The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

May 3, 2010 – February 2, 2022 R41219

The New START Treaty:
Central Limits and Key Provisions
Updated February 2, 2022
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41219

The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

Summary
The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20
hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a
vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament—the Duma and Federation Council—
approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both
parties met the treaty’s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. On February
3, 2021, the two parties agreed to extend the treaty for five years, as permitted in the treaty text.
New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for
a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments.
Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to
no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber.
New START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate
the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and
their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according
to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than
those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more
flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.
The monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than
the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the
treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each
side’s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations
of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty;
and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.
New START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the
conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the
United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense
interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its
ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads.
The Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic
stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty
would serve U.S. national security interests because, they argued in 2010, Russia was likely to
reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and
Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. The 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least
through 2021. The Trump Administration raised questions about the value of the treaty and
suggested that the United States might allow it to lapse while negotiating a new treaty that would
include Russia and China, and capture all types of Russian nuclear weapons. It eventually sought,
but failed, to negotiate a short-term extension in the latter half of 2020. The Biden Administration
announced that it would seek a five-year extension of the treaty, and Russia accepted this
proposal, leading to the agreed extension on February 3, 2021.
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The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

Introduction
The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010.1 This treaty
replaced the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of
implementation, on December 5, 2009.2 The U.S. Senate provided its advice and consent to
ratification of New START on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. The Russian parliament,
with both the Duma and Federation Council voting, did so on January 25 and January 26, 2011.
The treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011. New START also superseded the 2002
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty), which lapsed in 2012.3
New START provided the parties with seven years to reduce their forces. Both parties completed
their required reductions by February 5, 2018.4
New START was set to expire on February 5, 2021, 10 years after it entered into force, unless the
United States and Russia agreed to extend it for no more than 5 years. They agreed to take this
step in an exchange of diplomatic notes on January 26, 2021, and completed the process through
an additional exchange of diplomatic notes on February 3, 2021.5
This provision permitting the extension of New START is included in Article XIV, paragraph 2 of
the treaty, which states
If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider
the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no
more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
Because this provision is included in the text of the treaty, President Biden could extend New
START without asking the Senate for its approval. The Russian parliament had to approve new
legislation supporting the extension, a step that it took on January 27, 2021. President Putin
signed this legislation on January 29, 2021.6

1 The treaty is officially titled the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text of the Treaty, its Protocol,
annexes, and article-by-article analysis can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm.
2 For a brief summary of the original START Treaty, as well as a review of the U.S.-Russian negotiations on the new
START Treaty see CRS Report R40084, Strategic Arms Control After START: Issues and Options, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 The Moscow Treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 2012, unless replaced by a subsequent treaty. For
details on this agreement see CRS Report RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty,
by Amy F. Woolf.
4 Heather Nauert, New START Treaty Central Limits Take Effect, U.S. Department of State, press statatement,
Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277888.htm. See also “Russia Confirms
Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, February 5, 2018,
http://tass.com/politics/988458.
5 Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation,
U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on-the-extension-
of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/. See, also, Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation on the extension of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, February 3, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/
content/id/4551078.
6 See Office of the President of Russia. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64949 .
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The Extension Process
On January 21, 2021, the Biden Administration indicated that it would seek a full five-year
extension of the New START Treaty. According to an Administration official, “New START is
manifestly in the national security interest of the United States and makes even more sense when
the relationship with Russia is adversarial.”7 Secretary of State Antony Blinken expanded on this
point in his statement released after the final exchange of diplomatic notes on February 3, 2021.
He noted that
Extending the New START Treaty ensures we have verifiable limits on Russian ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026. The New START Treaty’s verification
regime ... provides us with greater insight into Russia’s nuclear posture, including through
data exchanges and onsite inspections ... Especially during times of tension, verifiable
limits on Russia’s intercontinental-range nuclear weapons are vitally important. Extending
the New START Treaty makes the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the world
safer. An unconstrained nuclear competition would endanger us all.8
The Biden Administration’s prompt announcement of its intention to extend New START was
driven by the short amount of time available before the treaty’s February 5 expiration. The
Obama Administration had briefly considered pursuing an extension before it left office in 2016,
but did not raise the issue with Russia. As noted below, the Trump Administration had pursued
negotiations on a short-term extension in the last year of its term, but had failed to reach an
agreement with Russia.
In 2018 and 2019, Trump Administration officials had indicated that they were reviewing the
treaty and assessing whether it continued to serve U.S. national security interests before deciding
whether the United States would propose or accept a five-year extension.9 In testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May 2019, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson
and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg had raised concerns with the treaty.
They noted that Russia was developing new kinds of strategic offensive arms that would not
count under the treaty and that it is modernizing and expanding its stockpile of shorter-range
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are also outside the scope of the treaty. They also noted that
China was modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, although it remained much smaller
than the U.S. and Soviet arsenals; China is not a party to the treaty.10
These concerns about Russian and Chinese nuclear forces outside the New START limits came to
dominate discussions about the future of New START. In February 2019, General John Hyten,
then the commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), testified that New START
continued to serve U.S. national security interests because its monitoring regime provided
transparency and visibility into Russian nuclear forces and because its limits provide

7 John Hudson, “Biden administration to seek five-year extension on key nuclear arms treaty in first foray with Russia,”
Washington Post, January 21, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-russia-nuclear-treaty-
extension/2021/01/21/4667a11e-5b40-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.html.
8 Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation,
U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on-the-extension-
of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/.
9 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts, Hearing, 115th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. See the prepared statement of Honorable David Trachtenberg, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091818_Trachtenberg_Testimony.pdf.
10 See, for example, the testimony of Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense David Trachtenberg in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Future of Nuclear Arms
Control, Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2019.
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The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions

predictability about the future size and structure of those forces. But he argued that new kinds of
Russian nuclear forces could eventually pose a threat to the United States. He indicated that the
United States and Russia might expand New START so that these weapons could be brought
under the treaty limits.11 In addition, in April 2019, President Trump directed his staff to develop
proposals for expanded arms control efforts that would include China as a party, noting that the
United States should “persuade China to join an arms-control pact limiting or verifying its
capabilities for the first time.”12
The public debate about the possible extension of New START incorporated views about how to
address these concerns. For example, some experts believed the United States and Russia should
extend the treaty then use the time during the extension to discuss how to include Russia’s new
types of systems within the treaty limits. They noted that most of the systems would not enter the
Russian force until late in the 2020s, so saw no need to condition extension on their eventual
inclusion. They also noted that this approach would allow the United States to retain the benefits
of New START while seeking to negotiate a trilateral treaty with Russia and China.13 Some also
suggested that the United States and Russia extend the treaty for shorter than the full five years, to
retain the limits and transparency in the treaty, while pressing Russia, and possibly China, to
negotiate a follow-on agreement that would address U.S. concerns.14
Other analysts, however, suggested the opposite, arguing that the United States should not agree
to extend New START unless Russia agreed to count its new systems under the treaty limits.
Some also argued that the United States and Russia should allow New START to lapse, both to
relieve the United States of its obligations and because they believed that Russia’s interest in
retaining limits on U.S. forces would provide the United States with leverage when negotiating a
treaty to replace New START.15 Some also argued that the treaty better served Russian than U.S.
interests because, as was noted above, Russia was pursuing the development of weapons that may
not count under the treaty limits.16 President Trump and others in his Administration suggested
that the United States replace New START with a trilateral “next generation” arms control
agreement that would capture all U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons.17

11 Joe Gould, “US nuclear general worries over Russia’s weapons outside New START,” Defense News, February 26,
2019, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nuclear-arsenal/2019/02/26/us-nuclear-general-worries-over-russias-
weapons-outside-new-start/.
12 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,” Washington
Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-
control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?utm_term=
.3e294ce0a8e9.
13 Stephen Pifer, Want to Improve Relations with Russia? Here’s a START, Brookings, Washington, DC, September 6,
2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/06/want-to-improve-relations-with-russia-heres-a-
start/. See also Thomas M. Countryman, Can Trump and Putin Head Off a New Nuclear Arms Race? Arms Control
Association, Washington, DC, August 8, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2018-08/trump-putin-head-
new-nuclear-arms-race.
14 Franklin C. Miller and Eric Edelman, “Russia Is Beefing Up Its Nuclear Arsenal. Here’s What the U.S. Needs to
Do.,” Politico, December 30, 2019, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/31/russia-nuclear-arsenal-new-
start-091487.
15 Michaela Dodge, A Nuclear Guide to the Helsinki Summit, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, July 18, 2018,
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/nuclear-guide-the-helsinki-summit.
16 Matthew Costlow, “Don’t Give Russia the Gift of Extending New START,” Defense One, July 10, 2018,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/dont-give-russia-gift-extending-new-start/149605/.
17 See, for example, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, U.S. Department
of State, on the Future of Nuclear Arms Control. Transcript, Hudson Institute, May 21, 2020,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/
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Background
President Obama and and Russia’s President Medvedev outlined their goals for the negotiations
on a new START Treaty in early April 2009. In a joint statement issued after they met in London,
they indicated that the subject of the new agreement “will be the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms.”18 This statement indicated that the new treaty would not address missile
defenses, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, or nondeployed stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The
Presidents also agreed that they would seek to reduce their forces to levels below those in the
2002 Moscow Treaty, and that the new agreement would “mutually enhance the security of the
Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces, and will include effective
verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing the START
Treaty.”
The Presidents further refined their goals for New START, and gave the first indications of the
range they were considering for the limits in the treaty, in a Joint Understanding signed at their
summit meeting in Moscow in July 2009. They agreed that the new treaty would restrict each
party to between 500 and 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and between 1,500 and 1,675
associated warheads. They also agreed that the new treaty would contain “provisions on
definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures,
as well as confidence building and transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less
costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty.”19
The New START Treaty follows many of the same conventions as the 1991 START Treaty. It
contains detailed definitions and counting rules that the parties use to identify the forces limited
by the treaty. It also mandates that the parties maintain an extensive database that describes the
locations, numbers, and technical characteristics of weapons limited by the treaty. It allows the
parties to use several types of exhibitions and on-site inspections to confirm information in the
database and to monitor forces and activities limited by the treaty.
But the new treaty is not simply an extension of START. The United States and Soviet Union
negotiated the original START Treaty during the 1980s, during the latter years of the Cold War,
when the two nations were still adversaries and each was still wary of the capabilities and
intentions of the other. Many of the provisions in the original treaty reflect the uncertainty and
suspicion that were evident at that time. The New START Treaty is a product of a different era
and a different relationship between the United States and Russia.20 In some ways, its goals
remain the same—the parties still sought provisions that would allow for predictability and
transparency in their current forces and future intentions. But, the United States and Russia have
streamlined and simplified the central limits and the monitoring and verification provisions. The
new treaty does not contain layers of limits and sublimits; each side can determine its own mix of
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles

Transcript_Marshall%20Billingslea%20on%20the%20Future%20of%20Nuclear%20Arms%20Control.pdf.
18 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian
Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America, April 1, 2009,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-president-dmitriy-medvedev-russian-federation-
and-president-barack-.
19 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Understanding by Obama, Medvedev on Weapon
Negotiations,” July 8, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-
treaty.
20 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Comparison of START Treaty,
Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/
rls/139901.htm.
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(SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Moreover, in the current environment, the parties were far less
concerned with choking off avenues for potential evasion schemes than they were with fostering
continued cooperation and openness between the two sides.
Central Limits and Key Provisions
Central Limits
Limits on Delivery Vehicles
The New START Treaty contains three central limits on U.S. and Russian strategic offensive
nuclear forces; these are displayed in Table 1, below. First, it limits each side to no more than 800
deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy
bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Second, within that total, it limits each side to no
more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to
carry nuclear armaments. Third, the treaty limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed
warheads. Deployed warheads include the actual number of warheads carried by deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments. Table 1 compares these limits to those in the 1991 START Treaty and the 2002
Moscow Treaty.
Table 1. Limits in START, Moscow Treaty, and New START
Treaty
START (1991)
Moscow Treaty (2002)
New START (2010)
Limits on Delivery
1,600 strategic nuclear
No limits
800 deployed and
Vehicles
delivery vehicles
nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers
and heavy bombers
equipped to carry nuclear
weapons
Within the 800 limit, 700
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers
equipped to carry nuclear
weapons
Limits on Warheads
6,000 warheads attributed
1,700-2,200 deployed
1,550 deployed warheads
to ICBMs, SLBMs, and
strategic warheads
No sublimits
heavy bombers
No sublimits
4,900 warheads attributed
to ICBMs and SLBMs
1,100 warheads attributed
to mobile ICBMs
1,540 warheads attributed
to heavy ICBMs
Limits on Throwweight
3,600 metric tons
No limit
No limit
Source: State Department fact sheets.
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According to New START’s Protocol21 a deployed ICBM launcher is “an ICBM launcher that
contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM
launcher located at a space launch facility.” A deployed SLBM launcher is a launcher installed on
an operational submarine that contains an SLBM and is not intended for testing or training. A
deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs is one that contains an ICBM and is not a mobile test
launcher or a mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a space launch facility. These deployed
launchers can be based only at ICBM bases. A deployed ICBM or SLBM is one that is contained
in a deployed launcher. Nondeployed launchers are, therefore, those that are used for testing or
training, those that are located at space launch facilities, or those that are located at deployment
areas or on submarines but do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM.
The New START Treaty does not limit the number of nondeployed ICBMs or nondeployed
SLBMs. It does, however, state that these missiles must be located at facilities that are known to
be within the infrastructure that supports and maintains ICBMs and SLBMs. These include
“submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for
ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities
for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities.”
Nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs may also be in transit between these facilities, although Article
IV of the treaty indicates that this time in transit should be “no more than 30 days.”
The parties share information on the locations of these missiles in the database they maintain
under the treaty and notify each other when they move these systems. These provisions are
designed to allow each side to keep track of the numbers and locations of nondeployed missiles
and to deter efforts to stockpile hidden, uncounted missiles. A party would be in violation of the
treaty if one of its nondeployed missiles were spotted at a facility not included on the list, or if
one were found at a location different from the one listed for that missile in the database.22
According to the Protocol to New START, a deployed heavy bomber is one that is equipped for
nuclear armaments but is not a “test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber located at a repair facility
or at a production facility.” Moreover, a heavy bomber is equipped for nuclear armaments if it is
“equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs.” All
deployed heavy bombers must be located at air bases, which are defined as facilities “at which
deployed heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.” If an air base cannot support
the operations of heavy bombers, then the treaty does not consider it to be available for the basing
of heavy bombers, even though they may land at such bases under some circumstances. Test
heavy bombers can be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and nondeployed heavy
bombers other than test heavy bombers can be located only at repair facilities or production
facilities for heavy bombers. Each party may have no more than 10 test heavy bombers.
Heavy bombers that are not equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface
missiles, or nuclear bombs will not count under the treaty limits. However, the treaty does specify
that, “within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be
distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.” Moreover, if a party
does convert some bombers within a given type so that they are no longer equipped to carry
nuclear weapons, it cannot base the nuclear and nonnuclear bombers at the same air base, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties.

21 New START is a three-part document. It includes the Treaty, a Protocol, and technical annexes. All three parts will
be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.
22 Each individual missile will be identified in the database by a “unique identifier,” which will, in most cases, be the
serial number affixed to the missile during production.
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Hence, the United States could reduce the number of bombers that count under the treaty limits
by altering some of its B-52 bombers so that they no longer carry nuclear weapons and by basing
them at a separate base from those that still carry nuclear weapons. In addition, if the United
States converted all of the bombers of a given type, so that none of them could carry nuclear
armaments, then none of the bombers of that type would count under the New START treaty. This
provision allows the United States to remove its B-1 bombers from treaty accountability. They no
longer carry nuclear weapons, but they still counted under the old START Treaty and were never
altered so that they could not carry nuclear weapons. The conversion rules that would affect the
B-1 bombers are described below.
Limits on Warheads
Table 1 summarizes the warheads limits in START, the Moscow Treaty, and the New START
Treaty. Two factors stand out in this comparison. First, the original START Treaty contained
several sublimits on warheads attributed to different types of strategic weapons, in part because
the United States wanted the treaty to impose specific limits on elements of the Soviet force that
were deemed to be “destabilizing.” Therefore, START sought to limit the Soviet force of heavy
ICBMs by cutting in half the number of warheads deployed on these missiles, and to limit future
Soviet deployments of mobile ICBMs. The Moscow Treaty and New START, in contrast, contain
only a single limit on the aggregate number of deployed warheads. They provide each nation with
the freedom to mix their forces as they see fit. This change reflects, in part, a lesser concern with
Cold War models of strategic and crisis stability. It also derives from the U.S. desire to maintain
flexibility in determining the structure of its own nuclear forces.
Table 1 also highlights how the planned numbers of warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic
forces have declined in the years since the end of the Cold War. Before START entered into force
in 1991, each side had more than 10,000 warheads on its strategic offensive delivery vehicles. If
the parties implement the New START Treaty, that number will have declined by more than 80%.
However, although all three treaties limit warheads, each uses different definitions and counting
rules to determine how many warheads each side has deployed on its strategic forces.
Under START, the United States and Russia did not actually count deployed warheads. Instead,
each party counted the launchers—ICBM silos, SLBM launch tubes, and heavy bombers—
deployed by the other side. Under the terms of the treaty, they then assumed that each operational
launcher contained an operational missile, and each operational missile carried an “attributed”
number of warheads. The number of warheads attributed to each missile or bomber was the same
for all missiles and bombers of that type. It did not recognize different loadings on individual
delivery vehicles. This number was listed in an agreed database that the parties maintained during
the life of the treaty. The parties then multiplied these warhead numbers by the number of
deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to determine the number of warheads that counted
under the treaty’s limits.
In most cases, the number of warheads attributed to each type of ICBM and SLBM was equal to
the maximum number that missile had been tested with. START did, however, permit the parties
to reduce the number of warheads attributed to some of their ballistic missiles through a process
known as “downloading.” When downloading missiles, a nation could remove a specified number
of reentry vehicles from all the ICBMs at an ICBM base or from all the SLBMs in submarines at
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bases adjacent to a specified ocean.23 They could then reduce the number of warheads attributed
to those missiles in the database, and therefore, the number that counted under the treaty limits.
Unlike ballistic missiles, bombers counted as far fewer than the number of warheads they could
carry. Bombers that were not equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted
as one warhead, even though they could carry 16 or more bombs and short-range missiles. U.S.
bombers that were equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted as 10
warheads, even though they could carry up to 20 cruise missiles. Soviet bombers that were
equipped to carry long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles counted as 8 warheads, even though
they could carry up to 16 cruise missiles. These numbers were then multiplied by the numbers of
deployed heavy bombers in each category to determine the number of warheads that would count
under the treaty limits.
In contrast with START, the Moscow Treaty did not contain any definitions or counting rules to
calculate the number of warheads that counted under the treaty limit. Its text indicated that it
limited deployed strategic warheads, but the United States and Russia could each determine its
own definition of this term. The United States counted “operationally deployed” strategic nuclear
warheads and included both warheads on deployed ballistic missiles and bomber weapons stored
near deployed bombers at their bases. Russia, in contrast, did not count any bomber weapons
under its total, as these weapons were not actually deployed on any bombers. Moreover, because
the Moscow Treaty did not contain any sublimits on warheads deployed on different categories of
delivery vehicles, the two parties only had to calculate an aggregate total for their deployed
warheads. In addition, while they exchanged data under START on the numbers of accountable
launchers and warheads every six months, they only had to report the number of warheads they
counted under the Moscow Treaty once, on December 31, 2012, at the end of the treaty’s
implementation period.
Like START, the New START Treaty contains definitions and counting rules that will help the
parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. For ballistic missiles,
these rules follow the precedent set in the Moscow Treaty and count only the actual number of
warheads on deployed delivery vehicles. For bombers, however, these rules follow the precedent
set in START and attribute a fixed number of warheads to each heavy bomber.
Article III of the New START Treaty states that “for ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads
shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.”
Missiles will not count as if they carried the maximum number of warheads tested on that type of
missile. Each missile will have its own warhead number and that number can change during the
life of the treaty. The parties will not, however, visit each missile to count and calculate the total
number of warheads in the force. The New START database will list total number of warheads
deployed on all deployed launchers. The parties will then have the opportunity, 10 times each
year, to inspect one missile or three bombers selected at random. At the start of these inspections,
before the inspecting party chooses a missile or bomber to view, the inspected party will provide
a list of the number of warheads on each missile or bomber at the inspected base. The inspecting
party will then choose a missile at random, and confirm that the number listed in the database is
accurate. This is designed to deter the deployment of extra warheads by creating the possibility
that a missile with extra warheads might be chosen for an inspection.
As was the case under START, this inspection process does not provide the parties with the means
to visually inspect and count all the deployed warheads carried on deployed missiles. Under
START, this number was calculated by counting launchers and multiplying by an attributed

23 A reentry vehicle is a cone-shaped container that holds a warhead to protect it from heat and other stresses when it
reenters the Earth’s atmosphere.
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number of warheads. Under New START, as was the case in the Moscow Treaty, each side simply
declares its number of total deployed warheads and includes that number in the treaty database.
Unlike the Moscow Treaty, however, the parties will provide and update these numbers every six
months during the life of the treaty, rather than just once at the end of the treaty.
Under the New START Treaty, each deployed heavy bomber equipped with nuclear armaments
counts as one nuclear warhead. This is true whether the bomber is equipped to carry cruise
missiles or gravity bombs. Neither the United States nor Russia deploys nuclear weapons on their
bombers on a day-to-day basis. Because the treaty is supposed to count, and reduce, actual
warheads carried by deployed delivery vehicles, the bomber weapons that are not deployed on a
day-to-day basis are excluded. In addition, because the parties will use on-site inspections to
confirm the actual number of deployed warheads on deployed delivery vehicles, and the bombers
will have no warheads on them during inspections, the parties needed to come up with an
arbitrary number to assign to the bombers. That number is one.
Conversion and Elimination
According to New START, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped to
carry nuclear armaments shall continue to count under the treaty limits until they are converted or
eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty’s Protocol. These provisions are far
less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and
Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty
limits.
ICBM Launchers
Under START, ICBM launchers were “destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight
meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters.” If missiles were removed from
silos, and the silos were not eliminated in this fashion, then the silos still counted as if they held a
deployed missile and as if the deployed missile carried the attributed number of warheads.
New START lists three ways in which the parties may eliminate ICBM silo launchers. It states
that silo launchers “shall be destroyed by excavating them to a depth of no less than eight meters
or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters.” It also indicates that the silos can be
“completely filled with debris resulting from demolition of infrastructure, and with earth or
gravel.” Finally, it indicates the party carrying out the elimination can develop other procedures to
eliminate its silos. It may have to demonstrate this elimination alternative to the other party, but
that party cannot dispute or deny the use of that method.
Hence, instead of blowing up the silos or digging them out of the ground, the parties to the treaty
might choose to disable the silo using measures it identifies itself, so that it can no longer launch
a missile. This could be far less costly and destructive than the procedures mandated under
START, and would help both nations eliminate some silos that have stood empty for years while
continuing to count under the old START Treaty. For the United States, this would include the 50
silos that held Peacekeeper missiles until 2005 and the 50 silos that held Minuteman III missiles
until 2008. The United States has never destroyed these silos, so they continued to count under
START. It can now disable theses silos and remove them from its tally of launchers under the
New START Treaty. According to the recent reports, the Air Force Global Strike Command began
preparations to eliminate these silos in March 2011, and plans to fill them with gravel. It expects
to complete this process by 2017.
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Mobile ICBM launchers
Under START, the elimination process for launchers for road-mobile ICBMs required that “the
erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis”
and that “the framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and
erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately
equal size.” It also required that the missile launch support equipment be removed from the
launcher chassis, and that the “mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and of the launcher
leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis” and cut into two pieces of approximately
equal size. START also required that 0.78 meters of the launcher chassis be cut off and cut into
two parts, so that the chassis would be too short to support mobile ICBMs.
Under New START, the elimination process for launchers for road mobile ICBMs is far more
simple and far less destructive. As was the case under START, the elimination “shall be carried
out by cutting the erector-launcher mechanism, leveling supports, and mountings of the erector-
launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis and by removing the missile launch support
equipment ... from the launcher chassis.” But neither the framework nor the chassis itself have to
be cut into pieces. If the chassis is going to be used “at a declared facility for purposes not
inconsistent with the Treaty” the surfaces of the vehicle that will be visible to national technical
means of verification must be painted a different color or pattern than those surfaces on a
deployed mobile ICBM launcher.
SLBM Launchers
Under START, the SLBM launch tubes were considered to be eliminated when the entire missile
section was removed from the submarine; or when “the missile launch tubes, and all elements of
their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between
the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the
outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes
pass and that contain all the missile launch-tube penetrations” were removed from the submarine.
The missile launch tubes then had to “be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.”
Under New START, SLBM launch tubes can be eliminated “by removing all missile launch tube
hatches, their associated superstructure fairings, and, if applicable, gas generators.” In other
words, the missile section of the submarine and the individual launch tubes can remain in place in
the submarine, and cease to count under the treaty limits, if they are altered so that they can no
longer launch ballistic missiles. Moreover, according to the Ninth Agreed Statement in the New
START Protocol, SLBM launch tubes that have been converted in accordance with this procedure
and are “incapable of launching SLBMs may simultaneously be located on a ballistic missile
submarine” with launch tubes that are still capable of launching SLBMs. After a party completes
this type of conversion, it “shall conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted launcher and an
SLBM launcher that has not been converted” to demonstrate, to the other party, “the
distinguishing features of a converted launcher and an SLBM launcher that has not been
converted.” The United States plans to use this procedure to reduce the number of launch tubes
on each SSBN from 24 to 20. According to recent reports, it will begin this process in 2015, so
that it will have no more than 240 operational launchers for SLBMs by the treaty deadline of
February 2018.24

24 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January
2013, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full.pdf+html.
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Under START, the United States had to essentially destroy an entire submarine to remove its
launch tubes from accountability under the treaty limits. With these provisions in New START,
the United States cannot only convert ballistic missile submarines to other uses without
destroying their missile tubes and missile compartments; it can also reduce the number of
accountable deployed SLBM launchers on ballistic missile submarines that continue to carry
nuclear-armed SLBMs. These provisions will provide the United States a great deal of flexibility
when it determines the structure of its nuclear forces under New START.
During the past decade, the United States converted four of its Trident ballistic missile
submarines so that they no longer carry ballistic missiles but now carry conventional cruise
missiles and other types of weapons. These are now known as SSGNs. Because the United States
did not remove the missile compartment from these submarines, they continued to count as if they
carried 24 Trident missiles, with 8 warheads per missile, under the old START Treaty. These
submarines will not count under the New START Treaty.
In the Second Agreed Statement in the New START Protocol, the United States has agreed that,
“no later than three years after entry into force of the Treaty, the United States of America shall
conduct an initial one-time exhibition of each of these four SSGNs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to confirm that the launchers on such submarines are incapable of launching
SLBMs.” Moreover, if an SSGN is located at an SSBN base when a Russian inspection team
visits that base, the inspection team will have the right to inspect the SSGN again to confirm that
the launchers have not been converted back to carry SLBMs. Russia can conduct six of these
reinspections during the life of the treaty, but no more than two inspections of any one of the
SSGNs.
Heavy Bombers
Under START, heavy bombers were eliminated by having the tail section cut off of the fuselage at
a location that obviously was not an assembly joint; having the wings separated from the fuselage
at any location by any method; and having the remainder of the fuselage cut into two pieces, with
the cut occurring in the area where the wings were attached to the fuselage, but at a location
obviously not an assembly joint.
START also allowed the parties to remove heavy bombers from treaty accountability by
converting them to heavy bombers that were not equipped to carry nuclear armaments. According
to the elimination and conversion Protocol in START, this could be done by modifying all
weapons bays and by removing or modifying the external attachment joints for either long-range
nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments that the bombers were equipped to carry.
The elimination procedure for heavy bombers has also been simplified under New START. To
eliminate bombers, the parties must cut “a wing or tail section from the fuselage at locations
obviously not assembly joints,” or cut “the fuselage into two parts at a location obviously not an
assembly joint.” It no longer has to remove the wings from the fuselage. In addition, to convert a
bomber counted under the treaty to a heavy bomber no longer equipped to carry nuclear
armaments, the parties can either modify the weapons bays and external attachments for pylons
so that they cannot carry nuclear armaments, or modify all internal and external launcher
assemblies so that they cannot carry nuclear armaments, or develop any other procedure to carry
out the conversion. As was the case with the conversion and elimination of missile launchers, the
party may have to demonstrate its conversion procedure, but the other party does not have the
right to object or reject the procedure.
The United States no longer equips its B-1 bombers with nuclear weapons, and has no plans to do
so in the future. It has not, however, converted these bombers to nonnuclear heavy bombers using
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the procedures outlined in START. As a result, they continued to count as one delivery vehicle
and one warhead under the counting rules in START. The United States does not, however, want
to count these bombers under the New START Treaty. As a result, in the First Agreed Statement,
the United States and Russia agreed, during the first year that the treaty is in force, the United
States will conduct a “one-time exhibition” to demonstrate to Russia that these bombers are no
longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The bombers that no longer carry nuclear weapons
will have a “distinguishing feature” that will be recorded in the treaty database and will be
evident on all B-1 bombers that are no longer equipped to carry nuclear weapons. After all the B-
1 bombers have been converted in this manner, they will no longer count against the limits in the
New START Treaty.
Mobile ICBMs
Mobile ICBMs in START
Mobile ICBMs became an issue in the original START negotiations in the mid-1980s, as the
Soviet Union began to deploy a single-warhead road-mobile ICBM, the SS-25, and a 10-warhead
rail-mobile ICBM, the SS-24.25 The United States initially proposed that START ban mobile
ICBMs because the United States would not be able to locate or target these systems during a
conflict. Some also questioned whether the United States would be able to monitor Soviet mobile
ICBM deployments well enough to count the missiles and verify Soviet compliance with the
limits in START. Some also argued that the Soviet Union might be able to stockpile hidden
missiles and launchers, and to reload mobile ICBM launchers during a conflict because the
United States could not target and destroy them.
The Soviet Union refused to ban mobile ICBMs. As a result, START limited the United States
and Soviet Union to 1,100 warheads on mobile ICBMs. The treaty also limited the numbers of
nondeployed missiles and nondeployed launchers for mobile ICBMs. Each side could retain 250
missiles and 110 launchers for mobile ICBMs, with no more than 125 missiles and 18 launchers
for rail mobile ICBMs. This did not eliminate the risk of “breakout,” which refers to the rapid
addition of stored missiles to the deployed force, but it did limit the magnitude of the breakout
potential and the number of missiles that the Soviet Union could “reload” on deployed launchers
during a conflict.
START also contained a number of complementary, and sometimes overlapping, monitoring
mechanisms that were designed to help the parties keep track of the numbers and locations of
permitted missiles.26 Each side could monitor the final assembly facility for the missiles to count
them as they entered the force.27 The parties also agreed to record the serial numbers, referred to
in the treaty as “unique identifiers,” for the mobile ICBMs, and to list these numbers in the
treaty’s database. These numbers were used to help track and identify permitted missiles because
the parties could check the serial numbers during on-site inspections to confirm that the missiles
they encountered were those that they expected to see at the facility during the inspection. The

25 In 1987, the United States began to develop its own mobile ICBM, the 10-warhead MX (Peacekeeper) missile, and it
continued to explore mobile basing for the new single-warhead small ICBM. Although it eventually deployed the
Peacekeeper missile in fixed silos, the parties considered it to be a mobile ICBM under the terms of START.
26 For more information on the monitoring regime in START, see CRS Report R41201, Monitoring and Verification in
Arms Control, by Amy F. Woolf.
27 The perimeter/portal continuous monitoring systems (PPCMS) consisted of fences surrounding the entire perimeter
of the facility and one restricted portal through which all vehicles large enough to carry items limited by the treaty
(such as the first stage of a mobile ICBM) had to pass. The portal contained scales and other measuring devices that the
countries could use to determine whether the vehicle carried an item limited by the treaty.
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parties also had to provide notifications when mobile ICBMs moved between permitted facilities
and when mobile ICBMs moved out of their main operating bases for an exercise. These
notifications were designed to complicate efforts to move extra, hidden missiles into the deployed
force. Finally, missiles and launchers removed from the force had to be eliminated according to
specific procedures outlined in the treaty. This not only helped the parties keep an accurate count
of the deployed missiles, but served as a further deterrent to efforts to hide extra missiles outside
the treaty regime.
Mobile ICBMs in New START
The New START Treaty contains many limits and restrictions that will affect Russia’s force of
mobile ICBMs, but it does not single them out with many of the additional constraints that were
contained in START. Russia pressed for an easing of the restrictions on mobile ICBMs in New
START, in part because these restrictions were one sided and only affected Russian forces. But
Russian officials also noted, and the United States agreed, that mobile ICBMs could enhance the
survivability of Russia’s nuclear forces, and therefore strengthen strategic stability under the new
treaty.
The United States was also willing to relax the restrictions on mobile ICBMs because it is far less
concerned about Russia’s ability to break out of the treaty limits than it was in the 1980s. After 15
years of START implementation, the United States has far more confidence in its knowledge of
the number of deployed and nondeployed Russian mobile ICBMs, as it kept count of these
missiles as they entered and left the Russian force during START. There is also far less concern
about Russia stockpiling extra missiles while New START is in force. During the 1980s, the
Soviet Union produced dozens of new missiles each year; Russia now adds fewer than 10
missiles to its force each year.28 Some estimates indicate that, with this level of production,
Russia will find it difficult to retain the 700 deployed missiles permitted by the treaty. In such a
circumstance, it would have neither the need nor the ability to stockpile and hide extra missiles.
Moreover, where the United States was once concerned about Russia’s ability to reload its mobile
launchers with spare missiles, after launching the first missiles during a conflict, this scenario no
longer seems credible. It would mean that Russia maintained the ability to send extra missiles and
the equipment needed to load them on launchers out on patrol with its deployed systems and that
it could load these missiles quickly, in the field, in the midst of a nuclear war, with U.S. weapons
falling all around. Yet, Russia has not practiced or exercised this capability and it is hard to
imagine that it would try it, for the first time, in the midst of a nuclear war.
The New START Treaty does not contain a sublimit on mobile ICBMs or their warheads. It also
does not contain any limits on the number of nondeployed mobile ICBMs or the number of
nondeployed mobile ICBM launchers. These launchers and warheads will, however, count under
the aggregate limits set by the treaty, including the limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed
launchers. As a result, the United States will still need to count the number of mobile ICBMs in
Russia’s force.
New START will not permit perimeter and portal monitoring at missile assembly facilities. The
parties must, however, provide notification at least 48 hours before the time when solid-fuel

28 According to one U.S. inspector, monitoring at Votkinsk “was very monotonous. We could have months go by
without inspecting a missile.” See Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Treaty-Monitoring Presence at Russian Missile Plant
Winding Down,” Global Security Newswire, November 20, 2009.
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ICBMs and solid-fuel SLBMs leave the production facilities. Moreover, the parties will continue
to list the serial numbers, or unique identifiers, for mobile ICBMs in the shared database.29
New START limits the locations of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, both to help the United
States keep track of the missiles covered by the treaty and to deter Russian efforts to hide extra
missiles away from the deployed force. Deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers must be
located only at ICBM bases. All nondeployed launchers for mobile ICBMs must be located at
“production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or
elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities.” The locations of
nondeployed mobile ICBMs are also limited to loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair
facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities test ranges, space launch facilities,
and production facilities. Some of these facilities may be at bases for operational mobile ICBMs,
but, in that case, the nondeployed missiles must remain in the designated facility and cannot be
located in deployment areas.
Moreover, when deployed or nondeployed missiles or launchers move from one facility to
another, the parties will have to update the database so each facility contains a complete list of
each item located at that facility, and of the unique identifier associated with each item. Then,
according to the Protocol to the Treaty, “inspectors shall have the right to read the unique
identifiers on all designated deployed ICBMs or designated deployed SLBMs, non-deployed
ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and designated heavy bombers that are located at the inspection
site.”30 Hence, the parties will have the opportunity to confirm that items located at the facilities
are supposed to be there.
This is designed not only to increase transparency and understanding while the treaty is in force,
but also to discourage efforts to hide extra missiles and break out of the treaty limits. The treaty
does not limit the number of nondeployed missiles, but it does provide the United States with
continuous information about their locations and the opportunity, during on-site inspections, to
confirm that these missiles are not mixed into the deployed force. Moreover, the number of
nondeployed launchers for these missiles is limited, under the 800 limit on deployed and
nondeployed launchers. So, even if Russia did accumulate a stock of nondeployed missiles, the
number that it could add to its force in a relatively short amount of time would be limited.
Some have questioned whether Russia might use these stored mobile ICBMs to break out of the
treaty by deploying them on mobile launchers that are not limited by the treaty. Specifically, they
have questioned whether the New START Treaty would count rail-mobile ICBMs, and, if not,
whether Russia could develop and deploy enough of these launchers to gain a military advantage
over the United States.31 This concern derives from the definition of mobile launcher in the
paragraph 45 of the Protocol to the Treaty, which indicates that a mobile launcher is “an erector-
launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled device on which it is mounted
[emphasis added].” This definition clearly captures road-mobile launchers, such as those that
Russia uses for its SS-25 and SS-27 missiles, because the transporters for these missiles are self-
propelled. But a rail car that carried an erector-launcher for an ICBM would not be self-propelled;
it would be propelled by the train’s locomotive.

29 In START, the parties recorded unique identifiers only for mobile ICBMs. In New START, the parties will record
these numbers for all ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers covered by the limits in Treaty.
30 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140047.pdf.
31 See, for example, Christopher Ford, “Does New START Fumble Reloads and Rail-Mobile ICBMs?” New Paradigms
Forum, April 26, 2010, http://02e18f7.netsolhost.com/New_Paradigms_Forum/Nuclear_Weapons/Entries/2010/4/
26_New_START_Fumbles_Missile_REloads_and_Rail-Mobile_ICBMs.html.
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Others, however, point to several provisions in the treaty that indicate that rail-mobile launchers
of ICBMs would count under the treaty limits. First, they note that the treaty limits all deployed
and nondeployed ICBM launchers. It defines ICBM launcher, in paragraph 28 of the Protocol to
the Treaty, as “a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.”
Any erector-launcher for ICBMs would be covered by this definition, regardless of whether it
was deployed on a fixed site, on a road-mobile transporter, or on a railcar.
Moreover, the article-by-article analysis of the treaty specifically states that “all of the defined
terms are used in at least one place elsewhere in the Treaty documents.” Article III, paragraph 8
of the treaty lists the current types of weapons deployed by each side and notes that these all
count against the limits. It does not list any missiles deployed on rail-mobile launchers, and,
therefore, the Protocol does not define rail-mobile launchers, because Russia no longer deploys
any missiles on rail-mobile launchers. It had deployed SS-24 missiles on such launchers during
the 1980s and 1990s, but these were all retired in the past decade, and the last operating base for
these missiles and railcars was closed in 2007.32
The treaty would not prohibit Russia from deploying these types of systems again in the future.
Article V specifically states that “modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may
be carried out.” However, the second paragraph of this article indicates that, “when a party
believes a new kind of strategic offensive arms is emerging, that party shall have the right to raise
the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.” Section 6 of the Protocol to the Treaty, which describes the Bilateral Consultative
Commission, states that this body should “resolve questions related to the applicability of
provisions of the treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm.” In addition, Article XV of the
treaty states that “if it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol ... that do not affect the
substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty,” the parties can use the BCC to reach
agreement on these changes without amending the treaty. Hence, if Russia were to deploy ICBMs
on rail-mobile launchers, the parties could modify the definition to “mobile launcher” to confirm
that these weapons count under the treaty limits.
New START does not define rail-mobile launchers for ICBMs because neither the United States
nor Russia currently deploys these systems and the treaty does not specifically prohibit their
deployment in the future. If, however, either party installs an erector-launcher for an ICBM on a
rail car, that launcher would count under the treaty limits, and the new type of strategic arm,
represented by the launcher on a railcar, would be covered by the limits in the treaty. The parties
would then use the BCC to determine which of the monitoring provisions and elimination and
conversion rules applied to that type of weapons system.
Monitoring and Verification33
The original START Treaty included a comprehensive and overlapping set of provisions that was
designed to allow the United States and Soviet Union to collect a wide range of data on their
forces and activities and to determine whether the forces and activities were consistent with the
limits in the treaty. While each party would collect most of this information with its own satellites
and remote sensing equipment—known as national technical means of verification (NTM)—the
treaty also called for the extensive exchange of data detailing the numbers and locations of
affected weapons, numerous types of on-site inspections, notifications, exhibitions, and

32 Pavel Podvig, New START on Rail-Mobile ICBMs and Reloads, April 29, 2010, http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/
04/new_start_on_rail-mobile_icbms.shtml.
33 For more information on the monitoring and verification regime in New START, see CRS Report R41201,
Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control, by Amy F. Woolf.
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continuous monitoring at assembly facilities for mobile ICBMs. Further, in START, the parties
agreed that they would not encrypt or otherwise deny access to the telemetry generated during
missile flight tests, so that the other side could record these data and use them in evaluating the
capabilities of missile systems.
The New START Treaty contains a monitoring and verification regime that resembles the regime
in START, in that its text contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty, provisions
governing the use of NTM to gather data on each side’s forces and activities, an extensive
database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty, provisions
requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty, and inspections allowing the parties to
confirm information shared during data exchanges. At the same time, the verification regime has
been streamlined to make it less costly and complex than the regime in START. It also has been
adjusted to reflect the limits in New START and the current circumstances in the relationship
between the United States and Russia. In particular, it focuses on maintaining transparency,
cooperation, and openness, as well as on deterring and detecting potential violations.
Under New START, the United States and Russia continue to rely on their NTM to collect
information about the numbers and locations of their strategic forces. They may also broadcast
and exchange telemetry—the data generated during missile flight tests—up to five times each
year, although, in practice, they have done so only once each year. They do not need these data to
monitor compliance with any particular limits in New START, but the telemetry exchange
provides some transparency into the capabilities of their systems.34 The parties also exchange a
vast amount of data about their forces, specifying not only their distinguishing characteristics, but
also their precise locations. They will notify each other, and update the database, whenever they
move forces between declared facilities. The treaty also requires the parties to display their
forces, and allows each side to participate in exhibitions, to confirm information listed in the
database.
New START permits the parties to conduct up to 18 short-notice on-site inspections each year.
These inspections began in early April 2011, 60 days after the treaty entered into force. These
inspections can occur at facilities that house both deployed and nondeployed launchers and
missiles. The treaty divides these into Type One inspections and Type Two inspections. Each side
can conduct up to 10 Type One inspections and up to 8 Type Two inspections. Moreover, during
each Type One inspection, the parties will be able to perform two different types of inspection
activities—these are essentially equivalent to the data update inspections and reentry vehicle
inspections in the original START Treaty. As a result, the 18 short-notice inspections permitted
under New START are essentially equivalent to the 28 short-notice inspections permitted under
START.
Type One Inspections
Type One inspections are those that occur at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases that
house deployed or nondeployed launchers, missiles, and bombers. The parties use these
inspections “to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and
non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this treaty. During Type One inspections, the
parties may also confirm that the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed
SLBMs and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers” are
consistent with the numbers declared deployed on those specific launchers.

34 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Telemetry, fact sheet, Washington,
DC, April 8, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139904.htm.
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The inspections used to confirm the number of deployed warheads in New START will be
distinctly different from the inspections in START because the counting rules for ballistic missiles
have changed. Under START, the treaty database listed the number of warheads attributed to a
type of missile, and each missile of that type counted as the same number of warheads. The
parties then inspected the missiles to confirm that the number of warheads on a particular missile
did not exceed the number attributed to that type of missile. The database in New START will list
the aggregate number of warheads deployed on all the missiles at a given base, but before
beginning a Type One inspection, the team will receive a briefing on the actual number of
warheads deployed on each missile at the base. During the inspections, the parties will have the
right to designate one ICBM or one SLBM for inspection, and, when inspecting that missile, the
parties will be able to count the actual number of reentry vehicles deployed on the missile to
confirm that it equals the number provided for that particular missile prior to the inspection. The
inspected party can cover the reentry vehicles to protect information not related to the number of
warheads, but the party must use covers that allow the inspectors to identify the actual number of
warheads on the missile.
Because these inspections are random, and occur on short notice, they provide the parties with a
chance to detect an effort by the other party to deploy a missile with more than its listed number
of warheads. As a result, the inspections may deter efforts to conceal extra warheads on the
deployed force. These inspections, by allowing the parties to count the actual number of deployed
warheads, provide added transparency.
Type Two Inspections
Type Two inspections occur at facilities that house nondeployed or converted launchers and
missiles. These include “ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; storage facilities for
ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile launchers of ICBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and
mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; and training facilities.” The parties will perform these
inspections “to confirm the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and declared data,
specified for such facilities, on the number and types of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed
SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs.” In addition,
they can conduct these inspections at formerly declared facilities, “to confirm that such facilities
are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.” They can also use Type II
inspections to confirm that solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, or mobile launchers of
ICBMs have been eliminated according to treaty procedures.
Ballistic Missile Defense
Presidents Obama and Medvedev had agreed, when they met in April 2009, that the two nations
would address Russia’s concerns with U.S. missile defense programs in a separate forum from the
negotiations on a New START Treaty.35 However, during their meeting in Moscow in July 2010,
Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that the treaty would contain a “provision on the
interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms.”36 This statement,
which appears in the preamble to New START, states that the parties recognize “the existence of

35 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian
Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America,” April 1, 2009.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-president-dmitriy-medvedev-russian-federation-
and-president-barack-.
36 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Understanding by Obama, Medvedev on Weapon
Negotiations,” July 8, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-
treaty.
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the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that
current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic
offensive arms of the parties.”
Russia and the United States each issued unilateral statements when they signed New START that
clarified their positions on the relationship between New START and missile defenses. Russia
stated that
the Treaty can operate and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from
developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or qualitatively. Consequently,
the exceptional circumstances referred to in Article 14 of the Treaty include increasing the
capabilities of the United States of America’s missile defense system in such a way that
threatens the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.37
In its statement, the United States stated that its
missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. The
United States missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United States
against limited missile launches, and to defend its deployed forces, allies and partners
against regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and deploying its
missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
collaborative approach to strengthening stability in key regions.38
These statements do not impose any obligations on either the United States or Russia. As Senator
Lugar indicated before New START was signed, these statements are, “in essence editorial
opinions.” Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher also stated that “Russia’s unilateral statement
on missile defenses is not an integral part of the New START Treaty. It’s not legally-binding. It
won’t constrain U.S. missile defense programs.”39 These statements also do not provide Russia
with “veto power” over U.S. missile defense systems. Although Russia has said it may withdraw
from the treaty if the U.S. missile defenses threaten “the potential of the strategic nuclear forces
of the Russian Federation,” the United States has no obligation to consult with Russia to confirm
that its planned defenses do not cross this threshold. It may develop and deploy whatever
defenses it chooses; Russia can then determine, for itself, whether those defenses affect its
strategic nuclear forces and whether it thinks the threat to those forces justifies withdrawal from
the treaty.
Article V, paragraph 3 of New START also mentions ballistic missile defense interceptors. It
states that the parties cannot convert ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers to launchers for
missile defense interceptors and that they cannot convert launchers of missile defense interceptors
to launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs. At the same time, the treaty makes it clear that the five
ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base that have already been converted to carry missile
defense interceptors are not affected by this prohibition. It states that “this provision shall not
apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of
missile defense interceptors therein.”
This provision is designed to address Russian concerns about the U.S. ability to “break out” of the
treaty by placing ICBMs in silos that had held missile defense interceptors or by converting

37 Article 14 indicates that each party shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events related to the subject of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme national interests. For the full Russian statement,
see https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/140187.htm.
38 https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/140406.pdf.
39 Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, The Case for New START Ratification, Atlantic Council Panel Discussion,
April 21, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm.
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ICBM silos to missile interceptor silos then quickly reversing that conversion to add offensive
missiles to its forces with little warning. Russia began to express this concern after the United
States converted the five ICBM silos at Vandenberg for missile defense interceptors. It initially
sought to reverse this conversion, or at least to count the silos under the New START limits. The
United States refused, but, in exchange for Russia accepting that the five converted silos would
not count under New START, the United States agreed that it would not convert additional silos.
The provision will also protect U.S. missile defense interceptors from the START inspection
regime. If the parties were permitted to convert missile defense silos to ICBM silos, they would
also have been able to visit and inspect those silos to confirm that they did not hold missiles
limited by the treaty. The ban on such conversions means that this type of inspection is not only
unnecessary, but also not permitted.
The Obama Administration has stated on many occasions that the New START Treaty does not
contain any provisions that limit the numbers or capabilities of current or planned U.S. ballistic
missile defense systems.40 The ban on launcher conversion does not alter this conclusion because
the United States has no plans to use any additional ICBM launchers or any SLBM launchers to
hold missile defense interceptors. It is constructing new launchers for its missile defense systems.
Some have questioned, however, whether the ban on silo conversion may limit missile defenses
in the future, particularly if the United States wanted to respond to an emerging missile threat by
quickly expanding its numbers of missile defense interceptors.41
General Jim Jones, President Obama’s National Security Adviser during the negotiations, stated
that this provision is a “limit in theory, but not in reality.”42 It is not just that the United States has
no plans to convert ICBM silos to missile defense interceptor silos, it is that it would be quicker
and less expensive for the United States to build new silos for missile defense interceptors than to
remove the ICBMs and all their equipment, reconfigure the silo, and install all the equipment for
the missile defense interceptors. Moreover, given that the missile defense interceptor launched
from the central United States, where U.S. ICBM silos are located, would drop debris on U.S.
territory, the United States might prefer to locate its missile defense interceptors in new launchers
near the U.S. coast.
General Patrick O’Reilly, then the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, also stated that his
agency “never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg and intends to hedge
against increased BMDS [ballistic missile defense system] requirements by completing
construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we determined that if more interceptors
were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI [ground-
based interceptor] missile field (which is not prohibited by the treaty).”43 He went on to note that
“some time ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from
submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive option.” Putting missile defense
interceptors in SLBM launchers would undermine the primary mission of the submarine, which is
designed to patrol deeply and quietly to remain invulnerable to attack, by requiring it to remain in
one place near the surface while it sought to track and engage attacking missiles.

40 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Key Facts About the New START Treaty, Washington, DC, March
26, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty. See also the remarks
of Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher at Atlantic Council Panel Discussion on April 21, 2010, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm.
41 “Stopping Missile Defense?,” Wall Street Journal, April 17, 2010, p. A12.
42 James L. Jones, “New START Treaty Won't Limit Missile Defenses,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2010.
43 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services, Strategic Forces, President Obama’s Fiscal 2011 Budget Request for the
Missile Defense and Ballistic Missile Review Programs, Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 14, 2010.
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Conventional Long-Range Strike
During their summit meeting in July 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed that the New
START Treaty would contain “a provision on the impact of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration on strategic stability.” This
statement, which is in the preamble to the treaty, simply states that the parties are “mindful of the
impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.”
During the negotiations on New START, Russia voiced concerns about U.S. plans to deploy
conventional warheads on ballistic missiles that now carry nuclear warheads.44 Russian officials
argued that these weapons could upset stability for several reasons. First, even if Russia were not
the target of an attack with these missiles, it might not know whether the missile carried a nuclear
warhead or a conventional warhead, or whether it was headed toward a target in Russia.
Moreover, ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could destroy significant targets
in Russia and, therefore, they might provide the United States with the ability to attack such
targets, with little warning, without resorting to nuclear weapons. Finally, some argued that the
United States might replace the conventional warheads with nuclear warheads to exceed the
limits in a treaty.
Russia initially sought to include a provision in New START that would ban the deployment of
conventional warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. The United States rejected this proposal. It
was considering this capability as a way to attack targets around the world promptly, and did not
envision using these weapons against Russia. As a result, as the White House noted in its Fact
Sheet on New START, “the Treaty does not contain any constraints on ... current or planned
United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.”45 However, if the United States
deployed conventional warheads on missiles that are covered by the limits in START, the
warheads on these missiles would count under the treaty limit on deployed warheads. Because the
United States expected to deploy very small numbers of these systems, this trade-off would not
have a significant effect on U.S. nuclear capabilities.46
Moreover, if the United States deployed conventional warheads on new types of long-range strike
systems, these systems would not necessarily count under or be affected by the limits in New
START. The United States would likely consider these to be a “new type of strategic offensive
arms.” Under Article V, paragraph 2, Russia would have the right to raise its concerns about these
weapons within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), but the United States would not
have to accept Russia’s interpretation or accede to any requests to count the systems under the
treaty.47 The same procedures would apply if Russia were to develop new types of strategic
offensive arms—with either nuclear or conventional warheads. The United States could raise its

44 For information about the issues associated with the potential deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic
missiles see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background
and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. See also David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Faces Choice of New Weapons for
Fast Strikes,” New York Times, April 23, 2010.
45 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Key Facts About the New START Treaty,” Washington, DC,
March 26, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-new-start-treaty.
46 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Conventional Prompt Global
Strike, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 8, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/139913.htm.
47 Article V, paragraph 2 of the treaty states that “when a party believes a new kind of strategic offensive arms is
emerging, that party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission.”
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concerns with these weapons in the BCC, but Russia would not have to accept a U.S. request to
count these weapons under the treaty.
U.S. and Russian Forces Under New START
U.S. Forces
According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released by DOD on April 6,
2010,48 the United States planned to maintain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers
under New START.49 The 2010 NPR did not specify how many ICBMs would remain in the
force, but indicated that each would be deployed with only one warhead. It also indicated that the
United States would, initially at least, retain 14 Trident submarines. It might, however, reduce its
fleet to 12 submarines after 2015. The NPR did not indicate whether the Trident submarines
would continue to be deployed with 24 missiles on each submarine, or if the Navy would
eliminate some of the launchers on operational submarines in accordance with the treaty’s Ninth
Agreed Statement. Finally, the NPR indicated that the United States would convert some of its 76
dual-capable B-52 bombers to a conventional-only role.
The Obama Administration clarified its plans for U.S. forces under New START in the 1251 plan
that it submitted to the Senate with the treaty documents on May 13, 2010.50 This plan indicated
that the United States would eliminate at least 30 deployed ICBMs, retaining a force of up to 420
deployed launchers under the treaty limits. It would also retain 14 Trident submarines, but each
submarine would contain only 20 launchers, and two of the submarines would be in overhaul at
any time, so only 240 launchers would count under the limit on deployed launchers. In addition,
the report indicated that the United States would retain up to 60 deployed bombers equipped for
nuclear weapons, including all 18 B-2 bombers in the current force.
This force would have included up to 720 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, a
number that exceeds the 700 deployed missiles and bombers permitted by the treaty. In a hearing
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates and
Admiral Mullen, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that the United States
would have to make a small number of further reductions, or convert a small number of
additional systems to nondeployed status, to meet the treaty limits. However, they noted that
because the United States would have seven years to reduce its forces to these limits, they saw no
reason to identify a final force structure at that point. Secretary Gates noted that DOD was
considering a number of options for the final force structure, and would make a decision on this
force structure after considering the international security environment and Russia’s force
structure in the treaty’s later years.
The Obama Pentagon released its plans for the New START force structure in April 8, 2014. As
was indicated in May 2010, this force will include 14 submarines with 20 launchers on each
submarine. Because two submarines will be in overhaul at any time, these submarines will count
as carrying 240 deployed launchers within a total of 280 deployed and nondeployed launchers.
The force also calls for a reduction in the number of deployed ICBMs from 450 to 400, with the

48 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, pp. 19-25.
49 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms this commitment to retaining the triad. U.S. Department of Defense,
Nuclear Posture Review, report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/
2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
50 Congress mandated that the President submit a report on this plan in Section 1251 of the FY2010 Defense
Authorization Act, P.L. 111-84.
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retention of all 50 empty launchers, for a total force of 450 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers. The Air Force will also count 4 ICBM test launchers as nondeployed launchers within
the total. Finally, New START force will include 60 deployed bombers and 6 nondeployed
bombers.
Even before it determined the final force structure, the Pentagon had requested funding to pursue
activities that would enable these reductions, regardless of the specific force structure decisions.
For example, in the FY2014 budget, the Pentagon requested funding for an environmental
assessment (EA) that would be needed before it could eliminate ICBM silos. Several Members of
Congress objected to this study, arguing that it would allow the Administration to eliminate an
ICBM squadron regardless of whether this turned out to be the preferred option for force
reductions. Several Members strongly supported the retention of all 450 ICBM silos, even if a
portion of them were nondeployed, with the missiles removed to meet the New START limit of
700 deployed launchers.51
The Pentagon responded to this criticism by noting that the EA would not predetermine the
outcome of the force structure decision. However, if it were not initiated by the end of 2013, it
would not be completed in time to support reductions by 2018, if the Pentagon chose to pursue
those reductions. In other words, even if the study were completed, the ICBM silos could remain
in the force, but if the study was not begun in time, the ICBM silos could not be eliminated, even
if that proved to be the preferred force structure option. In response to these concerns, Congress
included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 (H.R. 3304, §1056) that
limited the Pentagon’s ability to reduce U.S. forces under New START. Specifically, the
legislation states that “the Secretary of Defense may only use funds authorized to be appropriated
by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2014 to carry out activities to prepare for
such reductions.” Further, the legislation states that only 50% of the funds authorized for the EA
can be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense submits the required plan that
describes preferred force structure option under New START. The Pentagon has now submitted
the plan, but it is unclear whether the EA will proceed.
Table 2, below, contains an estimated force structure of the United States prior to New START’s
entry into force; the force structure as of February 5, 2018 (when the reductions were required to
meet the treaty limits); and the force structure as outlined in a recent treaty-mandated data
exchange.52 As these data demonstrate, the United States reached the reduced force level required
by the treaty. Within these limits, the United States retains a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers. It has reduced the number of deployed nuclear-armed B-52 bombers by converting
many to conventional missions. It has reduced the number of launchers on its Trident submarines
and retains 400 Minuteman III missiles. An additional 54 Minuteman III launchers do not hold
ICBMs and therefore do not count under the 700 limit for deployed launchers. As noted below,
the actual number of launchers and warheads listed in the data exchange does not quite reach the
treaty limits of 1,550 warheads on 700 launchers, or match the force specified in 2014, because
maintenance requirements can reduce the number of deployed systems on a day-to-day basis.
The United States did not have to destroy many ICBM or SLBM launchers to reach the limits in
New START. The treaty includes provisions that allowed the United States to exempt many of its

51 Jeremy Herb, “Senators Tell Hagel Not to Study ICBM Cuts,” The Hill, September 27, 2013, http://thehill.com/
blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/325137-senators-tell-hagel-not-to-study-icbm-cuts.
52 This data is from March 1, 2021. The two sides exchanged data in September 2021, but the State Department has
provided only aggegate totals, not an update of the numbers of each leg of the triad. U.S. Department of State, Bureau
of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,
fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 1, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-
offensive-arms-2/.
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existing nondeployed launchers, including 94 B-1 bombers, and 4 ballistic missile submarines
that have been converted to carry cruise missiles, from treaty limits. Moreover, as it reduced its
deployed forces, the United States did not have to destroy either ICBM or SLBM launchers; it
could deactivate them so that they could no longer launch ballistic missiles. Instead of eliminating
missiles and launchers, the United States reached the limits in New START by deploying its
missiles with far fewer than the maximum number of warheads that each could be equipped to
carry. The Air Force has completed the deactivation of 50 Minuteman III missiles that will be
removed from the force under New START, and the Navy has completed the elimination of four
launch tubes on all 14 of its Trident submarines.
Table 2. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START
Estimated U.S. Forces, 2010
U.S. Forces, February 5, 2018a
U.S. Forces, March 1, 2021b
Deployed
Total
Deployed
Total
Deployed

Launchers Warheads Launchers Launchers Warheads Launchers Launchers Warheads
Minuteman
450
500
454
400

454
399
399
III
Peacekeeper
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
Trident
336
1,152
280
203

280
206
912
B-52
76
300
46
36

47
35
35
B-2
18
200
20
13

19
11
11
Total
880
2,152
800
652
1,350
800
651
1,357
Sources: CRS estimates, Air Force estimates.
a. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Forces, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 6, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284376.pdf. The fact sheet does not display warhead
subtotals for each delivery system; it includes only an aggregate across the force.
b. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 1, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-2/
Russian Forces
On February 5, 2018, when the treaty reductions were complete, Russia announced that it had
reduced its forces to 1,444 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers,
within a total of 779 deployed and nondeployed launchers.53
During the implementation of New START, the number of warheads deployed on Russian
missiles and bombers climbed above the New START limits, leading some to express concerns
about Russia’s intention to comply with the treaty. Others noted that this was a reflection of
Russia’s modernization program, as it deployed new multiple-warhead ballistic missiles in place
of older single-warhead missiles, and waited until late in the implementation process to eliminate
older multiple-warhead land-based missile. Russia also retired many of its older ballistic missile
submarines, replacing them with several new Borey-class submarines; three of these have entered
the force, and three more are under construction. This submarine is deployed with the new Bulava

53 “Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, February
5, 2018, http://tass.com/politics/988458.
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missile. The missile failed many of its early flight tests, and continues to experience some failed
tests, although it has had more several successful tests since late 2010.
Table 3. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Under New START
Estimated Forces 2010a
Russian Forces, February 5, 2018b
March 1, 2021c
Total
Deployed
Deployed
Total
Deployed
Deployed

Launchers Warheads Launchers Launchers Warheads Launchers Launchers Warheads
ICBMs
383
1,355

SLBMs
160
576

Bombers
77
856

Total
620
2,787
779
527
1,444
767c
517
1,456
Sources: United States Department of State, Fact Sheet, START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive
Arms; Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2010;
Russian Nuclear Forces http://russianforces.org/.
a. Russia does not provide details on the types of weapons counted in its New START Force. The formal data
exchanges only list aggregate totals.
b. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Forces, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 6, 2018,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284376.pdf. The fact sheet does not display warhead
subtotals for each delivery system; it includes only an aggregate across the force.
c. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 1, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-2/
Table 3, above, presents estimates of Russia’s aggregate force numbers in 2010, along with the
aggregate numbers listed in the data exchanges in 2018 and 2021.
Ratification
U.S. Ratification Process
The Obama Administration submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate on May 13, 2010.
The treaty package included the treaty text, the Protocol, the Annexes, the Article-by-Article
analysis prepared by the Administration, and the 1251 report on future plans and budgets for U.S.
nuclear weapons required by Congress. It also included the text of the unilateral statements made
by the United States and Russia when they signed the treaty. The Senate offered its advice and
consent to the ratification of the treaty by voting on a Resolution of Ratification. The treaty’s
approval requires a vote of two-thirds of the Senate, or 67 Senators.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings on the treaty. These began in April
2009, with testimony from former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger.
In total, the committee received testimony from more than 20 witnesses from both inside and
outside the Obama Administration. It received testimony from current senior officials from the
State Department, the Defense Department, and the Department of Energy, and from several
former officials from past Administrations. The committee completed its hearing process in mid-
July, after receiving a National Intelligence Estimate on the future of Russian forces and a report
on the verifiability of the treaty.
The Senate Armed Services Committee held a total of eight hearings and briefings on the treaty.
The Armed Services Committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of
Defense Gates, Secretary of Energy Chu, and Admiral Mullen on June 17, 2010. It also received
testimony and briefings from other Administration officials and from experts from outside the
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government. The Intelligence Committee also held a closed hearing to discuss U.S. monitoring
capabilities and the verifiability of the treaty.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a business meeting to mark up the Resolution of
Ratification for New START on September 16, 2010.54 The committee began its consideration
with a draft proposed by Senator Lugar, then addressed a number of amendments proposed by
members of the committee. Both the Lugar draft and many of the proposed amendments
addressed the members’ concerns with U.S. missile defense programs, U.S. conventional prompt
global strike capabilities, monitoring and verification, and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Most of these amendments were defeated, although the committee did modify and incorporate
some into the resolution.55
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of
14-4, and sent the resolution to the full Senate. The Senate did not address the treaty before the
November elections. The Administration pressed the Senate to debate the treaty during the lame-
duck session of Congress in December 2010. Many Senators supported this goal. Some, however,
suggested that the Senate would not have time to debate the treaty during the lame-duck session,
and indicated that they preferred the Senate wait until 2011 to debate the treaty.
The Senate began the debate on New START on December 16, 2010. During the debate, some
Senators proposed amendments to the treaty, both to strike language related to ballistic missile
defenses and to add language related to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The treaty’s supporters
argued that these amendments would “kill” the treaty because they would require Russian
approval and could lead to the reopening of negotiations on a wide range of issues addressed in
the treaty. The Senate rejected these amendments, but it did accept amendments to the Resolution
of Ratification that underlined the U.S. commitment to modernizing its nuclear weapons
infrastructure and its commitment to deploying ballistic missile defenses. In addition, President
Obama sent a letter to the Senators confirming his view that the New START Treaty places “no
limitations on the development or deployment of our missile defense programs,” highlighting his
commitment to proceed with the deployment of all four phases of the missile defense system
planned for Europe, and noting that the continued development and deployment of U.S. missile
defenses would not threaten the strategic balance with Russia and would not “constitute the basis
for questioning the effectiveness and viability of the New START Treaty.”56
The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of New START on December 22, 2010,
approving the Resolution of Ratification by a vote of 71-26. President Obama signed the
instruments of ratification in early February 2011.
Russian Ratification Process
Russia’s President Medvedev submitted the New START Treaty to the Russian Parliament on
May 28, 2010. Both houses of the Russian Parliament, the Duma and the Federation Council, will
vote on the treaty, with a majority vote required to approve the law on ratification. Russia’s

54 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty with Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty), Executive Report, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 1,
2010, Ex. Rept 111-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010).
55 Josh Rogin, “Kerry and DeMint Spar over Missile Defense,” Foreign Policy, The Cable, September 16, 2010,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/16/kerry_and_demint_spar_over_missile_defense. See also John
Isaacs, Analysis of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Passage of the new START Treaty, The Chain Reaction,
September, 16, 2010, https://livableworld.org/analysis-of-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-passage-of-the-new-
start-treaty/.
56 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-understanding-start-follow-treaty.
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president said he hoped that the two sides could “synchronize” their ratification, voting on the
treaty at about the same time. This would avoid the circumstances that existed on the second
START Treaty in the late 1990s, when the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification of START
II in January 1996, but by the time the Russian Parliament voted in 2000, the parties had
negotiated a Protocol to the Treaty that also required ratification. The Senate never voted on the
new version of the treaty, and START II never entered into force. Most experts agreed that
President Medvedev should be able to win approval for the treaty in the Russian Parliament with
little difficulty.
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma had initially supported the treaty. However,
in early November 2010, Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the committee, indicated that the
committee would reconsider the treaty. He indicated that this was in response to both the delay in
the U.S. Senate’s consideration of the treaty and the conditions and understandings that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee included in the U.S. Resolution of Ratification.
Nevertheless, after the Senate voted on the treaty on December 22, members of the Duma called
for the prompt ratification of New START. Reports indicated they received the documents from
the Senate on December 23, and they held their first vote on the Draft Law on Ratification by
Friday, December 24. The Duma then crafted amendments and declarations to the Federal Law on
Ratification, and, after two more votes, approved the treaty by a vote of 350-96 (with one
abstention) on January 25, 2011.
The upper chamber of Russia’s parliament, the Federation Council, also voted on the ratification
of the treaty. Sergei Mironov, the Speaker of the Federation Council, indicated that the vote
would take place after the vote in the Duma.57 This occurred on January 26, 2011, when the
Federation Council unanimously approved the ratification of the treaty.58 President Medvedev
signed the instruments of ratification on January 28, 2011. Russia’s Federal Law on Ratification
contains a number of declarations and understandings that highlight the Duma and Federation
Council’s concerns with the New START Treaty. These do not alter the text of the treaty and,
therefore, did not require U.S. consent or agreement. Many of the provisions in the law call on
Russia’s leadership to pursue funding for the modernization and sustainment of Russia’s strategic
nuclear forces. They also reiterate Russia’s view that the preamble to the treaty, and its reference
to the relationship between offensive and defense forces, is an integral part of the treaty. The law
does not indicate that this language imposes any restrictions on the United States. It does,
however, reiterate that Russia has a right to withdraw from the treaty, and could do so if the
United States deploys defenses that undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. In addition, the law
indicates that new kinds of strategic offensive weapons, such as the potential U.S. conventional
prompt global strike weapons, should count under the treaty limits. The law indicates that the
parties should meet in the BCC and agree on how to count these systems before either party
deploys the system. This differs from the U.S. interpretation because the United States has
indicated that it could deploy such systems before completing the discussions in the BCC. These
differing interpretations did not delay the entry into force of the treaty, but could raise questions
in the future, if the United States deploys a PGS system that it does not consider to count under
the treaty limits.
Entry into Force and Implementation
Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification for the
New START Treaty on February 5, 2011. This act brought the treaty into force and started the

57 “Federation Council Ready to Ratify New START on Same Day as Duma—Mironov,” Interfax, December 23, 2010.
58 “Russian Parliament Approves START Nuclear Arms Treaty,” BBC News, January 26, 2011.
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clock on early activities outlined in the treaty. For example, the United States and Russia
conducted their initial data exchange, 45 days after the treaty entered into force, on March 22,
2011, within 45 days of entry into force. They also had the right to begin on-site inspection
activities in early April, 60 days after the treaty entered into force. Reports indicate that this
process began in the United States with the display of a B-1 bomber and in Russia with the
display of Russia’s new RS-24 missile.
Consultations
The United States and Russia also met in Geneva, from March 28 through April 8, 2011, in the
first meeting of the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission. The representatives issued two
joint statements at the conclusion of the meeting that addressed procedures that would be used
during the on-site inspection process. The parties met for the second session of the BCC from
October 19 to November 2, 2011.
The third meeting of the BCC occurred in late January 2012. During that meeting, the parties
signed several statements on the sharing telemetry on missile test launches. They agreed that they
would exchange telemetric data on one ICBM or SLBM launch that had occurred between
February 5, 2011, when the treaty entered into force, and the end of 2011. They also agreed on
when they would begin and end the sharing of telemetric data during the flight test of an ICBM or
SLBM. They also agreed on the procedures they would use when demonstrating the recording
media and playback equipment used when providing telemetric information.59
The BCC met for a fourth time in September 2012. During this meeting, the two sides agreed on
the use of tamper detection equipment during on-site inspections. The BCC met again in February
2013. At this meeting, the two sides signed an agreement indicating that they would exchange
telemetry on the launch of ICBM or one SLBM during the time between January 1 and December
31, 2012.60 The BCC met again in January 2014, with the two sides, again, agreeing that they
would exchange telemetric information on the launch of one ICBM or SLBM from 2013. They
also agreed to use an additional measuring device during reentry vehicle inspections at SSBN
bases. In October 2016, the parties met in the 12th session of the BCC; the State Department did
not provide any public details about the substance of the meeting. The 13th session of the BCC
met from late March to mid-April 2017; the State Department, again, did not offer any details
about the substance of the meeting.
According to a State Department Fact Sheet released at the conclusion of the reduction period, on
February 5, 2018, the two sides conducted a total of “14 meetings of the Treaty’s Bilateral
Consultative Commission (twice each Treaty year) to discuss issues related to implementation,
with no interruption to the Parties’ work during global crises causing friction elsewhere in the
bilateral relationship.”61 Two sessions also occurred in 2018 and 2019. The United States and
Russia agreed, however, to delay the March 2020 meeting in response to the coronavirus

59 For the text of these three statements, see, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183540.htm, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183541.htm,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183539.htm.
60 United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Bilateral Consultative
Commission: Decision on the Number of Launches of ICBMs and SLBMs Conducted in 2012, on Which an Exchange
of Telemetric Information Will Be Carried Out in 2013, Geneva, Switzerland, February 19, 2013, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/204959.htm.
61 U.S. State Department, Key Facts About New START Treaty Implementation, fact sheet, Washington, DC, February
5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277889.htm.
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outbreak.62 The parties have resumed their meetings in the BCC, with the most recent session
taking place in Geneva, on October 14-21, 2021.63
Reductions
In a data exchange released in February 2011, with numbers drawn from the treaty’s initial data
exchange, the U.S. State Department noted that the United States had 1,800 warheads on 882
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.64 These deployed forces were
within a total of 1,124 deployed and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and deployed
in nondeployed heavy bombers. By September 2011, the United States had reduced these
numbers to 1,790 warheads on 882 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers.65 The total number of deployed and nondeployed launchers had declined to 1,043. The
reduction in 81 nondeployed launchers likely reflects the conversion or elimination of some of the
“phantom” launchers that remained in the U.S. force but no longer carried nuclear warheads. In
the most recent exchange, with data current as of April 1, 2014, the United States indicated that it
had 778 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 952
deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carry a total of
1,585 warheads.
In data released on January 1, 2015, from the exchange that occurred on September 1, 2014, the
United States had 794 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within
a total of 912 deployed and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces
carry a total of 1,642 warheads. The increase in deployed forces reported in this exchange likely
reflected the return to service of one SSBN, after it completed its overhaul process. The numbers
declined again, by the time of the October 2015 exchange, both because another SSBN has begun
its overhaul and because the U.S. Air Force has completed the “de-MIRVing” of the ICBM force.
Each Minuteman III missile now carries a single warhead.
In addition, in September 2015, the Air Force announced that it had begun to convert a portion of
the B-52H bomber force from nuclear to conventional-only capability, thus removing 30
operational bombers from accountability under New START.66 While the Air Force has not
provided any public statements about the changes made to the B-52 bombers, these changes are
likely consistent with the objective of rendering the bombers unable to carry or launch nuclear-
armed cruise missiles.
According to the State Department, as of September 1, 2016,67 the United States had a force of
1,367 warheads on 681 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within
a total of 848 deployed and nondeployed launchers. This included 416 deployed ICBM launchers,
with a total of 454 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers; 209 deployed SLBM launchers
within a total of 320 deployed and nondeployed launchers; 10 deployed B-2 bombers, within a
total of 20 deployed and nondeployed B-2 bombers; and 46 deployed B-52 bombers, within a

62 “Decision on halting inspections under New START made upon mutual agreement—diplomat,” Tass, March 29,
2020.
63 U.S. Department of State, On the Nineteenth Session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission Under the New
START Treaty, Media Note, Washington, DC, October 14, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on-the-nineteenth-session-of-
the-bilateral-consultative-commission-under-the-new-start-treaty/.
64 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm.
65 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/175945.htm.
66 U.S. Department of Defense, Air Force Global Strike Command, AFGSC Completes First New START Bomber
Conversion, September 17, 2015.
67 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/262624.htm.
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total of 54 deployed and nondeployed B-52 bombers. These data show that the United States has
continued to convert B-52 bombers from nuclear to conventional-only capability; to remove
ICBMs from operational launchers, on the path to 400 deployed ICBM launchers; and to reduce
the number of launchers from 24 to 20 on each ballistic missile submarine. The data released in
April 2017, from the March 1, 2017, data exchange, show that the United States counted 1,411
warheads on 673 deployed launchers, within a total of 820 deployed and nondeployed launchers.
The increase in warheads possibly reflects the return to service of ballistic missile submarines,
following the elimination of the four excess launchers.
The data exchange from September 2017, which shows the U.S. aggregate numbers of warheads
and launchers, indicates that United States had met the New START limits. At that time it had
1,393 warheads on 660 deployed launchers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed
launchers.
Some analysts questioned whether the U.S. reductions through September 2016, which placed the
United States below the New START limits of 1,550 warheads on 700 deployed launchers,
indicated that the Obama Administration had decided to reduce U.S. nuclear forces, unilaterally,
to levels below the New START limits.68 However, these reductions were temporary, and the
number of deployed launchers and warheads has now risen and should reach the levels permitted
by the treaty when implementation is complete in 2018. For example, while the United States was
reducing the number of launch tubes on deployed submarines, it removed them from deployment
and removed the missiles from the launchers. These launchers and warheads did not count in the
deployed force. Because each submarine now counts as 20 launchers, the September 2017 total of
660 deployed launchers can be read to indicate that two submarines, with 40 launchers, were still
in nondeployed status at the time.
The data exchanges from 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 show that the United States continues to
have fewer than the permitted number of deployed missiles and warheads, as it continues to
remove systems from deployment for short periods of time. In September 2018, it reported that it
had 1,398 warheads deployed on 659 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On
March 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,365 warheads deployed on 656 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed
launchers for missiles and bombers. On September 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,376 warheads
deployed on 668 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total
of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On March 1, 2020, it
reported that it had 1,373 warheads deployed on 655 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles
and bombers.
On September 1, 2020, the State Department reported that the United States had 1,457 warheads
deployed on 675 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total
of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.69 This increase of 20
deployed strategic launchers and 84 deployed strategic warheads over the March 2020 data likely
represents the move from maintenance to deployment of an additional ballistic missile submarine,

68 Bill Gertz, “Russia Adds Hundreds of Warheads Under Nuclear Treaty,” Washington Free Beacon, October 5, 2016.
In a speech in Berlin, in June 2013, President Obama announced that the Pentagon had concluded that the United States
could maintain a robust deterrent with one-third fewer warheads than the 1,550 permitted by New START. He did,
however, indicate that the United States would only reduce to that level in cooperation with Russia. See
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany.
69 https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/10-01-2020-October-NST-FACTSHEET.pdf.
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which would carry 20 SLBM launchers. On March 1, 2021, the State Department reported that
the United States had 1,357 warheads deployed on 651 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles
and bombers.70 In September 2021, the State Department reported that the United States had had
1,389 warheads deployed on 665 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers, within a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.71
The State Department fact sheets also include the summary of Russia’s force data. In February
2011, Russia reported that it had 1,537 warheads on 521 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers. Russia also reported a total of 865 deployed and nondeployed delivery
vehicles. At the time of this report, analysts expressed surprise that Russian forces were already
below the treaty limits in New START when the treaty entered into force. Some argued that this
indicated the United States did not have to sign the treaty to bring about reductions in Russian
forces, and that the treaty represented unilateral concessions by the United States. Others noted
that the number of deployed warheads possibly reflected the ongoing retirement of older Russian
missiles and could change in the future as Russia deployed new, multiple-warhead land-based
missiles. In September 2011, in the second treaty data exchange, Russia reported that it had 1,566
deployed warheads on 516 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.
Hence, although the number of deployed delivery vehicles declined, the number of warheads
increased by a small amount, and then exceeded the treaty limit of 1,550 warheads. Because the
data provide no details of the force composition, this increase could have been due either to the
deployment of the new MIRVed RS-24 missiles, which carry more warheads than the single-
warhead SS-25 missile they replace, or to variations in the numbers of warheads carried on
deployed SLBMs. The number of deployed and nondeployed delivery vehicles had increased
slightly, to 871. This could reflect the retirement of some of Russia’s older missiles, which would
move their delivery vehicles from the deployed to nondeployed column in the data.
In the data exchange from April 1, 2014, Russia reported that it had 498 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 906 deployed and nondeployed
launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carry a total of 1,512 warheads. In the data
exchanged in September 2014, and released in January 2015, Russia reported a force of 528
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 911 deployed
and nondeployed launchers. It also indicated that these deployed forces carried a total of 1,643
warheads. Within these totals, Russia continued to deploy some new ICBMs and SLBMs while
retiring older systems. However, as all categories had increased since the last data exchange, new
deployments seemed to be outpacing retirements. This continued over the past year, as, in March
2016—when Russia reported that it had 1,735 warheads on 521 deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 856 deployed and nondeployed launchers.
The pattern shifted a little in September 2016—when Russia reported that it had 1,796 warheads
on 508 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 847
deployed and nondeployed launchers—as the number of warheads continues to rise while the
number of deployed and nondeployed launchers has declined.
The data exchanged in March 2017 show that Russia had begun to reduce the number of deployed
warheads while increasing the number of deployed launchers—at that point it counted 1,765

70 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 1, 2021. https://www.state.gov/new-start-
treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-2/.
71 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, September 28, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-
start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms/.
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warheads on 523 deployed launchers, within a total of 816 deployed and nondeployed launchers.
The September 2017 data reinforce this trend. Russia reported a force 1,561 warheads, only 11
over the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads, on 503 deployed launchers. Hence, Russia appeared to
be reducing older systems with larger numbers of warheads, while still deploying new missiles
with fewer warheads, as it headed toward the New START limits by February 2018. On February
5, 2018, Russia reported that it had met the New START limits, with 1,444 warheads on 527
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, within a total of 779 deployed and nondeployed
launchers.72
The data exchanges from 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 show that the Russia continues to comply
with the New START limits. In September 2018, it reported that it had 1,420 warheads deployed
on 517 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 775
deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers. On March 1, 2019, it reported
that it had 1,461 warheads deployed on 524 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers, within a total of 760 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and
bombers. On September 1, 2019, it reported that it had 1,426 warheads deployed on 513 deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 757 deployed and
nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.
On March 1, 2020, Russia reported that it had 1,326 warheads deployed on 485 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 754 deployed and nondeployed
launchers for missiles and bombers. Although the State Department does not provide details on
the underlying force structure, one analyst attributed the decline in the number of deployed
launchers and deployed warheads to the possible deactivation of a regiment of SS-18 ICBMs and
the possible withdrawal of some Topol ICBMs.73 On September 1, 2020, Russia reported that it
had 1,447 warheads deployed on 510 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers, within a total of 764 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.
According to one analyst, increase of 25 deployed launchers and 121 deployed strategic warheads
likely “reflects fluctuations caused by launcher maintenance and upgrade work to new systems.”74
On March 1, 2021, Russia reported that it had 1,456 warheads deployed on 517 deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, within a total of 767 deployed and nondeployed
launchers for missiles and bombers.75 On September 1, 2021, Russia reported that it had 1,458
warheads deployed on 527 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers,
within a total of 742 deployed and nondeployed launchers for missiles and bombers.76
Some analysts questioned whether the increase in Russian warheads reported in March 2016 and
September 2016 indicated that Russia would eventually withdraw from New START without
reducing to its limit of 1,550 deployed warheads.77 Others, however, noted that Russia did not

72 “Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, February
5, 2018. http://tass.com/politics/988458.
73 Pavel Podvig, “New START Data as of March 1, 2020,” Russian Forces, April 2, 2020, http://russianforces.org/blog/
2020/04/new_start_data_as_of_1_march_2_1.shtml
74 Hans M. Kristensen, “At 11th Hour, New START Data Reaffirms Importance of Extending Treaty,” Federation of
American Scientists, October 1, 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/10/new-start-2020_aggregate-data/.
75 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, July 1, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-start-
treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms-2/.
76 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty Aggregate
Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, fact sheet, Washington, DC, September 28, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-
start-treaty-aggregate-numbers-of-strategic-offensive-arms/.
77 Bill Gertz, “Russia Deployed over 150 New Warheads in Past Year,” Washington Free Beacon, April 6, 2016.
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need to meet the limits until February 2018, so the warhead levels in 2016 should not be of
concern. They also noted that Russia continues to deploy new systems, like a third new
submarine and new multiple-warhead land-based missiles, at a faster pace than it has retired older
systems.78 Hence, as Russia retired older multiple-warhead missiles before the deadline, it
succeeded in reducing its forces below the limit of 1,550 warheads.
Some have also suggested that Russia’s continuing deployment of new missiles systems, and its
plans for modernization through the next 5-10 years, indicate that Russia may be prepared to
exceed the limits under New START, either before or shortly after the treaty’s 2021 expiration.79
They have suggested that the United States respond to Russia’s plans with its own plans to
modernize and expand its nuclear forces. Others, however, while agreeing with assessments of
Russia’s ability to expand its nuclear forces, argue that the United States should respond by
pressing Russia to extend New START through 2026 so that limits on Russian forces remain in
place.
Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance
The United States has not raised any questions, in public, about Russia’s compliance with the
New START Treaty. In the April 2021 version of the Annual Report on Implementation of the
New START Treaty, the State Department reported that “based on the information available as of
December 31, 2020, the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with
the terms of the New START Treaty.” The report indicated that the United States “has raised
implementation-related questions with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in
the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).”80
Russia has also raised questions about U.S. implementation during BCC sessions. In its statement
released on February 5, 2018, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that it had
concerns with the conversion procedures the United States had used to eliminate some missile
launchers and B-52 bombers from its force structure. It noted that Russia could not verify that the
conversions had been done in a way that permanently “rules out the use of Trident II submarine-
launched ballistic submarines and nuclear weapons of heavy bombers.”81 The Protocol to New
START states the parties must demonstrate their elimination procedures if there is a question
about whether the method meets the treaty terms, but it does not allow for the other party to
object and require changes in the procedures. As a result, although the United States has insisted
that its procedures are sufficient, Russia continues to question this conclusion. Russian officials
had indicated that the United States should address Russia’s concerns with these procedures
before the two parties agree to extend New START before it expired in 2021, but they eventually
agreed to extend the treaty without this resoltuion.

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-deployed-150-new-warheads-past-year/. See, also, Bill Gertz, “Russia
Adds Hundreds of Warheads Under Nuclear Treaty, Washington Free Beacon, October 5, 2016.
78 Greg Thielmann, “Russia Relies on ‘Satan’ to Keep New START Data Exchange Numbers Up,” Arms Control
Today, April 5, 2016, http://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-04-06/Russia-Relies-on-Satan-to-
Keep-New-START-Data-Exchange-Numbers-Up.
79 Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Posture Review, New START, and the Russian Nuclear Buildup,” Real Clear
Defense, June 5, 2017.
80 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Implementation of the New Start Treaty, Washington, DC, April 15,
2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Annual-New-START-Report.pdf.
81 “Russia Confirms Commitment to New START Treaty—Foreign Ministry,” TASS Russian News Agency, February
5, 2018, http://tass.com/politics/988458.
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In a joint briefing provided by the United States and Russia in October 2011, the parties that, in
the first six months of treaty implementation, they had exchanged almost 1,500 notifications and
had conducted demonstrations of telemetric information playback equipment. By the end of the
first year of implementation, on February 5, 2012, the parties had exchanged over 1,800
notifications. They had also conducted three required exhibitions, with Russia exhibiting the RS-
24 missile and its launcher, and the United States exhibiting the B-1 and B-2 bombers. During the
year, both parties had also conducted all 18 of the permitted inspections at facilities in the other
nation. These inspections occurred at ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases; storage facilities;
conversion and elimination facilities; and test ranges.82 In late November 2012, the State
Department reported that the United States and Russia had each, as of November 26, conducted
15 of the 18 permitted inspections under the treaty. Both nations also completed their full
complement of 18 inspections before the end of the second year of implementation, in February
2013.
According to the State Department, the United States and Russia both completed all 18 of their
permitted Type 1 and Type 2 inspections during the first nine years of treaty implementation.
They continued to conduct these inspections in spite of growing tensions after Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine in early 2014. They have each conducted
two inspections in the current treaty year, which began on February 5, but have suspended
inspections through May 1, in response to the coronavirus outbreak. According to the State
Department, the two sides also exchanged 19,852 notifications by late April 1, 2020. These
notifications report on the location, movement, and disposition of strategic offensive arms. They
have also completed at least 15 exhibitions to demonstrate distinguishing features and technical
characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms or demonstrate the results of a conversion
of a strategic offensive arm subject to New START through early 2018.83 This includes the
November 2018 exhibition of Russia’s new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. These monitoring
activities will continue through 2021, or 2026 if New START is extended.
Issues for Congress
New START and Strategic Stability
When the Obama Administration released the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, it indicated that the
United States would retain a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers under the New START
Treaty. The NPR indicates that this force structure supports strategic stability because it allows
the United States to maintain an “assured second-strike capability” with warheads on survivable
ballistic missile submarines and allows the United States to retain “sufficient force structure in
each leg to ... hedge effectively ... if necessary due to unexpected technological problems or
operational vulnerabilities.”84 The Trump Administration, in the 2018 NPR, also reaffirmed the
support for the nuclear triad. Although it offered a more detailed rationale for the maintenance of

82 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, New START Treaty
Implementation Update, Washington, DC, May 17, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/183335.htm.
83 U.S. Department of State, Key Facts About New START Treaty Implementation, fact sheet, Washington, DC,
February 5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277889.htm.
84 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, April 6, 2010, p. 20,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.
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a triad, the underlying themes of strengthening deterrence and supporting stability were part of
the discussion.
Obama Administration officials also indicated that New START promoted strategic stability by
“discounting” the weapons on heavy bombers. As President Reagan argued during his
commencement address at Eureka College in 1982, ballistic missiles are the “most destabilizing
nuclear systems.”85 As a result, in his START proposals, President Reagan sought deep reductions
in ballistic missile warheads, but lesser reductions in the weapons on heavy bombers. The
counting rules in New START reflect this logic. Because bomber weapons would take hours or
days to reach their targets, and because they could be recalled after they were launched, they pose
less of a threat to strategic stability than do ballistic missiles. As a result, some argue that, even if
the United States and Russia retain hundreds of bomber weapons that do not count against the
treaty limits, the reductions required in ballistic missile warheads will enhance strategic stability.
Some have also noted that New START may strengthen strategic stability from the Russian
perspective by removing the specific limits and restrictions on mobile ICBMs. Russia does not
deploy many submarines at sea, and, therefore, lacks an assured second-strike capability on that
leg of its triad. Instead, it has sought to improve the survivability of its forces by deploying
ICBMs on mobile launchers. Under START, the United States sought to restrict these systems
because it feared it would not be able to count them in peacetime and target them in wartime. In
the current environment, concerns about wartime targeting played less of a role in the
negotiations. Consequently, instead of limiting their numbers and restricting their operations,
New START seeks to provide transparency and openness, so the United States can be confident in
its ability to count these weapons in peacetime even though it might not be able to attack them
during a conflict.
Critics of the New START Treaty have questioned whether it serves U.S. security interests even if
it did promote strategic stability. Some argued, during the negotiations, that the United States did
not need to negotiate a new treaty to maintain its own triad, as this was possible with or without
arms control. They also argued that the United States did not need to reduce its forces to bring
about reductions in Russia’s forces, as Russia would reduce its forces over the next decade as it
retired aging systems, even in the absence of a new arms control agreement.86 Moreover, they
questioned whether arms control should even be a part of the U.S.-Russian relationship, as arms
control is a symbol of a Cold War, antagonistic relationship between the two nations. They
believe that the United States and Russia should not measure their relationship with each other
using Cold War-era measures like strategic stability and survivable warheads.
This last argument has faded as the U.S.-Russian relationship has changed over the past decade.
Few now argue that arms control is irrelevant in the absence of an antagonistic relationship.
Instead, they dispute the value of arms control precisely because the major-power rivalry has
returned and the United States and Russia now have a more antagonistic relationship. They note
that this change has occurred in spite of the presence of New START, and, therefore, is evidence
of the failure of arms control to either support or strengthen strategic stability. Moreover, they
note that New START did not include any limits on Russian shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear
weapons, and, therefore, failed to capture the full scope of threats that Russia presents to the
United States and its allies.

85 Ronald Reagan, Commencement Address at Eureka College, May 9, 1982, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=42501.
86 Keith B. Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010, p. A21.
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Monitoring and Verification in New START
Monitoring and verification were among the central concerns addressed in the Senate committees
during their review of the New START Treaty. The cooperative monitoring measures in the treaty
received special scrutiny, as many observers of the arms control process specifically measured the
value of the monitoring and verification regime in the original START Treaty by its widespread
use of notifications, on-site inspections, and other cooperative measures.
Some critics of New START questioned whether the monitoring provisions in the new treaty were
sufficient to provide the United States with enough information to either confirm Russian
compliance with the treaty or to detect efforts to violate its terms. They pointed to differences
between the verification regime in the original START Treaty and those in New START to argue
that the new verification regime is less robust than the old regime. They noted that the United
States would no longer maintain a monitoring presence outside the Votkinsk facility where Russia
assembles its mobile ICBMs, which, they argued, could weaken the U.S. ability to count these
missiles as they entered Russia’s forces. They also noted that the United States and Russia would
no longer exchange telemetry data on all their ballistic missile flight tests, which, over time, could
lessen the U.S. ability to understand and evaluate the capabilities of Russian ballistic missiles.
Marshall Billingslea, who served in the Trump Administration as the State Department’s Special
Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, raised similar concerns, arguing that the monitoring
provisions in New START were insufficient because they were different from those in the original
START Treaty. He stated that, during the negotiations in late 2020, the United States would insist
that Russia accept more robust provisions governing on-site inspections and telemetry
exchanges.87
The Obama Administration and others who supported the new treaty argued that the verification
regime in New START would be more than sufficient to provide the United States with
confidence in Russia’s compliance with the treaty. They acknowledged that the regime is
different from the regime in the original START Treaty, but noted that this was, in part, due to
improvements in the relationship between Russia and the United States and differences between
the limits and restrictions in the two treaties. They argued that the monitoring regime in New
START was streamlined, both to reduce its costs and to ease the disruptions caused by monitoring
for U.S. and Russian military forces. They also noted that it relied on as much or more
cooperation between the two parties, which would continue to build confidence and reduce
suspicions.
Moreover, many in the Obama Administration noted that the United States had not had any
opportunity to monitor Russian forces on Russian territory since the original treaty expired in
December 2009. They argued that continuing delays in Senate consideration of New START
could further reduce U.S. and Russian confidence in their knowledge of each other’s forces,
leading to worst-case assessments and possible instabilities. They further reminded those who
contend that the verification regime in New START is less robust than the regime in old START
that the absence of a treaty would have meant the absence of any monitoring and verification
regime. The United States did not have the option of returning the regime of the original START
Treaty; nor should it have wanted to do so since the new treaty has different limits and restrictions
than the old treaty. Many U.S. officials, including Admiral Mullen and General Chilton, included

87 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms
Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-
and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/.
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their concerns about the absence of monitoring in their appeals for the prompt ratification of the
New START Treaty.
Questions about the monitoring and verification regime in New START go beyond concerns
about the specific monitoring mechanisms and the U.S. ability to confirm Russian compliance
with individual limits in the treaty. Most experts agree that neither party can be absolutely certain
that the other is in perfect compliance with all the limits and restrictions in the treaty. This is due,
in some cases, to ambiguities in the treaty language and varying interpretations of the treaty
requirements. It is also due to the fact that both sides may have gaps in their knowledge about the
details of the other side’s forces and activities. These uncertainties do not, by themselves, indicate
that the parties should not ratify and implement the treaty. The broader question often asked by
experts on treaty monitoring and verification is whether the parties, in general, and the United
States, in particular, will have high confidence in Russia’s compliance with the treaty, and, in
those cases when compliance concerns may come up, whether the United States will be able to
detect evidence of potential violations that might undermine U.S. security with enough warning
to respond and adjust U.S. forces to offset those security concerns.
The Obama Administration indicated, in documents submitted to the Senate in July 2010, that the
New START Treaty met this standard. The Administration concluded that the benefits to Russia
of cheating would be minimal, as the United States, by maintaining a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs,
and bombers, would be able to respond to any attempt to shift the strategic balance by adding
significant numbers of warheads to its own forces. Moreover, if Russia were to cheat to any
significant degree, it would undermine its relationship with the United States and interfere with
any possible future arms control agreements. Therefore, in a letter sent to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in September 2010, Secretary of Defense Gates concluded that Russia
would not be able to achieve “militarily significant cheating” under the New START Treaty.88
A review of the verification regime in New START, and summary of some of the differences
between the verification regime in the original START Treaty and the regime in New START can
be found in CRS Report R41201, Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control.
New START and Ballistic Missile Defenses
As was noted above, during the debate over New START the Obama Administration testified
repeatedly that the New START Treaty imposes no limits on current or planned ballistic missile
defense programs in the United States. Some critics have claimed, however, that the United States
might impose those limits itself, to ensure that Russia does not withdraw from New START, as it
said it might do in the unilateral statement it released when it signed the treaty.
Officials from the Obama Administration argued that this concern was unfounded. They noted
that the Soviet Union issued a similar statement when it signed the original START Treaty,
threatening to withdraw if the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM
Treaty). Yet, when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia not only did
not withdraw from START, it continued to participate in negotiations on the 2002 Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty. Moreover, in the 1990s, when the United States might have altered
its missile defense plans in response to the Soviet letter, the United States actually expanded its
missile defense activities and increased spending on missile defense programs. As a result, there
is little reason, based on historical data, to expect the United States to restrain its missile defense
programs. Moreover, officials from the Obama Administration have highlighted that the Ballistic

88 Robert Burns, “Gates: Any Russian Arms Cheating Would Backfire,” Associated Press, September 9, 2010.
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Missile Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the 2011 budget all offer strong
support for continuing U.S. missile defense programs.89
Some critics have also claimed that Russia might seek, and the United States might agree to, new
limits on U.S. missile defense capabilities in the Bilateral Consultative Commission established
by the treaty. According to the Protocol to New START, this commission is designed “to promote
the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.” The Protocol indicates that the United States
and Russia will meet in the commission to “resolve questions relating to compliance with the
obligations assumed by the Parties,” agree on “additional measures as may be necessary to
improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty,” and “discuss other issues raised by either
Party.” Some have claimed that because this agenda is somewhat open-ended, Russia may raise
its concerns about U.S. missile defenses in the commission and propose limits on those systems.
The Obama Administration insisted that the parties could not, and would not use the BCC to
negotiate new limits on ballistic missile defenses or any other elements of the U.S. strategic
arsenal. In a fact sheet that accompanies the treaty, the State Department has indicated that the
parties would use the BCC “to reach agreement on changes in the Protocol to the Treaty,
including its Annexes, that do not affect substantive rights or obligations. The BCC may in no
way make changes that would affect the substantive rights and obligations contained in the New
START Treaty.”90 The parties may use the BCC to “agree upon such additional measures as may
be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty” but these measures would
address concerns that came up while implementing the existing limits and restrictions in the
treaty. They would not be able to impose new limits or restrictions without amending the treaty,
and any amendment to the treaty would be subject to the same ratification process as the treaty
itself. The Senate would have to offer its advice and consent.
Although the Obama Administration pursued discussions with Russia on missile defense issues
for several years, it never accepted any limitations on U.S. missile defense programs and insisted,
repeatedly, that U.S. missile defense programs were not designed or capable of undermining
Russia’s ballistic missile defenses. Russia, however, continued to question U.S. intentions and
press for limits on ballistic missile defenses. It has insisted that any negotiations on further
reductions in nuclear weapons include discussions about limits on ballistic missile defenses.
Congress remains concerned about the possibility that the United States might accept limits on
missile defenses in exchange for limits on offensive nuclear forces. Senator Barrasso raised this
issue in a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18, 2018. He
asked officials from the State Department and Defense Department to assure him that “in any
arms control discussions with Russia for which you're responsible that the United States will not
agree to limiting our own missile defense programs.” Both Under Secretary of State Andrea
Thompson and Under Secretary of Defense David Trachtenberg provided those assurances.91
Modernization
The New START Treaty does not limit or restrict the ability of the United States or Russia to
modernize strategic offensive nuclear forces. It specifically states, in Article V, paragraph 1, that,
“Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive

89 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Ballistic Missile Defense and the
New START Treaty, fact sheet, Washington, DC, April 21, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/140624.htm.
90 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/145830.htm.
91 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts, hearing, 115th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.
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arms may be carried out.” Both nations are currently modernizing their forces and replacing aging
missiles, submarines, and bombers.
Moreover, while some Members of the Senate insisted that the Obama Administration commit to
modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal before voting in support of the treaty, many have also
indicated that their continuing support for the modernization programs is linked to ongoing
implementation of New START. Several Senators emphasized this linkage during a hearing in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 2018. Senator Menendez noted that
“bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms-control process that
controls and seeks to reduce Russian nuclear forces.” Senator Corker pointed out that, when the
Senate gave its consent to the ratification of New START, “there was no doubt” about the “tie
between the two.” He stated that “the essence of this is that the modernization piece, and the
reduction in warheads piece go hand in hand.”92
U.S. Modernization
The United States is currently recapitalizing all three legs of its nuclear triad, with replacements
planned for its bombers, air-delivered cruise missiles, land-based ballistic missiles, and ballistic
missile submarines over the next 20 years.93 It is also pursuing life extension programs for many
of the warheads in the U.S. stockpile, to ensure that the weapons remain safe, secure, and
effective. The Obama Administration outlined much of this modernization program in a report,
known as the 1251 Report, mandated by Congress in the FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
111-84, §1251). This provision required the Administration to submit a report to Congress when it
submitted the New START Treaty to the Senate that described how it planned to “enhance the
safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; modernize
the nuclear weapons complex; and maintain the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons.” In this
1251 report, the Obama Administration stated that the United States planned to spend $180
billion over the next 10 years to meet these objectives, with $80 billion allocated to the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex and nuclear warheads and $100 billion allocated to the Navy and Air
Force for the maintenance and modernization of their delivery systems. The program has
expanded over the years, and, although cost estimates vary, the Congressional Budget Office has
estimated that the United States is likely to spend around $350 billion over 10 years and $1.2
trillion over 30 years to modernize its nuclear arsenal. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the
Trump Administration reaffirmed its support for the continuing modernization of the U.S. nuclear
triad, advocating for the completion of all the programs initiated under the Obama
Administration, while adding two new systems to the plan.94
During the debate over New START’s ratification, some Members of Congress and analysts
outside government questioned whether the Obama Administration was sufficiently committed to
modernizing and maintaining its strategic nuclear forces, nuclear weapons complex, and nuclear
warheads. Some also questioned whether the funding in the program would be sufficient to
maintain and sustain the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some argued that the totals did not add enough
above the previously planned program to go far in expanding the U.S. capability to maintain and
modernize its forces. Others questioned whether the Administration would sustain its

92 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts, hearing, 115th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.
93 For details see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by
Amy F. Woolf.
94 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT.PDF.
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commitment for more than a year or two, particularly in an era of tight defense budgets. These
concerns grew as the fiscal constraints imposed through the Budget Control Act in 2011 reduced
the resources available for modernization in the nuclear enterprise and have led to delays in some
programs.
Others, however, argued that the Obama Administration’s budget for the nuclear weapons
complex in FY2011 and the added funding outlined in the 1251 report demonstrated a strong
commitment to recapitalizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, maintaining nuclear warheads,
and maintaining and modernizing the delivery vehicles. The Administration added nearly 10%, or
over $700 million, to the DOE budget for nuclear weapons in FY2011. Ambassador Linton
Brooks, who had served as the Director of the National Nuclear Security Administration during
the Bush Administration, indicated that he would have “killed” for a budget of that magnitude
when he was managing the nuclear weapons complex for DOE.95 While the 2011 Budget Control
Act required some delays in planned spending on nuclear weapons modernization, the Obama and
Trump Administrations’ budget proposals continued to show increases above the levels expected
before the ratification of New START.
Russian Modernization
Russia is also deploying new missiles, submarines, and bombers to replace aging systems within
the limits of New START. At the same time, it may be developing new types of strategic
offensive arms that might not be captured by the limits in the treaty. In his annual address on
March 1, 2018, Russian President Putin announced that Russia was developing several new
nuclear delivery vehicles that could evade or penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses.96 One of
the new weapons mentioned in the speech, the large, multiple-warhead ICBM known as the
Sarmat, would by most estimates clearly count under the New START Treaty.
However, other systems—including a long-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, a long-range
nuclear-armed underwater drone, and an air-delivered hypersonic cruise missile—may not be
covered by the treaty’s definitions of existing types of strategic offensive systems. As was noted
above, the treaty addresses the possible emergence of new types of strategic offensive arms in
paragraph 2 of Article V, where it states that the parties should raise their concerns about such
weapons in the BCC. It does not, however, indicate how the parties will resolve such questions or
whether they must agree before a weapon is included or excluded from the treaty limits.
According to Under Secretary of State Thompson, in September 2018, the United States had not
yet questioned Russia about these systems. However, these weapons would only raise concerns
under New START if they were deployed before the treaty expired. Many analysts doubt that this
will happen since most of the weapons mentioned in the speech seem to be in the early stages of
development.97

95 https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2010-12/nuclear-weapons-budget-more-enough-maintain-arsenal-
modernize-complex.
96 Anton Troianovski, “Putin Claims Russia Is Developing Nuclear Arms Capable of Avoiding Missile Defenses,”
Washington Post, March 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-claims-russia-has-nuclear-
arsenal-capable-of-avoiding-missile-defenses/2018/03/01/d2dcf522-1d3b-11e8-b2d9-08e748f892c0_story.html.
97 James Cameron, “Putin Just Bragged About Russia’s Nuclear Weapons. Here’s the Real Story.” Washington Post,
March 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/03/05/putin-claims-russia-has-
invincible-nuclear-weapons-heres-the-story-behind-this/.
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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed, in April 2009, when they initiated the negotiations on
the New START Treaty, that this agreement would address only strategic nuclear forces, the long-
range weapons that each side could use to reach the territory of the other side. It would not seek
to limit or restrict the shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons in either side’s arsenal. This
agreement derived not only from the fact that the existing START Treaty, and nearly all past
bilateral arms control treaties, had addressed only strategic nuclear weapons, but also from the
fact that many of the issues that would need to be addressed in a treaty that limited nonstrategic
nuclear weapons would likely prove too complex to resolve in the near term, when both sides
sought to replace the existing START Treaty.
There was widespread agreement in Congress, in the Obama Administration, and within the arms
control community, that the United States and Russia should seek to negotiate a treaty that
increases transparency and possibly imposes limits on nonstrategic strategic nuclear weapons.
However, there is also widespread agreement that negotiating such a treaty would prove
extremely difficult, as Russia maintains a far larger stock of these weapons than the United States,
in part to compensate for perceived weaknesses in its conventional forces, and because U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons are a part of the U.S. commitment to NATO, and the United States
believes that any changes in their deployment should be addressed by the alliance before they are
addressed in an arms control negotiation.
Some analysts and Senators questioned whether the United States should agree to further
reductions in its strategic nuclear weapons in the absence of any limits on Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons. They noted that Russia retains more than 2,000 operational nonstrategic nuclear
weapons while the United States has around 200 in Europe, and that the value of these weapons
could grow as the numbers of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons decline. They also
noted that these weapons could seem particularly threatening to some of the new NATO states
that are located near the periphery of Russia. Others however, argued that Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons do not pose a threat to the United States or NATO, as Russia has indicated that
these weapons would only be used in response to an attack on Russian territory. So, these analysts
noted, as long as NATO does not initiate such an attack, NATO members would not be threatened
by these weapons. Moreover, as Senator Lugar noted in his response to former Massachusetts
Governor Mitt Romney’s critique of New START, most of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons
do not pose a missile threat to Europe. Senator Lugar stated that “most of Russia’s tactical
nuclear weapons either have very short ranges, are used for homeland air defense, are devoted to
the Chinese border, or are in storage.”98
Many of the experts who testified in support of the New START Treaty agreed that the United
States and Russia should pursue negotiations on a treaty on nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
However, most agreed that Russia would be unwilling to participate in such discussions, and the
United States and Russia would be unlikely to find common ground on such an agreement, unless
both sides ratified and implemented the New START Treaty first. For example, in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 29, 2010, former Secretaries of Defense
James Schlesinger and William Perry both indicated that nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be

98 Press Release of Senator Richard Lugar. “Lugar: Romney Misinformed on New START Treaty.” July 8, 2010,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ranking/release/lugar-romney-misinformed-on-new-start-treaty.
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an issue for the next treaty, and that the United States should ratify New START as a step on the
path to get to reduction in nonstrategic nuclear weapons.99
The Trump Administration, in the Nuclear Posture Review released on February 2, 2018, also
expressed concerns about Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. While it did not
advocate for the negotiation of a treaty specifically limiting these weapons, it did indicate that
Russia would have to address these concerns before the United States would be willing to
negotiate further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Thus, when it began discussions with
Russia on New START extension in 2020, it insisted that Russia agree to link an extension to an
agreement to freeze the number of warheads in its nuclear stockpile.
New START and the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Agenda
The Obama Administration argued that U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control, in general, and
the New START Treaty, specifically, could help move forward the U.S. and international nuclear
nonproliferation agenda. No one has argued that the treaty will convince nations who are seeking
their own nuclear weapon that they should follow the U.S. and Russian lead and reduce those
weapons or roll back those programs. However, some have argued that U.S.-Russian cooperation
on arms control could strengthen the U.S.-Russian cooperation on a broader array of issues and
that, “cooperation is a prerequisite for moving forward with tough, internationally binding
sanctions on Iran.”100
Moreover, some have noted that U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control would also
demonstrate that these nations are living up to their obligations under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).101 Most nations that are parties to the NPT believe that reductions
in the number of deployed nuclear weapons are a clear indicator of U.S. and Russian compliance
with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.102 During the preparatory committee meetings
(PrepComs) leading up to the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, many of the participants
called on the United States and Russia to complete negotiations on a New START Treaty. While
the completion of this treaty may not assure the United States of widespread agreement on U.S.
goals and priorities at the NPT review conference, many argue that the absence of an agreement
would have certainly complicated U.S. efforts and reduced the chances for a successful
conference.
In contrast, some have argued that the New START Treaty will do little to advance U.S.
nonproliferation goals. They noted that the parties at the NPT review conference may express
their approval of the New START, but their positions on substantive issues would reflect their
own national security interests and goals. Moreover, some critics argue that New START might
undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals by calling into question U.S. security commitments and
the continuing salience of U.S. nuclear weapons.
The State Department, in its press releasing announcing that the United States had met its
obligation to reduce to the New START limits, noted that “the United States continues to

99 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on
U.S.-Russia Arms Control Cooperation, Hearing, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 29, 2010.
100 Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, The Case for New START Ratification, Atlantic Council Panel Discussion,
April 21, 2010, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/us/140633.htm.
101 Ibid.
102 Article VI states that the parties to the treaty will “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.” https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm.
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demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its arms control obligations, including under the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” through its adherence to the New START limits.103
U.S.-Russian Arms Control After New START
Prospects for Further Reductions
In 2010, when it signed the New START Treaty, the Obama Administration indicated that it
hoped this would be the first step in a renewed arms control process with Russia. In his statement
on April 8, 2010, President Obama indicated that “this treaty will set the stage for further cuts.
And going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with Russia on reducing both our strategic and
tactical weapons, including nondeployed weapons.”104 In his State of the Union Address on
February 12, 2013, the President stated that, as a part of the “effort to prevent the spread of the
world’s most dangerous weapons,” the United States would “engage Russia to seek further
reductions in our nuclear arsenals.”105 Then, on June 19, 2013, in a speech in Berlin, President
Obama stated that, after a comprehensive review, he had “determined that we can ensure the
security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while
reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third.” He stated that he intended
“to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures.”106
Many analysts outside government supported the idea of further reductions beyond New START.
They had hoped New START would cut more deeply into U.S. and Russian forces, reducing them
to perhaps 1,000 warheads on each side. Others focused their concern on the absence of limits on
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear warheads. They expected a second treaty
to address some of these concerns. Some suggested that the two sides pursue a single,
comprehensive treaty that would limit strategic, nonstrategic, and nondeployed warheads. This
was similar to the approach that the Obama Administration appeared willing to pursue in 2013.
Others suggested that the United States and Russia accelerate their reductions under New START,
amend the treaty to reduce the numbers of permitted weapons, or agree informally to reduce their
forces below New START levels. They argued that these steps, if the nations took them together,
could enhance stability and reduce nuclear dangers, without waiting for the completion a new,
lengthy treaty negotiation process.107 Some also suggested that the United States and Russia could
increase transparency on their nonstrategic nuclear weapons, even if they were not yet ready to
agree to limits or reductions in these systems.
Some have also suggested that the United States and Russia revisit proposals from prior treaties—
such a ban or limits on multiple-warhead (MIRVed) missiles—as a way to not only deepen the

103 Heather Nauert, New START Treaty Central Limits Take Effect, U.S. Department of State, Press Statement,
Washington, DC, February 5, 2018, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/02/277888.htm.
104 “Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at New START Signing Ceremony and Press
Conference,” April 8, 2010, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-new-start-treaty-signing-cere.
105 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address,”
February 12, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.
106 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate—Berlin,
Germany,” June 19, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-
brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany.
107 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, International Security Advisory Board, Options for Implementing
Additional Nuclear Force Reductions, Washington, DC, November 27, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/201403.pdf.
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reductions in deployed warheads but also to bolster stability in the strategic balance.108 The
United States and Russia agreed to ban land-based MIRVed missiles in the 1993 START II Treaty,
as a way to reduce the vulnerability of land-based weapons and to ease the pressure to launch
these weapons early in a crisis. They never implemented this ban, as the START II Treaty never
entered into force, but concerns about crisis stability remain as Russia’s modernization program
includes the development of a new large, MIRVed land-based missile. On the other hand, Russia
considers MIRVed land-based missiles to be a part of its response to U.S. ballistic missile
defenses, and is unlikely to accept such a proposal.
Others, however, disputed the notion that the United States and Russia should follow New
START with further reductions in nuclear weapons. While some were willing to support the
modest reductions of New START, they would not have supported a treaty that imposed deeper
reductions. They also objected to the broader arms control agenda that President Obama had
outlined in his speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, including his call for the ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Hence, some
who concluded that the New START Treaty would not harm U.S. security by itself objected to its
ratification because they believed its defeat would close the door on the rest of the President’s
arms control agenda.
Russia has also questioned whether New START was the first step towards deeper reductions.
Shortly after the treaty entered into force, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that
Russia would not want to pursue further negotiations until New START had been implemented.
Russian officials have stated, repeatedly, that a treaty mandating further reductions would not
only have to include limits on U.S. ballistic missile defenses and nonnuclear strategic strike
systems, but would also have to limit the forces of the other major nuclear powers.
Most experts agree that a new treaty that addressed each of these issues raised by both parties
would likely be extremely difficult to complete. Russia has been unwilling to negotiate reductions
in its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and neither side may be willing to adopt the amount of
transparency necessary to negotiate verifiable limits on nondeployed warheads in storage. The
United States has firmly rejected Russia’s proposals for limits on ballistic missile defense and has
been unwilling to include conventional-armed cruise missiles or other long-range missiles in
nuclear arms control negotiations. Moreover, Britain, France, and China—the other declared
nuclear weapons states under the NPT—have not shown any willingness to participate in the
U.S.-Russian arms control process.
Prospects for the negotiation of a follow-on treaty dimmed further in 2014, following Russia’s
annexation of Crimea and incursion into Ukraine. In addition, in July 2014, the Obama
Administration—in its Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments—stated that the United States
“has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987]
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or
produce launchers of such missiles.”109 While Russia appeared to be complying with New
START, most agreed that further negotiations would be unwise; some also suggested that the
United States suspend its implementation of New START until Russia returned to compliance

108 Dakota S. Rudesill, “MIRVs Matter: Banning Hydra-Headed Missiles in a New START II Treaty,” Stanford
Journal of International Law, vol. 54, no. 1 (Winter 2018), pp. 83-115.
109 U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments, Washington, DC, July 2014, p. 8, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/
230047.htm.
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with the INF Treaty. Others, however, have argued that the United States should continue to
implement New START, as the limits on the size of Russia’s strategic forces and the transparency
provided by its verification regime continue to serve U.S. national security interests.
Extending New START
As was noted above, President Trump and President Putin reportedly discussed New START
during their summit in Helsinki in July 2018, with President Putin presenting President Trump
with a document suggesting that they extend the treaty after resolving “existing problems related
to the Treaty implementation,” but the two did not reach an agreement on the issue.110 In the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump Administration noted that the United States had met the
treaty’s central limits, and that it would “continue to implement the New START Treaty and
verify Russian compliance.” It did not, however, indicate whether it might seek an extension of
the treaty and made it clear that it was unlikely to negotiate a new treaty before New START’s
expiration in 2021. It noted that the United States is committed to “arms control efforts that
advance U.S., allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners
that comply responsibly with their obligations.” But it also noted that Russian actions, including
its noncompliance with the INF Treaty and other arms control agreements, and its actions in
Crimea and Ukraine made further progress difficult.111
The Trump Administration conducted an interagency review of New START to determine
whether it continues to serve U.S. national security interests, has indicated that this review would
inform the U.S. approach to the treaty’s extension.112 Administration officials addressed this
review during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 18,
2018.113 Both Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense David Trachtenberg emphasized how Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and its more
general approach to arms control undermined U.S. confidence in the arms control process. Under
Secretary Thomson noted that “the value of any arms control agreement is derived from our
treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations and avoiding actions that result in
mistrust and the potential for miscalculation.” She also said that Russia’s noncompliance “has
created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia’s commitment to arms
control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater
transparency and predictability.”
Several Senators questioned whether the Administration’s review would include a broader
assessment of whether the provisions in New START contributed to U.S. national security. They
focused on both the benefits of the limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and the value of the
transparency provided by the monitoring and verification regime. Deputy Under Secretary
Trachtenberg acknowledged that “the verification and monitoring and on-site inspection
provisions provide a level of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not just to
the United States but to our allies as well.” But he reiterated that “any decision on extending the

110 Bryan Bender, “Leaked Document: Putin Lobbied Trump on Arms Control,” Politico, August 7, 2018.
111 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Report, Washington, DC, February 2, 2018,
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT.PDF.
112 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts, hearing, 115th
Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018. See the prepared statement of Honorable David Trachtenberg, Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/091818_Trachtenberg_Testimony.pdf.
113 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Status of U.S.-Russia Arms Control Efforts,” hearing,
115th Cong., 2nd sess., September 18, 2018.
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treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START treaty
remains in our national security interests in light of overall Russian arms control behavior.”114
Senators held a similar conversation with Under Secretary Thompson and Deputy Under
Secretary Trachtenberg during a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May
15, 2019. In this hearing, the two witnesses addressed concerns about Russia’s development of
new kinds of strategic offensive arms that would fall outside the New START limits, Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons that are not covered by the Treaty, and China’s nuclear
modernization programs. At the same time, Under Secretary Thompson refused to speculate about
possible changes in Russian forces if the treaty were to expire, and Deputy Under Secretary
Trachtenberg declined to offer insights into how the United States might alter its nuclear forces or
how it might recover the data and information provided by New START’s verification regime if
the treaty were to expire.115
During this hearing, Undersecretary of State Andrea Thompson stated that the United States had
begun to hold discussions with Russia about its new kinds of strategic weapons at the technical
expert level. Russian officials have stated that some of its new strategic systems should not count
under New START because they do not meet the treaty’s definition of deployed missile launchers
or heavy bombers. At the same time, they have recognized that the new 10-warhead land-based
ballistic missile and the new Avangard missile-based hypersonic glide vehicle will count under
New START. Russia conducted its static exhibition of the Avangard for U.S. treaty inspectors in
November 2019 and, according to press reports, began to deploy the system in late December
2019.
Russia suggested that the two sides discuss its new types of weapons in a separate forum that
addresses concerns about strategic stability. It indicated that this forum could meet in the years
after the parties extended New START. Russia has not yet produced any of these weapons, and
may produce only a small number between 2021 and 2026. So even if these weapons were not
captured by New START, such discussions could occur before the weapons posed a significant
threat to the United States or its allies.
Russian officials also questioned whether they should extend New START. At a conference in
Washington, DC, in March 2019, Anatoly Antonov, Russia’s ambassador to the United States,
noted that Russia was not interested in expanding New START to include Russia’s new kinds of
strategic systems. He also said that Russia would be unwilling to discuss an extension until the
United States addressed Russia’s concerns with U.S. implementation of the treaty’s conversion
and elimination procedures.116
Russian officials, however, altered their position in 2020. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov both noted that Russia believed the treaty’s extension
would serve U.S. and Russian national security interests. They asserted that most of Russia’s new
types of weapons systems should not count under New START limits, but have stated that Russia
would participate in strategic stability talks to address these weapons after the parties extend New
START.117 Moreover, Russia set aside its insistence that the parties resolve its concerns with U.S.

114 Ibid.
115 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Future of Nuclear Arms Control, Hearing, 116th Cong., 1st
sess., May 15, 2019.
116 Russia has objected to the U.S. procedures that remove submarine launch tubes and heavy bombers from the treaty
limits because they are not irreversible.
117 See, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s interview with Interfax news agency, December 26,
2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3983633, and Foreign
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conversion and elimination procedures. In December 2019, President Putin stated that “Russia is
ready to extend the New START treaty immediately, before the year’s end and without any
preconditions.”118
Those who favored renegotiating, rather than extending, New START believed this would
provide the United States with the opportunity to press Russia to include limits on its new types
of long-range nuclear delivery systems and to accept limits on shorter-range, nonstrategic
delivery vehicles. But this approach envisioned a more complicated treaty that could take years to
complete. Therefore, it might not have provided a capable or timely response to the impending
expiration of New START. As noted above, Russia had been unwilling to accept limits on its
nonstrategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the past, and any attempt to convince Russia to do so in
the future could require the United States to agree to the elimination of its nuclear weapons
deployed in Europe. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov reiterated this point during an interview in
October 2020.119 Moreover, while limits on nonstrategic nuclear weapons have long been a U.S.
priority for the next arms control agreement, Russia has stated that the next agreement should
include limits on U.S. ballistic missile defense programs, limits on nonnuclear strategic-range
delivery systems (specifically, U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles), and limits on other nations’
(specifically British and French) nuclear forces. These demands would have impede an effort to
renegotiate or replace New START before its 2021 expiration, but could be included in a
framework for a new agreement to be negotiated after an extension of New START.
Some also questioned whether the United States should extend New START because they
believed it might eventually constrain the ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization program.120 While
the United States plans to recapitalize all three legs of its nuclear triad, each program is sized to
fit within the limits of New START. But, with growing concerns about the challenges the United
States might face from Russia and China, along with growing concerns about the scope of their
nuclear modernization programs, the United States might eventually seek to expand its forces
beyond the limits in New START. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review hints at this possibility by
noting that the plan for rebuilding the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad will include at least 12
Columbia-class submarines, thus leaving open the possibility of a larger program.
Nevertheless, based on the pace of modernization, New START may not interfere with the U.S.
modernization program, even after its extension through 2026. Most of the new U.S. systems are
not scheduled to enter the force until the late 2020s. Moreover, the new systems are to replace
existing, older systems, which would keep the U.S. force within the New START limits for many
years. Any expansion beyond those limits would not occur until later in the 2030s. On the other
hand, if New START had expired in 2021, the United States might have felt compelled to both
accelerate and expand its modernization programs if Russia also expanded its nuclear programs
when released from the constraints of the treaty.

Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions during Government Hour at the Federation Council,
Moscow, December 23, 2019, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/
id/3977671.
118 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin offers US to extend key nuclear pact right now,” Associated Press, December 5, 2019,
https://apnews.com/7b031de50f534ba181446080117f728f.
119 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s interview
with the Kommersant newspaper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.
120 For details, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, by
Amy F. Woolf.
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Negotiations During the Trump Administration
During the last year of the Trump Administration, officials from the United States and Russia met
in Vienna for discussions on arms control. Marshall Billingslea, who served as the Special
Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, noted, in a press conference after the talks in June 2020,
that the two sides had agreed to establish a number of working groups on strategic stability issues.
One such group, according to U.S. sources, would discuss “nuclear warheads and doctrine,” while
the Russian readout indicated the working group would just discuss doctrine.121 The two sides,
however, did not reach an agreement on whether to extend New START. At the time, Billingslea
stated the United States would only “contemplate an extension of that agreement but only under
select circumstances” that included Russia’s willingness to include its nonstrategic nuclear
weapons and new types of strategic nuclear weapons in an agreement and China’s willingness to
participate in the talks.122 Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov, noted that Russia
was ready to extend the treaty, but would not do so “at all costs, especially at the price they want
from us.”123
Before the June talks began, Billingslea noted that the United States invited China to the meeting;
China did not accept that invitation. He also noted that the United States would seek to convince
Russia to pressure China to join the talks.124 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov rejected
this approach, noting that “it is a sovereign right of any nation to join any talks.”125 He indicated
that he believes the June talks in Vienna should remain bilateral, and that they should focus on an
extension of New START.126
U.S. and Russian teams met in Vienna on August 17-18, 2020, where they again discussed the
possible extension of New START. According to Billingslea, the Trump Administration believed
the New START Treaty was “deeply flawed and that it is not particularly in the U.S. interest to
simply extend that treaty.” But he noted that the United States might be willing to extend the
treaty for a period of time if Russia agreed to sign “a politically binding agreement” that provided
a framework for a new treaty. He said the United States presented Russia with “a very detailed set
of proposals relating to our steadfast view that the next agreement must cover all warheads, all
nuclear warheads,” and that it would “need to have a better set of verification and transparency
measures.”127 In subsequent interviews, he indicated that the parties might verify limits on nuclear

121 Michael R. Gordon, “Trump Administration Weighs Extending New START Nuclear Treaty,” Wall Street Journal,
June 23, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-weighs-extending-new-start-nuclear-treaty-
11592952274.
122 Online Press Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, And
Lieutenant General Thomas A. Bussiere, Deputy Commander, United States Strategic Command, June 24, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/online+press+briefing+with+ambassador-marshall-billingslea-special-presidential-envoy-for-
arms-control-and-lieutenant-general-thomas-a-bussiere-deputy-commander-united-states-strategic-command/.
123 Maxim Blinov, “Moscow is ready for non-renewal of the START, Ryabkov said,” Ria Novosti, June 25, 2020,
https://ria.ru/20200625/1573461669.html.
124 Nick Wadhams, “U.S. and Russia to Meet June 22 on Curbing Nuclear Stockpiles,” Bloomberg News, June 8, 2020,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-08/u-s-and-russia-to-meet-in-vienna-june-22-for-nuclear-arms-
talks?sref=lGIy6Jfd
125 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Comments. The Gorchakov Fund. Moscow, May 22, 2020,
https://gorchakovfund.ru/en/news/view/deputy-foreign-minister-of-russian-sergey-ryabkov-took-part-in-the-online-
discussion-about-russia-u-/.
126 Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Negotiator Doubts China Will Join 3-Way Arms Accord Sought by Trump,” Wall
Street Journal, May 9, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-negotiator-doubts-china-will-join-3-way-arms-
accord-sought-by-trump-11591735208.
127 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms
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warheads by installing perimeter monitoring systems outside warhead production facilities to
count warheads as they entered and left the force. This type of system was used outside under the
INF and original START treaties to monitor the production of rocket motors for missiles, items
that are much larger and more obvious than the warheads that would be counted in this new
concept.
Billingslea did not offer any insights into whether, or how, the framework proposed by the United
States would accommodate Russia’s concerns about U.S. weapons programs, instead, he
indicated that the United States would only agree to extend New START if Russia agreed to the
U.S. proposals for the new framework. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov noted
that Russia had taken “American ideas into consideration,” and he stated that “Russia stands for
an extension of the START Treaty, but is not ready to pay any price for that.”128
In his statement following the August meeting, Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of including
China in the arms control negotiations, but indicated that the United States was “not suggesting
… that we would amend the New START Treaty to include China.” He did, however, indicate
that the new U.S.-Russian framework would have to include a path for China to join because “the
next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include China.”129
In mid-September 2020, Billingslea sought to increase the pressure on Russia to accept the U.S.
proposals. In an interview with CNN, he indicated that the “cost” of extending New START could
increase if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals from the August meeting. Specifically, he said
that the United States could include “a lot of the other bad behavior that the Russians are engaged
in around the world” in the nuclear negotiations.130 In addition, in an interview with the Russian
newspaper Kommersant in mid-September, he mentioned that if Russia did not accept the U.S.
proposals, the United States would not only allow New START to lapse but would also promptly
increase the numbers of warheads on its strategic forces by restoring warheads and missiles that
had been removed under New START.131
Press reports indicated that the United States believed Russia would accept the U.S. proposals for
a new agreement in exchange for New START extension because it believed that Russia was
“desperate” to extend New START.132 But Russian officials disputed this conclusion. Russia’s
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov responded to Billingslea’s interview in Kommersant by
noting that “there are no grounds for any kind of deal, in the form proposed by our colleagues in
Washington.” He stated that Russia preferred a full five-year extension of New START but would

Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-
and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/.
128 Michael R. Gordon, “Trump Administration Shifts Course on Russian Arms Talks, Easing Insistence China Join
Now,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-shifts-course-on-
russian-arms-control-talks-easing-insistence-china-join-11597781025?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1.
129 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for
Arms Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18,
2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-
control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/.
130 Kylie Atwood, “US seeks to pressure Russia into nuclear weapons treaty concessions before election,” CNN,
September 18, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treaty/index.html.
131 Elena Chernenko, “‘If Russia does not accept our offer before the elections, the entry price will go up,’”
Kommersant, September 21, 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4499882.
132 Kylie Atwood, “US seeks to pressure Russia into nuclear weapons treaty concessions before election,” CNN,
September 18, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/18/politics/us-russia-nuclear-treaty/index.html.
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be willing to extend the treaty for a shorter period. He concluded that “we will not pay the
American asking price for an extension even for five years, let alone for a shorter period.”133
Ryabkov again disputed the U.S. view of Russia’s interest in New START when he stressed that
“the extension of the START Treaty in itself is not critical, from our point of view.”134
Billingslea and Ryabkov met again, in Helsinki, on October 5, 2020. This meeting occurred on
short notice, reportedly after phone calls between President Trump and President Putin and a
meeting between the U.S. national security adviser, Robert O'Brien and a key Russian national
security advisor, Nikolai Patrushev, brought the two sides closer to an agreement.135 Billingslea
told the press that the talks had “yielded important progress” in developing a framework for a
politically binding agreement that would both impose a freeze on each side’s nuclear arsenal and
outline the parameters for a future treaty.136 The parties did not agree on the precise definitions
needed to implement the warhead freeze or the necessary verification procedures needed to
monitor it.137 U.S. officials also acknowledged that, while they had reached agreement on the
broad principles of a future treaty, they had deferred some of the more complicated issues to
future discussions. According to U.S. officials, the parties agreed that they would pair the
warhead freeze with an extension of New START, with both lasting the same amount of time. The
parties had not agreed on the precise length of time for this extension, although reports indicated
it would likely be in the range of one to two years.138
The Trump Administration reportedly pressed Russia to conclude this agreement quickly so that
the Presidents could meet to sign it before the U.S. election in November.139 A U.S. official
indicated that he believed President Putin supported the deal and that the two sides could
complete it in a week or two, particularly if Putin’s support “percolates down through their
system so that my counterpart hopefully will be authorized to negotiate.”140 Russian officials,
however, disputed this assessment. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the U.S.
conditions for the treaty’s extension are “absolutely unilateral and don’t take into account our

133 Elena Chernenko, “There is no good deal in sight on the basis the Americans are proposing,” Kommersant,
September 22, 2020, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4501227.
134 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s interview
with the Kommersant newspaper, October 22, 2020. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.
135 Vivian Salama and Mary Ilyushina, “Trump administration renews push for nuclear arms agreement with Russia
before election,” CNN, October 12, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/politics/us-russia-nuclear-agreement-push/
index.html.
136 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says,” Wall Street
Journal, October 5, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russia-move-toward-outline-of-nuclear-deal-
administration-official-says-11601933654.
137 David Lawler, “Trump aiming for nuclear arms deal with Russia before Election Day,” Axios, October 9, 2020.
https://www.axios.com/trump-russia-nuclear-arms-agreement-new-start-4fe42c37-83e0-4088-aa26-b37f8a07bf7f.html.
138 Paul Sonne, “Threat from nuclear weapons and missiles has grown since Trump entered office,” Washington Post,
October 13, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/nuclear-weapons-trump-arms-race/2020/10/12/
1f32e026-041b-11eb-8879-7663b816bfa5_story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=
EBB%2010.13.20.
139 Michael R. Gordon, “Trump Administration Pushes Russia for Arms Control Deal by Election,” Wall Street
Journal, October 9, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-pushes-russia-for-arms-control-deal-by-
election-11602275351?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2.
140 David Lawler, “Trump aiming for nuclear arms deal with Russia before Election Day,” Axios, October 9, 2020,
https://www.axios.com/trump-russia-nuclear-arms-agreement-new-start-4fe42c37-83e0-4088-aa26-b37f8a07bf7f.html.
See, also, Julian Borger, “Nuclear arms talks spiral into confusion as Russia rejects US ‘delusion,’” The Guardian,
October 13, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/13/us-russia-arms-control-talks-new-start-treaty.
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interests, or the experience of many decades when arms control has existed to mutual
satisfaction.141
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S. reports of a quick agreement “an illusion,” and
noted that significant differences remained between the U.S. and Russian positions. Responding
to comments made by Billingslea in mid-October, Ryabkov stated that the US proposal for a
freeze on nuclear arsenals “is unacceptable” because it does not address Russian concerns about
other issues affecting strategic stability. He noted that these include weapons in space, U.S.
ballistic missile defenses, and new U.S. long-range conventional weapons.142 He also noted that
Russia was unwilling to sign a formal agreement limiting shorter-range nuclear weapons until the
United States took steps to remove its nuclear weapons and their infrastructure from Europe.
Ryabkov also critiqued the U.S. insistence that the freeze include a monitoring regime that relied
on perimeter monitoring at warhead production facilities. He noted that perimeter control “is all
from the already distant foggy past. This is from a completely different era. There is no reason to
restore anything like that.”143 Ryabkov did note, however, that he parties could reach an
agreement quickly if the United States simply accepted the Russian proposals for the
agreement.144
On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START “unconditionally
for at least a year” while they continue talks on other arms control issues. Then-U.S. National
Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, dismissed this as a “non-starter” without the freeze on nuclear
arsenals, and suggested that Russia’s position could lead to “a costly arms race.” On October 20,
the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would accept a one-year freeze on nuclear
arsenals if the United States did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also indicated the
countries could “hold comprehensive bilateral talks” on “all factors that can influence strategic
stability” during the extension. The U.S. State Department responded by welcoming the Russian
statement and noting that the “United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a
verifiable agreement.” Russia, however, considers the requirement for verification to be an
unacceptable condition added to the freeze.145
On October 22, President Putin repeated his call to extend the treaty and freeze weapons for a
year, without preconditions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and NSA O’Brien both
acknowledged that the two sides remained at odds over whether to codify verification measures
before extending New START or to work them out in discussions following the extension.146 The

141 “US sees ‘important progress’ in Helsinki nuclear arms talks,” Associated Press, October 7, 2020,
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/10/06/us-sees-important-progress-in-helsinki-nuclear-arms-
talks/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2010.07.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-
%20Early%20Bird%20Brief.
142 “Russia Sees ‘No Prospects’ For Extending Nuclear Pact With U.S.,” RFE/RL, October 14, 2020,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-sees-no-prospects-for-extending-nuclear-pact-with-u-s-/30892261.html.
143 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s interview
with the Kommersant newspaper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/
cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4402033.
144 Vivian Salama and Mary Ilyushina, “Trump administration renews push for nuclear arms agreement with Russia
before election,” CNN, October 12, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/politics/us-russia-nuclear-agreement-push/
index.html.
145 John Hudson and Paul Sonne, “Trump administration rejects Putin’s offer on nuclear arms deal extension,”
Washington Post, October 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-rejects-
putins-offer-on-nuclear-arms-deal-extension/2020/10/16/48d01db8-0fe2-11eb-bfcf-b1893e2c51b4_story.html.
146 Lara Seligman and Bryan Bender, “Hopes dim for nuclear agreement with Russia before Election Day,” Politico,
October 23, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/23/nuclear-agreement-russia-election-day-431369.
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United States and Russia did not resolve these differences before the end of the Trump
Administration.
Negotiations During the Biden Administration
As noted above, the Biden Administration announced its plans to pursue a five-year extension of
new START on January 21, 2021, and completed the extension process by exchanging diplomatic
notes with Russia on February 3, 2021. In November 2020, Antony Blinken, then the prospective
Secretary of State, had suggested that President Biden would extend New START for five years
and then would seek to expand the arms control process to include other types of weapons and
additional countries.147 This agenda was evident in Secretary Blinken’s statement following the
February 3 extension. He noted that
President Biden has made clear that the New START Treaty extension is only the
beginning of our efforts to address 21st century security challenges. The United States will
use the time provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue with
the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms
control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons. We will also pursue arms control to reduce
the dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal. The United States is
committed to effective arms control that enhances stability, transparency and predictability
while reducing the risks of costly, dangerous arms races.148
Officials from the outgoing Trump Administration had suggested that the Biden Administration
continue to pursue the framework from late 2020 to lock in Russia’s commitment to impose a cap
on the size of its stockpile.149 Others, however, note that this framework should not be binding on
the Biden Administration because the two nations had not actually reached an agreement on what
would be limited or how to count the limited items.150 The Biden Administration reportedly
agreed with this position, with an official noting that they were aware the previous Administration
had exchanged proposals with Russia but had “not seen anything to suggest that at any point an
agreement on the terms that have been reported was in place.”151
President Biden discussed arms control and strategic stability issues with Russia’s President Putin
during a summit in Geneva on June 16, 2021. After the summit the two Presidents released a Joint
Statement on Strategic Stability, which outlined their agreement on a path forward for nuclear
arms control and risk reduction.152 Specifically, they agreed that the United States and Russia
would engage in “an integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue” that would “seek to lay the
groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” As noted above, the United

147 David Sanger, “The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the World,” New York
Times, November 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html.
148 Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, On the Extension of the New START Treaty with the Russian
Federation, U.S. Department of State, press statement, Washington, DC, February 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/on-
the-extension-of-the-new-start-treaty-with-the-russian-federation/.
149 Jon Kyl and Tim Morrison, “Biden faces big decisions on nuclear arms control—here’s what he should do,” Fox
News, December 19, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/nuclear-arms-control-biden-jon-kyl-tim-morrison.
150 Steven Pifer and James Acton, “Trying to Box in Biden on Arms Control,” Defense One, January 29, 2021,
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/01/trying-box-biden-arms-control/171730/.
151 John Hudson, “Biden administration to seek five-year extension on key nuclear arms treaty in first foray with
Russia,” Washington Post, January 21, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-russia-nuclear-
treaty-extension/2021/01/21/4667a11e-5b40-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.htm.
152 The White House, U.S.-Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability, Geneva, Switzerland, June 16,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/16/u-s-russia-presidential-joint-
statement-on-strategic-stability/.
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States and Russia had engaged in similar talks in the past, and both Presidents supported their
resumption prior to the summit. In his press briefing following the summit, President Biden noted
that this dialogue would allow diplomats “to work on a mechanism that can lead to control of new
and dangerous and sophisticated weapons that are coming on the scene now that reduce the times
of response, that raise the prospects of accidental war.”153
The United States and Russia held their first round of strategic stability talks on July 28, 2021.154
Prior to the discussions, a State Department official noted that the United States would seek to
clarify “what the United States sees as threats to the current security environment and into the
future” and reiterated that the United States believes that arms control should address all Russian
nuclear weapons. Russia’s deputy foreign minister Ryabkov indicated the Russia had shared its
prospective agenda for the talks with the United States and noted that the two countries “are just
at the very beginning of what I hope would be a sustainable process.”155
Both sides offered positive assessments after the talks began in July 2021. Ned Price, the State
Department spokesman, indicated that the discussions were “professional and substantive.” He
noted that “the U.S. delegation discussed U.S. policy priorities and the current security
environment, national perceptions of threats to strategic stability, prospects for new nuclear arms
control, and the format for future Strategic Stability Dialogue sessions.”156 Deputy Foreign
Minister Ryabkov also noted that he was pleased the talks, indicating that “we were able to
widely present positions to each other. He noted that the two sides have “significant differences in
views on important issues” but stated there were also issues where they found common ground.157
After the first round of talks, the two sides reported that they had agreed to hold a second plenery
session in September, but that they would “hold informal consultations in the interim, with the
aim of determining topics for expert working groups at the second plenary.”158 The second round
of talks occurred in September 2021. After that meeting, the delegations announced that they
would “form two interagency expert working groups.” The first group would focus on “Principles
and Objectives for Future Arms Control,” and the second would address “Capabilities and
Actions with Strategic Effects.”159
The United States and Russia held a third round of talks—chaired by Deputy Secretary of State
Wendy Sherman and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov—on January 10, 2022. This

153 The White House, Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference, Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/06/16/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-
conference-4/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=newsletter_axiosam&stream=top.
154 Mohammad Zargham and Simon Lewis, “Senior U.S. diplomat Sherman to lead arms control talks with Russia next
week,” Reuters, July 26, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/senior-us-diplomat-lead-talks-with-russia-next-week-
state-department-2021-07-23/
155 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S., Russian Officials to Hold Talks on Future Arms Control Agenda,” Wall Street Journal,
July 27, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russian-negotiators-to-hold-talks-on-arms-control-in-future-
11627423200.
156 Ibid.
157 “Ryabkov called a down-to-earth and business meeting with the United States on strategic stability,” Tass, July 28,
2021. https://tass.ru/politika/12009721.
158 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Participation in Strategic
Stability Dialogue with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, Washington, DC, July 28, 2021,
https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-participation-in-strategic-stability-dialogue-with-russian-deputy-
foreign-minister-sergey-ryabkov/.
159 U.S. Department of State , Joint Statement on the Outcomes of the U.S. – Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue in
Geneva on September 30, Media Note, Washington, DC, September 30, 2021, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-
on-the-outcomes-of-the-u-s-russia-strategic-stability-dialogue-in-geneva-on-september-30/.
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meeting occurred within the context of U.S. and NATO concerns about Russia’s military buildup
around the periphery of Ukraine. In a press briefing following the meeting, Secretary Sherman
noted that the United States was “open to discussing the future of certain missile systems in
Europe—along the lines of the now defunct INF Treaty between the U.S. and Russia.” She also
noted that the United States was “also open to discussing ways we can set reciprocal limits on the
size and scope of military exercises, and to improve transparency about those exercises, again on
a reciprocal basis.” While these issues do not relate directly to the prospects for negotiations on
an agreement that would follow New START, they do fit within the paradigm of discussions on
strategic stability.160
Prospects for Trilateral Arms Control
U.S. Views
In April 2019, President Trump directed his staff to develop proposals for expanded arms control
efforts that include China as a party, noting that the United States should “persuade China to join
an arms-control pact limiting or verifying its capabilities for the first time.”161 The Administration
has labeled this approach as “21st century arms control” and has argued that it would better serve
U.S. national security interests than would the extension of New START.162 Administration
officials did not offer many details about the U.S. goals for these discussions beyond calling for
an agreement that would limit all the nuclear weapons deployed by all three nations.163
Nevertheless, a senior State Department official maintained that it is critical to bring China into
the arms control process because “China has enjoyed having both Moscow and Washington
constrained by strategic arms control, and it is on track to at least double the size of its arsenal
over the next few years.”164 Trump Administration officials have also suggested that China should
want to join in the U.S.-Russian arms control process to solidify its status as a great power. As
Marshall Billingslea recently argued, “Great power status requires behaving with great power
responsibility.”165 A State Department official also recently suggested that the United States
would “mobilize world opinion against [China] if they don’t negotiate with us.”166

160 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Deputy Secretary Wendy R. Sherman on the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability
Dialogue, Geneva, Switzerland, January 10, 2022, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-deputy-secretary-wendy-r-
sherman-on-the-u-s-russia-strategic-stability-dialogue/.
161 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,”
Washington Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staff-to-
prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html?
utm_term=.3e294ce0a8e9.
162 Christopher A. Ford, U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,” U.S Department of State, Arms Control
and International Security Papers, Washington , DC, April 6, 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/
T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf.
163 Paul Sonne and John Hudson, “Trump orders staff to prepare arms-control push with Russia and China,”
Washington Post, April 25, 2019.
164 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Senior State Department Official on the New START, March 9, 2020,
https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-official-on-the-new-start/.
165 Michael R. Gordon, “Russian Negotiator Doubts China Will Join 3-Way Arms Accord Sought by Trump,” Wall
Street Journal, June 9, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-negotiator-doubts-china-will-join-3-way-arms-
accord-sought-by-trump-11591735208.
166 Paul Sonne and Robyn Dixon, “Trump envoy to begin nuclear talks with Russia as key treaty hangs in the balance,”
Washington Post, June 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-envoy-to-begin-nuclear-
talks-with-russia-as-key-treaty-hangs-in-the-balance/2020/06/09/ed38c196-a1df-11ea-9d96-c3f7c755fd6e_story.html.
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The Biden Administration has noted that it agrees that “it’s absolutely urgent for China to take on
greater responsibility, transparency and restraint for its nuclear weapons arsenal,” but noted that it
did not make sense to hold an extension of New START “hostage to China” because Russia’s
nuclear force is so much larger than China’s force.167
When the United States and Russia began discussions on strategic stability and the arms control
in July 2020, the Trump Administration insisted that the China participate in the negotiations.
However, as noted below, China has refused to join the talks and Russia has rejected the U.S.
suggestion that it pressure China to do so. When the United States and Russia met again in
August 2020, the United States seemed willing to begin discussions on a follow-on agreement to
New START without China at the table. In his statement following the meeting, Billingslea
reiterated the U.S. goal of including China in the arms control negotiations, but indicated that the
United States was “not suggesting … that we would amend the New START Treaty to include
China.” He did, however, indicate that the new U.S.-Russian framework would have to include a
path for China to join because “the next treaty will have to be multilateral, it will have to include
China.”168
Some analysts familiar with China’s views and the U.S.-Russian arms control process contend
that the United States would have difficulty negotiating an agreement with China with limits
similar to those mandated by the U.S.-Russian New START Treaty. As noted above, this treaty
permits the United States and Russia to deploy 1,550 warheads on their long-range nuclear
delivery systems; unclassified estimates contend that China deploys fewer than 150 warheads on
systems of a similar range.169 China might reject a treaty that codified this imbalance; the United
States and Russia would likely object to an agreement that either invited China to increase its
forces to U.S. and Russian levels or required the U.S. and Russia to reduce their forces to China’s
level. Consequently, some analysts have suggested that the United States seek a political
commitment from China with a pledge to refrain from increasing its nuclear forces while the
United States and Russia remain bound by the limits of New START.170 Alternatively, the United
States and China could also pursue bilateral talks where they could share information and
concerns about their respective nuclear forces. Such talks could open communications and build
confidence between the two governments, while also possibly identifying areas for further
cooperation.171

167 John Hudson, “Biden administration to seek five-year extension on key nuclear arms treaty in first foray with
Russia,” Washington Post, January 21, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-russia-nuclear-
treaty-extension/2021/01/21/4667a11e-5b40-11eb-aaad-93988621dd28_story.htm.
168 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for
Arms Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18,
2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-
control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/.
169 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 75, no.
4 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511.
170 Frank Rose, Bringing China into the fold on arms control and strategic stability issues, The Brookings Institute,
Washington, DC, September 25, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/09/25/bringing-china-
into-the-fold-on-arms-control-and-strategic-stability-issues/.
171 President Biden held a virtual meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on
November 15, 2021, where the President “underscored the importance of managing strategic risks. He noted the need
for common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict and to keep lines of communication
open.” During the meeting, the two leaders reportedly discussed the possibility of holding talks to achieve this goal.
The White House, Readout of President Biden’s Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic
of China, Washington, DC, November 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-
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Former State Department officials had also noted the difficulties with bringing China into the
arms control negotiations. Andrea Thompson, the former Under Secretary of State for
International Security and Arms Control, recently noted that she raised the issue repeatedly with
Chinese officials, and “they were not interested in having a discussion.”172 In December 2019,
then-Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford sent China an invitation to begin a two-way
“strategic security dialogue.” China has not responded to this invitation, but the White House
apparently believes these talks could serve as a “first step toward an agreement that will cover all
U.S., Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons.”173
Nevertheless, in May 2020 Marshall Billingslea suggested that the United States would be
unlikely to extend New START unless China joins the arms control process.174 He modified this
approach in August 2020, when he acknowledged that the United States would not seek to amend
New START to include China and that the United States would likely work with Russia to
negotiate a “politically binding” framework agreement on a successor agreement. But he also
argued that this framework should include a pathway for China to join the discussions and
continued to insist that a future treaty would have to include China.175 Billingslea has noted that
China is modernizing its nuclear forces, and that it plans to transform its military into a “first tier
force by 2050.” Therefore, he stated, a “three-way arms control agreement would provide the best
way to avoid an unpredictable three-way arms race.” He also argued that Russia should take the
initiative to bring China to the negotiating table.176 In response to questions about why China
should participate and what incentives the United States would offer, he noted that China wants to
“be afforded great power status” and that the United States is “certainly willing to afford them
that respect.” He also pointed out that, if China and Russia did not agree to pursue arms control
agreements that met the U.S. goals, they could face an arms race with the United States. He said
“we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion. If we have to, we will, but we sure would
like to avoid it.”177 Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford made a similar point in the paper
he published in April 2020, when he stated that “we are giving Moscow and Beijing incentives to
negotiate seriously with us by being prepared to compete ruthlessly and effectively with them—
and to win that competition—if they will not talk.”178

china/. See also David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “As China Speeds Up Nuclear Arms Race, the U.S. Wants to
Talk,” New York Times, November 28, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/28/us/politics/china-nuclear-arms-
race.html.
172 Julian Borger, “Trump to pull US out of third arms control deal,” The Guardian, May 24, 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/24/nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-arms-control-chaos.
173 Christopher A. Ford, U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,” U.S Department of State, Arms Control
and International Security Papers, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, p. 5, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2020/04/T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf.
174 William Gertz, “EXCLUSIVE: Envoy says China is key to new arms deal with Russia,” The Washington Times,
May 7, 2020, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/may/7/marshall-billingslea-says-new-start-fate-hangs-chi/.
175 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for
Arms Control And Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Vienna, August 18,
2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-
control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command/.
176 Hudson Institute, Special Presidential Envoy Marshall Billingslea on the Future of Nuclear Arms Control,
Transcript, Washington, DC, May 21, 2020, https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/
Transcript_Marshall%20Billingslea%20on%20the%20Future%20of%20Nuclear%20Arms%20Control.pdf.
177 Ibid.
178 Christopher A. Ford, U.S. Priorities for “Next-Generation Arms Control,” U.S Department of State, Arms Control
and International Security Papers, Washington, DC, April 6, 2020, p. 5, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2020/04/T-paper-series-1-Arms-Control-2.pdf.
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Russian Views
In his remarks at the Hudson Institute, Special Presidential Envoy Billingslea noted that Russia
has agreed with the U.S. suggestion that future arms control agreements include other nuclear-
armed nations. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted this point in comments he
made shortly before New START entered into force in 2011. At the time, he suggested that further
steps in arms control could not occur until the United States and Russia fulfilled their obligations
under New START and that, when they did occur, they would have to include other nuclear
armed nations.179 While most observers believed this was a reference to China, Russia, and the
Soviet Union before it, have long believed that arms control treaties should also limit British and
French nuclear forces because these can reach targets in Russia. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey
Ryabkov confirmed this view in June 2019, when he noted that Russia “sees the need to include
all countries” recognized as nuclear weapons states “in such a format.” This would mean
including “the UK and France, the closest allies of the United States, whose nuclear potentials are
an integral element in the overall military planning system, including within the framework of
NATO.”180
Neither France, with around 300 nuclear warheads, nor the United Kingdom, with a force of
around 200 warheads, has shown any interest in participating in the U.S.-Russian arms control
process. Hence, if the United States believes that a 21st century arms control treaty must include
China, and Russia believes it must also include the United Kingdom and France, the prospects of
negotiating such a treaty before New START expires, or even as a replacement after New START
is extended, seem extremely low.
At the same time, Russian officials have rejected the U.S. view that Russia must work to bring
China into the arms control process. In a statement issued in May 2020, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs stated Russia is “ready to support any multilateral initiatives that can enhance
international security and stability. However, this must be based on the free will of their potential
participants. No country may be coerced into them.”181 Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov also
rejected the suggestion that Russia bring China to the table, noting that “it is a sovereign right of
any nation to join any talks.”182
Chinese Views
China has long been opposed to participation in formal negotiations to limit or reduce nuclear
weapons. The PRC generally argues that the United States and Russia, as the nuclear powers with
by far the largest arsenals and the greatest capabilities, should take the first steps toward
meaningful arms control.183 Consistent with this past approach, China rejected the Trump
Administration’s April 2019 invitation to participate in arms control negotiations with Russia and
the United States. At the time, Geng Shuang, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

179 Richard Boudreaux, “Russia Says Next U.S. Arms Talks Must Include Others,” Wall Street Journal, January 14,
2011, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704307404576079953654840710.
180 “Ryabkov: meeting with Thompson gave a start to contacts of the Russian Federation and the United States on
strategic stability,” Tass, June 12, 2019, https://tass.ru/politika/6543135.
181 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria
Zakharova, Moscow, May 14, 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/
content/id/4122532#6.
182 Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. Comments. The Gorchakov Fund. Moscow, May 22, 2020.
183 Pan Zhengqiang, “China’s No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” in Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking, eds. Li
Bin and Tong Zhao, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016, p. 65.
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noted that China’s “nuclear force is always kept at the minimum level required by national
security, with an order-of-magnitude difference from that of the US and Russia.”184 PRC officials
reiterated this point on multiple occasions in 2019 and 2020.185 China has also rejected calls by
the United States and others in the international community for it to offer more transparency into
the size and structure of its nuclear forces, noting that these measures would only aid its
adversaries in planning attacks against those forces.186

Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

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184 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s
Regular Press Conference on May 6, 2019, Beijing, China, May 6, 2019, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1661163.shtml.
185 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on
January 22, 2020,” January 22, 2020, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
2511_665403/t1735126.shtml.
186 China has not rejected all forms of arms control, as it has participated in discussions in international arms control
fora, including the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. It is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Biological Weapons Convention, and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It has signed (although it has not yet
ratified) the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It also participates in the P-5 process (a reference to the Permanent five
members of the UN Security Council), where the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom
discuss measures to reduce nuclear risks within the context of the NPT. Maximilian Hoell, The P5 Process: Ten Years
On, European Leadership Network, Global Security Policy Brief, London, August 2019,
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/190925-P5-Process-Max-Hoell-1.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
R41219 · VERSION 82 · UPDATED
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