F-35s.

The enacted version of the FY2017 NDAA includes a provision (Section 1042) that would allow the Navy to reduce the number of active-component carrier air wings from 10 to nine until such time as the navy fields enough carriers to support 10 wings or the start of FY2026, whichever comes first.