Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber

April 14, 2016 – September 22, 2021 R44463

Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range
Strike Bomber
Updated September 22, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44463

Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber

Summary
The Department of Defense is developing a new long-range bomber aircraft, the B-21 Raider
(previously known as LRS-B), and proposes to acquire at least 100 of them. B-21s would initial y
replace the fleets of B-1 and B-2 bombers, and could possibly replace B-52s in the future.
B-21 development was highly classified until the summer of 2015, when the Air Force revealed
initial details of the aircraft and the program. Although technical specifications and other data
remain out of public view, many details of the budget, acquisition strategy, procurement
quantities, and other aspects of the B-21 program are now in the public arena. On September 20,
2021, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendal announced that five B-21s were in production.
The Administration’s FY2022 budget request included $2.98 bil ion for further development and
initial production of the B-21. As passed, the FY2021 defense appropriations bil funded the
program at $2.84 bil ion.
As a large defense program that involves issues of strategic and nuclear policy, as wel as
substantial expenditures, the B-21 is likely to be subject to significant congressional interest.
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Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber

Introduction
On October 27, 2015, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced its intention to award a
contract to build the new Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) to the Northrop Grumman
Corporation. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Air Force announced that the bomber would be
designated the B-21 “Raider,” in honor of the Doolittle Raiders of World War II.1
The B-21 is intended to operate in both conventional and nuclear roles, with the capability of
penetrating and surviving in advanced air defense environments.2 It wil be capable of operation
by an onboard crew or piloted remotely. It is projected to enter service in the mid-2020s, building
to an initial fleet of 100 aircraft. B-21s wil be based at Dyess AFB, TX; Whiteman AFB, MO;
and El sworth AFB, SD, with El sworth as the training base.3 4
The B-21 is one of the Air Force’s top three procurement priorities.5
Figure 1. B-21
Artist’s rendering

Source: U.S. Air Force.
History
Next-Generation Bomber
The B-21 has its roots in the Air Force’s Next-Generation Bomber (NGB) program.6 Begun in
2004 as a congressional initiative to explore new technologies, NGB grew in response to the 2006

1 Mike Martin, The B-21 has a name: Raider, U.S. Air Force, Press release, Washington, DC, September 19, 2016,
http://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/948366/the-b-21-has-a-name-raider/. T he “ B-21” type designation,
which does not follow in the standard sequence, ostensibly recognized the B-21’s role as a “ 21st century” bomber.
2 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Press Briefing on the Announcement of the Long Range Strike
Bomber Contract Award, Washington, DC, October 27, 2015 , http://go.usa.gov/cswxQ.
3 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, Air Force selects locations for B-21 aircraft, May 2, 2018,
https://go.usa.gov/xpZse.
4 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: B-21 Raider,” press release, July 6, 2021, https://go.usa.gov/x6exF.
5 T he other top priorities, as enunciated by Air Force officials on many occasions, are the F-35A Lightning II fighter
and the KC-46A tanker, both of which are in initial production.
6 For more on the predecessor program, see CRS Report RL34406, Air Force Next-Generation Bomber: Background
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Quadrennial Defense Review’s (QDR’s) cal for development of a next-generation bomber that
would enter service by 2018. The NGB program sought to develop a new land-based, penetrating
long-range strike capability to complement a modernized bomber force.7
Prior to 2006, the Air Force had indicated that its fleet of B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers would
suffice until 2037, when advanced technologies, such as hypersonic cruise vehicles, would
potential y reach maturity and be incorporated into a follow-on bomber aircraft. The 2006 QDR’s
cal for a new bomber to enter service in 2018 thus accelerated Air Force plans for fielding a new
bomber by almost 20 years.
Two competitors participated in the NGB program: Northrop Grumman and a team composed of
Boeing and Lockheed Martin.8 Both competitors had experience with modern bomber design and
development: Northrop was the prime contractor for the B-2, and Boeing was a major
subcontractor on that program. Rockwel International (later acquired by Boeing) was the prime
contractor for the B-1. Boeing was the prime contractor for the B-52.
From FY2004 to FY2009, DOD requested more than $1.4 bil ion in the unclassified Air Force
research and development budget for the NGB. After these initial development efforts, Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates announced that he would recommend deferring the start of an NGB
program: “We wil not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we
have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology.”9 Several issues
regarding the NGB had not been resolved, most notably whether it should be capable of
unmanned operations and whether the NGB should have the capability to deliver nuclear
weapons. Either of these capabilities would have added cost and complexity to the system.
Long-Range Strike (Bomber)
Following cancel ation of the NGB program in 2009, Air Force and DOD officials conducted a
“front-end analysis,” considering different concepts to accomplish the long-range strike mission.
Options included large aircraft carrying long-range standoff weaponry, conventional y armed
bal istic missiles, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and other configurations.10 After
considering the options, Secretary Gates approved the Air Force request to continue developing
an optional y manned penetrating bomber in 2011. LRS-B reportedly differs in concept from the
NGB:

and Issues for Congress.
7 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 46.
8 See, for example, Douglas Barrie and Amy Butler, “Double Duty,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 28,
2008: 24; Amy Butler, “USAF Chief De-emphasizes 2018 For Bomber,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 4,
2009: 1-2. Boeing and Lockheed announced their joint development effort for the NGB in January 2008. (Boeing and
Lockheed Martin, “Boeing and Lockheed Martin T eam for Next Generation Bomber Program,” press release, January
25, 2008, http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2008-01-25-Boeing-and-Lockheed-Martin-Team-for-Next-Generation-
Bomber-Program.)
9 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Recommendation Statement (Arlington, VA), As Prepared for Delivery by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, April 06, 2009 , available at http://go.usa.gov/czcnw.
10 T he concept of large aircraft carrying long-range weaponry has resurfaced as DOD’s proposed “Arsenal Plane.” See,
inter alia, James Drew, “ USAF flaunts ‘arsenal plane’ concept at Air Warfare Symposium ,” FlightGlobal.com ,
February 26, 2016, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-flaunts-arsenal-plane-concept -at-air-warfare-
422472/, and Oriana Pawlyk, “ Plans for Pentagon 's Future Flying Bomb T ruck Begin to T ake Shape,” Military.com ,
November 12, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/12/plans-pentagons-future-flying-bomb-truck-
begin-take-shape.html.
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[NGB] was far more ambitious and expensive, in part because of the assumption that the
aircraft would operate nearly independently, which drove requirements up. NGB would
have needed to be capable of its own intelligence and other functions that LRS-B will get
through support from a network of already fielded Air Force platforms.11
Congress subsequently authorized a follow-on to the NGB program that became the Long Range
Strike (Bomber), or LRS-B, in the FY2011 defense authorization bil .12 It is perhaps notable that
cancel ation of the NGB program caused only a two-year break in unclassified funding, as Table
1 indicates. LRS-B was funded in the same budget line as the predecessor NGB.13
Table 1. NGB/LRS-B Funding, FY2006-FY2022
(in mil ions of dol ars)
06
07
08 09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
req.
24
38
7
0
0
199 295
292
359
883
736
1290
2004
2279
2982
2980 2981
Source: Justification books for Air Force research and development, PE 0604015F, and Air Force procurement,
line item B02100, for FY2022 and prior years.
The form of the program’s name varies depending on the source, but it is typical y shown as
“Long Range Strike (Bomber)” or “Long Range Strike-Bomber.” This syntax implies that the Air
Force was potential y developing other long-range strike systems and/or complementary systems
(like sensors and/or communications capabilities) to enable the bomber in its long-range strike
role. At the initial public rollout of the LRS-B program, Air Force officials confirmed that LRS-B
was part of a family of systems, and that other unspecified programs would support the bomber in
operation.14 Subsequently, the Air Force stated:
The B-21 Raider will be a component of a larger family of systems for conventional Long
Range Strike, including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, electronic attack,
communication and other capabilities.15
Two LRS-B designs were submitted, and on October 27, 2015, Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee
James announced DOD’s intention to award the contract to Northrop Grumman. The other
competitor, a team of Boeing and Lockheed Martin, protested the award. On February 16, 2016,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) denied the protest.16

11 Amy Butler, “USAF Offers Long-Awaited Peek At Secret Bomber Plans,” Aerospace Daily, September 3, 2015, pp.
1-2.
12 P.L. 111-383, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.
13 Development of the NGB, like development of the B-21, was carried in Air Force RDT &E program element
0604015F.
14 Air Force briefing to and discussion with CRS and think tank representatives, September 1, 2015. T his meeting was
conducted under Chatham House rules, which preclude identifying the specific briefers or attendees.
15 U.S. Air Force, "Fact Sheet: B-21 Raider," press release, July 6, 2021, https://go.usa.gov/x6exF.
16 GAO’s protest decision, noted at http://www.gao.gov/docket/B-412441.1, was classified. Instead of a formal report,
GAO issued a statement describing the decision, available at http://ec.militarytimes.com/static/pdfs/ALL-ST AFF-
852618-v1-B-412441-PUBLIC-ST AT EMENT-ON-OUTCOME-OF-BOEING-PRO.pdf.
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Basic Design
Figure 2. Updated B-21 Artist’s Rendering
Released July 6, 2021

Source: U.S. Air Force.
The B-21 was designed around three specific capabilities:
1. A large and flexible payload bay capable of carrying a full range of current and
future armament.
2. Range (although classified).
3. Projected average procurement unit cost of $550 mil ion per plane in FY2010
dol ars, which was announced publicly to encourage competing manufacturers to
constrain their designs.
Although the Air Force has released artist’s renderings of the bomber, the specific design remains
classified.
In an effort to achieve the $550 mil ion cost target, unit cost was designated as a key performance
parameter in the acquisition strategy, meaning that inability to reach that price could disqualify a
bid. (That price is based on acquisition of 100 aircraft; variations in quantity may affect actual
unit cost.) At the award announcement, the independent cost estimate for Northrop’s winning bid
was revealed to be $511 mil ion per plane, equivalent to $564 mil ion in FY2016 dollars.17 The
Air Force states that the average procurement unit cost as of 2021 is $550 mil ion, or $639
mil ion in 2019 dollars.18
The released renderings (Figure 1 and Figure 2) show a flying-wing design not dissimilar to the
B-2, although simpler in shape. It resembles early proposed designs that later evolved into the B-
2.
Initial B-21s wil be manned, with unmanned operation possible several years after initial
operational capability (IOC). Nuclear qualification wil also take two years or so after IOC.
Few technical details have been revealed. No mention has been made of a desired speed, although
the combination of long range, large payload, and cost constraints strongly suggest B-21 wil be
subsonic. Details such as the B-21’s size, required stealth, structure, number and type of engines,

17 Air Force briefing to and discussion with CRS and think tank representatives, September 1, 2015.
18 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: B-21 Raider,” press release, July 6, 2021, https://go.usa.gov/x6exF.
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projected weapons, and onboard sensors remain classified, which makes evaluating the proposed
cost difficult.
What Is Stealth?
“Stealthy” or “low-observable” aircraft are those designed to be difficult for an enemy to detect. This
characteristic most often takes the form of reducing an aircraft’s radar signature through careful shaping of the
airframe, special coatings, gap sealing, and other measures. Stealth also includes reducing the aircraft’s signature in
other ways, as adversaries could try to detect engine heat, electromagnetic emissions from the aircraft’s radars or
communications gear, and other signatures.
Minimizing these signatures is not without penalty. Shaping an aircraft for stealth leads to different choices than
shaping for speed. Shrouding engines and/or using smal er powerplants reduces performance; reducing
electromagnetic signatures may introduce compromises in design and tactics. Stealthy coatings, access port
designs, and seals may require higher maintenance time and cost than more conventional aircraft.
As the United States has gained experience with stealth and advanced its technologies from the F-117 through the
B-2, F-22, and F-35, some of the operational and maintenance costs have been reduced.19 The B-21 wil benefit
from that knowledge, although some of the performance compromises inherent in designing for stealth cannot be
avoided.20
Technical Maturity
CRS previously noted that the B-21’s proposed funding and deployment schedule implied that
considerable development had been accomplished prior to contract award.21 The Air Force later
confirmed this, with senior program officials stating that both competing designs were at an
unusual y high level of detail and development for a system in which the prime contractor had not
been selected. The low-observable characteristics of both designs were investigated in detail
against current and anticipated threats, and final designs were complete down to the level of, for
example, individual access panels.22 This high level of technical readiness may help explain why
the Air Force anticipates IOC approximately 10 years from contract award, whereas other
technical y complex aircraft like F-22 and F-35 have taken more than 20 years.23
Major subsystem risk reduction was also accomplished, and both competitors’ designs
incorporated substantial quantities of existing subsystems (sometimes with B-21-specific
refinements). This effort presumably reduces technological risk and shortens the time required for
the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase that precedes production. Indeed,
although DOD’s usual Technology Readiness Levels are not being used to measure maturity on
the program, program officials stated that as of 2015, no further technology development was
required to move B-21 to production.24 They see the most chal enging part of B-21 as the
integration of technologies in the EMD phase.

19 By 2008, for example, the man-hours required to maintain the B-2 fleet’s low-observable characteristics had been
reduced 30% from initial levels. Guy Norris, “Born-Again Bomber,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 3,
2009, p. 47.
20 CRS discussions with Northrop Grumman officials, March 10, 2016.
21 CRS Insight IN10351, Long Range Strike Bomber Begins to Emerge, September 2, 2015 (available to congressional
clients on request from author).
22 Air Force briefing to and discussion with CRS and think tank representatives, September 1, 2015.
23 B-21’s timeline more closely approximates F-22 and F-35 if it is dated from the initiation of the NGB program, not
from the October 2015 contract award.
24 Air Force briefing to and discussion with CRS and other think tanks, September 1, 2015. T echnology Readiness
Levels are DOD’s accepted method of measuring the maturity of a specific technology. T hey use a 9 -point scale;
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Air Force officials have emphasized that B-21 is part of a family of systems, implying that it is
the node of a larger, distributed network of sensors and communications, not al of which may
have been publicly disclosed. Connectivity with this family of systems has been included in the
B-21 design from the start, although it is not possible to gauge the maturity or stability of these
systems―and thus how much the B-21 may have to evolve in the future should those external
systems change.
B-21 wil employ open systems architecture, similar to that already being demonstrated on F-22,
U-2, B-2, and other platforms. Open architecture al ows new sensors or other subsystems from
various vendors to be easily integrated into the aircraft. As a result, the initial B-21 aircraft can be
augmented more easily as advanced technologies are developed; it also means that what might
otherwise be expensive development of advanced sensors and/or other subsystems may be
deferred and/or competed independent of the aircraft itself. This comports with earlier comments
about the possibility of B-21 being part of a family of systems, and suggests that some relevant
capabilities may be under development in other budget lines.
Acquisition Strategy
Although it is one of the Air Force’s largest programs, B-21 is being acquired through
nontraditional means. Instead of the regular acquisition process, the B-21 program is managed
and acquired through the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, with reduced overhead including a
much smal er program office than typical for such a significant program.25 Nevertheless, B-21
wil be designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program and is therefore subject to Nunn-
McCurdy reporting requirements.26
Plans cal for initial acquisition of B-21s to take place in five low-rate production lots totaling 21
aircraft. Two or three test aircraft wil precede the production lots. The development program
began on Friday, October 23, 2015, when Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Frank Kendal selected Northrop Grumman as the prime contractor.
According to program officials, selection of a contractor constituted “Milestone B” in this
acquisition, although it is not clear whether al of the required steps for a formal Milestone B
review were carried out under the B-21’s rapid acquisition construct.27 Subsequently, the Air
Force announced the B-21 had passed its preliminary design review, a step normal y required

technologies ranked 6 or above have been demonstrated in a relevant environment (as opposed to a laboratory setting.)
T he B-21’s subsystems’ readiness for production appears to indicate a T RL equivalent of 6 or 7.
25 Created in 2003, the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office “expedites development and fielding” of systems and
“conducts projects on accelerated timelines.” U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet: Rapid Capabilities Office, Washington, DC,
August 28, 2009, http://go.usa.gov/czcnB. “ T he RCO reports to a board of directors chaired by Pentagon procurement
chief Frank Kendall; Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James, Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh and service acquisition
head William LaPlante are also on the board.” Amy Butler, “USAF Offers Long-Awaited Peek At Secret Bomber
Plans,” Aerospace Daily, September 3, 2015, p. 2.
26 Correspondence from DOD Legislative Affairs to CRS, April 1, 2016. Nunn -McCurdy requirements specify how
DOD reports program cost growth to Congress; for more details, see CRS Report R41293, The Nunn-McCurdy Act:
Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz and Charles V. O'Connor.
27 Air Force briefing to and discussion with CRS and think tank representatives, September 1, 2015. “Milestone B,”
defined in DOD regulation, marks the point at which a program exits technology maturation/risk reduction and
proceeds to engineering and manufacturing development. A specific set of reports and certifications are required for a
standard Milestone B.
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before Milestone B, sometime before March, 2017.28 The critical design review required before a
Milestone C production decision was accomplished in late 2018. 29
On September 20, 2021, Frank Kendal , now Secretary of the Air Force, announced that five B-
21s were in production, rather than the two previously acknowledged.30 These likely include at
least one aircraft for static test and one for initial flight test. This disclosure confirms CRS’s
previous observations that the B-21 budget profile appeared more like a production program than
pure R&D. The B-21’s official first flight, original y anticipated in December 2021,31 is now
expected in mid-2022.32
DOD proposes to acquire the B-21 through a cost-plus-incentive-fee development contract
followed by firm-fixed-price procurement.33 This has occasioned some critical comment; see
“Issues for Congress” below for further discussion.
Budget Profile
Until FY2022, B-21 development was funded through Air Force research and development
budgets. Over the past few years, the outyear projections for that funding have declined. The Air
Force began to request B-21 procurement funds in FY2022, and a credible news report indicates
that they may total $5.9 bil ion through the following five years.34 That procurement funding is
shown as “FY20 reported w/proc” in Figure 3.

28 Valerie Insinna, “B-21 Raider covertly completes preliminary design review,” Defense News, March 8, 2017.
29 For more on the critical design review, see “Acquisition Process - Engineering & Manufacturing Development
(EMD) Phase,” AcqNotes, http://acqnotes.com/acqnote/tasks/critical-design-review-2. Valerie Insinna, “Blink and
you’ll miss it: T he B-21 bomber accomplishes another big review,” Defense News, December 7, 2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/12/07/blink -and-youll-miss-it-the-b-21-bomber-accomplishes-another-big-
review/.
30 Valerie Insinna, “Northrop Grumman now has five B-21 stealth bombers in production,” Defense News, September
20, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/09/20/northrop-grumman-now-has-five-b-21-stealth-bombers-in-
production/.
31 John A. T irpak, “B-21 to Fly in December 2021; More B-52s to Come Out of Boneyard,” Air Force Magazine, July
24, 2019, http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/July%202019/B-21-to-Fly-in-December-2021-More-B-
52s-to-Come-Out-of-Boneyard.aspx.
32 John A. T irpak, “Second B-21 Under Construction as Bomber Moves T oward First Flight,” Air Force Magazine,
January 15, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/second-b-21-under-construction-as-bomber-moves-toward-first-
flight/.
33 Lara Seligman, “Air Force Defends B-21 Bomber on Capitol Hill, but McCain Still ‘Concerned,’”
DefenseNews.com , March 2, 2016.
34 Anthony Capaccio, “ Northrop Grumman’s B-21 Stealth Bomber to Get Procurement Boost,” Bloomberg News,
March 28, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-28/northrop-grumman-s-b-21-stealth-bomber-to-
get-procurement -boost.
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Figure 3. Proposed B-21 Outyear Funding

Source: Air Force R&D justification books, PE 0604015F, for years indicated, and news reports.
Note: The FY2022 budget submission did not include outyear projections.
As Figure 3 shows, the B-21’s outyear funding projection changed in the FY2017 Administration
budget proposal, which cut $3.5 bil ion over the FYDP from the previous projection while
maintaining approximately the same rate of growth. Senior Air Force officials indicate that this
revision is due to the actual bids for the B-21 being considerably lower than either the Air Force’s
budget estimate or the independent estimate developed by DOD’s Office of Cost Analysis and
Program Evaluation. This budget revision results in the program growing at approximately the
same rate, but starting from a lower baseline.
The FY2022 budget request is the first unclassified document to include procurement funds for
the B-21, with $108 mil ion for advance procurement. The budget documentation does not
specify the purpose of those funds, nor explain whether the initial LRIP lots wil be purchased
with procurement or R&D funding.
Industrial Base
Northrop Grumman is building the B-21 at its facilities at Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, CA,
which were previously used to produce the B-2. The company also builds F-35 subassemblies and
Global Hawk and Triton UAVs on the site. Although the delivery schedule has not been
announced, work has been underway for some time to prepare the production line.35 The Air
Force subsequently added that B-21 testing would take place at nearby Edwards AFB, CA.36
Initial maintenance and sustainment wil reportedly be run from Tinker AFB, OK.37

35 CRS site visit to Palmdale, CA, March 10, 2016, and Guy Norris and Jen DiMascio, “Northrop Speeds Up B-2
Work, Primes For LRS-B,” Aviation Week, December 14, 2015, http://aviationweek.com/defense/northrop-speeds-b-2-
work-primes-lrs-b.
36 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, Acting SecAF Donovan announces B-21 manufacturing, testing locations,
September 16, 2019, https://go.usa.gov/xpZsn; 412th Test Wing Public Affairs, 420th FLTS reactivates to support B-21
Raider testing, October 9, 2019, https://go.usa.gov/xpZsp.
37 Oriana Pawlyk, “B-21 Raider Will Get Maintenance, Support from T hese 2 Air Force Bases,” Military.com,
November 19, 2018, https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/11/19/b-21-raider-will-get-maintenance-support-these-2-
air-force-bases.html.
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On March 7, 2016, the Air Force released a list of B-21 major subcontractors, without
commenting on what part of the aircraft they would provide. Subcontractors include
 Pratt & Whitney, East Hartford, CT;
 BAE Systems, Nashua, NH;
 GKN Aerospace, St. Louis, MO;
 Janicki Industries, Sedro-Woolley, WA;
 Orbital ATK, Clearfield, UT, and Dayton, OH;
 Rockwel Collins, Cedar Rapids, IA; and
 Spirit AeroSystems, Wichita, KS.
Following the B-21 contract award to Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin wil remain the
principal supplier of purpose-built combat aircraft to the DOD, as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4. U.S. Fixed-Wing Manned Military Aircraft Programs

Source: The Teal Group.
Issues for Congress
How Many B-21s to Procure
When it initially released information about the program, the Air Force announced that it hoped to
buy “80 to 100” B-21s. That number was resolved to a request for 100 in the FY2017 budget
submission and subsequent testimony has referred to 100 as a minimum number.
We require a fleet size that will ensure sustained dominance well into this century and
intend to procure a minimum of 100 B-21s. Procuring at least 100 B-21s will also reduce
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lifecycle ownership costs. Further, we are continuing to study the right size of the total
future bomber force.38
Through a spokesman, the Air Force confirmed the number, saying the change happened
“in Spring 2016” at the request of Air Force Global Strike Command. At that time, USAF
established 100 “as the floor—not the ceiling” for the B-21 fleet size, he said. AFGSC
“requires a minimum of 100 B-21 Raider aircraft, with a mix of legacy bombers, to meet
future COCOM [combatant commander] requirements,” the spokesman said.39
The B-21 is intended to initial y replace the 20 B-2 and 63 B-1 strategic bombers currently in the
fleet. B-2s date from the 1990s; B-1s date from the 1980s.
When the B-2 was procured in the 1990s, initial plans cal ed for 132 aircraft. Ultimately, 21 B-2s
were procured.40 The B-2 was not primarily intended to replace existing bombers, but to add
stealth capability to the fleet. Arguably, that role as an enhancement rather than a replacement
made it easier to reduce the number bought, since adding any quantity of B-2s would leave the
bomber force more capable than before.
By contrast, the Air Force plans to retire its B-2s and B-1s by 2040. Following those retirements,
with the full planned buy of 100 B-21s, the bomber fleet would grow in number from 159 to 176.
In testimony, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans, Programs and Requirements
stated that the United States needed a fleet of 165 bombers.41 Others argue that the resulting
bomber force wil be too smal , and that DOD should acquire more than 100 B-21s. For example,
a paper by retired Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Moel er recommended a force of 150 to
160 combat-coded bombers, which would require 200 B-21s.42
Subsequently, Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson announced a goal of increasing the
bomber fleet by seven squadrons.43 Although the goal was not accompanied by specific
procurement plans, observers note that would likely necessitate 75 additional bombers, with only
the B-21 then in production.44

38 U.S. Air Force, Statement Of General Stephen W. Wilson, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the Committee on
Arm ed Services, United States House Of Representatives regarding Military Assessm ent of Nuclear Deterrence
Requirem ents, March 8, 2017, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170308/105640/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-
WilsonUSAFS-20170308.PDF. Emphasis in original.
39 John A. T irpak, “It’s Official: Minimum of 100 B-21s,” Air Force, March 16, 2017, http://www.airforcemag.com/
DRArchive/Pages/2017/March%202017/March%2015%202017/It%E2%80%99s-Official-Minimum-of-100-B-
21s.aspx.
40 One B-2 was subsequently lost in an accident, and one is used for testing.
41 Colin Clark, “B-21 Bomber Boost? KC-46 Still Late,” Breaking Defense, May 25, 2017, http://breakingdefense.com/
2017/05/b-21-bomber-boost-general-touts-165-kc-46-still-late/.
42 Lt Gen Michael R. “Mike” Moeller, USAF (Ret.), US BOMBER FORCE: Sized to Sustain an Asymmetric Advantage
for Am erica, Mitchell Institute, 2015. Combat -coded aircraft are those containing full equipment and capabilities,
maintained to be fully ready, and not designated for training or other purposes. Of the force of 20 B-2s, 16 are combat -
coded.
43 Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, Air Force We Need: 386 operational squadrons, Washington, DC,
September 17, 2018, https://go.usa.gov/xPXAg.
44 See, inter alia, Colin Clark, “What Will New Bomber Squadrons Mean For Air Force? 75 More B-21s?,” Breaking
Defense, September 18, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/what -will-new-bomber-squadrons-mean-for-air-
force-75-more-b-21s/.
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Should Older Bombers Be Extended?
In deciding whether and how quickly to acquire B-21s, Congress may wish to consider the trade-
off between the cost and effectiveness of new aircraft and extending the service lives of existing
B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s. This may be a chal enging comparison, particularly as the B-52s are
already scheduled to remain in service for 80 years, an unprecedented service life for a combat
aircraft. Quite apart from the B-52’s suitability to operate in evolving air defense environments,
the chal enges of maintaining and operating an 80-year-old aircraft in regular service are
unknown. That said, many of the B-52’s systems have already been upgraded and replaced over
the years, so the time since manufacture may not represent the actual maturity of the aircraft.45
When Will B-21 Actually Be Available?
Budget documents and testimony have long indicated that the B-21 was expected to reach IOC in
the mid-2020s. More recently, Air Force statements have raised the possibility of a later IOC.
The B-21 bomber is “progressing really well,” Global Strike Command chief Gen. Robin
Rand told reporters ... it looks like “in the mid-2020s, we’ll have the first one at one of our
bases,” with initial operating capability “in the late ‘20s”. He reiterated his “strong
recommendation” that USAF buy “at least 100” of the bombers and “make sure we get to
that [number] by the late ‘30s.” At such a rate, production would be around five per year.46
It is not clear whether the move to a potential “late 2020s” IOC is driven by program issues,
budget constraints, or other issues. However, an Air Force fact sheet issued after this testimony
reinstated the “mid-2020s” date.47
Cost Issues
What Other Budget Items Support B-21?
In testimony, the Air Force Vice-Chief of Staff said, “The Air Force remains committed to B-21
affordability, with the average procurement cost of $564 mil ion in base year 2016 dollars.”48
As noted above, many aspects of the B-21’s design remain classified, which makes validating the
proposed cost difficult. Further, the unclassified budgets for the B-21 shown in Air Force
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation line 604015F and procurement line B02100 are only a
portion of the funding for the program. Whether B-21 itself enjoys additional (presumably
classified) funding, Air Force officials have stated that B-21 is part of a family of systems, and
that work on enabling technologies continues. It is not clear to what extent the B-21 depends on
these other systems in order to accomplish its missions. If they are essential to some or al of the
B-21’s missions, however, the cost of those enablers might be considered as part of the cost of the
B-21. To the extent they enable other systems besides B-21, a portion of the enablers’ cost could

45 For more information on B-52 and B-1 modernization, see CRS Report R43049, U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress.
46 John A. T irpak, “B-21 Update,” Air Force, March 3, 2017, http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2017/
March%202017/March%2003%202017/B-21-Update.aspx.
47 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: B-21 Raider,” press release, July 6, 2021, https://go.usa.gov/x6exF.
48 U.S. Air Force, Statement Of General Stephen W. Wilson, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force to the Committee on
Arm ed Services, United States House Of Representatives regarding Military A ssessm ent of Nuclear Deterrence
Requirem ents, March 8, 2017, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20170308/105640/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-
WilsonUSAFS-20170308.PDF.
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be attributed to B-21. DOD has not publicly identified these enabling systems, nor where in the
budget their development appears.
Both the House and Senate-passed versions of the FY2017 defense authorization bil included
requirements that DOD disclose the total cost of the B-21. However, those provisions did not
appear in the final conference report.49
Cost of Nuclear Capability
As noted earlier, one of the issues in the earlier Next-Generation Bomber program was whether to
incur the additional cost of making the bomber nuclear-capable. That decision has been made in
the affirmative for the B-21. Congress may wish to consider the trade-off between the cost of
making the B-21 nuclear-capable and other means of delivering nuclear weapons. The
contribution of each leg of the nuclear triad to deterrence is a long-standing debate, as are the
questions of the cost/effectiveness issue between penetrating platforms and standoff weapons.
The latter question is coming to the fore again with DOD’s proposals for the Long-Range
Standoff Missile (popularly LRSO) and the Arsenal Plane (see footnote 10). Whether standoff
missiles or land- or sea-based ICBMs offer the same flexibility as a bomber, and the value of any
additional flexibility, may figure into Congress’s considerations not only of B-21, but of other
nuclear modernization programs.50
Acquisition Process Issues
What Type of Contract Should Be Used for B-21?
As noted above, B-21 development is being conducted through a cost-plus-incentive-fee
development contract followed by firm-fixed-price procurement. The late Senator John McCain
publicly chal enged this contract structure, arguing that a fixed-price development contract would
be more beneficial to the government:
“I will not authorize a program that has a cost-plus contract—and I told them that,” said
McCain, R-Ariz. “If you have a cost-plus contract, tell me one time that there hasn’t been
additional costs, then I would reconsider. The mindset in the Pentagon that still somehow
these are still acceptable is infuriating.”51
Others noted that fixed-price development worked better when the major technology issues had
been solved and there was a broad market for the product that would al ow the contractor to
recoup its development costs should they be higher than the fixed price.
In evaluating the acquisition strategy, Congress may attempt to assess to what degree the declared
subsystem risk reduction has actual y reduced the technology risk of the entire B-21 program.
Congress may also consider whether it prefers to fix development costs and take a risk on which
capabilities can be achieved for that cost, or fix the technology requirement and take a risk that

49 John M. Donnelly, “Contractor Won Weak Bomber Oversight, McCain Says,” Roll Call, December 13, 2016,
https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/contractor-won-weak-bomber-oversight -mccain-says.
50 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
Developm ents, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
51 Lara Seligman, “Air Force Defends B-21 Bomber on Capitol Hill, but McCain Still ‘Concerned,’”
DefenseNews.com , March 2, 2016.
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Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber

costs wil increase.52 It may also wish to consider any cost inherent in changing the acquisition
strategy already being executed.53
In this context, it may be worth noting that DOD has found “no statistical correlation between the
use of contract type (e.g., cost-plus and fixed-price types) and lower cost or schedule growth.”54
Accuracy of Cost Estimating
As noted above, the winning bid for the B-21 came in substantial y below DOD’s independent
estimates. In the past, contractors have been accused of bidding unrealistical y low prices in order
to win a given contract, then using their incumbency to appeal for higher appropriations. Use of
cost-plus-incentive-fee development, as in the current contract, appears to put some cost risk on
the government, while firm-fixed-price procurement appears to put much of the risk for
subsequent cost increases on the contractor.
Congress may wish to revisit DOD’s cost estimation to understand why the estimated cost was
significantly higher than the actual bid. In addition, Congress may wish to use its oversight
mechanisms to verify that the contract can be executed at the price bid and/or select a contract
type maximizing contractor responsibility to meet the bid price.
Oversight Issues
Oversight of Rapid Acquisition Programs
B-21 is being acquired through nontraditional means, using the Air Force’s Rapid Capability
Office instead of a standard dedicated program office, as is more typical. Although this approach
may improve the speed and ease of the acquisition, Congress has relatively little experience
overseeing rapid acquisitions processes. At $3 bil ion a year, this program is significantly larger
than those that have traditional y been the subject of rapid acquisition. Congress may wish to
consider whether its ability to oversee such acquisitions is sufficient, and if the advantages gained
through rapid acquisition processes outweigh the chal enges of oversight when applied to major
defense acquisition programs. Alternatively, Congress may consider revising the existing
acquisition regulations to more closely approximate the rapid acquisition process.
Oversight of Highly Classified Programs55
Like many defense technology programs, most of the B-21 program is designated as a Special
Access Program. Special Access Programs implement stricter access requirements than those

52 A useful discussion of these issues can be found in Andrew Hunter, “Long Range Strike: 3 Lessons from Defense
Contracting that Tell us the Air Force’s New Bomber is Ready to Move Forward,” War on the Rocks, February 26,
2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/long-range-strike-3-lessons-from-defense-contracting-air-forces-new-bomber-
ready-to-move-forward/.
53 See, for example, James Drew, “Penalty for breaking Northrop’s B-21 contract is ‘$300 million,’” FlightGlobal.com,
March 9, 2016, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/penalty-for-breaking-northrops-b-21-contract-is-3-422960/.
54 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, T echnology, and Logistics, Performance of the Defense
Acquisition System : 2013 Annual Report, Washington, DC, June 28, 2013, p. 51, http://go.usa.gov/cetBd.
55 T his discussion was prepared by Eric Petersen, CRS Specialist in American National Government.
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necessary to obtain information classified at Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret levels.56 House57
and Senate58 rules govern the manner in which Members of Congress and their staffs may gain
access to national security classified information.
Primary oversight responsibility for government programs typical y lies with the members of
committees with jurisdiction established by House and Senate rules. With regard to the B-21
program, these committees include the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, as wel as
the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Due to the size
of the B-21 program, its implications for defense budgeting, and other issues like the role of
nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, the B-21 may attract interest from Members not
typical y involved in such issues. Congress may wish to consider whether such Members’
interests require a greater level of access to program data, or whether the issues can be adequately
addressed under the current rules.
Should B-21 Be Financed Through a Separate Strategic
Forces Fund?
In 2015, Congress authorized that the Ohio Replacement Program, the SSBN(X), which like B-21
has a nuclear mission, be funded not from the Navy budget, but through a National Sea-Based
Deterrence Fund in the Defense-Wide budget.59 On March 16, 2016, Air Force Secretary Deborah
Lee James told the House Armed Services Committee that al U.S. strategic forces should be
funded outside of service budgets.60 Two days later, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter agreed
“that a broader nuclear deterrent fund may be appropriate.”61
Those who support a separate nuclear deterrence fund argue that the nuclear deterrence mission is
a joint and national effort, not distinct to a particular military service, and thus should be funded
outside the services’ budgets. They also note that the military services are facing a “bow wave” of
deferred modernization and recapitalization following more than a decade of war, and that
moving the expensive nuclear forces to a separate budget wil al ow the services to focus on
enhancing capability for their unique missions without the competing expense of deterrence
forces.62 Others note that regardless of the budget line used, al of these funds wil come under the
DOD topline, and that real ocating funds to a DOD-wide deterrence fund wil reduce the overal
amounts available for al of the services.

56 For further discussion, see CRS Report R43216, Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions, by Michelle D. Christensen.
57 House Rule XXIII, cl. 13.
58 S.Res. 243, A resolution to establish the Office of Senate Security, 100th Congress, adopted July 1, 1987.
59 For more details on the Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class
Ballistic Missile Subm arine Program : Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
60 Marina Malenic, “USAF wants to add B-21, ICBM upgrades to ‘strategic deterrent’ fund,” IHS Jane’s 360, March
16, 2016.
61 Aaron Mehta, “Carter Open to DoD-wide Nuclear Weapons Fund,” Defense News, March 18, 2016.
62 For a discussion of the Air Force bow wave, see CRS Report R44305, The Air Force Aviation Investment Challenge.
Overall DOD bow wave issues are addressed in T odd Harrison, Defense Modernization Plans through the 2020s:
Addressing the Bow Wave, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 27, 2016, https://csis.org/files/
publication/160126_Harrison_DefenseModernization_Web.pdf.
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Author Information

Jeremiah Gertler

Specialist in Military Aviation

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

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