Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress

May 21, 2014 – February 6, 2024 R43543

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious
Ship Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
Updated February 6, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R43543

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Summary
The Navy is currently building two types of larger amphibious ships: LPD-17 Flight II class
amphibious ships, and LHA-type amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington
Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Oversight issues for
Congress regarding larger amphibious ships include the Navy’s plans for procuring LPD-17
Flight II class ships in FY2024 and subsequent years, and associated projected numbers of larger
amphibious ships; Navy proposals for retiring older LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships; the
Navy’s non-use of LHA-LPD-17 block-buy procurement authority provided by Congress;
technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs; and the operational readiness
of in-service larger amphibious ships.
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a force of 38 larger amphibious ships, including 12 LHA/LHD-type amphibious
assault ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e.,
12+13+13). The Navy and the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been working since
2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace the 355-ship force-level goal. The Marine
Corps supports a successor amphibious ship force-level goal with 31 larger amphibious ships,
including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 8 LPD-17 Flight II class
ships (i.e., 10+13+8). Marine Corps officials have stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger
amphibious ships would increase operational risks for meeting requests from U.S. regional
combatant commanders for amphibious ships for day-to-day forward presence or responding to
contingencies. The Navy also nominally supports a force-level goal of 31 larger amphibious
ships. Section 1023 of the FY2023 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to
include not less than 31 operational larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships
and 21 LPD-type or older LSD-type amphibious ships.
Notwithstanding 10 U.S.C. 8062, the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission does not program the
procurement of any further LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships (i.e., it proposes truncating the
LPD-17 Flight II program at three ships), and projects that the number of larger amphibious ships
will remain below 31, with the figure decreasing to 26 in FY2035 and to 19 to 23 in FY2053. The
Marine Corps’ FY2024 unfunded priorities list (UPL) includes, as its top unfunded priority,
$1,712.5 million in procurement funding for procuring a fourth LPD-17 Flight II class ship (LPD-
33) in FY2024.
The most recently procured LHA-type ship is LHA-9. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission
estimates its procurement cost at $3,834.3 million (i.e., about $3.8 billion). The ship has received
a total of $2,004.1 million in prior year advance procurement (AP) and procurement funding. The
Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining $1,830.1 million needed to complete the
ship’s procurement cost.
Section 129 of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-
263 of December 23, 2022) permits the Navy to enter into a block buy contract for procuring a
combination of up to five LPD-17 and LHA-type amphibious ships.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission also proposes retiring three aging LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships in FY2024.
Marine Corps officials in public remarks have called attention to the number of in-service
amphibious ships that are not operationally ready because they are undergoing or need
maintenance and repair work, and have stated that inadequate numbers of operationally ready
amphibious ships have resulted in instances of where the Navy has not been able to meet requests
from U.S. regional combatant commanders for amphibious ships for day-to-day forward presence
or responding to contingencies.
Congressional Research Service

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on two types of amphibious
ships being built for the Navy: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships and LHA-type
amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls
Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS.
Oversight issues for Congress regarding larger amphibious ships include the Navy’s plans for
procuring LPD-17 Flight II class ships in FY2024 and subsequent years, and associated projected
numbers of larger amphibious ships; Navy proposals for retiring older LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships; the Navy’s non-use of LHA-LPD-17 block-buy procurement authority
provided by Congress; technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs; and the
operational readiness of in-service larger amphibious ships.
A separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, previously
known as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program.1
Background
U.S. Navy Amphibious Ships
Roles and Missions
Navy amphibious ships are operated by the Navy, with crews consisting of Navy personnel. They
are battle force ships, meaning ships that count toward the quoted size of the Navy and toward the
Navy’s force-level goal. The primary function of Navy amphibious ships is to lift (i.e., transport)
embarked U.S. Marines and their weapons, equipment, and supplies to distant operating areas,
and enable Marines to conduct expeditionary operations ashore in those areas. Although
amphibious ships can be used to support Marine landings against opposing military forces, they
are also used for operations in permissive or benign situations where there are no opposing forces.
Due to their large storage spaces and their ability to use helicopters and landing craft to transfer
people, equipment, and supplies from ship to shore without need for port facilities,2 amphibious
ships are potentially useful for a range of combat and noncombat operations.3
On any given day, some of the Navy’s amphibious ships, like some of the Navy’s other ships, are
forward-deployed to various overseas operating areas in multiship formations called amphibious
groups (ARGs). Amphibious ships are also sometimes forward-deployed on an individual basis,

1 CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 Amphibious ships have berthing spaces for Marines; storage space for their wheeled vehicles, their other combat
equipment, and their supplies; flight decks and hangar decks for their helicopters and vertical take-off and landing
(VTOL) fixed-wing aircraft; and in many cases well decks for storing and launching their landing craft. (A well deck is
a large, garage-like space in the stern of the ship. It can be flooded with water so that landing craft can leave or return
to the ship. Access to the well deck is protected by a large stern gate that is somewhat like a garage door.)
3 Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can be used for launching and conducting humanitarian-
assistance and disaster-response (HA/DR) operations; peacetime engagement and partnership-building activities, such
as exercises; other nation-building operations, such as reconstruction operations; operations to train, advise, and assist
foreign military forces; peace-enforcement operations; noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs); maritime-security
operations, such as anti-piracy operations; smaller-scale strike and counterterrorism operations; and larger-scale ground
combat operations. Amphibious ships and their embarked Marine forces can also be used for maintaining forward-
deployed naval presence for purposes of deterrence, reassurance, and maintaining regional stability.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 5 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

particularly for conducting peacetime engagement activities with foreign countries or for
responding to smaller-scale or noncombat contingencies.
Types of Amphibious Ships
The Navy’s current amphibious ship force consists entirely of larger amphibious ships, including
the so-called “big-deck” amphibious assault ships, designated LHA and LHD, which look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers, and the smaller (but still quite sizeable) amphibious ships,
designated LPD or LSD, which are sometimes called “small-deck” amphibious ships.4 As
mentioned earlier, a separate CRS report discusses the Navy’s Medium Landing Ship (LSM)
program, previously known as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) program, which is a
program to build a new type of amphibious ship that would be much smaller than the Navy’s
current LHA/LHD- and LPD/LSD-type amphibious ships.5
Amphibious Ship Force-Level Goal
Requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062
10 U.S.C. 8062(b) requires the Navy to include not less than 31 operational amphibious warfare
ships. The 31 amphibious ships are to include not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck”
amphibious assault ships, with the remaining amphibious ships being LPD/LSD-type amphibious
ships. The requirement for the Navy to include these numbers and types of amphibious ships was
added to 10 U.S.C. 8062 by Section 1023 of the FY2023 (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of
December 23, 2022).
Force-Level Goal under 355-Ship Plan of 2016
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and
maintaining a force of 38 larger amphibious ships, including 12 LHA/LHD-type amphibious
assault ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e.,
12+13+13).6 This 38 ship force-level goal predates the LSM program and consequently includes
no LSMs.
Successor Force-Level Goal
The Navy and OSD have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace
the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, but have not been able to come to closure on a successor
goal. Required numbers and types of amphibious ships reportedly have been matters of discussion

4 U.S. Navy amphibious ships have designations starting with the letter L, as in amphibious landing. LHA can be
translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, assault; LHD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter-capable, well
deck; LPD can be translated as landing ship, helicopter platform, well deck; and LSD can be translated as landing ship,
well deck. Whether noted in the designation or not, almost all these ships have well decks. The exceptions are LHAs 6
and 7, which do not have well decks and instead have expanded aviation support capabilities. For an explanation of
well decks, see footnote 2. The terms “large-deck” and “small-deck” refer to the size of the ship’s flight deck.
5 CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
6 For more on the Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding
Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. For a more detailed review of the 38-ship force
structure requirements, see Appendix A of archived CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship
Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Congressional Research Service

2

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

and debate between the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD).7
The Marine Corps supports a successor amphibious ship force-level goal with 31 larger
amphibious ships—including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 8
LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., 10+13+8)—plus 35 LSMs (aka “31+35”).8 Marine Corps
officials have stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger amphibious ships would increase
operational risks for meeting requests from U.S. regional combatant commanders for amphibious
ships for day-to-day forward presence or responding to contingencies.9
The Navy nominally supports a force-level goal of 31 larger amphibious ships: A July 18, 2023,
press report stated that the Navy on June 20, 2023, had submitted to the congressional defense
committees a classified, congressionally mandated Battle Force Ship Assessment and
Requirement (BFSAR) that Navy officials stated publicly calls for achieving and maintaining a
future fleet of 381 ships, including 31 larger amphibious ships.10

7 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Want 31 Amphibious Ships. The Pentagon Disagrees. Now What?” Defense News, May 2,
2023; Laura Heckmann, “Navy, Marine Corps at Odds Over Fleet Requirements,” National Defense, March 29, 2023;
Brent D. Sadler, “This Ugly Dispute Over Amphibious Warships Didn’t Have to Happen,” Defense One, March 23,
2023; Paul McLeary, “Marines Furious over the Navy’s Plan for Troop-Carrying Ships,” Politico Pro, March 17, 2023;
Caitlin M. Kenney, “Is the LPD-17 Flight II Amphib Worth It? Depends Who You Ask,” Defense One, March 16,
2023; Rich Abott, “Pause in Procurement of LPDs is Mostly Due To Price, CNO Says,” Defense Daily, March 15,
2023; Megan Eckstein, “Naval Chief Says Rising Cost Spurred Amphib Production Pause,” Defense News, March 15,
2023; Justin Katz, “ Both Citing Cost, Leaders of Navy, Marines Dig In on Amphib Ship Fight,” Breaking Defense,
March 15, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marine Corps Debate Amphibious Ship Costs as Clash Over LPD-17
Flight II Line Continues,” USNI News, March 15 (updated March 16), 2023; Nick Wilson, “Berger: LSD
Decommissioning Would Violate Amphib Requirement; Unfunded Priorities Coming Soon,” Inside Defense, March
15, 2023; Nick Wilson, “CNO: LPD Pause Is Cost-Driven, Budget Growth Will Not Last,” Inside Defense, March 15,
2023; Justin Katz, “‘Unacceptable’: Marines Are Ready to Fight Tonight—About the Amphib Budget,” Breaking
Defense, March 13, 2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024,”
Defense One, March 13, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy: OSD Directed Amphib Procurement Pause, Joint Staff
Says Current Amphib Force ‘Sufficient,’” USNI News, March 13 (updated March 20), 2023; Megan Eckstein,
“Commandant pushes amphibious warship funding as next budget emerges,” Defense News, March 9, 2023; Mallory
Shelbourne, “FY2024 Budget: Navy Won’t Buy Any More San Antonio Amphibs in the Next Five Years,” USNI
News, March 9 (updated March 15), 2023; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Reviews Cost-Saving Design Changes Before
Resuming Amphib Buys,” Defense News, February 28, 2023; Rich Abott, “Rivers: Navy Not Talking About ‘Walking
Away’ From LPD Flight II,” Defense Daily, February 27, 2023; Megan Eckstein, “White House Steps in as Navy,
Pentagon Feud over Amphibious Ship Study,” Defense News, December 8, 2022; Justin Katz, “Del Toro: Navy-Marine
Corps Amphib Study in ‘Final Stages,’ Being Briefed to Leadership,” Breaking Defense, December 6, 2022; Lee
Hudson, “Senators Press Del Toro for Update on Amphib Study,” Politico Pro, November 14, 2022; Megan Eckstein,
“US Marines Warn Against Navy’s FY24 Decommission Plans,” Defense News, October 4, 2022.
8 See, for example, Todd South, “Back to Ship: Marines Need Ships to Fight. Will They Get Them?” Military Times,
March 24, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Some Lawmakers Back Marines in Disagreement over Navy Amphib Force,”
Defense News, April 5, 2022; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Push Light Amphib Warship While Navy Secretary Awaits
Study,” Defense One, April 5, 2022; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marines Divided Over the Amphibious Fleet’s
Future as Delays and Cancellations Mount in FY 2023 Budget Request,” USNI News, April 3, 2022.
9 See, for example, Caitlin M. Kenney, “‘We Didn’t Have the Ships’ to Send ‘Best Option’ to Help Earthquake
Victims, Commandant Says,” Defense One, February 15, 2023; Caitlin M. Kenney, “Marines Issue Warning on
Amphib Fleet, The Assistant Commandant Says 31 Large Amphibious Warfare Ships Are Needed to Avoid Risk,”
Defense One, February 14, 2023.
10 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Raises Battle Force Goal to 381 Ships in Classified Report to Congress,” USNI News, July 18,
2023. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Navy’s New 381-Hull Fleet Plan Recommits To Big Amphibious Warfare Ships,”
The Drive, July 19, 2023. See also Linda Hersey, “Franchetti Pledges Support for 31-Amphib Mandate, Delivering
Columbia Submarines on Time,” Inside Defense, September 14, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 9 link to page 9 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

FY2023 NDAA Provisions
The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December
23, 2022) included the following provisions relating to the amphibious ship force-level goal:
• Section 1022 amended 10 U.S.C. 8026 to require the Secretary of the Navy to
ensure that the views of the Commandant of the Marine Corps are given
appropriate consideration before a major decision is made by an element of the
Department of the Navy outside the Marine Corps on a matter that directly
concerns amphibious force structure and capability.
• Section 1023, as noted earlier, amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to
include not less than 31 operational larger amphibious ships, including 10
LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD or LSD type ships.
• Section 1025 amended 10 U.S.C. 8695 to state that, in preparing a periodic battle
force ship assessment and requirement, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
shall be specifically responsible for developing the requirements relating to
amphibious warfare ships.
Number of Amphibious Ships at End of FY2022 and Projected Through FY2053
The Navy’s force of amphibious ships at the end of FY2022 included 31 larger ships, including 9
amphibious assault ships (2 LHAs and 7 LHDs), 12 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 10 older
LSD-41/49 class ships. The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission projects that the Navy at the end
of FY2024 will include 29 larger amphibious ships, including 9 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD
Flight I class ships, and 7 LSD-41/49 class ships.
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, released on April 18, 2023,11
includes three 30-year shipbuilding profiles and three resulting 30-year force-level projections.
The three alternatives are called PB2024 (meaning the President’s budget for FY2024),
Alternative 2, and Alternative 3. The document shows the projected number of larger amphibious
ships remaining below 31 ships throughout the 30-year period, with the figure decreasing to 26
ships in FY2035 and decreasing further, to 19 ships (PB2024), 20 ships (Alternative 2), or 23
ships (Alternative 3), in FY2053.
Existing LSD-41/49 Class Ships
The Navy procured a total of 12 Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class ships (Figure
1) procured between FY1981 and FY1993. The ships entered service between 1985 and 1998.12
The LSD-41/49 class included 12 ships because the class was built at a time when the Navy was
planning a 36-ship (12+12+12) amphibious force. LD-41/49 class ships have an expected service
life of 40 years. Two of the ships were retired in 2021 and 2022. The Navy’s proposed FY2024
budget proposes retiring three more in FY2024 at ages of 34, 35, and 38 years, which would leave
seven in service at the end of FY2024.

11 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, with cover letters dated March 30, 2023, released April 18, 2023, 31 pp.
12 The class was initially known as the Whidbey Island (LSD-41) class. The final four ships in the class, beginning with
Harpers Ferry (LSD-49), were built to a modified version of the original LSD-41 design, prompting the name of the
class to be changed to the Harpers Ferry/Whidbey Island (LSD-41/49) class. Some sources refer to these 12 ships as
two separate classes.
Congressional Research Service

4

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Figure 1. LSD-41/49 Class Ship

Source: Cropped version of U.S. Navy photo dated July 13, 2013, showing the Pearl Harbor (LSD-52).
Amphibious Warship Industrial Base
Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS, is the Navy’s
current builder of both LPDs and LHA-type ships, although other U.S. shipyards could also build
amphibious ships.13 The amphibious warship industrial base also includes many supplier firms in
numerous U.S. states that provide materials and components for Navy amphibious ships. HII
states that the supplier base for its LHA production line, for example, includes 457 companies in
39 states.14
LPD-17 Flight II Program
Program Origin and Name
The Navy decided in 2014 that the LSD-41/49 replacement ships would be built to a variant of
the design of the Navy’s San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. (A total of 13 LPD-17
class ships [LPDs 17 through 29] were procured between FY1996 and FY2017.) Reflecting that
decision, the Navy announced on April 10, 2018, that the replacement ships would be known as
the LPD-17 Flight II class ships.15 By implication, the Navy’s original LPD-17 design became the
LPD-17 Flight I design. The first LPD-17 Flight II class ship is designated LPD-30. Subsequent
LPD-17 Flight II class ships are to be designated LPD-31, LPD-32, and so on.
Whether the LPD-17 Flight II class ships constitute their own shipbuilding program or an
extension of the original LPD-17 shipbuilding program might be a matter of perspective. As a

13 Amphibious ships could also be built by U.S. shipyards such as HII/Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS) of
Newport News, VA; General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA;
and (for LPDs at least) General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME. The Navy over the years has from
time to time conducted competitions among shipyards for contracts to build amphibious ships.
14 Source: HII statement as quoted in Frank Wolfe, “Navy Budget Plan Delays Buy of Amphibious Ships,” Defense
Daily, March 15, 2019.
15 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Designates Upcoming LX(R) Amphibs as San Antonio-Class LPD Flight II,” USNI News,
April 11, 2018. Within a program to build a class of Navy ships, the term flight refers to a group of ships within the
class that are built to a particular version of the class design. The LPD-17 Fight II program was previously known as
the LX(R) program and before that as the LSD(X) program.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 10

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

matter of convenience, this CRS report refers to the Flight II class shipbuilding effort as a
separate program. Years from now, LPD-17 Flight I and Flight II class ships might come to be
known collectively as either the LPD-17 class, the LPD-17/30 class, or the LPD-17 and LPD-30
classes. On October 10, 2019, the Navy announced that LPD-30, the first LPD-17 Flight II class
ship, will be named Harrisburg, for the city of Harrisburg, PA.16 As a consequence, LPD-17 Flight
II, if treated as a separate class, would be referred to as Harrisburg (LPD-30) class ships.
Design
Compared to the LPD-17 Flight I design, the LPD-17 Flight II design (Figure 2) is somewhat
less expensive to procure, and in some ways less capable—a reflection of how the Flight II design
was developed to meet Navy and Marine Corps operational requirements while staying within a
unit procurement cost target that had been established for the program.17 In many other respects,
however, the LPD-17 Flight II design is similar in appearance and capabilities to the LPD-17
Flight I design. Of the 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, the final two (LPDs 28 and 29) incorporate
some design changes that make them transitional ships between the Flight I design and the Flight
II design.
Figure 2. LPD-17 Flight II Design
Artist’s rendering

Source: Cropped version of Huntington Ingalls Industries rendering accessed March 2, 2021, at
https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/file?fid=5c9a85ca2cfac22774673031.

16 Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs, “SECNAV Names Future Amphibious Transport Dock Ship in Honor of the
city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,” Navy News Service, October 10, 2019.
17 The Navy’s unit procurement cost targets for the LPD-17 Flight II program were $1,643 million in constant FY2014
dollars for the lead ship, and an average of $1,400 million in constant FY2014 dollars for ships 2 through 11. (Source:
Navy briefing on LX(R) program to CRS and CBO, March 23, 2015.) The cost target for the lead ship was greater than
the cost target for the subsequent ships primarily because the procurement cost of the lead ship incorporates much or all
of the detail design and nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the program. Incorporating much or all of the
DD/NRE costs of for a shipbuilding program into the procurement cost of the lead ship in the program is a traditional
Navy shipbuilding budgeting practice.
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 28 link to page 28

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Procurement Cost
LPD-17 Flight II class ships have a current estimated unit procurement cost of about $1.9 billion.
Procurement Quantity and FY2024 Funding Request
The first LPD-17 Flight II class ship (LPD-30) was procured in FY2018, the second (LPD-31) in
FY2020 (the Navy states that the year was FY2021),18 and the third (LPD-32) in FY2023. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, like its FY2023 budget submission, proposes truncating the
LPD-17 Flight II program to three ships by making LPD-32 the final ship in the program. The
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission does not request any funding for the procurement of LPD-33
and programs no additional LPD-17 Flight II class ships or LPD-type ships of a follow-on design
through FY2028. The Marine Corps’ FY2024 unfunded priorities list (UPL) includes, as its top
unfunded priority, $1,712.5 million in procurement funding for procuring LPD-33 in FY2024.
LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
LHA-type amphibious assault ships (Figure 3 and Figure 4) are procured once every few years.
Figure 3. LHA-8 Amphibious Assault Ship
Artist’s rendering

Source: Rendering accompanying Tyler Rogoway, “The Next America Class Amphibious Assault Ship Wil
Almost Be In a Class of its Own,” The Drive, April 17, 2018. A note on the photo credits the photo to HII.
LHA-8 was procured in FY2017. The most recently procured LHA-type ship, LHA-9, was
procured in FY2021 (the Navy states that the year was FY2023).19 The Navy’s FY2024 budget
submission estimates its procurement cost at $3,834.3 million (i.e., about $3.8 billion). The ship
has received a total of $2,004.1 million in prior year advance procurement (AP) and procurement

18 For further discussion, see the Appendix.
19 For further discussion, see the Appendix.
Congressional Research Service

7

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining $1,830.1 million needed to
complete the ship’s procurement cost.
Figure 4. LHA-7 Amphibious Assault Ship
Shown with 20 F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) on Flight Deck

Source: Photograph accompanying Stavros Atlamazoglou, “The US’s Experimental ‘Lightning Carriers’ Are
‘Much More Capable’ than China’s Current Carriers, US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, December 6, 2022. The
article credits the photograph to U.S. Marine Corps/Sgt. Samuel Ruiz.
Proposed Retirements of LSD-41/49-Class Ships
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission proposes retiring three aging LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships in FY2024 at ages of 34, 35, and 38 years; two more in FY2025; and one more
in FY2026.
NDAA Provisions Authorizing Block Buys
FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs
Section 124 of the FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395/P.L. 116-283 of January 1, 2021), as amended by
Section 121 of the FY2022 NDAA (S. 1605/P.L. 117-821 of December 27, 2021), permitted the
Navy to enter into a block buy contract in FY2021 or FY2022 for the procurement of three LPD-
17 class ships and one LHA-type amphibious assault ship. Such a contract would have been the
first block buy contract to cover the procurement of ships from two separate ship classes. Using
block buy contracting could reduce the unit procurement costs of LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-type
ships and affect Congress’s flexibility for making changes to Navy shipbuilding programs in
response to potential changes in strategic or budgetary circumstances during the period covered
by the block buy contract.20 The Navy did not use this authority.

20 For more on block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. See also Megan
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

8

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

FY2023 NDAA
Section 129 of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7776/P.L. 117-263 of December 23, 2022) permits the
Navy to enter into a block buy contract for procuring a combination of up to five LPD-17 and
LHA-type amphibious ships. Similar to the point made in the previous paragraph, such a contract
would be the first block buy contract to cover the procurement of ships from two separate ship
classes. As noted above, using block buy contracting could reduce the unit procurement costs of
LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-type ships and affect Congress’s flexibility for making changes to
Navy shipbuilding programs in response to potential changes in strategic or budgetary
circumstances during the period covered by the block buy contract. As of January 2024, the Navy
has not used this authority.
Issues for Congress
LPD-17 Flight II Procurement and Projected Numbers of
Amphibious Ships
One issue for Congress—an issue that emerged as a prominent item in Congress’s review of the
Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget—concerns the Navy’s plans for procuring LPD-17 Flight II
class ships in FY2024 and subsequent years, associated projected numbers of larger amphibious
ships, and whether these plans and projections are consistent with the 31-ship force-level goal for
larger amphibious ships. As noted earlier:
• The Marine Corps supports an amphibious ship force-level goal with 31 larger
amphibious ships, including, among other things, 8 LPD-17 Flight II class ships.
• The Navy also nominally supports a force-level goal of 31 larger amphibious
ships.
• 10 U.S.C. 8062 requires the Navy to include not less than 31 operational
amphibious warfare ships, including not less than 10 LHA/LHD-type “big deck”
amphibious assault ships and the remainder being LPD/LSD-type amphibious
ships.
Notwithstanding the three above points, the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, as noted earlier,
does not program the procurement of any further LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ships (i.e., it
proposes truncating the LPD-17 Flight II program at three ships), and projects that the number of
larger amphibious ships will remain below 31, with the figure decreasing to 26 in FY2035 and to
19 to 23 in FY2053. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• Are the Navy’s plans for procuring amphibious ships and the Navy’s projected
numbers of amphibious ships consistent with the requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062
for the Navy to include not less than 31 amphibious ships? If not, why not? More
specifically, is the Navy’s proposal to truncate the LPD-17 Flight II program to
three ships, and not procure any more such ships during the five-year period
FY2024-FY2028, consistent with the requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062?
• 10 U.S.C. 8062 requires the Navy to include not less than 11 operational aircraft
carriers. When the Navy projected that for a period of several years, it would
have 10 rather than 11 operational aircraft carriers, the Navy requested, and

Eckstein, “Ingalls Eyeing LPD Cost Reductions, Capability Increases As Future Fleet Design Evolves,” USNI News,
January 21, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

9

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Congress approved, a legislative waiver permitting the Navy to include 10 rather
than 11 operational carriers during that period.21 As noted above, the Navy’s
projects that the number of amphibious ships will remain below 31 ships
throughout the FY2023. Has the Navy requested a legislative waiver of the
requirement under 10 U.S.C. 8062 for the Navy to include not less than 31
operational amphibious warfare ships? If the Navy has not requested such a
waiver, why not?
• What are the potential operational consequences of the projected numbers of
amphibious ships shown in the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission?
• What impact would the truncation of LPD-17 Flight II procurement to a total of
three ships have on the shipyard that builds LPD-17 Flight IIs (HII/Ingalls—the
Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which is part of Huntington Ingalls
Industries) in terms of workloads, employment levels, and costs for building
other Navy warships (including DDG-51 destroyers and LHA-type amphibious
assault ships) that are built at that yard? What impact would the truncation of
LPD-17 Flight II procurement have on supplier firms associated with
construction of LPD-17 Flight II ships?22
• What changes to the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission would be needed to
better align Navy plans with the amphibious ship force-level required by 10
U.S.C. 8062? How much additional funding for procuring amphibious ships and
for operating and supporting amphibious ships would be needed to achieve and
maintain a force of not less than 31 amphibious ships, including not less than 10
LHA/LHD-type “big deck” amphibious assault ships? In a situation of finite
defense funding, what impact might providing this additional funding have on
funding available for other Navy or DOD priorities?
An April 18, 2023, press report stated
Like its predecessor, the U.S. Navy’s 2024 long-range shipbuilding plan is a tardy,
multiple-choice document that appears to fall short of the legal requirement for amphibious
warships. And some lawmakers are not happy.
“Why are you violating the law? And why does your shipbuilding plan have no remote
interest for the next 30 years, as far as I can tell, of hitting the statutory mandate that we
told you to hit?” [Senator Dan Sullivan] asked Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro at a
Tuesday [April 18] hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

21 As discussed in in the CRS report on the Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program (CRS Report
RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke), the aircraft carrier force dropped from 11 ships to 10 ships between December 1, 2012, when the aircraft
carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) was inactivated, and July 22, 2017, when the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)
was commissioned into service. Anticipating the gap between the inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of
CVN-78, the Navy asked Congress for a temporary waiver of 10 U.S.C. 8062(b) to accommodate the period between
the two events. Section 1023 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October
28, 2009) authorized the waiver, permitting the Navy to have 10 rather than 11 operational carriers between the
inactivation of CVN-65 and the commissioning of CVN-78.
22 For press reports discussing the amphibious ship industrial base, see, for example, Nick Wilson, “Amphibious
Warship Industrial Base is ‘Underutilized’ as LPD Procurement Pause Drags On,” Inside Defense, January 22, 2024;
Megan Eckstein, “HII Warns of Potential Carrier, Amphib Issues in FY25 Budget Request,” Defense News, January 8,
2024.
Congressional Research Service

10

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

“It is my responsibility to follow the law. It's also my responsibility to ensure that we just
don't waste taxpayer money on vessels, for example, that will never see the light of day,”
Del Toro replied....
Sullivan was complaining about the Navy’s stated plan to allow its amphibious fleet to
drop to 29 ships in 2024, below the 31-ship floor that Congress mandated in the 2023
National Defense Authorization Act.
He was not alone. Several senators remarked on the amphibious-ship plan during the
hearing or in later emailed statements....
[Senator Tim Kaine, who leads the committee’s Seapower subcommittee, said in his
statement:] ““Lastly, on the issue of amphibious ships: the Marine Corps has made it clear
that they need 31, and Congress shares that view. I’m frustrated that neither this plan nor
the President’s budget gets us there.”...
The top request in the Marine Corps’ 2024 unfunded priorities list is to fully fund LPD 33
to try to get the fleet back to the minimum requirement, Marine Corps Commandant Gen.
David Berger told senators at Tuesday’s hearing.
“In the shipbuilding plan and the budget submitted, there is no plan to get to that number.
And that's why I put it as the top of the unfunded list,” Berger said. “I know it to be the
operational requirement and the law. And I saw no plan to get there.”23
A March 15, 2023, press report stated
The Navy halted its pursuit of the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock line
because of the program’s growing costs and delays in the shipyard, the service’s top officer
said Wednesday.
The pause to reassess the LPD-17 Flight II line started a year ago at the direction of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday said at
the annual McAleese Conference....
The pause on buying amphibious ships is so the Navy can perform a Battle Force Ship
Assessment and Requirements Study, which will help inform amphibious ship buys and
likely wrap up in the third quarter of FY 2023, and evaluate both possible cost savings and
capabilities, officials have said....
The Navy wanted [LPD-32] to be the last LPD-17 Flight II purchase, as the service last
year tried to end the line early after only buying three ships instead of the originally planned
13.
After appeals from the Marine Corps for advanced procurement funding for LPD-33,
lawmakers opted to continue the line and allotted $250 million in advanced procurement
dollars for that ship in the FY 2023 funding and policy bills.
But the service did not include the ship in its five-year budget outlook released Monday
[March 13]. The Navy could buy LPD-33 in FY 2025 if it followed industry’s
recommendation to order the ships every two years to keep a stable work force and
maintain the supply chain. Because of the two-year centers, Gilday said the Navy has time
to evaluate the LPD-17 Flight II line.
“Congress has given us the authorities in the latest [National Defense Authorization Act]
to do a bundle buy and we all agree that that’s the way that we ought to go after these ships.
But to go after a single ship in ‘25, and put that in the budget now – based on where we are
with all this churn on cost and so forth and this concern about the cost of those ships – it’s

23 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy Shipbuilding Plan Draws Lawmakers’ Ire Anew,” Defense One, April 18, 2023. See also
Doug G. Ware, “‘You’re Ignoring the Law’: Navy Secretary Grilled in Senate over Lack of Amphibious Ships,” Stars
and Stripes, April 18, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

11

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

like telling a car dealer, ‘hey I really want to buy that minivan. I’m going to buy that
minivan. Now let’s roll up our sleeves and talk about price,’” Gilday said.
“It’s not going to drive down the price of that ship. It needs to be competitive. Actually,
with that production line and that ship, it’s not competitive. One company builds it,” the
CNO added.
But the Marine Corps has a different take. At the same conference, Marine Corps
Commandant Gen. David Berger made the case for the LPD-17 Flight II line and said a
block buy acquisition strategy is the way to pursue the ships to save money. The
commandant argued that HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding is approaching the point in the line
where they can see cost savings and that increased costs to buy new LPDs are because of
inflation....
Berger was part of the team in 2014 that assessed the LPD-17 line and chose to pursue an
altered design – Flight II – instead of starting from scratch on a new amphibious ship
program. He expressed doubt that the Navy could find more cost savings by doing another
assessment and said halting the line would affect the workforce and drive the price up....
Naval Sea Systems Command chief Vice Adm. Bill Galinis could not provide details when
asked if NAVSEA is formally assessing the LPD design or looking at a potential Flight
III....
Both Berger and Gilday argued for block buys to achieve cost savings, a point Navy
Secretary Carlos Del Toro echoed in advocating for potential multi-year procurement
strategies.
“I think it’s necessary to try to get to why is the cost of the LPD going up as significantly
as it has. It’s now approaching pretty much the cost of a DDG Flight III destroyer,” Del
Toro said.
“So there are some concerns to that. So we’re going to actually take a look at that over the
next few months actually, hopefully by either June or September we’ll have the final
answer to are there ways that we could perhaps bring that cost down a bit.”...
Berger cited his minimum requirement of 31 amphibious ships, which Congress signed
into law in FY 2023, as the reason why he cannot support the pause in purchasing LPDs.
“They’re right at the point in the curve that’s the most efficient and we’re going to take a
time out. From my perspective, I can’t accept that when the inventory – the capacity has to
be no less than 31,” the commandant said.24
A March 13, 2023, press report stated
The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31 ships, despite an agreement
with the Marine Corps and a potential violation of last year’s defense policy law.
Sent to Congress on Monday [March 13], the Navy’s proposed $255.8 billion 2024 budget
aims to retire eight warships before the end of their intended service life, including three
Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to scrap last year but
which were saved by the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act....
“We've gone through, not only on LSDs but the other divestments proposed in this budget,
did a ship-by-ship review, to understand the material state of each of the ships. What we
found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of readiness. We want to make sure
that the capabilities that we field are the right capabilities, and are able to perform the

24 Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy and Marine Corps Debate Amphibious Ship Costs as Clash Over LPD-17 Flight II Line
Continues,” USNI News, March 15 (updated March 16), 2023.
Congressional Research Service

12

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

mission to the standards that we expect,” Navy Undersecretary Erik Raven told reporters
ahead of the proposed budget’s release.
“And so we're proposing those divestments because we think the return on investment, on
further investments on those particular ships, as judged hull by hull, that return on
investment is not there,” Raven said. “Additionally, say that we have sailors and Marines
who are serving on these ships, we think that getting them matched up to the right platforms
is the way to go.”
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger last week rejected any plans that would cut
these aging LSDs before their replacements were delivered.
Despite the delivery of one LPD in 2024, the early retirement of the three LSDs would
mean the total number of amphibs that year would drop below the legally required 31 ships
minimum laid out in the 2023 NDAA, according to the budget documents. Raven told
reporters that the Navy is not seeking a waiver at this time....
Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-ship requirement for amphibs.
“Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting the options for our combatant
commanders,” he said in a statement to Defense One. “Per strategic guidance, the Marine
Corps must be able to provide the nation with crisis response capabilities and build
partnerships with allies and partners in support of integrated deterrence—difficult to
achieve without the requisite number of amphibious warships.”...
Last month, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro said the service is taking a “strategic pause”
on buying more LPDs until additional studies are completed, Defense News reported.
Afterward, the Navy would “probably” start buying them again, according to the report.
On Monday, Raven told reporters at the Pentagon that the office of the Secretary of Defense
had directed the pause and a capabilities-based assessment, and that there is an “integrated
team” to assess the ships.
“What we are making sure that we are doing as we move forward with our budget plans,
is making sure that we have the right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only
meeting military requirements, but working with industry,” Raven said. “And for LPD,
we're taking a look at the acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that we
would have the right capabilities at the right price and working with industry partners to
put together that plan moving forward.”
The Navy has “time to get this right” with the LPD, and that the Navy and Marine Corps
are “fundamentally aligned” on the 31-ship requirement, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, the
deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget, said Monday.
“Both service chiefs like 31 [ships] as a requirement. Both service chiefs like multiyear
procurements. Both service chiefs want to buy in a predictable future. And so if we can do
a study and actually lower the costs of this, that's all to the good of the Department of the
Navy and Marine Corps,” Gumbleton said.25
Another March 13, 2023, press report stated
The future amphibious warship fleet—and its productions line—are in peril of being sunk
by budget politics. And the Marine Corps is ready to fight about it.
“Without a programmed replacement for [dock landing ships] being decommissioned,
substantial risk falls on the combatant commander as the requirement for 31 ships will not

25 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Navy On Path To Violate 31-Amphibious-Ship Requirement in 2024,” Defense One, March 13,
2023.
Congressional Research Service

13

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

be met,” Maj. Joshua Benson, a spokesman for the service’s three-star general in charge of
combat development and integration, told Breaking Defense today. “This is unacceptable.”
The Navy’s new fiscal 2024 budget request follows up on previous comments from Navy
Secretary Carlos Del Toro, who has said the service will take a “strategic pause” in
purchasing new amphibious warships, which are designed to ferry Marines and their
equipment into strategic locations where they can deploy from ship to shore. At the time,
Del Toro said the pause was so the Navy can consider both how many ships it needs as
well as the capabilities onboard those vessels.
Speaking to reporters ahead of the budget rollout, Navy Undersecretary Erik Raven
declined to answer several questions about the pause, instead thanking for Congress for its
support in the previous budget and promising to work with industry and the Hill moving
forward.
During an event on the Hill last week, Commandant Gen. David Berger also declined to
explain the logic behind the “strategic pause,” saying it was Del Toro’s place to articulate
the administration’s position. But he was blunt about the risk in not meeting what the
Marines say is a minimum of 31 amphibious ship fleet, a figure backed up by a recent joint
Navy-Marine Corps assessment delivered to lawmakers.
“The inventory is going to go down, the risk is going to go up,” he said then. “The risk
meaning our ability as a nation to respond when needed, and sometimes you can’t predict
that the risk goes up — that a combatant commander doesn’t have the right tool for the job.
That’s the risk.”
But the new comments from the Marine Corps’ three-star command in charge of
developing warfighting technologies represent major, public push-back against the
Pentagon’s formal request.
In follow up comments today to Breaking Defense, Benson emphasized that risk, citing the
ongoing humanitarian crises in Turkey prompted by multiple earthquakes.
“The ongoing humanitarian disaster in Turkey is the most recent example of a situation
that would benefit from the capabilities organic to an [amphibious ready group/ Marine
expeditionary unit]. Unfortunately, no operationally deployable amphibious warfare ships
were available,” said Benson.
In terms of the industrial base, the Marine Corps views the “strategic pause” as putting its
ship production lines at risk of completely shutting down. “Depending on the length of the
pause,” Benson said shipyards may be forced to cut their workforce, losing “years of
experience that have been carried forward from keel to keel.”
“If a shipbuilder is forced to make these decisions due to forecasted gaps in production, re-
starting a line becomes much more expensive,” he added.26
Proposed Retirements of LSD-41/49 Class Ships
Another issue for Congress concerns the Navy’s proposal in its FY2024 budget submission to
retire three LSD-41/49-class amphibious ships in FY2024. A March 30, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy’s plan to decommission three amphibious warships ahead of schedule has
drawn ire from some legislators, who last year put into law a requirement for the service to
maintain a fleet of at least 31 ships for the Marine Corps to use.

26 Justin Katz, “‘Unacceptable’: Marines Are Ready to Fight Tonight—About the Amphib Budget,” Breaking Defense,
March 13, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

14

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

The Navy in its fiscal 2024 budget request asked to decommission three Whidbey Island-
class amphibious dock landing ships — the Germantown, Gunston Hall and Tortuga —
which it tried to decommission last year and Congress voted to save.
Vice Adm. Scott Conn, the deputy chief of naval operations for warfighting requirements
and capabilities, explained during a Tuesday [March 28] hearing before the Senate Armed
Services Committee’s sea power panel that these ships are not viable options for overseas
operations given their poor condition. The vessels have not reached the end of their planned
40-year life span.
Conn said the ships’ original service life was meant to be 35 years, but in the 1990s the
Navy changed that to 40 based on the assumptions the ships would operate in six-month
deployments and be properly maintained along the way.
Throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, “we operated those ships much longer than
six-month deployments,” Conn said. “We know we didn’t put the resources [toward] those
ships to be able to sustain them. So now we’re in a position where we have some hard
choices to make.”
As the Navy watches their performance in ongoing maintenance availabilities, “we don’t
have the confidence, as we’re seeing growth work and new work, that those ships will get
out of the maintenance phase, be able to get through a work-up cycle … which is a year
long, and then go on deployment.”
Why keep them if “we can’t get them away from the pier,” Conn wondered.
It would cost about $3 billion to keep the Whidbey Island amphibious ships and cruisers
the Navy wants to decommission, but Conn argues that money would be better spent on
other ships. Additionally, decommissioning the ships rather than continuing their
unsuccessful maintenance availabilities would free up sailors for other ship assignments at
sea and would free up repair yards to work on ships that are more badly needed by the fleet.
Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, who serves in the Marine Corps Reserve, told Conn the
Navy’s plan to decommission these ships brings the fleet lower than the now-statutory
requirement for 31 ships.
“This is not a suggestion, it’s a law,” he said. “You have a law, we passed it … and the
Navy comes out and says: ‘Eh, we’ll just blow off those silly U.S. senators.’ ”
Conn told him that “having 31 ships, of which three of them may be tied to a pier for the
next five years, is not really 31.”27
Use of Block Buy Contract Authority
Another issue for Congress is whether the Navy intends to use the LPD-LHA block buy
contracting authority provided by Congress in Section 129 of the FY2023 NDAA, and if not, then
what, if anything, Congress should do in response. As noted earlier, the Navy did not use the
LPD-LHA block buy contracting authority provided in the FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs.
An April 3, 2023, press report stated
The Chief of Naval Operations wants the Navy to pursue a multi-year procurement strategy
for the amphibious warship program the service indicated it would end in the latest budget
submission.
“Most recently, on Friday, we put LPD-32 on contract at a good price and we hope to
leverage the multi-year authorities that we have to keep that great line of ships going,”

27 Megan Eckstein, “Lawmakers Decry US Navy’s Plan to Decommission Aging Amphibious Ships,” Defense News,
March 30, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

15

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Adm. Mike Gilday said Monday [April 3] at the annual Navy League’s Sea Air Space
symposium.
A March 9, 2023, press report stated that Marine Corps Commandant General David Berger
today doubled down on the need for 31 traditional amphibious warships and endorsed block
buys and other contracting strategies to signal consistent demand to industry....
“We have bought these one at a time. That's not the way you do it,” Berger said at a
Thursday [March 9] forum hosted by the Amphibious Warship Industrial Base Coalition.
“We do block buys for other platforms—destroyers, submarines aircraft carriers—for all
the right reasons. We need to do it also for amphibious ships.”28
At a June 22, 2021, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Department of
the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, General David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, stated that using the block buy authority in the FY2021 and FY2022 NDAAs would
reduce the combined cost of the four ships by $722 million.29 At a June 17, 2021, hearing before
the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on
seapower programs in the Department of the Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget, Frederick J.
Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition
(ASN RDA) (i.e., the Navy’s acting acquisition executive), stated that this would equate to a
reduction of 7.1%.30 At a June 8, 2021, hearing before the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee on Navy and Marine Corps investment programs, the Department of
Navy witnesses were asked about the Navy’s intentions regarding the block buy contracting
authority granted by Section 124. Stefany replied that
to update you on that authority that your—your committee provided last year, the Section
124 Authority, we have finished negotiating with HII Ingalls to document a … contract
structure that could be put in place to implement the four-ship procurement that you’re
referring to, that—that we just finished that up about a week ago.
And, so we had a—a handshake agreement [with HII Ingalls] on what that would look like
if we were to actually enact it into a contract and we packaged that up and we’re sending
it to the department31 leadership for—for a decision. But what—and—and get that in place
before the authority that expires at the end of this year, that you provided us.
But—in—I’ll just let you know the initial indications we’re getting from the department is
that they would like to defer this decision so that they can make an overall, as they do their
overall [FY]'23 budget review this summer and fall, of the overall force structure, work
with Admiral Kilby and General Smith on the right mix of ships of the future, the
commitment of four ships at once, they would like to make—defer that commitment until
they are able to make that force-structure assessment.
So, right now, indicators are that we are not gonna be able to execute that, but it’s not a
done deal. It’s going through the process within the department for a final decision sir.32

28 Nick Wilson, “Commandant Endorses Block Buys for Amphibious Warships,” Inside Defense, March 9, 2023. See
also Mallory Shelbourne, “FY2024 Budget: Navy Won’t Buy Any More San Antonio Amphibs in the Next Five
Years,” USNI News, March 9 (updated March 15), 2023.
29 Richard R. Burgess, “Senators Hammer $1 Billion Loss, Industrial Instability with Navy’s Planned 2022
Shipbuilding,” Seapower, June 22, 2021.
30 Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21,
2021.
31 This is a reference to the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense.
32 Transcript of hearing as posted by CQ.com. The passage as printed here includes some minor typographical
corrections done by CRS for readability. See also Megan Eckstein, “Deal to Buy Four Amphibious Warships Losing
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

16

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Technical and Cost Risk in LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Programs
Another potential issue for Congress is technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA
programs.
LPD-17 Flight II Program
A June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report—the 2023 edition of GAO’s
annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following about the LPD-
17 Flight II program:
Current Status
Construction of LPD 17 Flight II ships is underway. The first ship in Flight II, LPD 30, is
nearly 30 percent complete. The Navy now expects delivery of LPD 30 in the fall of 2025,
a delay of approximately 6 months from our last assessment. In addition, the Navy began
construction of LPD 31 in September 2022—a delay of 5 months.
The program continues to experience schedule delays due to labor shortages resulting from
COVID-19. For example, the shipbuilder reassigned workers from LPD 30 to mitigate
ongoing labor shortages on Flight I ships. As of September 2022, the LPD 30 workforce
was at approximately 80 percent of planned levels. Program officials said that they expect
to see workers reassigned to LPD 30 and 31 as work on the final Flight I ship, LPD 29, is
completed. The Navy has yet to realize any cost increases from the delays.
As we reported last year, testing plans for Flight II are under revision, with a final test and
evaluation master plan expected in early 2023. The Navy and the test authority agreed on
a testing approach but still need to develop a full test strategy. Specific areas under
discussion include the need for a Full Ship Shock Trial and testing the new mast and
radar—introduced on the final Flight I ships and to be included in Flight II ships.
The program office and test authority characterized the design changes between Flight I
and Flight II—including the new mast and radar—as iterative technology enhancements,
not an introduction of new critical technologies. While they may not consider these systems
new critical technologies, there is risk with this first time integration of these systems on
LPD 17 class ships.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
According to the program office, they are in the process of testing and delivering LPD 17
class ships. The program also stated that it laid the keel for LPD 30, started fabrication of
LPD 31, and placed LPD 32 under contract to procure long lead time materials.33
LHA Program
A January 2024 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—
DOT&E’s annual report for FY2023—stated the following about the LHA program:
TEST ADEQUACY

Steam, as Navy Takes Another Look at Future Force Needs,” Defense News, June 8, 2021; Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy
Reaches ‘Handshake’ Deal on Four-Ship Amphib Buy, Pentagon Wants New Navy Force Structure Assessment,” USNI
News, June 8, 2021.
33 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-23-106059, June 2023 p. 164.
Congressional Research Service

17

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

In February 2023, DOT&E published an LHA 6 Flight 0 FOT&E report based on
evaluation conducted between March and April 2022 on USS Tripoli (LHA 7), as detailed
in the FY22 Annual Report. Testing was adequate to demonstrate LHA 6 Flight 0 capability
to support Marine Corps aviation operations in the F-35B-heavy configuration consisting
of 20 F-35B aircraft, 3 SH-60S Seahawk helicopters, a Marine Aviation Combat Element,
and a Marine Command Element. Testing evaluated the ability to embark, operate, support,
and maintain the fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in this configuration. The LHA 6 program
conducted this FOT&E period of the LHA 6 Flight 0 in accordance with a DOT&E-
approved test plan, and tests were observed by DOT&E. The LHA 6 program plans to use
test observations to inform future F-35B-heavy operational concepts and tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
As first reported in the FY21 Annual Report, DOT&E and the LHA 6 program have yet to
agree on an LHA Flight 1 LFT&E strategy to evaluate the survivability of the LHA 6 Flight
1 against air-delivered or underwater kinetic threats. Specific DOT&E concerns are the
lack of fire testing for embarked vehicle spaces and the lack of a Full Ship Shock Trial.
PERFORMANCE
EFFECTIVENESS
LHA 6 Flight 0 ships are operationally effective in supporting Marine Corps aviation
operations in the F-35B-heavy configuration. USS Tripoli demonstrated the capability to
conduct representative flight operations with 20 embarked F-35Bs throughout two days of
mission exercises. USS Tripoli supported reliable launch and recovery of the F-35B. The
Navy also demonstrated sufficient capability to conduct casualty control in the F-35B-
heavy configuration during the simulated events of an aircraft fire on the flight deck and in
the hangar of an LHA Flight 0 ship.
LHA 6 Flight 0 ships have limited special access program facility (SAPF) capacity,
degrading the planning and execution of real-world missions with sustained operations in
the F-35B-heavy configuration. Full details are in the LHA 6 Flight 0 FOT&E report.
SUITABILITY
LHA 6 Flight 0 is operationally suitable for amphibious warfare and standard ACE
operations. USS Tripoli experienced no material issues and demonstrated sufficient
reliability to support strike and defensive counter air missions in the F-35B-heavy
configuration. Additionally, the ship’s command, control, and communications systems
were sufficient to support the demonstrated missions. Full details are in the LHA 6 Flight
0 FOT&E report.
The embarkation of an F-35B-heavy ACE created crewing requirements that exceeded the
12-hour routine operations. The Navy will likely need to develop a crewing plan for
supplementing the ship’s crew when operations exceed 12 hours with the embarkation of
an F-35B-heavy ACE.
SURVIVABILITY
No data are available to change the survivability assessment of LHA 6 Flight 0 from
IOT&E or assess survivability of LHA 6 Flight 1.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Navy should:
1. Investigate SAPF space options that support sustained operations with an F-35B-
heavy ACE embarked. If SAPF space cannot be increased to support mission requirements,
the Navy and Marine Corps should investigate the feasibility of relaxing the requirement
for the SAPF as necessary to support F-35B operations.
Congressional Research Service

18

link to page 23 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

2. Investigate supplemental crewing options for sustained LHA 6 Flight 0 operations
with an F-35B-heavy ACE embarked.
3. As recommended in the last two Annual Reports, deliver the LHA 6 Flight 1 LFT&E
strategy for DOT&E approval in FY24. Identify funding in the updated TEMP for
embarked vehicle fire testing and a Full Ship Shock Trial.34
Operational Readiness of In-Service Amphibious Ships
Another issue for Congress concerns the operational readiness of in-service amphibious ships.
Marine Corps officials in public remarks have called attention to the number of in-service
amphibious ships that are not operationally ready because they are undergoing or are in need of
maintenance and repair work, and have stated that inadequate numbers of operationally ready
amphibious ships have resulted in instances of where the Navy has not been able to meet requests
from U.S. regional combatant commanders for amphibious ships for day-to-day forward presence
or responding to contingencies.35 The situation has prompted the Marine Corps to explore
alternatives for deploying Marines on other kinds of ships that are not designed for embarking
and transporting Marine forces.36
Legislative Activity for FY2024
Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Table 1 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 procurement and advance
procurement (AP) funding request for the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA-9 programs.
Table 1. Summary of Congressional Action on FY2024 Procurement
Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
LPD-33 advance procurement (AP) funding
0
0
0
0
0
500.0

LPD-33 procurement funding
0
750.0
1,863.0
1,000.0
0
0

LHA-9 procurement funding
1,830.1
1,830.1
1,830.1
1,830.1
1,830.1
1,830.1

LHA-10 advance procurement (AP) funding
0
0
0
0
0
0

34 Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY 2023 Annual Report, January 2024, pp. 203-204.
35 Drew F. Lawrence and Konstantin Toropin, “Marines Can't Count on Navy Ships to Carry Them to Global
Emergencies, One of the Service's Top Generals Says,” Military.com, January 25, 2024. See also James G. Foggo,
“Evacuating Sudan: An Amphibious Gap and Missed Opportunity,” Defense News, May 3, 2023; Justin Katz, “Short
on Amphibs for Turkey, Sudan, the Marines Grapple with Crisis Response Ethos,” Breaking Defense, May 1, 2023;
Nancy A. Youssef, “Grounding of U.S. Marine Unit Spotlights Lack of Ships in Asia-Pacific,” Wall Street Journal,
April 30, 2023.Richard R. Burgess, “Berger: Lack of Amphibs Left AFRICOM with No Sea-Based Option for Sudan
Evacuation,” Seapower, April 28, 2023; Konstantin Toropin, “‘I Let Down the Combatant Commander’: Marine
Leader Regrets His Forces Weren't Available for Recent Crises,” Military.com, April 28, 2023.
36 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Ship Shortage Forces Marines to Consider Alternate Deployments,” Defense
News, January 25, 2024.
Congressional Research Service

19

link to page 23 link to page 23 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee; HAC is
House Appropriations Committee; SAC is Senate Appropriations Committee.
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommended the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 1.
Section 346 of H.R. 2670 would require quarterly briefings from the Navy on the operational
status of the amphibious warfare fleet and would limit the obligation and expenditure of funds
from the Administration and Servicewide Activities part of the Operation and Maintenance, Navy
(OMN) appropriation account until 30 days after the Navy provides the first such briefing.
Section 1015 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8695(e) to require the Commandant of the Marine Corps to
provide input on the battle force ship assessment related to amphibious warships and vessels that
transport Marines.
Section 1017 would prohibit the obligation and expenditure of FY2024 funds to retire, prepare to
retire, inactivate, or place in storage certain Navy ships, including the LSD-41/49 class
amphibious ships USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and USS Tortuga
(LSD-46).
Section 1020 would provide authority to use FY2023-FY2025 funding to enter into an
incrementally funded contract for the advance procurement and construction of an LPD-17 class
ship.
H.Rept. 118-125 states:
LPD 33
The committee continues to support the statutory operational requirement of no less than
31 amphibious warships. The committee is concerned by efforts to pause or delay
amphibious ship construction, particularly those that may result in plans for less capable
ships. The committee supports funding for LPD 33 in fiscal year 2024, and is concerned
that further delay of amphibious warship construction plans could result in additional costs
and harm to the shipyard industrial base. (Page 20)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 1. The
recommended increase of $1,83.0 million in LPD-33 procurement funding is for “Program
increase for LPD–33—USMC UFR [unfunded requirements, aka Unfunded Priorities List
(UPL)].” (Page 422)
S.Rept. 118-58 states:
LPD–33
Neither the budget request, nor the future years defense program, included funding for
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) to purchase the next amphibious transport
dock, LPD–33.
Congressional Research Service

20

link to page 23 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

The Department of Defense has conducted extensive analysis of the LPD–17 class to
redesign the ship to achieve cost savings. This resulted in the design of the Flight II ships.
The LPD–33 would be the next Flight II ship of the LPD–17 class. Marine Corps witnesses
have testified that there are no capabilities excess to their needs in the Flight II design, but
the Department has decided to further study whether the LPD could be redesigned to yield
a ship that would be less expensive to acquire.
Given that is unlikely that the Navy could achieve major cost savings without significant
changes in capabilities, the committee fails to see why the Department would stop
production of LPDs without a replacement.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase in line number 14 of SCN of $1.9 billion
to fully fund LPD–33. (Pages 10-11)
Section 343 of S. 2226 would require quarterly briefings on the operational status of the
amphibious warship fleet.
Section 357 would limit the obligation and expenditure of funds from the Administration and
Servicewide Activities part of the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation
account until the Navy submits to the congressional defense committees a 30-year shipbuilding
plan that meets the statutory requirement in 10 U.S.C. 8062 to maintain 31 amphibious warships.
Section 1022 would amend 10 U.S.C. 8062 to direct the Navy to adjust scheduled maintenance
and repair actions to maintain a minimum of 24 amphibious warfare ships operationally available
for worldwide deployment.
Section 1023 would prohibit the obligation and expenditure of FY2024 funds to retire, prepare to
retire, or place in storage certain Navy ships, including the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships
USS Germantown (LSD-42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44), and USS Tortuga (LSD-46).
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670 recommended the
funding levels shown in the authorization final column of Table 1. The recommended increase of
$1.0 billion in LPD-17 procurement funding is for “Program increase for LPD–33—USMC UFR
[U.S. Marine Corps unfunded requirements list],” meaning the procurement of LPD-33 in
FY2024. (Page 1412)
Section 348 directs the Navy to submit, as part of its FY2025 budget submission, a 30-year
shipbuilding plan that “meets the statutory requirement to maintain 31 amphibious warships as
found in section 8062(b) of title 10, United States Code,” and prohibits the obligation and
expenditure of more than 50% of FY2024 funds for Administration and Servicewide Activities
within the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OPN), account until such a plan is submitted.
Section 352 of H.R. 2670 directs the Navy to provide semiannual briefings on the operational
status of the amphibious warship fleet.
Section 1019 amends 10 USC 8695(e), which sets forth the role of the Commandant of the
Marine Corps in the preparation of an annual Navy battle force ship assessment and requirement,
to state that the Commandant shall be specifically responsible for not only “for developing the
requirements relating to amphibious warfare ships,” as previously stated in 10 USC 8695(e), but
also “for naval vessels with the primary mission of transporting Marines.”
Regarding Section 1019, H.Rept. 118-301 states:
Sec. 1019—Responsibility of Commandant of the Marine Corps with respect to naval battle
force ship assessment and requirement reporting
Congressional Research Service

21

link to page 23 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1015) that would provide the Commandant of
the Marine Corps the responsibility for developing requirements related to all naval vessels
with the primary mission of transporting Marines within the Naval Battle Force Ship
Requirements and Assessment.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The Senate recedes with a clarifying amendment to the provision’s title.
The conferees agree that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has not been provided an
adequate voice in the generation of requirements for naval vessels that support Marine
Corps missions. Section 1025 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117–263) provided that the Commandant of the Marine
Corps would have responsibility for preparation of amphibious warfare ship requirements.
The section did not deal with requirements for smaller vessels, such as the Landing Ship
Medium (LSM). However, the Commandant called for a program of 35 LSMs to support
operations of three Marine Littoral Regiments, with affordability and speed to delivery as
key considerations. However, the Navy’s program only includes 18 LSMs, a number
insufficient to provide continuous support for two Marine Littoral Regiments. (Page 1169)
Section 1021 prohibits funds authorized by H.R. 2670 for FY2024 from being obligated or
expended to retire, prepare to retire, or place in storage certain ships, including the LSD-41/49
class amphibious ships USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44), and USS
Tortuga (LSD 46).
Section 1022 permits the use of FY2023-FY2025 funds to incrementally fund the procurement of
an LPD-17 class amphibious ship.
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommended the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 1.
Section 8073 of H.R. 4365 would prohibit funds made available by the act from being used to
decommissioning certain Navy ships, including the LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships USS
Germantown (LSD-42) and USS Tortuga (LSD-46).
H.Rept. 118-121 states:
MARINE CORPS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
The Committee is troubled that the budget request seeks to retire three amphibious dock
landing ships (LSDs) prior to reaching their expected service lives, which would bring the
total number of operational Marine Corps amphibious warfare ships under 31. Not only is
this request in contravention of existing law, but the Committee also notes that such a
reduction would further inhibit the Marine Corps’ ability to respond to crises and support
emerging combatant commander requirements. The Committee is concerned that the
proposed rate of procurement of new amphibious ships is insufficient to meet the Marine
Corps’ operational requirement. While the Committee notes that the Department of the
Navy is studying future landing platform dock (LPD) requirements, it believes that an
interruption in the procurement of new amphibious ships will have a detrimental effect on
maritime power projection and the shipbuilding industrial base. Therefore, the Committee
recommendation prevents the decommissioning of two LSDs to sustain near-term capacity.
Further, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, to submit a report to the congressional defense
Congressional Research Service

22

link to page 23 Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

committees, not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, on the Department’s
plan to meet and sustain a minimum of 31 operational Marine Corps amphibious warfare
ships. (Page 11)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 1. The recommended
increase of $500.0 million in LPD-33 advance procurement (AP) funding is for “Program
increase: Advance procurement of LPD 33.” (Page 135) The committee’s mark includes an
additional $250.0 million in LPD-33 advance procurement (AP) funding for “Realignment of
fiscal year 2023 funds for advance procurement of LPD 33.” (Page 135) Section 8045 of S. 2587
rescinds certain prior-year funds, including $250.0 million in LPD-17 Flight II advance
procurement (AP) funding.

Congressional Research Service

23

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Appendix. Procurement Dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9
This appendix presents background information regarding the procurement dates of LPD-31 and
LHA-9. In reviewing the bullet points presented below, it can be noted that procurement funding
is funding for a ship that is either being procured in that fiscal year or has been procured in a prior
fiscal year, while advance procurement (AP) funding is funding for a ship that is to be procured in
a future fiscal year.37
Overview
An institutional issue for Congress in FY2021 concerned the treatment in the Navy’s proposed
FY2021 budget of the procurement dates of LPD-31 and LHA-9. The Navy’s FY2021 budget
submission presented LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021 and LHA-9 as a
ship projected for procurement in FY2023. Consistent with congressional action on the Navy’s
FY2020 and FY2021 budgets regarding the procurement of LPD-31 and LHA-9, this CRS report
treats LPD-31 and LHA-9 as ships that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided
procurement funding for) in FY2020 and FY2021, respectively. Potential oversight issues for
Congress included the following:
• By presenting LPD-31 as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021 (instead of
a ship that was procured in FY2020) and LHA-9 as a ship projected for
procurement in FY2023 (instead of a ship that was procured in FY2021), was
DOD, in its FY2021 budget submission, disregarding or mischaracterizing the
actions of Congress regarding the procurement dates of these three ships? If so
• Was DOD doing this to inflate the apparent number of ships requested
for procurement in FY2021 and the apparent number of ships included in
the five-year (FY2021-FY2025) shipbuilding plan?
• Could this establish a precedent for DOD or other parts of the executive
branch in the future to disregard or mischaracterize the actions of
Congress regarding the procurement or program-initiation dates for other
Navy ships, other Navy programs, other DOD programs, or other federal
programs? If so, what implications might that have for the preservation
and use of Congress’s power of the purse under Article 1 of the
Constitution, and for maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of
government relative to the executive branch?
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, similar to its FY2023, FY2022, and FY2021 budget
submissions, presents LHA-9 as a ship procured or projected for procurement in FY2023. Navy
officials have described the listing of LHA-9 in the Navy’s FY2023 budget submission as a ship
being requested for procurement in FY2023 as an oversight.
LPD-31—an LPD-17 Flight II Class Amphibious Ship
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission presented LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious
ship, as a ship requested for procurement in FY2021. This CRS report treats LPD-31 as a ship
that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided procurement funding for) in FY2020,

37 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy—Background,
Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
Congressional Research Service

24

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

consistent with the following congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 budget regarding the
procurement of LPD-31:
• The House Armed Services Committee’s report (H.Rept. 116-120 of June 19,
2019) on H.R. 2500, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (not just AP) funding for the program.38
• The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in
FY2020, showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.39
• The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.40 Section
129 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the Navy to enter into a contract,
beginning in FY2020, for the procurement of LPD-31, and to use incremental
funding to fund the contract.
• The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.41
• The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provided procurement (not AP) funding
for an LPD-17 Flight II class ship. The paragraph in this act that appropriated
funding for the Navy’s shipbuilding account, including this ship, includes a
provision stating “Provided further, That an appropriation made under the
heading ‘Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy’ provided for the purpose of
‘Program increase—advance procurement for fiscal year 2020 LPD Flight II
and/or multiyear procurement economic order quantity’ shall be considered to be
for the purpose of ‘Program increase—advance procurement of LPD–31’.” This
provision relates to funding appropriated in the FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act
(Division A of H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245 of September 28, 2018) for the
procurement of an LPD-17 Flight II class ship in FY2020, as originally
characterized in the explanatory statement accompanying that act.42

38 H.Rept. 116-120, p. 379, line 012.
39 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 12. See also pp. 23-24 for associated report language.
40 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 012. See also p. 1144 for associated report language.
41 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 12. See also p. 122 for associated report language.
42 See PDF page 176 of 559, line 12, of the explanatory statement for H.R. 6157/P.L. 115-245.
Congressional Research Service

25

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

LHA-9 Amphibious Assault Ship
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, similar to its FY2023, FY2022, and FY2021 budget
submissions, presents LHA-9 as a ship procured or projected for procurement in FY2023. This
CRS report treats LHA-9 as a ship that Congress procured (i.e., authorized and provided
procurement funding for) in FY2021, consistent with the following congressional action on the
Navy’s FY2020 and FY2021 budgets regarding the procurement of LHA-9:
• The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-48 of June 11,
2019) on S. 1790, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
recommended authorizing the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a
quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending
procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.43
• The conference report (H.Rept. 116-333 of December 9, 2019) on S. 1790/P.L.
116-92 of December 20, 2019, the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act,
authorized the procurement of LHA-9 in FY2020, showing a quantity increase of
one ship above the Navy’s request and recommending procurement (rather than
AP) funding for the program.44 Section 127 of S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 authorizes the
Navy to enter into a contract for the procurement of LHA-9 and to use
incremental funding provided during the period FY2019-FY2025 to fund the
contract.
• The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 116-103 of September
12, 2019) on S. 2474, the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act, recommended
funding for the procurement of an LHA amphibious assault ship in FY2020,
showing a quantity increase of one ship above the Navy’s request and
recommending procurement (rather than AP) funding for the program.45
• The final version of the FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R.
1158/P.L. 116-93 of December 20, 2019) provided procurement (not AP) funding
for an LHA amphibious assault ship. The explanatory statement for Division A of
H.R. 1158/P.L. 116-93 stated that the funding was for LHA-9.46
• The procurement (not AP) funding provided for LHA-9 in the FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act (see previous bullet point) was subsequently reprogrammed
to provide support for counter-drug activities of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) along the U.S. southern border.47 The final version of the
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260 of
December 27, 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021), however, once
again provided procurement (not AP) funding for an LHA amphibious assault
ship. The explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260 stated
that the funding is for “Program increase—LHA 9.”48 As a result of the FY2021
procurement (not AP) funding for LHA-9, the ship once again has an
authorization (provided in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act),
authority for using incremental funding in procuring it (provided by Section 127

43 S.Rept. 116-48, p. 433, line 15.
44 H.Rept. 116-333, p. 1566, line 015.
45 S.Rept. 116-103, p. 118, line 15.
46 Explanatory statement for Division A of H.R. 1158, PDF page 175 of 414, line 15.
47 Reprograming action (Form DD 1415) FY 20-01 RA, February 13, 2020, page 3 of 5.
48 Explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 133/P.L. 116-260, PDF page 204 of 469, line 17.
Congressional Research Service

26

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act), and procurement (not AP)
funding (provided in the FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act).
Ship Procurement Date Provision in FY2021 NDAA
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) decision to present LPD-31 and LHA-9 in its FY2021
budget submission as ships requested for procurement in FY2021 and FY2023, respectively, even
though Congress procured the two ships in FY2020 and FY2021, respectively, posed an
institutional issue for Congress regarding the preservation and use of Congress’s power of the
purse under Article 1 of the Constitution, and for maintaining Congress as a coequal branch of
government relative to the executive branch. Section 126 of the FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395/P.L.
116-283 of January 1, 2021) states
SEC. 126. TREATMENT IN FUTURE BUDGETS OF THE PRESIDENT OF SYSTEMS
ADDED BY CONGRESS.
In the event the procurement quantity for a system authorized by Congress in a National
Defense Authorization Act for a fiscal year, and for which funds for such procurement
quantity are appropriated by Congress in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account
for such fiscal year, exceeds the procurement quantity specified in the budget of the
President, as submitted to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for
such fiscal year, such excess procurement quantity shall not be specified as a new
procurement quantity in any budget of the President, as so submitted, for any fiscal year
after such fiscal year.
Regarding the original Senate version of this provision, the Senate Armed Services Committee’s
report (S.Rept. 116-236 of June 24, 2020) on the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (S.
4049) states
Treatment of weapon systems added by Congress in future President’s budget
requests (sec. 126)
The committee recommends a provision that would preclude the inclusion in future annual
budget requests of a procurement quantity of a system previously authorized and
appropriated by the Congress that was greater than the quantity of such system requested
in the President’s budget request.
The committee is concerned that by presenting CVN–81 as a ship that was procured in
fiscal year 2020 (instead of as a ship that was procured in fiscal year 2019), LPD–31 as a
ship requested for procurement in fiscal year 2021 (instead of as a ship that was procured
in fiscal year 2020), and LHA–9 as a ship projected for procurement in fiscal year 2023
(instead of as a ship that was procured in fiscal year 2020), the Department of Defense, in
its fiscal year 2021 budget submission, is disregarding or mischaracterizing the actions of
Congress regarding the procurement dates of these three ships. (Page 11)

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Congressional Research Service

27

Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R43543 · VERSION 134 · UPDATED
28

Download PDF

Download EPUB

Revision History

Feb. 6, 2024

HTML · PDF

Jan. 29, 2024

HTML · PDF

Dec. 20, 2023

HTML · PDF

Aug. 23, 2023

HTML · PDF

May. 22, 2023